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# Peter of Auvergne and the Twofold Efficient Cause

WILLIAM DUNPHY

IN discussing the various ways Christian thinkers in the thirteenth century attempted to utilize Aristotle for their *intellectus fidei*, Etienne Gilson has often stressed the historical importance of their transformation of Aristotle's moving cause into a creating cause of existence. In a recent article, he pointed to Peter of Auvergne, a late thirteenth century Paris Master in the Faculty of Arts, as an important witness to this transformation.<sup>1</sup> The pertinent texts of Peter's *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* were recently published,<sup>2</sup> and I propose now to analyze these texts in their appropriate historical context.

Any commentator on the *Metaphysics*, aware of creation as a kind of causing, had an opportunity early to confront and compare this with Aristotle's cause of motion. In his discussion of the *aporiae* in Book Beta, Aristotle raises the questions whether Wisdom can be one science if it treats of four different causes, and whether, as the science of causes, it can be the science of Being since there are many beings to which not all the causes apply. For, he asks, how can there be for immobile things a cause of motion, or a final cause, which is the end or purpose of a motion?<sup>3</sup>

In his *Quaestiones* commentary on this passage, Peter of Auvergne asks first whether there is an efficient cause (*causa activa*) for unchangeable things (*in immobilibus*), and then whether there is a final cause for unchangeable things.<sup>4</sup>

At first sight, so runs the first objection, it might seem that there cannot be an efficient cause for immobile things, for an active or efficient cause is an originaive principle of motion, as Aristotle said:

<sup>1</sup> E. Gilson, "Notes pour l'histoire de la cause efficiente," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age*, 37 (1962), 7-31.

<sup>2</sup> W. Dunphy, "Two Texts of Peter of Auvergne on a Twofold Efficient Cause," *Mediaeval Studies*, 26 (1964), 287-301.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, 2 (996a 18-29).

<sup>4</sup> Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* III, 3-4 in *ed. cit.*, 289, 296.

*unde principium motus*. Obviously, then, there is no efficient cause for immobile things, for by definition they do not move.<sup>5</sup>

This argument is solidly Aristotelian, and seems to have been in his mind when he raised the *aporia*. Father Joseph Owens thinks Aristotle was talking about the Platonic Ideas and Mathematics and did not envisage a solution in which efficient and final causality would be found among immobile beings.<sup>6</sup>

The reason is clear if we recall Aristotle's notion of efficient causality. Whenever he lists the number of causes, this cause is always introduced in connection with change or motion. He refers to it as "the primary source of the change or coming-to-rest," "that from which motion takes its source," and "that from which the change or the resting from change first begins."<sup>7</sup>

According to Aristotle, the element common to his predecessors' treatment of this cause was their vagueness. Material and formal causes are not sufficient to account for generation and corruption, an originative source of motion is required.<sup>8</sup> In all substantial change, the moving or efficient cause produces or rather educes the generated form from the potentiality of an apt underlying substrate.<sup>9</sup>

In natural comings-to-be, the efficient cause is the same in form as what is produced, as when man begets man. In artificial productions, the efficient cause is the form in the mind of the artificer, the same, *qua* form, as the artifact, for the art of building is the form of the house.<sup>10</sup> This is proportionally true in accidental changes, with this difference, that the accidental form need not pre-exist actually in the efficient cause, though it must be there at least potentially.<sup>11</sup>

In his *On the Generation of Animals*, Aristotle makes the point that, generally speaking, when one thing is made from two, of which one is active and the other passive, the active agent does not exist in that which is made. We can see this in the case of movement, for the mover does not exist in that which is moved, but only the motion from the mover. In human generation, the female corresponds to the passive, while the male corresponds to the active principle men-

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* III, 3 ob. 1, 289.

<sup>6</sup> *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*, second ed. (Toronto, 1963), 223.

<sup>7</sup> *Physics* II, 3 (194b 23-195a 2); *Metaphysics* I, 3 (983a 26-32); *Posterior Analytics* II, 11 (94a 20-23).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* I, 10; *On Generation and Corruption* II, 9.

<sup>9</sup> *Metaphysics* VII, 8 (1035a 23-30).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 7 (1032a 24-b 14).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 9 (1034b 7-19).

tioned above. Thus the one thing produced from them, comes from them only in the sense in which a bed comes into being from the carpenter and the wood, or as health comes to be from the medical art and the patient. In these cases the active principle acts as that which imparts the motion and as the form. Thus the female does not produce offspring by herself, but needs a principle which begins the movement in the embryo, and defines the form it is to assume. So also, the carpenter does not exist in what he makes, but the shape and form of his product come from him to the material, by means of the motion he sets up. It is his hands that move the tools which in turn move the material. It is his art and his soul, in which is contained the form, that moves his hands or any other part of him with a motion of some definite kind, a motion that varies with the varying nature of the object to be made.<sup>12</sup>

We can note Aristotle's apparent lack of interest in handling any existential problems in connection with efficient causality. This cause is in some way a true cause of being since it is the cause, through motion, of the presence of a form in a certain matter, and form is the primary cause of the being of a thing in the sense in which being means the formal 'whatness' of a thing determining it to be such a kind and no other. The existence or non-existence of a thing is determined factually, whence scientific knowledge concerning its being can begin. This inquiry ends with the form as the primary cause of the thing's being.<sup>13</sup>

In the light of Aristotle's comparison between that activity properly called act, and that called movement as between the complete and the incomplete, we can note also the element of imperfection connected with Aristotle's efficient causality. Every movement is incomplete, for it is not true that at the same time a thing is walking and has walked, or is building and has been built, or is coming to be and has come to be, or is being moved and has been moved. And what is moved is different from what has been moved.<sup>14</sup>

Could Aristotle's separate substances, the ultimate causes of all being, exercise efficient causality with its implied imperfection? It seems not, for these first causes are pure forms, completely in act. Though causes of the being of all things through motion, they are not its efficient causes, for Aristotle not only tells us that they cause all being

<sup>12</sup> *On the Generation of Animals* I, 21-22.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* VII, 17 (1041a 10-20).

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, IX, 6 (1048b 23-35).

as loved (final causality), but, as finite and perfect forms with no actualities beyond themselves, they could not exercise efficient causality as understood by Aristotle.<sup>15</sup>

Obviously, such a causal principle could not serve as the full explanation of productive causality for thinkers aware of a creative production of the world *ex nihilo*. Thus Peter of Auvergne, in answering the question above, effects a transformation of Aristotle's efficient cause by adding to the principle which gives being to another through motion (*unde principium motus*) another efficient principle which gives being to another by a simple eduction or emanation (*unde principium esse*). Since he cites Avicenna as the source of this doctrine, let us look briefly at the way Avicenna develops it.

Following Aristotle, Avicenna found that four principles or causes were needed to account for physical bodies. The two causes that are intrinsic are matter and form. The two extrinsic principles are the efficient and final causes. The efficient cause impresses forms into their matters, thus constituting composite beings that act by their forms and suffer the actions of other forms through their matter. The final cause is that on account of which forms have been impressed into their matters.

On the level of Physics, the science of sensible bodies as subject to change, Avicenna made a fourfold division of efficient causes of motion (any passage from potency to act through a form in matter). The principle of motion is either an adviser, a helper, a preparer or a perfecter. The latter two are of interest here. The preparer merely disposes a matter for the advent of a form which comes to it from another, higher agent. The perfecter gives the substantial forms to natural beings, but is not itself a natural thing. Therefore its study does not belong principally or most truly to the physicist, except in so far as he declares it to be one of the efficient principles of a sensible composite. The perfecter is most truly a principle of motion for it is that which truly reduces potency to act.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The causality of the Aristotelian separate entities is a much controverted question. However, the text of *Metaphysics* XII, 7 (1072a 25) seems quite explicit on this point. For a concise summary of the controversy, cf. J. Owens, *op. cit.*, 467-69, notes 44-45.

<sup>16</sup> *Principium autem motus aut est praeparans aut est perficiens. Sed praeparans est id quod praeparat materiam, sicut motus spermatis in permutationibus praeparantibus. Et perficiens est id quod tribuit formam constituentem species naturales et est extra naturalia. Et non pertinet ad naturalem scire hoc verissime, sed tantum ut ponat quod hoc est praeparans et attribuens formam, et non dubitet quod praeparator sit principium motus et quod perficiens est etiam principium motus. Quia ipsum est vere quod trahit de potentia ad effectum. Sufficientia I, 10 (Venice, 1508), fol. 19ra.*

There is, however, another efficient principle, according to Avicenna, which is not related to natural bodies only but to all being (*esse*). This type of efficient cause always gives being to something else, separate from it.<sup>17</sup> He hints at this type of efficient cause again when, in discussing how nature is a principle of motion in substances by moving and preparing matter for a form, he warns that perhaps nature does not give this form but rather it comes from another which is better studied in another science than Physics.<sup>18</sup>

In his *First Philosophy*, Avicenna devotes the entire sixth treatise to discussions of the different types of causes and their definitions. In the first chapter he says that an efficient cause (*causa agens*) is that which gives being (*esse*) to a thing separate from itself. It does so in such a way that, according to its primary meaning, its essence is not the subject of that being which it gives, nor is its essence informed through that being, but the power (*potentia*) of that being is in it in a non-accidental way. An agent gives being, not simply in virtue of being an agent, but in virtue of being a certain type of agent, namely a creator who gives being without motion. The only being a natural agent, *qua* agent, gives to a thing is some one of the modes of motion. Thus, what gives being to natural things in this way is called the principle of motion. Substantial being, however, is given by natural agents only accidentally, in so far as they dispose a matter for the reception of its being. This being comes from that agent studied by the divine philosophers (metaphysicians), namely the creator of the world.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Sed cum accipitur principium efficiens non in respectu rerum naturalium tantum, sed respectu ipsius esse, erit communioris intentionis quam sit hoc. Et erit hoc quicquid est causa essendi sed remotum a sua essentia. *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Sed quomodo (natura) est principium motus in substantiis, hoc est sicut dispositio naturae cum movet et praeparat ad formam materiam cum apparatu quantitatis et qualitatis, .... Sed formam ei fortassis natura non attribuit, sed praeparet ei, et habet eam aliunde. Unde melius est ut cognoscatur hoc ex alia scientia. *Ibid.*, I, 5, fol. 17ra.

<sup>19</sup> Agens vero est causa quae acquirit rei esse discretum a seipso, scilicet ut [essentia] agentis secundum primam intentionem non sit subjectum illius esse quod acquiritur ab eo nec informetur per illud, sed ita ut in seipso sit potentia illius esse non accidentaliter, et sic etiam oportet ut illud esse non sit ab ipso inquantum est ipse agens. Sed si fuerit, fit secundum alium respectum, scilicet quoniam divini philosophi non intelligunt, per agentem principium motionis tantum, sicut intelligunt naturales, sed principium essendi et datorem ejus, sicut creator mundi. Causa vero agens naturalis non acquirit esse rei nisi motionem aliquam ex modis motionum: igitur acquirens esse [in] naturalibus est principium motus. *De Philosophia Prima* VI, 1 (Venice, 1508), fol. 91rb. Material in square brackets in this and following texts from this work are corrections from a thirteenth century manuscript, Paris *BN Lat.* 16096, fol. 39.

This distinction between kinds of agent causality, reminiscent of the distinction above between preparing and perfecting efficient causes, is used by Avicenna to solve the question of the simultaneity of cause and effect. Some, seeing that the son remains after the death of his father, the artifact after the artist, and heat after fire, thought that the effect, once caused, had no more need of its causes. But, Avicenna insists, every true cause is simultaneous with its effect. The above-mentioned causes (father, artist, fire) are not true causes of the being and existence of the son, artifact and heat. They cause motion only, disposing in this way the respective matters for the coming of the forms. The cause of this is the giver of forms (*occasio donatrix formarum* and *occasio separata efficiens naturas*). True or essential causes, those causes because of which the thing has actual being, are simultaneous with their effects.<sup>20</sup>

In Avicenna's view, the doctor does not give health to the patient as *causa perficiens*, but rather as *causa praeeparans*. The giver of health is none other than that principle which is more excellent than health, and which gives to matter all its forms.<sup>21</sup> For Avicenna, this is the separate Intelligence of the last and lowest sphere, the agent Intellect for all humanity, who ceaselessly radiates all possible forms which are then automatically received in suitably disposed matter.

Following this division of efficient causality between a principle of motion and a principle of being, Avicenna clearly distinguishes between generation and creation. While all efficient causes, *qua* efficient causes, give being to something other than themselves, sometimes this being is received after a relative non-being (the privation of this or that being), and sometimes after absolute non-being. The former involves a temporally pre-existing matter and is called generation, the latter involves nothing temporally pre-existent and is called creation—a simple giving of being to a thing which previously had no being whatsoever. Creation is the most worthy of all the ways of giving being, and does not have to be immediate. That creature whose being

<sup>20</sup> After speaking of the partial, preparatory causes, Avicenna says of the essential causes that ... *hae causae sunt separatae*, and *Igitur verae causa simul sunt cum suis causatis*. They are those causes ... *propter quas est esse rei in effectu*, and *necesse est ut sint cum ea, nec precedant in esse sic ut possint removeri remanente causato*. *Ibid.*, VI, 2, fol. 92ra.

<sup>21</sup> *Medicus enim non dat sanitatem sed praeeparat ad eam materiam et instrumentum*. *Non enim attribuit sanitatem nisi principium quod est excellentius sanitate, et hoc est quod dat materiae omnes suas formas, cujus essentia est nobilior quam materia*. *Ibid.*, IX, 3, fol. 103v b.

is directly and immediately from the First Necessary (and thus uncaused) Being, is the most noble of all. But those creatures whose being follows absolute non-being only mediately from the First, are nonetheless created.<sup>22</sup>

This transformation by Avicenna of efficient causality beyond the Aristotelian moving cause was challenged by another Moslem, known to the Latins as Averroes. This great commentator on the Aristotelian *corpus* bitterly criticized this Avicennian innovation, for he saw no need of any efficient cause beyond an originative source of motion to account for the production of an effect. For Averroes, the agent initiates a motion which causes a form to be actualized from the potentiality of matter. There is no creation or giving of that form by a so-called efficient cause.

One of the places he develops this criticism is a commentary on Aristotle's rejection of the Platonic Ideas as a factor in generation. For Aristotle, according to Averroes' account, what has the form of that which is to come-to-be suffices for the latter's generation. After discussing the difficulties which many thinkers encountered in understanding Aristotle on this, Averroes places them in three categories. One extreme group held that everything was in everything (*quodlibet est in quolibet*), although in a state of latency, so that generation is merely the issue of one thing from another. The agent in this case is merely a mover, extracting and distinguishing these "generated" things one from another. A second extreme group held that the agent created the whole being anew from nothing, so that it had no need for matter in which to act.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> That cause is dignior in causalitate, which absolute prohibet rem non esse. Haec igitur est causa quae dat rei esse [perfectum]. Et haec est intentio quae apud sapientes vocatur creatio, quod est dare rei esse post non esse absolute. *Ibid.*, VI, 2, fol. 92ra. A thing which comes into being, receives esse ejus ... post non absolute, vel esse ejus est post non, non absolute, sed secundum privationem privationis oppositae propriae in materia essentiae, sicut iam nosti. Si autem fuerit esse ejus post non [esse] absolute, tunc adventus ejus a causa erit creatio, et haec est dignior omnibus modis dandi esse, quia privatio iam remota est omnino, et inducitur esse. *Ibid.* We find therefore, quod ex his est quoddam esse quod est ex causa semper sine materia, et quoddam quod est ex materia, et quoddam quod est ex aliquo mediante et quodam sine medio. Convenit autem ut omne quod non est ex materia praejacente, vocemus non generatum, sed creatum, et ut ex omnibus creatis id vocemus nobilius quod est ex prima causa nulla mediante... *Ibid.*, fol. 92r b.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Averroes, *In Metaph.* XII, 3 t.c. 18 (Venice, 1574), vol. VIII, fol. 303E-305I. He describes the first two groups as follows: ... quidam eorum sunt dicentes latitationem, et contrarii eorum sunt dicentes creationem. Dicentes enim latitationem dicunt quod quodlibet est in quolibet, et quod generatio est exitus rerum ab invicem, et quod

The group between these two extremes is further sub-divisible into three sections. Each of these held that generation is a transmutation in substance, and that nothing is generated from nothing. They held, further, that a subject of generation is required, from which the generated thing comes-to-be through the agency of something alike in form. They differed, however, in that some were of the opinion that the agent created the form and placed it in the matter. Of these, some like Avicenna denied this agent to be in matter in any way, calling it the *dator formarum*. Others said that that agent was found in two ways, either separated or not separated from matter. But the third opinion, that of Aristotle, held that the agent makes only the composite of matter and form. It does so by moving matter and transmuting it until there is educed from it into act that form which before was there only potentially.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, continues Averroes, Aristotle held firmly that the agent does not produce (*non invenit*) a form, creating it, since in that case something would have come from nothing. Rather, the form is not generated or corrupted, except accidentally in the generation or corruption of the composite. Averroes believed that if a man conserved these fundamental truths of Aristotle, he would not fall into the above-mentioned errors. He felt that some (including Avicenna), misled by their imagination about the creation of forms, posited a "giver of forms." This notion of creation has also led theologians of the three religions to hold that something comes-to-be from nothing.<sup>25</sup>

agens non est nisi extrahens et distinguens eas ab invicem. Quod autem agens apud istos non est nisi movens manifestum est. Dicentes autem creationem dicunt quod agens creat totum ens de novo ex nihilo, quod non habet necesse ad hoc ut sit materia in quam agat, sed creat totum. *Ibid.*, 304E-F. Averroes identifies the latter opinion in the next sentence as that of the (Loquentes) in nostra lege et lege Christianorum.

<sup>24</sup> Opiniones autem mediae inter istas duas videtur reduci in duas: quarum una dividitur in duas, et tres. Ista autem tres conveniunt in hoc, quod ponunt generationem esse transmutationem in substantia, et quod nihil generatur ex nihilo, scilicet quod necessarium est in generatione subjectum esse, et quod generatum non sit nisi ab eo quod est sui generis in forma. Una autem istarum opinionum est quod agens creat formam, et ponit eam in materia. Et istorum, quidem dicunt quod illud agens non est in materia omnino, et vocant ipsum datorem formarum, et Avicennae est de illis. Quidam dicunt quod illud agens invenitur duobus modis, aut abstractum per materia, aut non. Et haec est sententia Themistii et forte Alpharabii. ... Tertia autem est opinio Aristotelis, et est quod agens non facit nisi compositum ex materia et forma. Et hoc fit movendo materiam et transmutando eam, donec exeat de eo illud quod est de potentia in ea ad illam formam in actu. *Ibid.*, 304-F-I.

<sup>25</sup> Aristoteles autem sustentatur super hoc, scilicet quod agens non invenit formam, creando eam, quoniam si creasset eam, tunc aliquid fieret ex nihilo. Et ideo forma

Thus Averroes, anxious to purge philosophy of any elements that had a religious source, criticized Avicenna for introducing a creative efficient cause that operates without motion. However, the notion of creation became an integral part of the philosophy of many medieval thinkers, including Peter of Auvergne's.

The first argument he lists in his question about an efficient cause (*causa activa*) for immobile beings stresses the Aristotelian notion of it as an originative source of motion. Since by definition there is no motion in immobile things, neither will there be any source of motion for them. Now this originative source of motion is the same thing as the active cause mentioned in the question. Therefore, there is no active cause for immobiles.<sup>26</sup>

The second objection, once more relying on the authority of Aristotle, points out the relationship existing between agent and patient as between something active and something passive. Now in those things where we do not find a passive principle, neither will we find an active one. But there is no passive principle in immobile beings, for if there were, these beings would have to be mobile and subject to motion. Wherefore, neither will there be an active principle or cause in them.<sup>27</sup>

There are two arguments to the contrary, based on the nature of demonstration. Since in demonstration we demonstrate a passion or attribute to belong to some subject, and since the middle term we use to do this is said to be a cause of the demonstration, if we find that this cause is an efficient cause in demonstrations about immobiles, then we can say that there is an efficient cause for them. By a process of elimination, the argument shows that the middle term in such demonstrations cannot be the formal cause of the demonstrated passion, for one is not the essence of the other, one being a substance, the other an accident. Neither can it be the material or final cause, since matter and ends are not found in immobiles, which leaves only the efficient cause. The same is seen to be the case where one accident is the cause of demonstrating another, for it is neither the end nor the form of the other. If we say it is a cause, it can be only the efficient cause.<sup>28</sup>

apud ipsum non habet generationem neque corruptionem, nisi accidentaliter, scilicet, per generationem et corruptionem compositi. Et cum homo conservaverit hoc fundamentum, nullus error accidet ei. Imaginatio ergo super creationes formarum induxit homines dicere formas esse et datorem esse formarum: et induxit Loquentes trium legum, quae hodie quidem sunt, dicere aliquid fieri ex nihilo. *Ibid.*, 305E-F.

<sup>26</sup> Peter of Auvergne, *ed. cit.*, 289.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 290.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

Since, as we have seen, immobile beings for Aristotle were neither efficient causes nor caused efficiently, Peter cannot reply affirmatively to the question taking *causa activa* in a purely Aristotelian sense. At this point, he turns to Avicenna and a twofold efficient cause. For Avicenna, Peter tells us, an efficient principle or cause is that through which being is acquired by another separate from itself, so that the cause, according to its very meaning, is not the recipient of that being. Since it is a property of form to give being, the efficient cause can be likened to form in that respect. However, since form, according to its essence, is conjoined to that to which it gives being, the efficient differs from a formal cause for it gives being to another separate from itself.<sup>29</sup>

So far, Peter could still be said to be faithful to Aristotle, for the Aristotelian efficient cause does cause being. But now, with Avicenna, he clearly transforms its meaning. Something, he continues, is the principle of giving being to another through motion, as we see happen in natural things, and universally in all transmutations. But something is also the principle of giving being to another through a simple eduction and emanation, as happens in immobile and immaterial things. The first type of efficient cause, which acts only by means of motion, is found in natural things and is called that from which comes the beginning of motion (*unde principium motus*). The second type of efficient cause, however, which is found in mathematical and divine things, is called the originative source of being (*unde principium esse*).<sup>30</sup>

Peter gives a rational justification for positing this latter type of efficient cause, based on the relation of cause and effect, namely, that for every *per se* effect there must be a *per se* cause. Now the form which is found at the termination of the motion of generation is something caused *per se*. What then is its *per se* cause? Not the cause whence comes the motion of generation, for it is the *per se* cause of the motion only, causing the form only accidentally. Therefore, concludes Peter, beyond the efficient cause which is the source of motion, we must posit an active cause which is the source of being.<sup>31</sup>

Having made these preliminary remarks, Peter answers the question. If you ask whether there is an active cause for immobile beings, the answer will be yes if we refer to active cause which is the source of

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 290-91.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 291-92.

being. Now, since the term "immobiles" refers both to those things which are separate from matter and motion in concept but not in being, and those which are separate from matter and motion both in concept and in being, he considers each in turn.

In the first type, namely mathematical entities, we do find an active cause which is a source of being, for we find there a demonstration in which the middle term is neither a formal, material nor final cause, but an efficient cause. His reasons here agree with those of the first argument in *oppositum* above. In the second type of immobiles, those completely separate from matter and motion, e.g. the separated substances, we also find that type of active cause which is a source of being. Peter assumes here the reason for this, for he says "if all immaterial substances proceed from one first immaterial substance, it is necessary that this one be related to them as efficient cause, and on whom they all depend for their being."<sup>32</sup>

But can the other kind of efficient cause, the *unde principium motus*, be found in either type of immobiles? Not in mathematical entities, for they have neither motion nor motive power. However, in immaterial substances we do find a power of moving, not immobiles, but mobile and sensible things. And so, Peter says, Aristotle posited all or certain of the immaterial substances as movers of these material and sensible things.<sup>33</sup>

But does he attribute to Aristotle a doctrine of efficient causality in the second sense of cause of being? The answer to this question is important for determining the attitude of Peter, a Christian philosophizing, towards Aristotle, the Philosopher *par excellence*. The same question asked of other thirteenth century thinkers is of obvious importance for determining a crucial aspect of the spirit of the age. Up to that point when the *Liber de Causis* was shown not to be the work of Aristotle, in whole or in part, Christian commentators on Aristotle, such as Roger Bacon and Albert the Great, were spared this difficulty in accommodating Aristotle to a doctrine of creation. However, after the translation by William of Moerbeke in 1268 of Proclus' *Elementatio Theologica* enabled St. Thomas to discard the hypothesis of the Aristotelian parentage of the *De Causis*, Christian thinkers could no longer assume as Aristotelian the thesis that *prima rerum creatarum est esse*.

In the text we are analyzing here, Peter concludes by saying that Aristotle intended that there be no motion among the immobiles since

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 292-93.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

there was no efficient causa (*causa activa*) in the sense of an *unde principium motus*, but only as a *principium esse*.<sup>34</sup> In another place where he asks whether something can come-to-be from absolute non-being, Peter begins his answer by affirming that every being whatsoever proceeds from one First Principle. He says that Aristotle and Averroes "touched on" this in Book Two of the *Metaphysics* where the latter writes that the First Principle which is most true and the greatest in being, is the cause of the being and truth in all other beings.<sup>35</sup> The second proposition on which he bases his answer is drawn from the *Liber de Causis* and is stated by Peter as that God is of infinite power not only in moving, but also in acting and energy. An agent of infinite power of this sort could produce its effect from that which is infinitely distant from itself, namely, absolute non-being. This production of the whole substance of a being is not the kind of production studied by the naturalist, who is concerned only with productions through motion, but is rather that kind of production which "some of the philosophers have called creation."<sup>36</sup> While Peter does not specifically place Aristotle among these philosophers, he does nothing to make his readers think otherwise when he notes that Aristotle always qualifies his statements that "from nothing, nothing comes-to-be" with the phrase "by nature."<sup>37</sup>

This same readiness to give the impression that Aristotle and the notion of creation are not necessarily incompatible (a readiness which he shares with St. Thomas) can be observed in another text where, apparently, he is seeking to explain why Aristotle always refers to the

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> This first proposition is actually from Proclus' *Elementatio Theologica*, ed. C. Van-steenkiste, *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*, 13 (1951), 269. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, 1 (993b 23-30); Averroes, *In Metaph.* II, 1, *t.c.* 4, *ed. cit.*, 30 C. Peter's text is from his Book VII, 19 and can be found in my "The Similarity Between Certain Questions of Peter of Auvergne's *Commentary on the Metaphysics* and the Anonymous *Commentary on the Physics* Attributed to Siger of Brabant," *Mediaeval Studies*, 15 (1953), 163-166.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 165-66.

<sup>37</sup> [Quia vero] naturalis non considerat aliquam factionem nisi quae est per motum et transmutationem, et omnis talis fit ex aliquo ente aut vel potentia, ideo naturalis accipit pro principio 'ex nihilo nihil fieri.' Unde Philosophus, quandocumque dicit quod 'ex nihilo nihil fit,' adjungit 'aliquid de natura.' Unde et primo *Physicorum* dicit quod omnes qui dicunt de natura concedunt 'ex nihilo nihil fieri,' VII, 19 (P., fol. 236va). This and the following textual references to Peter that have not as yet been published are based on a Paris manuscript, P (BN Lat. 16158) that served as a base for my edition from the seven extant manuscripts of this work. Where necessary, corrected readings within square brackets are from a Vatican manuscript, O (Ottobonianus 1145).

efficient cause as *unde principium motus*. This way of referring to the efficient cause (*causa agens*) is more manifest to us, because the cause of motion is more manifest than the cause of being. Hence we use the term principally (*per prius*) for the *principium motus* rather than for the *principium esse*.<sup>38</sup>

Peter finds this twofold division of efficient cause helpful in solving many other problems in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*. One such problem arose from the same Aristotelian *aporia* mentioned above, namely, can there be any final cause among immobiles since an end is always the terminus of some action and all action implies motion. The solution lies in emphasizing the reciprocal relationship existing between efficient and final causes, for the end causes the agent to be a cause, and the agent causes the end to be. Agent and end are thus always proportioned to one another. Here Peter repeats the twofold division of efficient causes. To each kind there will correspond a proportioned end. Thus, there will be an end which is a terminus of motion, and an end which is a terminus in being. The latter kind of final causes are found among immobiles. But, as we saw above, the cause of motion is more manifest to us than the cause of being and so we give the name of efficient cause first and foremost to the cause of motion. The same holds true for their proportionate ends, and we speak of a final cause primarily in terms of a *terminus motus* rather than as a *terminus in esse*.<sup>39</sup>

Peter concludes his discussion of the Aristotelian *aporia* in the question, "Whether the consideration of all the causes belongs to one science."<sup>40</sup> After showing how, on Aristotelian principles, the unity proper to the subject of a science can be found in the science of all beings in so far as they are related by attributional unity, he shows how this is true also of the science that treats of all the causes. For considered according to their proper notion of causality, all causes have a relationship by attribution to one, namely the final cause, the cause of causes. In this way, the science which treats primarily of the end, or the good, as does *metaphysics*, has the greatest claim to be the science which treats all the causes according to their very meaning as causes.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>38</sup> III, 4, *ed. cit.*, 298-99.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 296-99.

<sup>40</sup> *Utrum consideratio omnium causarum pertineat ad scientiam unam?* III, 5, P, fol. 183ra-vb; O, fol. 10vb-11ra.

<sup>41</sup> *Sed omnium generum causarum est aliquo modo ratio una, scilicet ratio entis.... Quare omnes causae pertinet ad considerationem unius scientiae, et maxime illius quae*

However, considering causes according to the determinate causality proper to each, the situation is more complicated. Following this way, it is clear that the natural philosopher does study all four causes, form, matter, efficient and final.<sup>42</sup> In mathematics, while there is no proper final or material causality, and no efficient causality in the sense of being the source of motion, there is formal causality and an efficient cause in the sense of *causa activa unde principium esse*.<sup>43</sup>

In metaphysics, treating as it does of being separate from matter and motion both in concept and in being, there will be obviously no treatment of matter under its proper causality, which is as subject of motion. However, following the lead of Averroes,<sup>44</sup> Peter says it can treat of matter under the aspect of substance. There is no question concerning its treating formal and final causes, and he had shown earlier how metaphysics deals with both kinds of efficient causes. Thus this science treats of only three causes according to their proper and determinate causalities.<sup>45</sup>

Peter again makes use of this twofold division of efficient causes in an interesting discussion of the role of the Platonic Ideas. On the hypothesis of their existence, could they be the efficient causes of singular things?<sup>46</sup> Considering everything Plato said about them (apparently relying on the testimony of Aristotle), Peter feels that you cannot give a simple yes or no answer. In some respects they seem to function as efficient causes, and in some respects they seem to function as formal causes.

considerat ens..... Sed omnes causae attributionem habent ... ad aliquod unum, scilicet ad finem, a quo venit ratio causalitatis in omnes alias.... Et ideo consideratio causarum secundum hoc quod causae sunt, non solum secundum quod entia, pertinet ad scientiam unam, et ad illam principaliter quod considerat causalitatem finis.... Haec autem est ista scientia. *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> Sed naturalis sunt omnes quatuor causae, forma, materia, efficiens et finis. The argument *in oppositum* had specified this: Ens enim naturale, quod considerat naturalis, habet omnes causas: [materiam], quae est subjectum motus; formalem, quae acquiritur per motum; efficientem etiam, quae est [unde] principium motus; iterum etiam et finem, quia finis proprie est ubi est motus, cum sit terminus motus. *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> In mathematicis autem invenitur forma sed non agens unde principium motus, licet sit ibi agens unde principium esse.... In mathematicis igitur solum secundum propriam rationem considerantur duo generum [causarum], causa scilicet formalis et causa activa unde principium esse. *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Averroes, *In Metaph.* VII, 1 t.c. 9 ed. cit., fol. 159 M 160 A.

<sup>45</sup> Sed est ibi reperire tria genera causarum secundum causalitates proprias, scilicet causam activam, formalem et finalem. *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> See the edited text below.

Peter begins his answer by listing four positions of Plato on the ideas: (1) as subsistent through themselves, and so, singular; (2) as species, through participation of which all of a definite kind are said to be such a kind, and so the ideas are said to be first in a genus and cause of all in that genus; (3) as forms and the very intelligibility (*quod quid erat esse*) of the individuals contained under them; (4) as universals in act, predicable of all contained under them.<sup>47</sup>

After indicating an apparent contradiction between the first and fourth positions, Peter answers the question. Taking the ideas as subsistent and firsts, he concludes they must be causes of some kind, for the first in any genus is the cause of all in that genus. He eliminates material and formal causality on the grounds that neither matter nor form (of matter) can be subsistent *per se*. Distinguishing between ends that are *intra*, scarcely distinguishable from the form of the thing that comes-to-be, and ends that are *extra*, coinciding in some way with the efficient cause of the thing that comes-to-be, Peter rules out final causality *intra*. The ideas as subsistent *per se*, then, must be efficient causes and in some way final causes *extra*, for there are no other kind of causes than these.<sup>48</sup>

Taking the ideas as firsts, he follows the same pattern of elimination, ending up with the ideas as active or efficient causes from which all that come after them derive their power. Next Peter introduces the Avicennian distinction between efficient causes. There is one that is the originating principle of being and the formal nature of the thing. There is another kind that is the originating principle of motion and transmutation. To make his meaning clear, Peter contrasts these two kinds of efficient causes by contrasting the way they are considered by the philosopher of nature and the metaphysician. Thus the ideas, on the hypothesis of their existence, would be efficient causes only in the sense of *unde principium esse*, and not as *unde principium motus*.<sup>49</sup>

It is interesting to note here again that Peter seems anxious not to deny that Aristotle, and for that matter Averroes, were ignorant of this twofold efficient causality. In their critique of Plato's position, as reported by Aristotle, that the ideas were efficient causes of singulars, both Aristotle and Averroes bring out the implicit contradiction of the ideas, as immaterial and immobile, being the efficient

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 18-19.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 19-20.

causes of anything, since they understand efficient causality as always involving matter and motion, the *unde principium motus*. Peter simply reports this position as denying ideas to be efficient causes only in the sense of *unde principium motus*. Then, he adds, it remains that if the ideas are held to be efficient causes, it must be in the sense of *unde principium esse*.<sup>50</sup>

Peter concludes his answer to the question by showing that the ideas, taken in the third and fourth ways as forms and universals, could not be the efficient causes of singulars.

How does Peter compare with other thirteenth century thinkers in his confrontation of the Aristotelian treatment of the four causes (especially the efficient) with a creational view of the origin of beings? While most of these men were content to speak of a *causa efficiens seu movens*, Peter crystalized the twofold division of efficient causes into a pair of compact formulas, *unde principium motus* and *unde principium esse*, modeled after the Aristotelian formula. Peter also made more use of this division in resolving specific problems arising from thirteenth century interpretations of Aristotelian texts. A forthcoming article will deal with this point, with special emphasis on St. Albert.

## TEXT

The question edited below, which appears in only two of the seven extant manuscripts of Peter's *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, is question 24 of Book I in the Paris manuscript, *Bibl. Mazarine* 3481 [M], fol. 140v b-141v a, and question 25 in the Vienna manuscript, *Nationalbibl.* 2330 [A], fol. 63v b-64r a. Manuscript M, which is of the early fourteenth century, appears to be another redaction of this work. Manuscript A, of later origin, not only follows M in the order of questions for the first two books of the *Metaphysics* (which is not that of the other five manuscripts), but also has questions not in any of the others. For example, A has twenty questions on the whole of Book X, and a series of seven added questions on Book XII. Marginal notations by the scribe indicate the latter are from "an earlier reportation." I have chosen M as the base for this edition, with occasional corrections from A, especially where M has obvious omissions due to *homoioleuton*.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 19-20.

PETRUS DE ALVERNIA, *QUAESTIONES IN METAPHYSICAM* I, 24.

[SI IDEAE SINT, UTRUM HABEANT RATIONEM PRINCIPII ACTIVI IPSORUM SINGULARIUM?]

Consequenter, quaeritur circa illam partem ibi, *Breviter quidem igitur*,<sup>1</sup> etc.,<sup>2</sup> in qua recolligit dicta antiquorum quantum ad quatuor genera causarum, primo ostendens quod non potest inveniri quintum genus principii<sup>3</sup> aliud<sup>4</sup> ab hiis quae dicta sunt, et specialiter circa quoddam dictum Platonis in ista lectione de ideis. Posuit enim eas<sup>5</sup> esse principia activa ipsorum singularium.<sup>6</sup> Et ideo,<sup>7</sup> quaeritur<sup>8</sup> si ideae sint, utrum<sup>9</sup> habeant rationem principii activi ipsorum singularium.

[1] Videtur quod non, quia quod est actus et forma alicujus non est activum principium ipsius,<sup>10</sup> quia nihil educit seipsum de potentia ad actum. Sed Plato posuit ideam<sup>11</sup> esse actus et formas<sup>12</sup> ipsorum singularium, sicut patet septimo hujus.<sup>13</sup> Quare non habuit eas ponere principium activum singularium. Ideae, si sint, non sunt activum principium singularium.<sup>14</sup>

[2] Item, nullum universale unde universale est causa singularium, quia causa activa universaliter debet proportionari effectui. Sed universale unde universale non est proportionatum singulari,<sup>15</sup> sicut nec commune particulari. Immo rationes istorum<sup>16</sup> distinctae et diversae sunt. Inter diversa autem, non cadit<sup>17</sup> proportio, quia proportio est unus modus identitatis, sicut patet quinto *Metaphysicae*.<sup>18</sup> Sed Plato posuit illas ideae universales esse et non<sup>19</sup> singulares. Quare, si essent, non essent causae<sup>20</sup> activae singularium.

[3] Item, quae sunt in intellectu non sunt activa principia singularium, quia effectus realis requirit causam realem. Sed universalis in<sup>21</sup> intellectu entia sunt tantum secundum intentiones et intentio naturaliter.<sup>22</sup> Singularia autem, realiter extra sunt. Quare quae sunt in intellectu, non sunt causae<sup>23</sup> eorum quae sunt extra. Sed ideae, si essent, essent tantum in<sup>24</sup> intellectu, quia universales essent et non particulares. Ratio autem universalis semper est in anima. Ideo, etc.

Oppositum arguitur, quia quod per se tale est, verius est tale quam quod est tale per participationem, quia<sup>25</sup> participantia summunt<sup>26</sup> rationem et virtutem operandi ex participato. Sed omnia agentia particularia agentia dicuntur, et etiam<sup>27</sup> entia, per participationem illius ideae separatae, sicut voluit Plato.

1 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, 7 (988a20).2 *Om.* M.

3 principium M.

4 *Om.* A.

5 Posuit ... eas, emended from potētiis M.

6 *Om.* Posuit ... singularium A.7 *Om.* A.8 *Add.* utrum A.9 *Om.* A.

10 illius A.

11 eas A.

12 forma A.

13 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, 6 (1031b 15-18).14 *Om.* Ideae ... singularium A.

15 singularibus A.

16 eorum A.

17 videtur cadere A.

18 8° hujus A; cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, 6 (1016b 31-1017a 3).19 *Add.* particulares vel A.

20 causas M.

21 *Om.* M.22 *Om.* et... naturaliter A.

23 causa M.

24 *Om.* M.25 *Om.* A.26 *Add.* enim A.27 *Om.* A.

Quare ideae, si essent, essent maxime entes et per se, igitur maxime activae et per se causae agentes. Si igitur essent, essent<sup>28</sup> principia activa ipsorum singularium.

Intelligendum quod considerando ad ea omnia quae Plato dixit, nec habuit ponere simpliciter ideas esse causas agentes, nec<sup>29</sup> simpliciter negare,<sup>30</sup> sed quoad aliqua ipsas ideas<sup>31</sup> esse<sup>32</sup> efficientes, quoad aliqua esse<sup>33</sup> formales vel formales causas.<sup>34</sup>

Et ad hujus intellectum, considerandum est quod Plato posuit ipsas ideas<sup>35</sup> esse<sup>36</sup> subsistentes, et cum omne per se subsistens sit singulare, habuit ponere quod essent<sup>37</sup> singulares. Posuit etiam secundo ipsas esse species per quarum participationem omnia in illa specie vel coordinatione dicebantur esse talia. Quare<sup>38</sup> per consequens ipsa<sup>39</sup> est aliquid<sup>40</sup> primum in quolibet<sup>41</sup> genere. Primum autem in quolibet genere est causa omnium aliorum in illo genere, sicut primum in specie<sup>42</sup> hominis homo, in specie asini asinus simpliciter. Posuit etiam tertio ipsas ideas esse formas et quod quid erat esse ipsorum individuorum sub se contentorum. Posuit etiam quarto quod<sup>43</sup> essent universalis actu praedicabilia de contentis sub ipsis, sicut patet septimo et tertio decimo hujus.<sup>44</sup>

Et ideo, cum posuerit<sup>45</sup> primo ipsas ideas esse<sup>46</sup> actu subsistentes et per consequens singulares, nunc autem in isto quarto dictio innuit eas esse universales. Cum universale et singulare per suas rationes opponantur, videtur in sua positione contradictoria implicare.

Igitur, si considerentur ideae in quantum dicit eas<sup>47</sup> esse actu<sup>48</sup> subsistentes et primas, sic bene possunt habere rationem principii activi. Quod demonstratur<sup>49</sup> ex ratione primi. Primum in unoquoque genere est causa omnium<sup>50</sup> illorum quae sunt in illo genere. Sed istae ideae ponuntur primae, quare habebunt rationem causae.<sup>51</sup> Sed non sunt materia,<sup>52</sup> propter conditionem concomitantem, quia dicebantur per se subsistentes, materia autem per se non subsistit sine forma, sed solum in quantum habet rationem actu partis compositi. Item, nec forma propter eandem rationem, nam forma non separatur ab eo cuius est forma. Ideae autem, cum sint subsistentes,<sup>53</sup> actu distinctae sunt. Quare<sup>54</sup> non sunt causa formalis. Et haec est ratio Aristotelis septimo hujus.<sup>55</sup>

Nec etiam causa finalis simpliciter, quia dupliciter finis est ipsius rei, quia<sup>56</sup>

28 Om. M.

29 Add. habuit eas A.

30 Add. esse tales A.

31 Om. A.

32 Add. causas A.

33 Add. causas A.

34 Om. vel ... causas A.

35 Om. A.

36 Add. per se A.

37 For habuit ... essent, read posuit per consequens ipsas esse A.

38 Et M.

39 quia M.

40 Om. A.

41 illo A.

42 genere A.

43 Si A.

44 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, 6 and XIII, 10.

45 possunt M.

46 Add. et A.

47 eis M.

48 Om. A.

49 sequitur A.

50 Om. A.

51 Add. et per consequens principii A.

52 For sunt materia, read causae materialis A.

53 existentes A.

54 Quia M.

55 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, 6 and 8.

56 Om. A.

quaedam<sup>57</sup> est intra et quaedam<sup>58</sup> extra. Finis intraneus rei non sunt,<sup>59</sup> quia ille finis non videtur distingui a rei<sup>60</sup> forma. Sed quia<sup>61</sup> finis extra aliquo modo coincidit cum causa efficiente ipsius rei, ideo relinquitur quod cum ideae sub ista consideratione sint aliqua causarum, et non sunt<sup>62</sup> ut sic causa materialis nec formalis nec finalis intra, et non sunt plures causae, oportet<sup>63</sup> quod sint causa efficiens et aliquo modo finis extra, nam et<sup>64</sup> finis extra aliquo modo activus est et motivus.

Item ex hoc<sup>65</sup> quod primae sunt, necessarium<sup>66</sup> est eas ponere<sup>67</sup> causas primas efficientes, quia a primo in unoquoque genere derivatur virtus participandi in<sup>68</sup> omnia alia ex quo est primum. Si enim non, debet<sup>69</sup> dare aliquod prius. Sed non dare aliquod<sup>70</sup> prius eis, ut suppositum est.<sup>71</sup> Quare<sup>72</sup> habebunt<sup>73</sup> rationem principii. Sed non principii materialis nec formalis nec finalis, ut ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur quod activi vel efficientis. Si igitur ideae ponantur eo modo quo dictum est, rationem principii activi habebunt.<sup>74</sup>

Sed est intelligendum quod Avicenna<sup>75</sup> distinguit de principio activo, quoddam<sup>76</sup> est activum<sup>77</sup> unde est principium esse et<sup>78</sup> rationis formalis rei, alio modo est activum aliquid quod<sup>79</sup> est unde principium motus et transmutationis.

Et illud<sup>80</sup> activum principium isto secundo modo dictum pertinet ad naturalem philosophum, quia, cum natura sit principium motus et quietus ejus in quo est per se et non secundum accidens, artifex naturalis considerans de natura, habet considerare de motu et transmutatione. Et ideo illud principium ad naturalem pertinet.<sup>81</sup>

Quantum<sup>82</sup> ad principium primo modo dictum, dico quod pertinet ad primum philosophum. Cujus ratio est:<sup>83</sup> principium est principium in quantum ens,<sup>84</sup> quia nihil habet rationem principii nisi<sup>85</sup> quod rationem entitatis habet. Principium igitur esse<sup>86</sup> est principium ipsius<sup>87</sup> sub ratione qua est ens. Cujus igitur est considerare ens unde ens,<sup>88</sup> ejus est considerare istud principium<sup>89</sup> unde tale. Sed primi philosophi est considerare ens unde ens.<sup>90</sup> Quare est ejus considerare<sup>91</sup> primum principium activum ipsius esse.

57 quidam enim A.

58 quidam A.

59 Add. ideae A.

60 Om. A.

61 Add. tamen A.

62 sint A.

63 relinquitur A.

64 Om. A.

65 eo A.

66 necesse A.

67 Add. esse A.

68 Om. A.

69 oportet A.

70 For non dare aliquid, read nihil est A.

71 Om. M.

72 Om. A.

73 Add. causae A.

74 For Si ... habebunt, read Quare etc. A.

75 Avicenna, *De Philosophia Prima* VI, 1

(Venice, 1508), fol. 91ra-b.

76 Add. enim A.

77 Om. A.

78 Om. A.

79 Om. A.

80 istud A.

81 For Et ... pertinet, read Quantum ergo ad naturalem pertinet illud principium considerare. A.

82 Add. autem A.

83 Add. quia A.

84 Add. est A.

85 Add. per hoc A.

86 Om. A.

87 Om. A.

88 Add. est A.

89 Add. primum A.

90 Add. est A.

91 For est ejus considerare, read et A.

Si igitur ideae essent, essent principia activa esse,<sup>92</sup> non activa motus et transmutationis. Cujus ratio est: philosophus enim, considerans generationes diversorum diversas esse, item ad generationem unius sequitur corruptionem alterius, videns etiam<sup>93</sup> omnem<sup>94</sup> diversitatem in effectu debere reduci in<sup>95</sup> ipsam causam, posuit ipsius<sup>96</sup> principia et causas esse stellas diversas, ita quod secundum constellationes diversas<sup>97</sup> diversarum complexionum sint generari,<sup>98</sup> intendens quod generationis est varia causa. Hoc etiam dicit secundo *De Generatione*<sup>99</sup> quasi in fine, quod latitudo solis diversa in obliquo circulo est causa generationis et corruptionis. Si igitur ideae positae a Platone secundum ejus intentionem sunt omnino immobiles, immutabiles et invariabiles, numquam<sup>100</sup> potuit Plato<sup>101</sup> eas ponere principium motus vel<sup>102</sup> transmutationis activum. Et ad hanc intentionem dicit<sup>103</sup> Commentator septimo hujus<sup>104</sup> contra Platonem quod immateriale numquam agit<sup>105</sup> in materiali, innuens per hoc quod cum ideae sint omnino immateriales secundum Platonem, quod<sup>106</sup> non possunt esse principia activa<sup>107</sup> ipsorum quae fiunt per motum et transmutationem, quia materialia sunt. Relinquitur igitur quod cum sint positae principia activa, quod sint principia activa esse<sup>108</sup> ipsius rei. Igitur, ideae sunt principia activa ipsius rei<sup>109</sup> secundum<sup>110</sup> unam partem dicti ipsius Platonis.

Si autem considerentur in quantum dicebantur formae et quod quid erat<sup>111</sup> esse ipsorum singularium, et non possunt dici principia activa ipsorum singularium, quia nihil est activum sui ipsius. Si autem ideae essent formae et quod quid erat esse ipsorum singularium,<sup>112</sup> non essent in essentia distinctae a singularibus. Si igitur ponerentur ut sic<sup>113</sup> principia activa<sup>114</sup> singularium, iam idem esset activum sui ipsius. Hoc autem est falsum et impossibile. Quare impossibile est quod ideae in quantum dicebantur esse quod quid est singularium sint principia activa singularium.

Si etiam ideae<sup>115</sup> sic<sup>116</sup> considerentur quarto modo, prout dicebantur esse quaedam universalis, isto modo non possunt dici principia activa, quia universale unde<sup>117</sup> universale commune est,<sup>118</sup> omne autem<sup>119</sup> agens determinatum est. Quare universale non est agens<sup>120</sup> nisi per<sup>121</sup> accidens.

92 *Om. A.*

93 *autem A.*

94 *Om. A.*

95 *ad A.*

96 *Add. generationis A.*

97 *Om. A.*

98 *For* sint generari, *read* diversa posuit generari *A.*

99 *Cf. Aristotle, On Generation... II, 10 (336a33-b19).*

100 *Add. posuit vel A.*

101 *Om. A.*

102 *nec A.*

103 *loquitur A.*

104 *Cf. Averroes, In Meta. VII, 8 t.c. 28 (Venice, 1574) vol. VIII, fol. 178C.*

105 *agit M.*

106 *Om. A.*

107 *Om. A.*

108 *Om. M.*

109 *Hom. Igitur... rei M.*

110 *quod M.*

111 *erit M.*

112 *Hom. Et non possunt dici... esse ipsorum singularium M.*

113 *For* ponerentur ut sic, *read* poneretur quod essent *A.*

114 *Add. ipsorum A.*

115 *Hom. in quantum... ideae M.*

116 *Om. A.*

117 *in quantum A.*

118 *For* commune est, *read* non est activum *A.*

119 *enim A.*

120 *Add. per se A.*

121 *secundum A.*

Item, effectus debet proportionari suae causae, sicut patet secundo *Physicorum*,<sup>122</sup> capitulo de causis, quod si causa universalis et effectus universalis, si causa particularis, et effectus. Cum igitur ideae dicantur<sup>123</sup> universalis quaedam, si ponerentur esse causae singularium, implicaretur<sup>124</sup> impossibile, quod<sup>125</sup> causae universalis esset immediate effectus particularis. Hoc autem est impossibile. Quare impossibile est quod isto modo dicantur<sup>126</sup> principia activa singularium.

Quia igitur isto modo quod quid est ipsorum entium, scilicet singularium, dicuntur; quod quid est<sup>127</sup> autem significatur sub ratione formae in compositis;<sup>128</sup> ideo, isto modo considerando eas, habent rationem causae formalis. Primo modo autem<sup>129</sup> rationem principii activi.

Et apparet ad rationes, quia procedunt viis suis.

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<sup>122</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, 3 (195b 25).

<sup>123</sup> dicuntur M; *add.* esse A.

<sup>124</sup> multiplicaretur A.

<sup>125</sup> *Add.* scilicet A.

<sup>126</sup> sint A.

<sup>127</sup> *Om.* M.

<sup>128</sup> *For* in compositis, *read* compositae A.

<sup>129</sup> *Add.* ponimus A.

# Gregory IV for Aldric of Le Mans (833): A Genuine or Spurious Decretal?

WALTER GOFFART

THE decretal letter *Divinis praeceptis* of pope Gregory IV for bishop Aldric of Le Mans, given on 8 July 833 at Colmar, orders that if Aldric were accused and placed in danger of deposition, he was not to be troubled in possession of his see until judged by the pope.<sup>1</sup> Gregory IV was in Alsace at this time, invited by Lothar, the eldest son of Louis the Pious, to participate in the dramatic confrontation that culminated in Louis' deposition on 30 June.<sup>2</sup> Bishop Aldric was present as well; he distinguished himself as one of the few dignitaries whose fidelity to Louis never wavered — not surprisingly perhaps in his case, since Louis had made him bishop of Le Mans only a few months before (November 832).<sup>3</sup> The decree protecting Aldric from deposition suggests that, a week after the triumph of Lothar, pope Gregory, who stood with him, turned around and made an emphatic gesture in favor of the other side. This too is not inconsistent with the evidence, for we know that, soon after, "Pope Gregory returned with heavy grief to Rome," disappointed at the use which Lothar and the others had made of their victory.<sup>4</sup> It seems therefore that the decretal for Aldric plausibly fits the circumstances of early July 833.

<sup>1</sup> Ph. Jaffé, *Regesta pontificum Romanorum*, 1, 2nd. ed. (Leipzig, 1885) (= Jaffé<sup>2</sup>), no. 2579. Critical edition by K. Hampe, MGH, *Epistolae*, 5 (Berlin, 1899), 73-81. Edited on the basis of only one branch of the manuscript tradition by Mabillon, *Vetera analecta*, 3 (Paris, 1682), 277 ff.; reprinted by P. Hinschius, *Decretales Pseudo-Isidorianae et Capitula Angilramni* (Leipzig, 1863), cxxxviii-cxciv (with sources facing the text); reedited by G. Busson and A. Ledru, *Actus pontificum Cenomannis in urbe degentium*, Archives historiques du Maine, 2 (Le Mans, 1901), 317-326. Only the editions that are relevant to this study are listed. — I am deeply indebted to Professor Schafer Williams for advice and assistance.

<sup>2</sup> B. Simson, *Jahrbücher des fränkischen Reichs unter Ludwig dem Frommen*, 2 (Leipzig, 1876), 31-61; H.-X. Arquillière, *L'Augustinisme politique*, 2nd. ed. (Paris, 1955), 170-189.

<sup>3</sup> *Annales Bertiniani*, edd. F. Grat, J. Vieilliard, S. Clémencet, Société de l'histoire de France (Paris, 1964), 9 with n. 9 (under 833). The information that Aldric stood with Louis to the last comes not from the *Ann. Bert.* but from a marginal note in the principal MS; its source is unknown but trustworthy, as shown by Simson, "Pseudoisidor und die Le Mans-Hypothese," *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte*, Kanon. Abt. 4 (1914), 50-55 (Simson's conjecture that the unknown source came from Le Mans is disputable). For Aldric's installation at Le Mans, *Gesta domni Aldrici*, edd. R. Charles and L. Froger (Mamers, 1889), 9-10.

<sup>4</sup> *Vita Hludowici* (by "the Astronomer"), c. 48, ed. Pertz, MGH, *Scriptores* (in folio), 2 (Han-

These considerations are never encountered in what has been written about this document within the last century. On the contrary, the authorities agree that *Divinis praeceptis* is a fabrication closely associated with two known enterprises of forgery, those of Le Mans and of Pseudo-Isidore, and that it supplies the clearest proof for a link between them. To uphold one side of this indictment, it is pointed out that, like the False Decretals of Pseudo-Isidore, the letter of Gregory is a patchwork, or mosaic, of quotations from various sources, and that the doctrine it upholds in the matter of episcopal depositions, though standing close to the genuine canon of Sardica, also approximates the Pseudo-Isidorian *actio spolii*. The relations of the document with Le Mans are even closer: bishop Aldric is its beneficiary, and a copy of it is transcribed in a manuscript of the *Actus pontificum Cenomannis in urbe degentium*, one of the best known productions of the Le Mans forger.<sup>5</sup> In 1886, Bernhard Simson developed the theory that Pseudo-Isidore originated in Le Mans, and Paul Fournier emphatically endorsed his views.<sup>6</sup> Though often disputed, the theory is still alive today, most of all in France, and the decretal of Gregory IV — designated a forgery — is the keystone of the argument.<sup>7</sup> Since opponents of the Simson-Fournier theory also affirm that *Divinis praeceptis* is forged, the verdict upon it is nearly unanimous.<sup>8</sup>

*Deutsche Geschichte unter den Karolingern* (1896, reprint Stuttgart, 1959), 390; Arquillière, *Augustinisme*, 179 f. n. 3. For a fuller discussion see below 30-31 with nn. 35-42.

<sup>5</sup> Hinschius, *Decretales*, clxxxvii-cxcv, developed the case against the decretal (for earlier opinion, below 31-32 with nn. 46-54). His commentary is much influenced by the erroneous opinion that it actually restored Aldric rather than protected him from deposition.

<sup>6</sup> B. Simson, *Die Entstehung der pseudo-isidorischen Fälschungen in Le Mans* (Leipzig, 1886), 18-46; id., "Le Mans-Hypothese," 44-65; P. Fournier, "La question des Fausses Décrétales," *Nouvelle revue historique de droit français et étranger*, 11 (1887), 70-104, 12 (1888), 103-109; id., "Études sur les Fausses Décrétales," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, 7 (1906), 773-6, 781-3.

<sup>7</sup> P. Fournier and G. Le Bras, *Histoire des collections canoniques en Occident*, 1 (Paris, 1931), 196-201. When the flimsiness of its basis is taken into account, the Simson-Fournier theory about the origins of Pseudo-Isidore enjoyed a remarkable fortune in France; see A. Amanieu, art. "Angilramne," *Dictionnaire de droit canonique*, 1 (1928), 524-5; F. Baix, art. "Benedictus Levita," *ibid.*, 2 (1935), 402-3; G. Le Bras, "Rôle privilégié du Maine dans l'histoire du droit canonique," *Province du Maine*, 2nd ser., 33 (1953), 181-3; R. Grand, "Nouvelles remarques sur l'origine du Pseudo-Isidore," *Studia Gratiana*, edd. J. Forchielli and A. Stickler (Bologna, 1955), 3-16.

<sup>8</sup> H. Wasserschleben, "Über das Vaterland der falschen Dekretalen," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 64 (1890), 246-8; G. Lurz, *Über die Heimat Pseudoisidors*, *Historische Abhandlungen*, edd. Th. von Heigel and H. Grauert, fasc. 12 (Munich, 1898), 73-74; E. Seckel, art. "Pseudoisidor," in Herzog-Hauck, *Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, 3rd ed., 16 (1905), 278; F. Lot, "La question des Fausses Décrétales," *Revue historique*, 94 (1907), 293-4; id., "Textes manœux et Fausses Décrétales," *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes*, 102 (1941), 9-13. The only defense of the nover, 1829), 636; tr. A. Cabaniss, *Son of Charlemagne* (Syracuse, 1961), 98; E. Mühlbacher,

In spite of the objections to the authenticity of the decretal, the argument of the opening paragraph has suggested that its condemnation is not certain, and two more points may be developed that set the document in a favorable light. First, the many quotations in the decretal bear out an independent report that the pope was presented in France with a collection of canon law. Secondly, the transmission of the document, far from proceeding exclusively from Le Mans, was chiefly ensured by Italian manuscripts containing collections of genuine papal letters of the ninth century.

When pope Gregory reached Alsace in 833, he was handed a letter from the Frankish episcopate faithful to Louis the Pious, challenging his right to intervene in this quarrel and threatening to break off communion with him if he persisted.<sup>9</sup> One version of what happened next is given by the *Epitaphium Arsenii seu vita Walae* by Pascasius Radbert, abbot of Corbie, a long apology for Wala, one of the leaders of the opposition to Louis the Pious.<sup>10</sup> According to Radbert, who was an eyewitness, Wala comforted pope Gregory and allayed his fears by giving him "nonnulla sanctorum patrum auctoritate firmata, predecessorumque suorum conscripta, quibus nullus contradicere possit," concerning papal independence and authority.<sup>11</sup> The description suggests a collection of conciliar canons and papal decretals such as, for example, the *Hispana*, or a catena of extracts from such a collection.<sup>12</sup> Now, Gregory's reply to the Frankish

decretal, by G. Busson, *Actus pontificum* (n. 1 above), 317 f. n. 3, was superficial and ineffectual. For a sensible discussion, which remains favorable to the letter's authenticity, see H. K. Mann, *The Lives of the Popes in the Early Middle Ages*, 2 (London, 1906), 226-7 n. 3 (Mann was wrong, however, in appraising the *Gesta Aldrici*, pp. 225-6).

<sup>9</sup> The letter of the bishops is known from Gregory's reply: Jaffé<sup>3</sup> no. 2578, *Romano pontifici*, ed. E. Dümmler, MGH, *Epistolae*, 5, 228-232 (among the letters of Agobard of Lyons; the text lacks opening and closing protocols. Mann, *Lives of the Popes*, 2, 200, took it to be incorporated in Agobard's treatise *De comparatione utrius regni*, but this was disproved by Baluze, PL 104, 291-2). On the incident, Simson, *Jahrbücher*, 2, 35-7; Arquillière, *Augustinisme*, 179-187.

<sup>10</sup> Ed. E. Dümmler, "Radberts *Epitaphium Arsenii*," *Abhandlungen der königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (1900), no. 2, 19-98, with commentary, 1-18. See also, H. Löwe in Wattenbach-Levison, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter. Vorzeit und Karolinger*, fasc. 3 (Weimar, 1957), 342-3; L. Weinrich, *Wala: Graf, Mönch und Rebell. Die Biographie eines Karolinger*, *Historische Studien*, no. 386 (Lübeck, 1963), 7-10, 93-8 (criticism of Dümmler's edition). Cf. Hinshius, *Decretales*, cxvii.

<sup>11</sup> *Epitaphium Arsenii*, II, 16, ed. Dümmler, 84; the text continues: "quod eius [sc. Gregorii] esset potestas, immo Dei et beati Petri apostoli, suaque auctoritas, ire, mittere ad omnes gentes pro fide Christi et pace ecclesiarum, pro predicatione evangelii et assertionem veritatis, et in eo esset omnis auctoritas beati Petri excellens et potestas viva, a quo oporteret universos iudicari, ita ut ipse a nemine iudicandus esset." On the credibility of this incident, Weinrich, *Wala*, 80 n. 71.

<sup>12</sup> Fournier-Le Bras, *Histoire*, 1, 68-9, 100-107; cf. G. Martínez Díez, "Nota sobre la colección *Hispana*," in *Concilios Visigóticos e Hispano-Romanos*, ed. J. Vives (Barcelona-Madrid, 1963), xii-xv.

bishops survives and, clearly, no canonical collection was used in its composition.<sup>13</sup> Radbert, writing almost twenty years after the event, might simply have been mistaken; the *Epitaphium Arsenii* is avowedly partisan and occasionally inaccurate. But its testimony should not be lightly rejected.<sup>14</sup> If Radbert's statement is not borne out by Gregory's letter to the bishops, then it is certainly by his letter for Aldric, which required a substantial collection of canonical material. In any case, owing to Radbert's standing as an eyewitness, the *Epitaphium Arsenii* makes it impossible to question that the pope was able, in July 833, to draft such a patchwork of quotations as *Divinis praeceptis* contains.

The history of the transmission of the decretal is more important to its authenticity than Radbert's testimony. Ever since the days of Mabillon, the text of *Divinis praeceptis* has chiefly been consulted in the editions of the *Actus pontificum Cenomanensium*, a work whose provenance is unquestionably Le Mans, and nothing in the pages where Hinschius, Simson, Fournier, Seckel and Lot condemned the document would lead one to suspect that the Le Mans copy was other than unique.<sup>15</sup> In fact, however, large extracts of the text were widely circulated by Gratian's *Decretum* many centuries before Mabillon published the *Actus*.<sup>16</sup>

Gratian did not get these extracts from Le Mans but from canonical collections. The extracts originally appeared in two influential works of an earlier age: the anonymous *Collection in 74 Titles* (1074-76) and the *Tripartita*, or *Collectio trium partium*, of Ivo of Chartres (c. 1095).<sup>17</sup> Neither

<sup>13</sup> Letter cited above n. 9. Two long quotations are included, from Gregory Nazianzus and Augustine, but these are not from a canonical collection; see Dümmler, "Radberts *Epitaphium Arsenii*," 15 with n. 2.

<sup>14</sup> The allusion to decretals is confirmed in the *Vita Hludowici*, c. 48, ed. Pertz, 635.

<sup>15</sup> Above nn. 1, 5, 6, 8. Fournier, *Rev. d'hist. eccl.*, 7 (1906), 778: "Elle nous a été conservée par une collection mancelle." Lot, *Bibl. Éc. chartes*, 102 (1941), 13, is particularly misleading. Simson, "Le Mans-Hypothese," 44, though he blamed scholars for taking no account of Hampe's edition, passed in silence over its chief revelation and insisted solely upon the transmission from Le Mans.

<sup>16</sup> *Decretum Gratiani* C. 2, q. 6, c. 11; C. 2, q. 7, c. 42; Dist. 12, c. 2; Dist. 19, c. 15; ed. A. Friedberg, *Corpus iuris canonici*, 1 (Leipzig, 1879), 469, 497, 27, 61.

<sup>17</sup> Neither of these collections is published; I rely on the descriptions of Fournier, "Le premier manuel canonique de la réforme du xi<sup>e</sup> siècle," *École française de Rome. Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, 14 (1894), 157-8; "Les collections canoniques attribuées à Yves de Chartres," *Bibl. Éc. chartes*, 57 (1896), 662-3; cf. Fournier-Le Bras, *Histoire*, 2 (Paris, 1932), 17, 61. On the date of the *Collection in 74 Titles*, see A. M. Stickler, *Historia iuris canonici Latini*, I: *Historia fontium* (Turin, 1950), 168 with n. 2. Fournier described the *Tripartita* in less detail than the other collection. I gather from R. Sprandel, *Ivo von Chartres und seine Stellung in der Kirchengeschichte*, *Pariser historische Studien*, 1 (Stuttgart, 1962), 180, that its attribution to Ivo is not certain. These collections appear to be the only two in which the extracts from *Divinis praeceptis* derive, perhaps directly, from a full text. Many other canonical collections, which descend from them, such as Anselm of Lucca, the *Polycarpus*, Ivo's *Decretum*, etc., contain the same extracts.

of the canonists who made these compilations was dependent on Le Mans for his knowledge of the decretal of Gregory IV. The *Collection in 74 Titles* was composed "a viris Cancellariae Pontificae addictis"; and Rome or Italy, where Ivo had just sojourned (1093), supplied him with the parts of the *Tripartita* in which *Divinis praeceptis* is included.<sup>18</sup> Although the precise source tapped by these compilers is difficult to determine, a glance at the critical edition of *Divinis praeceptis*, which Hampe published in 1899, reveals that Italy was just as important for the history of the transmission of the full text as for the extracts.

The oldest manuscript containing the decretal (early tenth century) is an Italian collection of canonical texts and papal decretals, the latter chiefly of Nicolas I and Hadrian II.<sup>19</sup> The contents are related to, though not precisely identical with those of a lost manuscript of Santa Maria sopra Minerva in Rome, of which several early modern copies and editions survive. This lost codex contained *Divinis praeceptis* also accompanied by the long series of letters of Nicolas I.<sup>20</sup> There is reason to believe that a similar collection served as source for the author of the *Collection in 74 Titles*,<sup>21</sup> and the same may well apply to the *Tripartita*.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Stickler, *loc. cit.*, Fournier, "Premier manuel," 200; Fournier-Le Bras, *Histoire*, 2, 105; Ivo in Italy, 1093, Sprandel, *op. cit.*, 178.

<sup>19</sup> Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 1557. See *Bibliothèque nationale, Catalogue général des manuscrits latins*, 2, ed. Ph. Lauer (Paris, 1940), 65f.; E. Perels, "Die Briefe Papst Nikolaus I., I," *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde*, 37 (1912), 566-9. On its origins, see below 29-30 with n. 34.

<sup>20</sup> The best of the surviving copies is Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 3859A; also Rome, Bibl. Valli-celliana C 15, and Vatic. lat. 4898 (opening lines only); Perels, "Die Briefe," 551-2, 565-6. Early editions from the lost MS by Caraffa and Baronius, and their derivatives, listed by Hampe, MGH, *Epistolae*, 5, 73. The lost MS could not date from much before the 12th cent., owing to the collection of letters of St. Boniface which it contained; see P. Ewald, "Studien zur Neuausgabe der Bonifatius-Briefe," *Neues Archiv*, 40 (1916), 687-713; cf. also Nürnberger in *Neues Archiv*, 7 (1882), 358-366, 374 f.

<sup>21</sup> The extracts from *Divinis praeceptis* are directly followed by a passage from a letter of Nicolas I, Jaffé<sup>2</sup> no. 2879 (Perels no. 100); see Fournier, "Premier manuel," 158. This same letter of Nicolas and that of Gregory vary their place in Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 1557 and 3859A and Vallic. C 15; it is conceivable that they directly followed one another in a related MS.

<sup>22</sup> The first piece in the collection of extracts from letters of pope Gregory (the Great) in the *Tripartita* is from the decretal of Gregory IV; this collection is a haphazard gathering of Gregorian materials from anywhere but Gregory's registers; Fournier, "Collections attribuées à Yves de Chartres," 662-3. Now, Paris, lat. 1557 contains a small collection of extracts from Gregory's letters (fol. 20<sup>v</sup>-24), preceded (fol. 7-8<sup>v</sup>) by the letter of Gregory IV. It would therefore be interesting to verify whether the collection of the MS is related to that of the *Tripartita*. On the other hand, one may ascertain that the extracts from letters of Nicolas I in the *Tripartita* have nothing to do with Paris lat. 1557; Perels, "Die Briefe Papst Nikolaus I., II," *Neues Archiv*, 39 (1914), 99-100. Neither do the conciliar materials in Part II of the *Tripartita*.

As against the extent of its diffusion in Italy, *Divinis praeceptis* left no traces north of the Alps except in Le Mans itself. All we have is the seventeenth-century transcript by André Duchesne of a lost manuscript of the *Actus pontificum Cenomanensium*.<sup>23</sup> This text of the decretal forms a distinct branch of the tradition, whose variant readings are generally preferable to those of the other branch.<sup>24</sup>

Though the quality of the Le Mans text is an unobjectionable trait in itself, the decretal deserves to be held suspect for keeping company with the notorious *Actus pontificum Cenomanensium*. But is it a part of the *Actus*? In other words, did the Le Mans forger incorporate *Divinis praeceptis* into his episcopal history along with many other spurious charters? This point was inconclusively debated. The problem results from the fact that, in the manuscript, the decretal is transcribed between the *Actus* and the First Continuation and might thus belong to the one or the other or to neither. In the two manuscripts of the *Actus*, Le Mans 224 (= *M*) and Duchesne's copy (= *D*), the original episcopal history written by the Le Mans forger c. 860 is coupled with various Continuations, of which the First dates from the eleventh century and the Second from the twelfth.<sup>25</sup> Different materials are found in the two manuscripts between chapter 18 of the *Actus* and the Second Continuation.<sup>26</sup> In *M*, ch. 18 is followed by a fragmentary transcription of the *Gesta Aldrici*, a separate book, whereas *D* contains four different pieces: 1) a brief, topical summary of the *Gesta Aldrici* (= Aldric-I); 2) the decree of Gregory IV; 3) another short section on Aldric (= Aldric-II); and 4) an entry about bishop Robert, which unquestionably belongs to the First Continuation.<sup>27</sup> To summarize:

<sup>23</sup> Paris, Bibl. Nat., Collection Baluze, vol. 45, fol. 110v. On the origins of this MS, see my forthcoming book, *The Le Mans Forgeries: A Chapter from the History of Church Property in the Ninth Century* (Harvard Univ. Press), ch. I, part 1, "*Actus pontificum*." The Amiens MS listed by Hampe reproduces not the decretal but only one of the extracts from canonical collections.

<sup>24</sup> Hampe, MGH, *Epistolae*, 5, 72, commented: "Textum prorsus diversum et multis locis meliorem praebet cod..." This MS is also the sole witness for the date of the decretal, *ibid.*, 81.

<sup>25</sup> On the date of the original *Actus*, *The Le Mans Forgeries*, ch. III, on the Continuations, R. Latouche, "Essai de critique sur la continuation des *Actus* (857-1255)," *Moyen Age*, 20 (1907), 227-247, 261-3.

<sup>26</sup> The editions of the *Actus* (listed above n. 1) assign no. 22 to this chapter; I adopt the numbering implied by the organization of the book in the MSS, as explained in *The Le Mans Forgeries*, ch. I.

<sup>27</sup> The edition of the *Actus* by Busson and Ledru (above n. 1) contains all of this, because it adheres slavishly to *M*; for the appearance of *M*, pp. 293-316 (the *Gesta Aldrici* was copied into *M* in the 12th cent. from the surviving unique MS, as shown by J. Havet, *Oeuvres*, 1 [Paris, 1896], 278 with n. 3); for the appearance of *D*, pp. 293, 316-327, 336-9 (the material on pp. 327-336 is extraneous to the *Actus* and comes from a different part of *M*). The edition is misleading and difficult to use at this critical junction between the *Actus* and its Continuations.

<i>M</i>	<i>D</i>
<i>Actus</i> ch. 18	<i>Actus</i> ch. 18
<i>Gesta Aldrici</i> pars. 1-9 (sudden interruption)	Aldric-I (= summary of <i>Gesta Aldrici</i> )
	<i>Divinis praeceptis</i>
	Aldric-II
	1st Continuation
2nd Continuation	2nd Continuation

It is agreed that *D* is the more complete manuscript at this point. Depending then upon where one decides the ending of the original *Actus* to be, the decretal might lie within it, or on neutral ground, or in the First Continuation. Havet proposed that the *Actus* ends with Aldric-I, whereas Lot argued for *Actus* ch. 18, and Simson for Aldric-II.<sup>28</sup>

The positions of Lot and Simson were dictated by the attitude of each one to *Divinis praeceptis*. Lot, who was opposed to the Le Mans hypothesis about Pseudo-Isidore, wanted to set the decretal as far away as possible from the *Actus*. Simson, on the other hand, wanted the decretal to be securely bound to the *Actus*. Both of them were mistaken. Lot's argument is untenable because Aldric-I is an exact summary of the *Gesta Aldrici* and is set to verse in *Carmen Cenomanensis* no. 7, another production of the Le Mans forger. Only the forger could have written it, just as he wrote entirely similar summaries in his hagiographies, the *Vitae Iuliani*, *Turibii*, and *Pavatii*.<sup>29</sup> Thus, in addition to ch. 18, Aldric-I unquestionably belongs to the *Actus*. Simson's proposal is just as untenable. For one thing, Aldric-II states that Aldric is dead, the very opposite of what the Le Mans forger persistently and mendaciously asserted. The passage also refers to the invasions of the Northmen, who are mentioned as *praedicti pagani* in the chapter on Robert by the First Continuator.<sup>30</sup>

Havet undoubtedly reached the right conclusion, and Latouche corroborated it in his work on the Continuations. The original, ninth-century *Actus pontificum* ends with Aldric-I; the First Continuation begins with Aldric-II.<sup>31</sup> The decretal that lies between them might have been inserted by either author or by an unknown scribe. Of these, admittedly, the Le

<sup>28</sup> Havet, *Oeuvres*, 1, 325-7; Lot, "Textes manœaux," *Bibl. Éc. chartes*, 102 (1941), 24-5; Simson, "Le Mans-Hypothese," 61-5.

<sup>29</sup> As shown in *The Le Mans Forgeries*, ch. I, part 1, "The Unity of the Forgeries." The *Vita Iuliani* in question here is *Bibliotheca hagiographica Latina* no. 4545, not no. 4546, which is also by the forger.

<sup>30</sup> *Actus*, edd. Busson-Ledru, 327, 336. On the forger's assertion that Aldric was alive, *The Le Mans Forgeries*, ch. III, part 4.

<sup>31</sup> Havet, as above n. 28; Latouches, "Continuation des *Actus*," 242-3, 265

Mans forger, author of the *Actus*, is the most likely candidate, but he denied us the opportunity for a positive attribution. If the *lemma* heading the decretal read, "*Placuit autem inserere exemplarem epistolae Gregorii papae...*", or such like, the forger's style would be immediately recognizable.<sup>32</sup> The actual *lemma*, "*Epistola Gregorii papae...*," might have been written by anyone. Regardless, however, of who held the pen, the intent was the same: the *Actus* was finished and several blank leaves remained; what better places to transcribe and preserve this precious document?<sup>33</sup>

In short, the history of the transmission of *Divinis praeceptis*, while not such as to certify its authenticity, is perfectly innocent in itself and a serious obstacle to the charge that the document is a forgery. One branch of the tradition stems from Le Mans, a chance survival that depended upon two accidents: a scribe copying the letter on the blank leaves following the end of the *Actus*, and the zeal of Duchesne in preserving a manuscript since lost. The other branch, stemming from Italy, spread in such profusion as to be beyond the reach of time. This applies particularly to the extracts of the decretal in canonical collections. But even the surviving manuscripts that contain the full text allow one to suspect a number of vanished intermediaries of which they are the remains.

The bishopric of Le Mans would have been in possession of a copy of *Divinis praeceptis*, whether genuine or forged, and in either case its text would probably be more correct than others, because descending, if forged, immediately from the original forgery, and, if genuine, from the document delivered to Aldric. In addition, a copy of the decretal reached Italy soon enough to be transcribed in the early tenth century into a manuscript containing many authentic papal letters of the ninth century. This fact is easily explained if *Divinis praeceptis* is taken to be authentic as well; a copy accompanied the pope to Rome in 833 and was preserved at the papal court. As it happens, the editor of the letters of Nicolas I asserted that the collection of letters of this pope in whose company the decretal of Gregory IV is found "can... scarcely be derived directly or

<sup>32</sup> See *The Le Mans Forgeries*, ch. III, part 2; the forger has a well known predilection for announcing that he was "inserting" this or that document.

<sup>33</sup> The decretal in Duchesne's copy is followed by a paragraph of commentary (*inc.*, *Quodsi David*), in *Actus*, edd. Busson-Ledru, 326. This passage is clearly dependent on the False Capitularies and Decretals and was in all likelihood added by the person who transcribed the decretal. It betrays no affinity whatever to the style and interests of the Le Mans forger. The class of Pseudo-Isidorian MS on which it depends was said by Simson and Seckel to date from much later than the 9th cent. (Simson, "Le Mans-Hypothese," 64-5; Seckel, as above n. 8 and *Neues Archiv*, 35 [1910], 510-512), but since their conclusion depends on Hinschius's edition it will have to await verification; see S. Williams, "The Oldest Text of the *Constitutum Constantini*," *Traditio*, 20 (1964), 450.

indirectly from anywhere else than the papal registers."<sup>34</sup> The same cannot be unequivocally asserted of *Divinis praeceptis*, but the possibility is a serious one. By contrast, those who condemn the letter are faced with the major problem of explaining how this isolated forgery, which had no diffusion north of the Alps, quickly reached Italy and was accepted there as a genuine papal decretal.

It is appropriate to repeat what was said in the first paragraph about the likelihood that Gregory issued *Divinis praeceptis* in July 833. On the surface, such an act seems inconsistent with his attitude in that year toward the bishops faithful to Louis the Pious; so Hinschius and Simson contended.<sup>35</sup> But the fact that the decretal is dated after 30 June refutes this objection. Before 30 June, Gregory was hostile to bishops like Aldric, who, in his view, were rending the seamless garment of Christ by resisting his efforts to restore peace and justice.<sup>36</sup> If *Divinis praeceptis* were dated ten or more days earlier than it is, it would certainly be spurious.

From 30 June onward, however, the issues changed. Gregory won his point, and the Frankish episcopate streamed to his camp. The exceptions were Aldric and two or three others, who held back because of the sanctity of their oaths to Louis.<sup>37</sup> These bishops, a trifling minority, were not rending the garment of Christ; on the contrary, their motives were praiseworthy, even though (as Gregory saw it) misguided.<sup>38</sup> Now, the sanctity of oaths was a crucial issue in the deposition of Louis; one of his chief faults, it was alleged, was that by his vacillations he threatened the whole fabric of fidelity. But no sooner was Louis deposed than Lothar showed that his regime spelled no improvement. Louis' overthrow was the signal for a partition of the empire with consequent redistribution of honors and benefices to those who had had the wit to join the winning side.<sup>39</sup> Aldric

<sup>34</sup> E. Perels, "Papst Nikolaus I. im Streit zwischen Le Mans und St. Calais," *Papsttum und Kaisertum* (= *Paul Kehr Festschrift*), ed. A. Brackmann (Munich, 1926), 160-161; cf. *Neues Archiv*, 37 (1912), 566, 569.

<sup>35</sup> Hinschius, *Decretales*, cxcv; Simson, "Le Mans-Hypothese," 45, 56.

<sup>36</sup> See the decretal *Romano pontifici*, with the commentaries cited above n. 9; also A. Hauck, *Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands*, 2 (repr., Berlin, 1958), 516 n. 3.

<sup>37</sup> As above n. 3.

<sup>38</sup> *Divinis praeceptis* refers to Aldric's *simplicitas* (ed. Hampe, 75, lines 15-16); it is suggested that he deserves patience and loving correction (76, lines 12-13), and that perhaps "conversations non habet amabiles" (79, lines 10-12; quoted from a decretal of Innocent I). On Gregory's attitude toward bishops' oaths, see *Romano pontifici*, ed. Dümmler, 230, lines 13-19.

<sup>39</sup> Agobard, *Epistola* 15, ed. Dümmler, MGH, *Epistolae*, 5, 226; *Liber apologeticus*, in PL 104, 311-312; Louis' penance at Soissons, Oct. 833, in MGH, *Capitularia*, 2, edd. A. Boretius and V. Krause (Hannover, 1890), 54 (c. 2). Also, Simson, as above n. 2; Hauck, *Kirchengeschichte*, 2, 517-519; L. Halphen, *Charlemagne et l'empire carolingien*, *Évolution de l'humanité*, 33 (Paris, 1949), 279, 281, 297, 293.

had been impolitic in his choice; he could now be deposed by a compliant council for the fault of having been faithful to his oath, and his bishopric made available to a more flexible candidate. Not surprisingly, Wala was appalled by this turn of events.<sup>40</sup> *Divinis praeceptis*, the letter by which, on 8 July, the pope protected Aldric from the consequences of his fidelity, proves that Gregory IV was also appalled and did what he could, not for Aldric, who was merely a symbol,<sup>41</sup> but rather to thwart such disgraceful proceedings. Then he "returned with heavy grief to Rome."<sup>42</sup> When the events of 833 are seen in this light, there is no inconsistency in Gregory's actions.

To sum up, the evidence favoring the authenticity of *Divinis praeceptis* is extensive and weighty. Though its text is largely patched together from earlier writings, the quotations are from genuine canonical sources.<sup>43</sup> We are informed, moreover, that Gregory was presented with just such a collection shortly before the date when the decretal was issued. The doctrine of the letter is consistent with papal tradition and reflects no Pseudo-Isidorian novelties.<sup>44</sup> What is otherwise known of the circumstances of 833 makes it likely that Aldric risked deposition, and also that Gregory intervened to protect him. It is apparent from the text that the pope acted not out of a liking for Aldric but because, as a matter of principle, he opposed political depositions of bishops, such as could be foreseen in the aftermath of Lothar's triumph.<sup>45</sup> Finally, the history of the transmission of the decretal is more compatible with the hypothesis of authenticity than with the alternative.

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For nearly a century after the decretal was first published by Caraffa (1591) and Baronius (c. 1600), its authenticity was not questioned. It was the Oratorian priest Charles Le Cointe (1611-1681), a now almost forgotten historian, who first cast doubt upon the decretal with a pair of objections that do credit to his critical sense.<sup>46</sup> Since, like Baro-

<sup>40</sup> Radbert, *Epit. Arsen.*, II, 18-19, ed. Dümmler, 89-90; Weinrich, *Wala*, 81.

<sup>41</sup> See below with n. 45.

<sup>42</sup> As above n. 4.

<sup>43</sup> On the sources, see below 32-33.

<sup>44</sup> Simson, "Le Mans-Hypothese," 47, pointed out the inconsistency of the False Decretals in this regard; some of their pronouncements are conventional, others novel. It is vain, however, to argue that *Divinis praeceptis* is Pseudo-Isidorian in doctrine unless it incorporates ideas that may be positively identified with Pseudo-Isidore, and this is not the case.

<sup>45</sup> Accurate observation by Simson, "Le Mans-Hypothese," 48.

<sup>46</sup> *Annales ecclesiastici Francorum*, 8 (Paris, 1683), 711. — The only set of this work in North America seems to be at Laval University, Quebec. On Le Cointe, *Biographie universelle*, new ed., 8 (Paris, n. d.), 541-3. He is notably missing from most modern Catholic encyclopedias.

nus,<sup>47</sup> Le Cointe did not know the date which the letter bears — it was revealed only when Mabillon published the *Actus pontificum Cenomanensium* (1682) — he assumed that it was related to Aldric's expulsion from Le Mans in 840. One objection, then, was that Gregory had no reason to write *Divinis praeceptis* in that year, for we have no information corroborating either that Aldric was then accused before the pope or that a *disputatio de potestate Romani pontificis* took place. The other objection was the silence of Aldric's biography, the *Gesta Aldrici*; this silence was eloquent because the author mentioned a letter of Gregory to Aldric different from *Divinis praeceptis*. Though creditable when made, neither of Le Cointe's points stands the test of time. In the first instance, his guess about the date was incorrect; in the other (as will shortly be shown), Le Cointe took an erroneous view of the *Gesta Aldrici*. Pagi, the annotator of Baronius's *Annales ecclesiastici*, was nevertheless hasty in retorting that Le Cointe "nihil in medium adducit, quod id [his condemnation] evindicat."<sup>48</sup> The charge of spuriousness soon took new life. The decretal was reprinted in the conciliar collection of Hardouin, which was bitterly attacked on the grounds that it was Ultramontane. Hardouin's lesser faults, according to these critics, included his failure to mention that *Divinis praeceptis* lay under a cloud.<sup>49</sup>

By the latter part of the eighteenth century, it was generally acknowledged that the doctrine of *Divinis praeceptis* was Pseudo-Isidorian and that its quotations were drawn directly from the False Decretals.<sup>50</sup> Once this premise (which Hinschius and later scholars would disprove) was taken for granted, there was more pressing reason than ever to divide over the document's authenticity. To some, such as Theiner and Paulus, *Divinis praeceptis* was genuine and thus proved that Pseudo-Isidore largely antedated 833.<sup>51</sup> Others, who had different and more tenable views about the date of Pseudo-Isidore, were bound to muster arguments that would eliminate the decretal from discussion. Spittler objected that the address was just the sort of foolishness one might expect from a forger; he found

<sup>47</sup> Baronius assigned the letter to the year 839. This may well be why it never became customary for historians to discuss *Divinis praeceptis* in the context of Gregory's visit to the Frankish kingdom in 833.

<sup>48</sup> A. Pagi, *Critica historico-chronologica in Annales ecclesiastici Baronii*, 3 (Antwerp, 1705), 575 (also in Pagi's edition of Baronius under 839).

<sup>49</sup> Alluded to in *Histoire littéraire de la France*, Palmé ed., 5 (Paris, 1866), 148. On Hardouin's edition and its critics, H. Quentin, *Jean-Dominique Mansi et les grandes collections conciliaires* (Paris, 1900), 38-52; C. Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus*, new ed., 4 (Brussels, 1893), 98.

<sup>50</sup> I have not been able to find where these views crystallized. They are certainly presupposed by the subsequent literature.

<sup>51</sup> J. A. Theiner, *De Pseudo-Isidoriana collectione dissertatio historico-canonica* (Bratislava, 1827), 44-6; Paulus in *Heidelberger Jahrbuch* (1833), 957 (not seen by me).

a similar implication of forgery in the silence of the text regarding the circumstance of Aldric's threatened deposition.<sup>52</sup> Richter considered it sufficient evidence of spuriousness that the *Gesta Aldrici* mentions neither a deposition of Aldric nor the decretal itself.<sup>53</sup> Wasserschleben and Weizsäcker merely appealed to the authority of their like-minded predecessors.<sup>54</sup>

The criticism of *Divinis praeceptis* entered its modern phase with Hinschius and the other scholars whose judgments were earlier outlined. The date borne by the decretal was no longer in doubt, and it was established that its quotations were not from Pseudo-Isidore but (with one possible exception) from genuine sources. Though these points were cleared up, no conclusive case was ever developed against the authenticity of the letter, because all those who wrote about it regarded its spuriousness as self-evident from the company it kept. By its doctrine and mode of composition, it approximated Pseudo-Isidore; by its beneficiary and its transmission, it touched Le Mans; what need to say more? To be sure, a number of supporting considerations were advanced, but, as will be seen, hardly any of them survives a critical examination.

It should be said to begin with that the theory that Le Mans was the home of Pseudo-Isidore — a theory with which the condemnation of *Divinis praeceptis* was intimately connected — is now conclusively disproved. In order to ensure the contemporaneity of the two enterprises of forgery, as well as to supply a motive for Pseudo-Isidore, the theory required that the Le Mans forgeries originate in the lifetime of bishop Aldric (832-857).<sup>55</sup> In fact, as I have shown at length elsewhere, Aldric was dead when the Le Mans forgeries were written; they were undertaken in the pontificate of his successor, at a time when Pseudo-Isidore was already in circulation.<sup>56</sup> This in itself is a reason for taking a more favorable view of the decretal of Gregory IV.

The Le Mans forger, who wrote a few years after Aldric's death, never referred explicitly to *Divinis praeceptis*, even though, whether genuine or

<sup>52</sup> L. T. Spittler, *Geschichte des kanonischen Rechts* (Halle, 1778), 241-4.

<sup>53</sup> A. L. Richter, *Lehrbuch des katholischen und evangelischen Kirchenrechts*, 4th ed. (Leipzig, 1844), 130-131 (the 8th ed. [1886] adds only a reference to Hinschius). This was virtually a return to Le Cointe's position.

<sup>54</sup> H. Wasserschleben, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der falschen Dekretalen* (Bresslau, 1844), 48-9; J. Weizsäcker, "Die pseudo-isorische Frage in ihrem gegenwärtigen Stande," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 3 (1860), 65.

<sup>55</sup> *The Le Mans Forgeries*, ch. II, part 1, "A Connection with Pseudo-Isidore?"

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, ch. III. Seckel's criticism of other aspects of the theory (n. 8 above) is excellent and fully borne out by my researches.

forged, it would have been available to him. If his work contains any allusion to the letter, it is in the fanciful setting of a eulogy of Aldric:

The aforesaid bishop Aldric was so great in dignity and honor and esteem (*amor*) that his fame reached as far as the Roman see, and the lord Gregory, the venerable apostolic,... sent him his sacerdotal vestment from Rome to the county of Maine, that vestment indeed which he had worn at Easter. [Gregory] also sent him a pastoral staff, called *serula*, along with a letter of his, calling upon [Aldric] to come to him if he possibly could; and [Gregory] granted [Aldric] that whatever request and benediction he wished to receive from the see of St. Peter would willingly and gladly be sent and granted him either by [Gregory] himself or by his envoy (*missus*).<sup>57</sup>

Although nothing in this allows the letter alluded to by the forger to be precisely identified with the decretal under discussion, their identity seems more than likely, provided it is understood that the forger used the decretal merely as inspiration for his exaggerated praise. The silence of the *Gesta Aldrici* suggests that, deliberately or from ignorance, the forger took no interest in the events of 833 or Aldric's part in them.<sup>58</sup> He may readily be imagined handling *Divinis praeceptis* and drawing from it those generalities that might be turned to the advantage of a eulogy: pope Gregory sent Aldric a letter, he greatly liked Aldric (the decretal is favorable to Aldric), invited him to Rome (the decretal allows for appeal to Rome), and granted him requests and benedictions personally or by a legate (the decretal provides that final judgment be pronounced either by the pope in person or by a legate). If *Divinis praeceptis*, rather than the forger's imagination, is indeed reflected in this passage of the *Gesta Aldrici*, the use which the forger made of it discloses such a lack of interest in its contents as to be hardly compatible with the idea that he fabricated it. His indifference is hardly surprising, for nowhere in his work does he betray the slightest concern with episcopal depositions. His interests lay elsewhere.<sup>59</sup>

The critics took it for granted that the decretal was fabricated to protect Aldric from deposition. According to Hampe and Simson, the time of composition was during the civil war of 840-843, when Aldric was momentarily driven from Le Mans by partisans of Lothar.<sup>60</sup> Fournier and

<sup>57</sup> *Gesta Aldrici*, edd. Charles-Froger, 125-6; the passage continues in the same vein with Aldric's influence at the court of Louis the Pious and is again inspired by a document.

<sup>58</sup> He wrote almost thirty years later, and Aldric's role had not been a matter of wide notoriety. We know of it only by accident (above n. 3).

<sup>59</sup> *The Le Mans Forgeries*, ch. V.

<sup>60</sup> Hampe, MGH, *Epistolae*, 5, 72 n. 2; Simson, "Le Mans-Hypothese," 56-61 (abundantly documented).

others preferred the date *c.* 850, when the enterprises of Nominoë, duke of Brittany, threatened the ecclesiastical integrity of the province of Tours and, more particularly, the diocese of Le Mans.<sup>61</sup> Those who favored the latter date argued against the former that Aldric, or anyone else, was unlikely to forge a letter of Gregory IV († 844) in his very lifetime. This objection is perfectly sound. Besides, the situation in the civil war of 840-843 was so fluid that, though driven out, Aldric never had reason to fear that his ejection would be followed by a regular deposition. His fortunes hinged on those of Charles the Bald, and except for brief moments there was no reason to despair. No bishops were in fact deposed.<sup>62</sup> A similar objection (which applies more generally to Fournier's explanation of the purpose of the Pseudo-Isidorian forgeries)<sup>63</sup> may be raised to the proposal that *Divinis praeceptis* was forged in 850 or thereabouts. A forgery was entirely vain and useless as a means to ward off a prince like Nominoë, who refused to be impressed by the quite genuine fulminations of kings, councils and popes.<sup>64</sup>

These proposed dates when Aldric had interest in a forged decretal of Gregory IV may both be knocked down with ease. Neither in 840 nor in 850 did he need a forgery, and in both cases he was confronted by adversaries against whom a forgery would have done him little good. By contrast, the claims of 833 — the date which the letter bears — are unimpeachable. Never in his career did Aldric need the document so much as then. Maine was a stronghold of Lothar's supporters; Aldric was freshly

<sup>61</sup> Fournier in *Rev. d'hist. eccl.*, 7 (1906), 781-3 (he previously agreed with Simson's date, *Nouv. rev. hist. de droit*, 11 [1887], 89-90); also in this sense, Lurz, *Über die Heimat*, 71-3; Seckel, as above n. 8.

<sup>62</sup> On the question of a forgery in Gregory's lifetime, it is obvious that, in this century, the volume of business transacted at the papal court was not so great as to make it possible for a forgery, especially so ambitious and unusual a one as this, to deceive the pope who was supposed to have issued it. One would thus have to imagine that the forger meant it only to scare off his antagonists in the Frankish kingdom. But again is it likely that these antagonists would have been so easily put off? In known cases, they were strikingly persistent. — On the civil war, F. Lot and L. Halphen, *Le règne de Charles le Chauve*, 1: 840-851, Bibliothèque de l'École des hautes-études, fasc. 175 (Paris, 1909), 1-84. L. Duchesne, *Fastes épiscopaux de l'ancienne Gaule*, 1-3 (Paris, 1907-1915), *passim*, discloses that no bishops were deposed; the bishops of Verdun and Cologne, who sided against Lothar, subsequently had a difficult time but without loss of office (3, 73-4, 181-2).

<sup>63</sup> *Rev. d'hist. eccl.*, 7 (1906), 765-772; Fournier-Le Bras, *Histoire*, 1, 196-8.

<sup>64</sup> Fournier, *Rev. d'hist. eccl.*, 7 (1906), 765-8, himself listed an impressive series of official *démarches* against Nominoë; why would forgeries have been more impressive? See the excellent, forthright statement of Lot, "La question," *Rev. hist.*, 94 (1907), 290-291. On the Breton troubles, Lot-Halphen, *Règne de Charles le Chauve*, 151-7, 166-7, 211-226.

elevated to the episcopate and stolidly loyal to Louis the Pious.<sup>65</sup> What is more, that is precisely the time when the decretal really could have helped Aldric, for Lothar and his partisans were sufficiently aware of the value of pope Gregory's support not to flout his wishes. The mere existence of the letter was enough to secure Aldric against a political deposition. Of course, if this is so, then the document is genuine, for, while Gregory might have intervened at the time to protect Aldric, Aldric himself could not possibly have expected to deceive anyone with a forgery pretending that Gregory did.<sup>66</sup>

The aspect of the letter that may still arouse legitimate suspicion is its text, which admittedly resembles a Pseudo-Isidorian fabrication more closely than a normal papal decretal of the ninth century.<sup>67</sup> The critics would probably have said more on this subject if they had not felt that the document was sufficiently condemned on other grounds. Seckel, for example, called the address "laughable in its magnificence,"<sup>68</sup> which suggests that, at first glance, the spuriousness of the letter is self-evident to the expert. Two special objections that have been addressed to the text deserve separate examination.

Hampe, building on the work of Hinschius and Simson, most thoroughly identified the sources incorporated in the decretal and established that its author relied chiefly on letters of Leo the Great, along with other genuine decretals and conciliar acts of the *Hispana*; the Bible and two fragments of Roman law were also quoted. Only one clause seemed to descend from a

<sup>65</sup> See above 22 with n. 3; Lothar's supporters in Maine implied by events of 834, *Vita Hludowici*, cc. 52-3, ed. Pertz, MGH, *Scriptores*, 2, 638-9; also Simson as above n. 60.

<sup>66</sup> Lot, *Bibl. Éc. chartes*, 102 (1941), 12-13: after eliminating 840 and 850, he concluded that 833 was the only suitable date for the letter; he nevertheless insisted it was a forgery, adding "Il n'est pas impossible que, à Colmar, Aldric ait obtenu une garantie, une sauvegarde, du pape Grégoire IV, sous une forme impossible à reconstituer". Though hardly a convincing hypothesis, this was a substantial step toward rehabilitation of the surviving decretal.

<sup>67</sup> Various attempts were made to link the style of *Divinis praeceptis* with that of Pseudo-Isidore, of the Le Mans forger and of bishop Aldric himself, but it is hardly necessary to reopen this line of inquiry. The resemblances are so few and inconclusive that they prove nothing unless surrounded by other evidence. See Simson, *Entstehung*, 70 (the expression mentioned is so common that it cannot be regarded as characteristic of any Carolingian author); Lot, *Bibl. Éc. Chartes*, 102 (1941), 13, cf. *ibid.*, 101 (1940), 5-37 *passim* (contains a fundamental contradiction; Aldric's style is first said to be completely different from the Le Mans forger's and, right afterwards, treated as though indistinguishable from the forger's).

<sup>68</sup> Seckel, as above n. 8. The address reads: "Dilectissimis fratribus universis coepiscopis per Galliam, Eoropiam [*sic*], Germaniam et per universas provincias constitutis Gregorius episcopus servus servorum Dei". Cf. a letter of Leo the Great: "Leo... universis episcopis per Campaniam et Picenum vel Tusciam et per universas provincias constitutis". Hampe, MGH, *Epistolae*, 5, 73 with n. 6.

suspicious source; on this basis, Fournier claimed that the author of the decretal had indeed relied on the *Hispana Gallica Augustodunensis* (Vatic. lat. 1341), an altered version of the *Hispana Gallica* that is regarded as the first effort of Pseudo-Isidore in deforming canon law.<sup>69</sup> *Divinis praeceptis* plainly agrees with the Pseudo-Isidorian reading of the passage against that of the *Hispana*:<sup>70</sup>

<i>Hispana</i>	sicut vetus consuetudo exigit (also: hoc enim et synodus Nicaena constituit atque definivit)
<i>Hisp. Gall.</i>	sicut vetus consuetudo exigit
<i>Dion.-Hadr.</i>	sicut synodus statuit
<i>Divin. praec.</i>	ut Nicæna sinodus definivit et beata consuetudo exigit
Autun <i>Hisp.</i>	sicut synodus statuit et beata consuetudo exigit
Ps.-Isidore	sicut synodus statuit et beata consuetudo exigit

But does it follow from this that *Divinis praeceptis* was itself a product of the Pseudo-Isidorian workshop? Several considerations urge that no such conclusion be drawn from so brief and isolated an item of evidence. Pope Gregory, as was seen, obtained canonical texts from Wala and Radbert, both monks of Corbie; in the view of current palaeographers, the earliest manuscripts of Pseudo-Isidore originate from Corbie; and there is now some doubt as to whether the Autun *Hispana* was a Pseudo-Isidorian *hors d'œuvre*.<sup>71</sup> What will emerge from these findings remains to be seen. It is already possible, in any case, to imagine an explanation for the reading of this passage in *Divinis praeceptis* other than that the letter is a Pseudo-Isidorian fabrication.

In another objection to the text of *Divinis praeceptis*, Fournier made much of the usage of "commonplace expressions" as a link between the decretal and Pseudo-Isidore. He drew attention to four quotations used in the decretal (three from letters of Leo) that express commonplace ideas, banalities, which turn out to have also been used frequently in the False Decretals. It seemed to Fournier that the same taste for commonplaces betrayed an identity of authorship.<sup>72</sup> The argument cannot be passed over

<sup>69</sup> *Nouv. rev. hist. de droit*, 11 (1887), 90 n. 1.

<sup>70</sup> The text in question is from the letter of Innocent I to Victorius of Rouen; parallel passages collected by Hampe, MGH, *Epistolae*, 5, 75 n. 1; they were verified, corrected and supplemented for me by Dr. Schafer Williams, notably from his microfilms of MSS Vienna lat. 411 (saec. VIII-IX), fol. 213-213<sup>v</sup> (*Hispana Gallica*); Vatic. lat. 1341 (saec. IX ex.), fol. 128 (Autun *Hispana*); Vatic. lat. 630 (saec. IX med.), fol. 207<sup>v</sup> and Vatic. *Ottobon.* 93 (saec. IX med.), fol. 118 (Pseudo-Isidore).

<sup>71</sup> Letter to me from Dr. Schafer Williams, 17 June 1965, about the Pseudo-Isidorian MSS and the Autun *Hispana*.

<sup>72</sup> *Nouv. rev. hist. de droit*, 12 (1888), 106-109; *Rev. d'hist. eccl.*, 7 (1906), 774-5. I wonder whether ninth-century authors would have agreed with Fournier that "banalities can be said in a thousand ways," especially when the commonplaces in question were papal.

but is far from peremptory; Simson for one never adopted it, even though his judgment of the decretal agreed with Fournier's.

Since all that might be said against the text of the decretal has probably not been said, it cannot be excluded that considerations of this sort will yet lead to its being condemned. Nevertheless, an unusual form and mode of composition are hardly irreconcilable with the idea that the document is genuine. The exceptional circumstances in which *Divinis praeceptis* was written are sufficient to justify many irregularities. One may imagine that its preparation was entrusted not to an official of the papal chancery but to a Frankish cleric, who happened to be in the pope's company.<sup>73</sup> This would explain the composition by strings of quotations which it displays, a characteristic of Frankish authors in general rather than specifically of Pseudo-Isidore.<sup>74</sup> It is also doubtful that the address, when sympathetically examined, will continue to seem "laughable."

To conclude, this study does not pretend to have solved every problem raised by the decretal of Gregory IV. An unqualified affirmation that *Divinis praeceptis* is authentic is probably premature. It has been shown, however, that the grounds on which the decretal has been condemned are inadequate, and that the evidence favoring its authenticity outweighs by far the objections that have been raised against it. This is a curious and interesting document, which sheds light upon several points of ninth-century history.<sup>75</sup> One hardly knows from which direction to mount a new, sustained argument that the letter is forged. If it is to continue to be doubted, better reasons will have to be offered than have been up to now.

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<sup>73</sup> It is noteworthy that Gregory's letter to the Frankish bishops (Jaffé<sup>2</sup> no. 2578; above n. 9) survives among the works of Agobard of Lyons, who may well have had a hand in drafting it; see in this sense Weinrich, *Wala*, 83 n. 72, and the sensible reservations of Hauck, *Kirchengeschichte*, 2, 517 n. 2.

<sup>74</sup> E.g. Jonas of Orleans, Hincmar of Reims, etc. It might be objected that the use of quotations by these authors does not have the quality of a mosaic, as do the letter of Gregory IV and Pseudo-Isidore. And yet, was not a pope best entitled to appropriate in this way the words of his predecessors? Cf. also E. Delaruelle in *Mélanges L. Halphen* (Paris, 1951), 191; F. Cabrol, art. "Centonisation," *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie*, 2 (1925), 3255. Composition by mosaic, far from being in principle a forger's technique, was widely practiced by liturgical authors.

<sup>75</sup> If, as seems possible, the reform party that was active in the events of 833 turns out to be related, if only as spiritual forebear, to the collaborators who were "Pseudo-Isidore," then the letter of Gregory IV might well have indirectly influenced the origins of the False Decretals. It may have taught "Pseudo-Isidore" how to go about his work.

# Notes on the Council and the Consistory of Rheims (1148)

NICHOLAS M. HARING, S.A.C.

## I

### THE PAPAL SUMMONS TO THE COUNCIL

ON 6 October 1147 Pope Eugene III thanked Suger, abbot of Saint-Denis (d. 1151) and administrator of the French kingdom, for offering him "loca regni tibi commissi pro voluntate nostra ad celebrandum concilium".<sup>1</sup> The letter, written at Auxerre, reveals that Eugene had planned the celebration of a council outside the territory administered by Suger during the absence of King Louis VII. The exact location originally contemplated is not quite certain, however.

On 11 October the pope sent a letter, carried by "John, subdeacon of the Roman Church," to Henry, bishop of Olmuetz (1126-1150), *ordering* him (*praecipiendo mandamus*) to attend a council to be held at Trier on *Laetare*-Sunday, 21 March 1148. A letter dispatched on the next day to Eberhardt, archbishop of Salzburg, the bishops, and abbots of his province, uses the same firm language of command (*praecipiendo mandamus*), announces the same date, but names Troyes as the locality where the council was to be convened.<sup>2</sup> But in view of Eugene's reply to Suger and the letter to Bishop Henry the reading *Trecas* (Troyes) is generally regarded as a scribal error.

The papal curia soon left Auxerre and on 30 November 1147 entered Trier preceded by numerous bishops "from every nation under the sky".<sup>3</sup> It seems that when complaints about increasing taxes became louder and louder Eugene decided in February 1148 to convene the council at Rheims<sup>4</sup> on the date fixed: 21 March 1148.

Those called upon to attend were, as we have seen, *ordered* to come:

<sup>1</sup> *Ep.* 229; PL 180, 1283CD.

<sup>2</sup> *Ep.* 231 (to Bishop Henry) and *Ep.* 232 (to Archb. Eberhardt); PL 180, 1284BD and 1285C.

<sup>3</sup> *Gesta Alberonis* 23; MGH SS 8, 255.

<sup>4</sup> H. Gieber, *Papst Eugen III*, in: *Beitr. zur mittelalt. und neueren Gesch.* 6 (Jena 1936) 83. Cf. Wibold, *Ep.* 63 (to Card. Jordan) and *Ep.* 64 (to Card. Guido, papal chancellor); ed. Ph. Jaffé, *Bibl. rer. germ.* 1: Mon. Corbeiensia (Berlin 1864) 140-141.

...per apostolica scripta... praecipiendo mandamus.<sup>5</sup> The pope's order included "the archbishops, bishops, and other prelates of churches from divers parts of the world"<sup>6</sup> that with their help and counsel and the assistance of the Holy Spirit he might correct what was amiss, and firmly lay down what had to be decreed. Nothing was to hold them back: *remota omni actione*.

The aging bishop of Olmuetz, Henry Zdik, asked to be excused. In a letter written from Trier on 18 December 1147 Eugene relieves him of his obligation to attend: "...in view of your many pressing duties... we absolve you".<sup>7</sup> But, in general, pressing duties were no sufficient excuse, and the failure to attend was punished with suspension.

At Rheims, as John of Salisbury writes, "the pope suspended the bishop of Winchester and the archbishops of Mainz and Cologne by name *and all those who failed to obey* the summons to the council in general".<sup>8</sup> It is difficult to appraise the extent and effect of this stern procedure.

The chronicler of Cologne notes of his archbishop (Arnold): ... *ab officio suo suspenditur quia se huic concilio subtraxerat*.<sup>9</sup> As administrator on behalf of King Konrad, the archbishop of Mainz may have felt he could not afford a prolonged absence. In September 1148 young Henry, King of the Romans, begged Eugene to excuse the archbishop who was then on his way to ask for the pope's forgiveness. Eugene never removed the suspension.<sup>10</sup>

Abbots were likewise suspended if they failed to obey the papal summons. The annalist of Brauweiler narrates: *Prutes episcopi Galliae et abbates ab Eugenio papa ab officiis suis suspensi sunt quorum unus domnus Amilius abbas noster fuit*.<sup>11</sup> Since the abbot died in 1149 the state of his health may very well have been the reason for his failure to attend the council.

The old archbishop of Trier was carried into Rheims lying on a stretcher mounted between two horses.<sup>12</sup> The bishop of Hereford, Robert of Be-thune, was in feeble health and fell ill on the third day of the council. He died at Rheims<sup>13</sup> on 14 or 16 April 1148. The bishop of Angoulême,

<sup>5</sup> *Epp.* 231 and 232; PL 180, 1284C and 1285C.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>7</sup> *Ep.* 241; PL 180, 1296D: ...*ut pro multis tibi instantibus negotiis vocationem ad concilium quod mediante Quadragesima, auctore Domino, celebrabimus, tibi pietatis gratia relaxemus... fraternitatem a iam dicti concilii vocatione absolvimus.*

<sup>8</sup> *Historia Pontificalis* 4; ed. Reg. L. Poole (Oxford 1927) 11. W. von Giesebrecht, *Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit* 4 (Braunschweig 1877) 315. H. Gleber, *Papst Eugen*, 89.

<sup>9</sup> *Chronica regia* (ad ann. 1149); *Recueil des hist.* 13, 721 D.

<sup>10</sup> (Wibald), *Ep.* 116 (99); ed. Jaffé 190. W. von Giesebrecht, *Geschichte* 4, 348.

<sup>11</sup> *Ann. Brunwilerenses* (ad ann. 1148); MGH SS 16, 707. H. Gleber, *Papst Eugen*, 91.

<sup>12</sup> *Gesta Alberonis* 24; MGH SS 8, 255.

<sup>13</sup> *Dict. Nat. Biogr.* 16 (1909) 1250.

Lambert de Palude, who is known to have attended the council, died on 13 June 1148, less than three months after the council.<sup>14</sup> The threat and fear of suspension is clearly reflected in the totally unfounded report that the bishops of Orleans and Troyes were deposed by Eugene at Rheims.<sup>15</sup>

How many Spanish bishops and abbots were suspended is, of course, also unknown. But we do know that the Spanish king himself pleaded on behalf of those who were struck by the papal penalty. Shortly after the council King Alfonso VII of Spain (1106-1157) asked Pope Eugene to lift the suspension incurred by those Spanish bishops and abbots "who did not come." Writing from Langres on 27 April 1148 Eugene replies: *Quia vero episcopus et abbates regni tui ad vocationem nostram tamquam devotus et humilis filius Remensi interesse concilio voluisti, benevolentiae gratias exhibentes, precum tuarum consideratione devicti eos qui non venerunt a suspensionis sententia relaxamus.*<sup>16</sup> Present at the council was Raymund, Primate of Toledo.<sup>17</sup>

While King Alfonso cooperated with Pope Eugene, King Stephen of England (1133-1189) granted no permission to attend except to the bishops of Hereford, Norwich, and Chichester. We have seen that the bishop of Hereford died at Rheims. The bishop of Norwich, William Turbe (1146-1174), had "the reputation of being a learned and accomplished scholar in an age which had not a few such men".<sup>18</sup> He went to Rheims. The bishop of Chichester, Hilary (1147-1169), did not attend. He incurred the sentence of the pope from which, as we shall see, he obtained absolution<sup>19</sup> in November 1148.

Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury (1139-1161) defied Stephen's restriction. Ralph Diceto writes: *Theobaldus Cantuarensis archiepiscopus Remis venit ad concilium sine licentia regis. Quare bonis suis omnibus spoliatus est.*<sup>20</sup> For his courage Theobald was praised publicly by Eugene at the council.<sup>21</sup> Speaking of Theobald Ralph Diceto adds: "His suffragans were suspended by the pope because they had not come to the coun-

<sup>14</sup> *Gall. chr.* 2, 1001.

<sup>15</sup> *Chron. Albrici mon. Trium Fontium* (ad ann. 1148); MGH SS 23, 840. Bishop Hatto of Troyes (1123-1145) resigned in 1140 and was succeeded by the Cistercian Henry (1145-1169). The bishop of Orleans, Manasses de Garlande (1146-1185 ?), is not otherwise known to have been under papal censure.

<sup>16</sup> *Ep.* 297; PL 180, 1346D-1347A.

<sup>17</sup> Hefele-Leclercq, *Hist. des conciles* V, 823.

<sup>18</sup> *Dict. Nat. Biogr.* 21 (1909) 360.

<sup>19</sup> R. Diceto, *Abbrev. chronica*. (ad ann. 1147); ed. William Stubbs, Rolls Series 68, 1 (London 1876) 263. *Dict. Nat. Biogr.* 9 (1908) 831.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, 262.

<sup>21</sup> Gervase, *Chronica* (ad ann. 1147); ed. William Stubbs, Rolls Series 73, 1 (London 1879) 133.

cil."<sup>22</sup> This means that suspension was incurred by the incumbents of Asaph, Bangor, Bath, Chichester, St. David, Ely, Exeter, Lichfield, Lincoln, Llandaf, London, Rochester, Salisbury, Winchester, and Worcester. We know less about the number of English abbots suspended by Eugene. But they, too, incurred the papal sentence, as is clearly implied by John of Salisbury: Theobald "released from suspension all English bishops and abbots with the exception of Henry of Winchester who went to Rome and personally obtained absolution".<sup>23</sup> According to the chronicler Gervase,<sup>24</sup> Theobald absolved at Faversham on 11 November 1148 the following four bishops: Simon of Worcester (1125-1150), Robert of Bath (1136-1166), Robert of Exeter (1138-1155), and Hilary of Chichester (1147-1169).

Present at the council was the Cistercian Henry Murdac, archbishop of York, whom Eugene had consecrated at Trier on 7 December 1147. Likewise present were the bishops of Hereford and Norwich and two archdeacons of York, Masters Walter and Geoffrey.<sup>25</sup> The future archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket, and the future archbishop of York, Roger, also attended the council.<sup>26</sup>

Only one Italian bishop, Crassantius of Mantua, is said to have come to the council. Rather than summon the Italian dignitaries Eugene had decided to celebrate a council at Cremona on 7 July 1148 to promulgate the decrees of Rheims.<sup>27</sup>

In view of the severe penalties attached to any disregard of the papal orders it is quite understandable that the number of attendants was so considerable that according to the chronicler of Cambrai nobody knew the exact number of the bishops and abbots that came "from the remote parts of the Ocean".<sup>28</sup> According to one estimate<sup>29</sup> the number of archbishops, bishops, and abbots was as high as 1100. A more conservative writer in Austria places the "multitude of bishops and abbots" close to "400 and more".<sup>30</sup>

Less understandable in view of the numerous suspensions incurred

<sup>22</sup> R. Diceto, *Abbrev. chronic.*; ed. Stubbs 262. J. Mabillon, *Annales OSB* 79, 12; ed. Lucca 6 (1745) 403.

<sup>23</sup> *Hist. pont.* 40; p. 80.

<sup>24</sup> *Chronica* (ad ann. 1147); ed. Stubbs 138.

<sup>25</sup> N. M. Haring, "Das sogenannte Glaubensbekenntnis des Reimser Konsistoriums von 1148," in: *Scholastik* 40 (1965) 84, n. 170.

<sup>26</sup> *Hist. pont.* 8; p. 18.

<sup>27</sup> *Hist. pont.* 21; p. 50.

<sup>28</sup> *Annales camerac.* (ad ann. 1148); MGH SS 16, 517: ...plures de remotis partibus oceani episcopi et abbates convenerunt pluralitatem quorum nemo perfecte verbo comprehendit.

<sup>29</sup> *Chronicon Albrici* (ad ann. 1149); Recueil des hist. 13, 701C. *Sigeberti contin. Gemblacensis* MGH SS 9, 504.

<sup>30</sup> *Ann. Mellic.* (ad ann. 1148); MGH SS 9, 504.

by untold bishops and abbots in the four kingdoms is the recent claim that full of enthusiasm and excitement prelates and scholars hurried to Rheims, especially because of Gilbert's trial — which, it may be added, is not even mentioned in Eugene's letters to Bishop Henry of Olmuetz and Archbishop Eberhardt of Salzburg.

S. Gammersbach<sup>31</sup> writes: Der "Fall Gilbert" muss in der damaligen wissenschaftlichen Welt ein ungeheueres Aufsehen erregt haben. Alles was Rang und Namen hatte, war nach Reims geeilt. The sober facts of recorded history do not justify such a cheerful interpretation of the events. We shall see that the interest in Gilbert's trial after the council was so small that Eugene had to hold back a number of dignitaries to bring about a final settlement.

In evaluating the actual number of the ecclesiastics attending the council the involvement of St. Bernard should not be overlooked. In 1148 the number of Cistercian communities was already considerable. Since abbots were included in the pope's summons,<sup>32</sup> a substantial number of Cistercians must have journeyed to Rheims, not to mention Benedictines, Canons Regular, Premonstratensians, the Order of Cluny, and others. The bishops assembled, as Geoffrey puts it, came from the four kingdoms of Gaul, Germany, England, and Spain.<sup>33</sup> And in keeping with the time, they came with their retinues. If their number was too large to be fixed with accuracy, an equal or rather larger number of servants and horses must be included. Rheims was hardly prepared for such an increase of its population.<sup>34</sup> Hence it stands to reason that the council had to be of short duration. We are told that it lasted eleven days.<sup>35</sup> It was probably shorter.

<sup>31</sup> *Gilbert von Poitiers und seine Prozesse im Urteil der Zeitgenossen*, in: *Neue Münstersche Beiträge zur Geschichtsf.* 5 (Cologne 1959) 80.

<sup>32</sup> The summons may have gone out only to abbots of outstanding merits, though no such restriction has come to my attention. The *Chronicon Laurehamense* (Lorsch); MGH SS 21, 440 notes: Folcnandus abbas ad Remense concilium evocatus hoc ab eo privilegium obtinuit... In his letters to Bishop Henry (PL 180, 1296D) and to King Alfonso (PL 180, 1346D) Pope Eugene speaks of his summons as a *vocatio*. The *privilegium* referred to by the chronicler was issued on 29 March 1148. This is an indication that the council which opened on 21 March 1148 may have closed before 29 March. The text of the *privilegium* is still extant in Pope Eugene's epistolary, *Ep.* 265; PL 180, 1314C-1316A.

<sup>33</sup> *Libellus* 4; PL 185, 596D.

<sup>34</sup> A vivid description of the impact on prices and the problems of food supplies at the council of Trent is found in H. Jedin, *Geschichte des Konzils von Trient* 1 (Freiburg i.B. 1951) 434-556. Similar conditions must have prevailed at Rheims. The problems were already felt at Trier in January of that year or even earlier, for at the end of the year 1147 Abbot Wibald wrote a letter to Cardinal Guido (the papal chancellor) and a letter to Card. Jordan to explain how much he had done for the "procuratio domni papae". In both letters he speaks of the number of *murmurantes* to which he did not wish to belong. Cf. *Epp.* 63 and 64; ed. Jaffé 140-141.

<sup>35</sup> *Gaufredi chronica* (ad ann. 1148); MGH SS 26, 201.

## II

## THE COUNCIL OF RHEIMS

The solemn opening of the council took place at Notre-Dame Cathedral on *Laetare*-Sunday, 21 March 1148. Eugene and the curia had arrived on or before 9 March. John of Salisbury assures us that passionate arguments about rights of primacy started many days before the official opening.<sup>1</sup> When in one instance words failed, the enraged opponents changed over to bodily assault.<sup>2</sup> Eugene refused to make quick decisions and, as John of Salisbury puts it somewhat sarcastically, "all received the same answer as the archbishop of Lyons"<sup>3</sup> who had apparently been the first to present his jurisdictional claims.

Busily engaged in receiving these prelates, Pope Eugene instructed Cardinals Julius and John Paparo to settle a controversy between Abbots Eustachius of Saint-Pierre (Jumièges) and Robert of Saint-Vincent (Le Mans). The final decision was enacted on 5 April 1148: *Actum in capitulo Remensi... Ego Iulius presbiter cardinalis tit. s. Marcelli controversiam istam ex mandato domini papae Eugenii terminavi et ideo ss. (subscripsi) et pro sigillo roboravi.* Cardinal John made the same declaration.<sup>4</sup> Other records testify to similar activities at Rheims.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. pont.* 1; p. 5. H. Fuhrmann, "Studien zur Geschichte der mittelalt. Patriarchate," *Zeitschr. der Savigny-Stiftung f. Rechtsgeschichte, kan. Abt.* 4 (1955) 95-183.

<sup>2</sup> H. Gleber, *Papst Eugen*, 85. *Gesta Alberonis* 24; MGH SS 8, 255.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. pont.* 1; p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> J. Ramackers, "Papsturkunden in Frankreich," NF 5: *Abh. der Akad. der Wissensch. in Göttingen* III, 35 (Göttingen 1935) 155, No. 76.

<sup>5</sup> S. Loewenfeld, *Epistolae Pont. Rom. ineditae* (Leipzig 1885), 106, No. 202: on 12 April 1148 Eugene confirmed at Rheims a settlement arbitrated by Cardinals Julius and Hyacinth. It concerned a litigation between the Knights of the Holy Sepulchre and the Benedictine William, abbot of Aniane. Another instance is recorded by the annalist of Ottobeuren: *Remis synodus celebratur ubi ab Apostolico Eugenio privilegium per abbatem Isingrimum loco nostro datur. Ann. Ottenburani Isingrimi minores* (ad ann. 1148); MGH SS 17, 315. In a letter, dated Tusculum 14 June 1149 and addressed to the archbishop of Tours, Eugene refers to a sentence of excommunication passed on the bishops of Dol and Brioux and confirmed at Rheims: *Sententia excommunicationis fuit in eos a te, frater archiepiscopo, promulgata et in Remensi concilio a nobis postmodum confirmata.* *Ep.* 353; PL 180, 1393A. A rather amusing forgery found among the letters of Pope Eugene (*Ep.* 591; PL 180, 1609B-1611A) claims to be a *privilegium* granted at Rheims on 23 March 1148 (on the third day of the council) signed by Cardinal Dietwin (who was in Palestine), Cardinals Octavian (of S. Cecilia), Bernard (of S. Clemente), Hubald ("bishop of Ferentino"), and Hyacinth (of "S. Adriano", in reality of S. Maria in Cosmedin): *Praesentibus et annitentibus* (= *annuentibus*) *episcopis Iohanne Ostiensi, Widone Praenestino, Samsone Remensi, Gisiberto Pictaviensi, Adalberone Trevirensi, Hartberto Utreysi, Bernardo Clarevallis.* *Datum Remis per manum Rolandi cancellarii X Kal. Aprilis....*

Eugene placed two items on the agenda of the council: first, a number of canons which were to be discussed and approved; second, the heretic Eon de Stella, a mental case, who in the words of Otto of Freising was not even worthy of being called a heretic.<sup>6</sup> Most of the canons were not new and had been approved by two previous councils held by Innocent II at Rheims (1131) and Rome (Lateran 1139). They were finally "promulgated with their interpretations and explanations, and approved by general consent with one exception".<sup>7</sup> Reynold of Dassel, later chancellor of Frederick Barbarossa, "and other Germans" protested against a regulation concerning clerical garb as explained in the second canon.<sup>8</sup> Eon de Stella seems to have caused some amusement and was finally handed over to Suger for punishment. He died not long after the council.<sup>9</sup>

### III

#### THE CONSISTORY OF RHEIMS 1148

If the council lasted eleven days, it came to an end on 1 April 1148. Most participants must have been quite anxious to depart.<sup>1</sup> But Eugene told a number of attendants to stay behind in order to bring the investigation into Gilbert's teaching to a final conclusion.

According to Otto of Freising the "more prudent judges" and those from less distant places were detained to close the case: ...*prudenteriores et viciniore ad causam episcopi Giliberti terminandam reservantur*.<sup>2</sup> The fact that Eugene retained a number of dignitaries is confirmed by John of Salisbury: ...*commanentibus adhuc diversarum provinciarum archiepiscopis et episcopis ad huius causae decisionem retentis*.<sup>3</sup> The implication is clear: those members of the assembly would have left if they had not been held back by the Pontiff. In other words, they were not interested enough in the trial to stay a day longer than the council required.

It has been claimed that "the French Church" pressed the pope for a

<sup>6</sup> *Gesta Frid.* I, 57; MGH SS (ad usum schol.) 46, 81. Hefele-Leclercq, *Hist. des conciles* V, 828.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. pont.* 3; p. 9. The canons have come down to us in two quite different versions: Mansi 21, 713-719. Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire* V, 824-827.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. pont.* 3; p. 9.

<sup>9</sup> *Gesta Frid.* I, 57; p. 81.

<sup>1</sup> A remark made by Geoffrey, *Ep. ad. Alb.* 13; PL 185, 595A, allows us to conclude that on the day after Gilbert's trial about 15 bishops were still in Rheims. Cf. N. M. Haring, "Das sogenannte Glaubensbekenntnis", 76, n. 123.

<sup>2</sup> *Gesta Frid.* I, 58; p. 82.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. pont.* 11; p. 26.

"quick condemnation" and that it seems to have advocated "Gilbert's complete submission".<sup>4</sup> Such claims not only lack historical proof but are also at variance with verifiable historical facts. The "French episcopate" which, as we are told, closed its ranks against the cardinals was in reality a *very small group* of men wise enough to interest St. Bernard in their cause. Needless to say, neither St. Bernard nor Suger could spare the time required to study the teaching of a scholar whom they endeavoured to convict in the presence of a fortunately more impartial arbiter.

The trial lasted two days. If Otto's remark:<sup>5</sup> *Decursa medianae Quadragesimae ebdomada sacroque dominicae passionis tempore inchoante episcopus Pictavinus... rursus ad iudicium trahitur* means the week after *Iudica*-Sunday, the trial took place during the week before Palm Sunday (4 April). Assuming that the council ended on Thursday, 1 April, the trial was held on Friday and Saturday (2-3 April). If the council closed earlier, the probable date of the trial was Monday and Tuesday (29-30 March), as indicated by Otto.

To draw a clear line between consistory and council, Pope Eugene transferred the debate to the archbishop's *cubiculum*, as Otto of Freising puts it.<sup>6</sup> The erroneous statement that Gilbert was dealt with in *concilio quod Papa Eugenius Remis celebravit*, was first made by St. Bernard<sup>7</sup> who knew that the council was officially closed before the consistory began. More accurate, though by no means precise, is the statement found in the *Libellus* against Gilbert written by Geoffrey of Auxerre after Gilbert's death on 4 September 1154: *Factaque est inquisitio tertia in urbe Remorum ubi praedictus papa magnum eodem anno concilium celebravit*.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> S. Gammersbach, *Gilbert von Poitiers* 96-99: An der Bestimmtheit und Feierlichkeit der Erklärung... erkennt man sogleich, dass die französische Kirche fest entschlossen war, auf eine schnelle Verurteilung der Gilbert zur Last gelegten Sätze hinzudrängen. (p. 95): Es lässt sich leicht erraten, dass das Vorgehen Bernhards und der französischen Kirche im Kardinalskollegium mehr als nur überraschte... Wie zuvor der französische Episkopat schlossen jetzt die Kardinäle die Reihen eng zusammen. (p. 99): Die französischen Kirche scheint auf eine völlige Unterwerfung Gilberts... hingedrängt zu haben.

<sup>5</sup> *Gesta Frid.* I, 58; p. 82.

<sup>6</sup> *Gesta Frid.* I, 58; p. 82.

<sup>7</sup> *Serm. super Cant. cant.* 80, 4, 8; ed. J. Leclercq and C. H. Talbot, *S. Bernardi Opera* 2 (Rome 1958) 283. M. Colker, "The Trial of Gilbert of Poitiers," in: *Med. St.* 27 (1965) 152-183, never mentions the consistory and by his repeated references to the council ignores an important distinction which only Gilbert's opponents had reasons to blur. The council had nothing to do with Gilbert and was formally dissolved before the consistory opened. Yet M. Colker speaks of "the symbolum adopted by the Rheims Council" (p. 183) and claims that at least Gilbert's first Boethian tractate was "a center of contestation at the Council" (p. 165).

<sup>8</sup> *Libellus* 4; PL 185, 596 D.

Rather vague is his later remark: *Sic in auribus Romanae ecclesiae et multitudinis episcoporum quos ad Remense concilium apostolica convocaverat auctoritas...*<sup>9</sup> We may add in passing that the "multitudo episcoporum" of which Geoffrey speaks was no longer in Rheims.

Geoffrey knew, of course, that the trial was held at a consistory. He admits the fact to Cardinal Albinus: "Ingredientibus vero nobis *consistorium*..."<sup>10</sup> It is therefore slightly ludicrous of him to declare: *Ibidem dominus papa auctoritate apostolica de assensu totius ecclesiae quae convenerat capitula ista damnavit.*<sup>11</sup> Even if we admit that "the entire Church" means this particular gathering,<sup>12</sup> it is simply not true that the entire group consented to the alleged condemnation, for there were numerous dissenters among those involved.<sup>13</sup>

While the trial was being held, Bishop Otto was "on the high seas" on his way to Jerusalem after the disastrous attempts to reach the Holy City by land.<sup>14</sup> Present at the trial was John of Salisbury, one of Gilbert's former students, now in the papal service. Like Bishop Otto he seems to be anxious to draw a clear line between the council, whose conclusion was reached with the promulgation of its canons,<sup>15</sup> and the consistory or *curia* at which Gilbert was tried: *Evocatus apparebat in curia vir aetate nostra litteratissimus magister Gislebertus...*<sup>16</sup> Later he writes: *Tandem a curia digressi...*<sup>17</sup> He also uses the word consistory saying: *Altera die cum dominus papa sederet in consistorio...*<sup>18</sup>

He quotes Gilbert's address to the pope in which the words occur: *...in sacro consistorio vestro.*<sup>19</sup>

The promulgation of the "creed", as recorded by John of Salisbury,<sup>20</sup> was made in the archbishop's residence, the so-called Tau-Palace, "not

<sup>9</sup> *Libellus* 27; PL 185, 605A.

<sup>10</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 4; PL 185, 589C.

<sup>11</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 8; PL 185, 592B.

<sup>12</sup> In twelfth-century usage, a local monastic community could be called *ecclesia* such as *ecclesia cisterciensis, clarevallensis, cluniacensis*, and so on.

<sup>13</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 6; PL 185, 591A: *Nec deerant qui pro eo se opponerent, licet parum intelligentes.* Without adding this sort of slur he declares later (*Ibid.* 8; PL 185, 592A): *...etsi stare visi fuerant aliqui pro persona sed non stabant aliquatenus pro doctrina.* *Libellus* 5; PL 185, 597A: *...ibi quoque, etsi pauci admodum pro doctrina starent sed plurimi pro persona.* *Libellus* 27; PL 185, 605A: *...heu, inter catholicos profitenti non defuere fautores.*

<sup>14</sup> *Gesta Frid.* I, 57; p. 81.

<sup>15</sup> *Hist. pont.* 3; p. 11.

<sup>16</sup> *Hist. pont.* 8; p. 16.

<sup>17</sup> *Hist. pont.* 10; p. 22.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*; p. 23.

<sup>20</sup> *Hist. pont.* 11; p. 26.

during the council but two weeks after the dissolution of the council".<sup>21</sup> Geoffrey remarks to Cardinal Albinus that the trial took place in the Tau-Palace: *Inde fuit quod in insigni palatio, cui nomen est Thau, ecclesia universa conveniens...*<sup>22</sup>

Even before the debate began it became obvious that Gilbert had instructed his clerics to bring into the hall the books he expected to use in his defence. To show that his teaching was in full accord with the teaching of the Fathers and the Church he did not compile a "patristic collection" of any kind but rather insisted on displaying his evidence in its authentic context.<sup>23</sup> His accusers, on the other hand, entered the hall with "a few *auctoritates* on a single *scedula*".<sup>24</sup>

Otto of Freising was made aware of this difference as he reveals in the statement: *Ille orthodoxorum patrum, quas non in scedulis decisas sed in corpore librorum integras attulerat, legi faciens auctoritates eandem se quam illi fidem tenere asserebat.*<sup>25</sup> When Gilbert's patrons — *fautores illius hominis*, as Geoffrey chooses to word it — did not hesitate to draw the opposition's attention to the difference, Geoffrey denounced their action as slander. His description reflects the tense atmosphere at the opening hour: *Ingredientibus vero nobis consistorium prima die, cum magnorum voluminum corpora per clericos suos Pictaviensis fecisset afferri et nos paucas auctoritates ecclesiae in sola scedula haberemus, occasione accepta calumpniabantur fautores illius hominis quod decurtata testimonia proferremus cum ille codices integros exhiberet ubi posset intelligi quemadmodum verbis propositis praecedentia vel sequentia adhaerent.*<sup>26</sup>

As a result the debate must have had its share of dull moments<sup>27</sup> despite

<sup>21</sup> *Hist. pont.* 11; p. 26. If the council was dissolved on Thursday, 1 April 1148, the promulgation was made about 15 April. The last known papal document issued at Rheims is dated 18 April 1148. *Ep.* 239; PL 180, 128D. A few days earlier (14 or 16 April) the bishop of Hereford died in Rheims.

<sup>22</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 8; PL 185, 592B. See also the *Vita S. Bernardi prima* III, 5, 15, PL 185, 312 C.

<sup>23</sup> This fact has been underestimated by M. Colker, "The Trial" 158ff., who favours the idea that in his defence Gilbert used a compilation of excerpts, though both Otto and Geoffrey clearly agree that Gilbert did *not* use a collection of texts. The purpose of Gilbert's procedure is well described by Geoffrey, *Ep. ad Albinum* 4; PL 185, 589D: ...cum ille (Gilbert) codices integros exhiberet ubi posset intelligi quemadmodum verbis propositis praecedentia vel sequentia adhaerent. In other words, Gilbert did not believe in separating a text from its context.

<sup>24</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 4; PL 185, 589D.

<sup>25</sup> *Gesta Frid.* I, 58; p. 82.

<sup>26</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 4; PL 185, 589D.

<sup>27</sup> According to Otto, *Gesta Frid.* I, 58; p. 82, Pope Eugene was "almost bored": *Cum huiusmodi sermone seu legendi prolixitate dies detineretur, tamquam tedio affectus Romanus inquit*

the fact that the reading of texts was done with such dispatch that Geoffrey complains about the speed.<sup>28</sup>

As soon as the debates of the first day had come to an end, St. Bernard's secretary, Geoffrey of Auxerre, went to the cathedral library to borrow books. One of the volumes he borrowed was St. Augustine's *De Trinitate*.<sup>29</sup> Geoffrey describes the effect of this move: "On the following day we brought so many *codices* to the debate that the bishop's patrons were struck dumb with amazement and had to be told by us: 'Look, we no longer have those sheets of paper'".<sup>30</sup>

At the end of that second day the cardinals declared: "We have heard both sides. We shall now decide how to settle the issue".<sup>31</sup>

#### IV

##### THE PROFESSION OF FAITH AND GEOFFREY'S SCRIPTURA

Since there was not a single cardinal at Rheims who, as John of Salisbury relates,<sup>1</sup> was not "opposed to the abbot in mind, thought, and deed" the cardinals' decision could hardly be expected to culminate in a condemnation of Gilbert. Geoffrey<sup>2</sup> tells us that, faced with this prospect of failure, ten archbishops and quite a number (*plurima multitudo*) of bishops, abbots, and *magistri* met at St. Bernard's residence (*hospicium*) on the following day.<sup>3</sup> Both Otto of Freising<sup>4</sup> and John of Salisbury<sup>5</sup>

antistes: Multa, frater, dicis, multa et ea fortassis quae a nobis non intelliguntur legi facis.... Gilbert, too, was tired: diutina collatione fatigatus. M. Colker paints a much livelier picture of the scene: "At this trial Gilbert's learning and nimble thinking, as he rapidly cited authorities, dazzled" (p. 155). He describes it as a "stunning defence" (p. 158), a "brilliant, if also bewildering defence" (pp. 155f.), "as a war in which the opposing factions hurled at each other passages from the Church Fathers as the chief ammunition" (p. 159). A less dramatic description is no doubt closer to the truth.

<sup>28</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 6; PL 185, 591A.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*, 5; PL 185, 590B.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*, 6; PL 185, 590D.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*, 7; PL 185, 591B: ...ut dicerent domini cardinales: Quia ecce audivimus quae proposita sunt. Deinceps iudicabimus qualiter debeant definiri.

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. pont.* 9; p. 21. Speaking of the cardinals, Geoffrey, *Ep. ad Albinum* 7; PL 185, 591C declares: ...iudicium sibi solis videbantur reservare quos noverant fere omnes errantis potius quam erroris fautores. Geoffrey never seems to have considered the possibility that in the appraisal of Gilbert's teaching he himself might have been mistaken.

<sup>2</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 7; PL 185, 591C.

<sup>3</sup> According to the *Hist. pont.* 8; p. 18 the meeting took place before the consistory. Both Otto (*Gesta Frid.* I, 84; p. 84) and Geoffrey (*Ep. ad Albinum* 7; PL 185, 591C) describe it as resulting from the debates.

<sup>4</sup> *Gesta Frid.* I, 58; p. 84: Moxque ad publicum progressus omnes quos poterat convocavit.

state that the meeting was not a spontaneous gathering but called by St. Bernard. Understandably, neither Pope Eugene nor the cardinals were present.

At the meeting St. Bernard proposed a profession of faith whose original form, as recorded by John of Salisbury,<sup>6</sup> was not accepted without protest.<sup>7</sup> Some quick action had to be taken, for there were "not a few" among those present at the meeting who were inclined to let "the council (= the meeting) be dissolved without a definition".<sup>8</sup> The profession of faith was conceived as an answer to the four *capitula* and was dictated *non sine multa deliberatione*.<sup>9</sup> The names of those "present at the council" (= meeting) were added and three dignitaries—the Cistercian Hugh of Mâcon, bishop of Auxerre, the Premonstratensian Milo, bishop of Théroutanne, and the Benedictine Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis—were delegated to submit the *scriptura* to the pope and the cardinals.<sup>10</sup> Geoffrey has recorded the strong message the three delegates were instructed to deliver.<sup>11</sup> At this juncture of the events, the person on trial was no longer Gilbert but Pope Eugene III who was faced with both the determined group led by St. Bernard and an equally determined curia whose spokesman reminded Eugene in no uncertain terms that the time had finally come to forget "old and new friendships," think of the Church Universal, and punish the outrageous audacity of such novel procedure in matters concerning the faith.<sup>12</sup>

Speaking of the *scriptura* delivered by the delegation, Geoffrey, who must have played an important role in the final drafting of this so-called profession of faith,<sup>13</sup> does not say anything about patristic texts contained

According to the author of the *Liber de vera philosophia* the number of those who heeded the call was rather small: cum paucissimis familiaribus suis in ospicio suo.... Cf. P. Fournier, *Études sur Joachim de Flore* (Paris 1909), 67.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. pont.* 8; p. 18: Petitione ipsius in eius hospicio convenerunt. Later (*ibidem* 11; p. 24) John refers to the locality as camera abbatis.

<sup>6</sup> *Hist. pont.* 8; p. 19.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. N. M. Haring, "Das sogenannte Glaubensbekenntnis," 65.

<sup>8</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 7; PL 185, 591D: Sed credebant nonnullos eorum ad hoc tendere ut sine aliqua definitione concilium solveretur. It should be noted that Geoffrey speaks of "dissolving the council" rather than dissolving the meeting.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>10</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 8; PL 185, 591D.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*. It seems that Gilbert had submitted a statement to the pope. The "fidei symbolum" (591C) was presented to the pontiff as an irrevocable reply to Gilbert's statement.

<sup>12</sup> *Gesta Frid.* I, 60; pp. 85-86.

<sup>13</sup> *Hist. pont.* 11; p. 25: Sunt autem in hunc concepta modum, fortassis de conscientia domini papae, a domino G. Autisiodorensi.

in the document sent to the pope and the curia. This fact weakens the assumption that the text edited by J. Leclercq<sup>14</sup> may be the *scriptura* submitted at Rheims.

The text published by Leclercq is in all likelihood an early attempt, presumably Geoffrey's own, to offer a compilation of patristic texts similar perhaps to the small collection prepared by Abbot Godescalc.<sup>15</sup> While Geoffrey was writing to Cardinal Albinus, a *scriptura* was discovered which, as we are told, Geoffrey had edited ante annos paene quadraginta with a list of ten archbishops, bishops, abbots and masters.<sup>16</sup> This has been interpreted as a reference to Geoffrey's *Libellus*.<sup>17</sup> But, while the *Libellus* has no such list of archbishops, bishops, abbots, and *magistri*, the text edited by Leclercq answers the description of the *scriptura* given by Geoffrey.<sup>18</sup> Hence it is probably something like Geoffrey's first draft or edition of the *Libellus* which contains almost all the patristic excerpts, generally of identical length, found in the document edited by Leclercq.

The approximate date of this document or *scriptura*, as Geoffrey calls it, can be established with the help of Geoffrey's letter to Cardinal Albinus whom he addresses as bishop of Albano and *domini papae vicarius*. Consecrated bishop of Albano between 18 May and 6 June 1189, Cardinal Albinus is known to have acted as *vicarius papae* in July 1191 as recorded in a charter of King Tancred.<sup>19</sup> Augustine, the cardinal's messenger to Geoffrey, could easily supply this information. If we assume that Geoffrey wrote in 1191 or rather 1192, his remark that he composed the *scriptura* "almost forty years ago" would bring the date down to 1152 or 1153. John of Salisbury<sup>20</sup> knew Geoffrey's *Libellus*, for he comments on its elegant style — of which Geoffrey was indeed a master — and adds that it was written after Gilbert's death (4 September 1154). Considering that the

<sup>14</sup> "Textes sur Saint-Bernard et Gilbert de la Porrée," in: *MedSt* 14 (1952) 108-109.

<sup>15</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 3; PL 185, 589A: Qui... notavit capitula et ex libris sanctorum catholicorum Patrum auctoritates paucas manifeste contrarias scripsit in scedula.

<sup>16</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 13; PL 185, 595A: Scriptura... cum ipso symbolo quod domino papae et Romanae ecclesiae ex parte decem archiepiscoporum et omnium episcoporum paene qui in illa adhuc die Remis inventi sunt cum abbatibus... et magistris scholarum et subscriptis nominibus singulorum...

<sup>17</sup> In his preface (p. xxxviii) to the *Historia Pontificalis* Poole identifies the *Libellus* with the *scriptura* just discovered by one of Geoffrey's confrères.

<sup>18</sup> Leclercq (p. 108) points to Geoffrey's description and draws the conclusion: L'écrit dont parle ici Geoffroy est son *Libellus* bien connu. The manner in which Geoffrey describes the *scriptura* (see 2 notes, above) rules out the *Libellus*, since it does not contain the *nomina subscripta singulorum*.

<sup>19</sup> See Poole's preface (p. xxxix) to the *Historia Pontificalis*. V. Pfaff, "Die Kardinäle unter Coelestin III (1191-1198)," in: *Zeitschr. der Savigny-Stiftung f. Rechtsgesch., kan. Abt.* 41 (1955) 84.

<sup>20</sup> *Hist. pont.* 11; p. 26.

*scriptura* is so much shorter than the *Libellus*, we can more readily understand that a copy of the *scriptura* accompanied Geoffrey's letter to the cardinal.

The fact that the *scriptura* contains two excerpts from Theodoret "the Greek" should be sufficient proof that its patristic collection was not compiled in its entirety by Abbot Godescalc. The presence of those two excerpts shows that its author, presumably Geoffrey, had found time to examine at least one of the *magnorum voluminum corpora* which Gilbert's clerics had brought to the consistory. In addition, the *scriptura* edited by Leclercq contains an Augustinian text (*De Trin.* V, 10, 11) which Geoffrey discovered after visiting the cathedral library of Rheims.<sup>21</sup>

## V

### THE SO-CALLED ACTS OF THE TRIAL

When John of Salisbury collected source material for what is known as his *Historia Pontificalis*, he planned to insert the text of the creed that played a role at the end of Gilbert's trial at the consistory of Rheims. This so-called profession of faith was, as we have seen, divided into four parts as a reply to four errors or heresies of which Gilbert was accused. Although those alleged errors are generally called *capitula*, John calls *capitula* the profession of faith.

He offers two versions of this profession of faith. The first of these two versions he probably jotted down at the meeting called by St. Bernard in connection with the trial. The profession of faith proposed by St. Bernard on this occasion was short and concise, but both the wording and the order were changed after the meeting described by John of Salisbury.<sup>1</sup>

After Gilbert's death on 4 September 1154, Geoffrey of Auxerre, then abbot of Igny, composed his *Libellus contra capitula Gisleberti Pictavensis episcopi*<sup>2</sup> in which a much more elaborate version of the profession, called *symbolum fidei*, is found.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Haring, "Das sogenannte Glaubensbekenntnis," 62, n. 41.

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. pont.* 8; p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> It was first published in J. Mabillon, *S. Bernardi opera* II, 6 (Paris: Thomas Moette 1690) 1325A-1339C, transcribed for Mabillon from a Longpont manuscript and sent to him by the Prior of Clairvaux, Jean-Baptiste de Noinville, whom he describes in the preface to vol. 5 as: *religiosus ac pius vir D. Iohannes Baptista de Noinville eiusdem loci (Clairvaux) Prior, amicus meus qui et Gaufridi S. Bernardi notarii libellum adversus Gilberti Porretani errores ex codice Longi-Pontis nobis suppeditavit.*

<sup>3</sup> *S. Bernardi opera* II, 6, 1339AC: PL 185, 617B-618B.

It seems that when John of Salisbury became aware of the expanded and revised version he decided to examine the papal records. He reports on the results of his research in the *Historia pontificalis* written in its present form in 1164: "Although I was present when they were published, I have not been able to find those *capitula* either among the acts of the council or in the register (*regestum*) of Pope Eugene." Then he adds: "I found them in Geoffrey's writings".<sup>4</sup>

John had many opportunities to examine the papal archives. During the years 1146-1159 he crossed the Alps ten times. His first journey was to Viterbo late in 1146; the second, after the council of Rheims, to Viterbo and Tusculum; the third, to Ferentino and Benevento, extended from September 1155 to about February 1156.<sup>5</sup>

The register of Pope Eugene was still extant on 18 February 1168-1170 when Pope Alexander III wrote in a letter from Benevento to Gerard, archbishop of Spalato and papal legate: *In registro Patris et praedecessoris nostri Eugenii papae annotatum invenimus... Transcriptum autem illius quod in supra scripto registro invenimus tibi praesentibus litteris inclusum transmittimus*.<sup>6</sup>

The fact that no official records or acts of the trial at Rheims were kept can also be gathered from the account given by Otto, bishop of Freising, in his *Gesta Friderici* written in 1156-1158. According to this account Pope Eugene declared to his enraged curia that the profession of faith that had been presented to him was not to be looked upon as an official statement of doctrine.<sup>7</sup>

The temperamental author of the *Liber de vera philosophia* concludes: "Hence nothing whatsoever has been defined... For if the pope and the council had decreed anything, it would have been written down just as their other decrees are written down, and its observance would have been ordered *sub poena*".<sup>8</sup> When Jacques Sirmond (1559-1651) and Cesare Baronius (1538-1607) worked on the *Annales ecclesiastici* they did indeed find the canons of the council of Rheims in the Vatican Archives but nothing related to Gilbert's trial: *Desiderantur in Vaticano canones fidei spectantes ad damnationem errorum Giliberti quos ex Gallicano (codice) posuimus*.<sup>9</sup> The *codex Gallicanus* referred to in this sentence had been sent

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. pont.* 11; p. 24.

<sup>5</sup> See Poole's preface to the *Hist. pontificalis*, p. lxxiii.

<sup>6</sup> *Ep.* 671: PL 200, 633AB.

<sup>7</sup> *Gesta Frid.* I, 60 p. 86.

<sup>8</sup> MS Grenoble, Bibl. de la Ville, 290, f. 90v.

<sup>9</sup> C. Baronius, *Annal. eccl.* (ad ann. 1148); ed. A. Theiner 19 (Bar-le-Duc 1869) 19, No. 9.

to the Vatican by Jacques Amyot, bishop of Auxerre (1571-1593) during the reign of Pope Gregory XIII.<sup>10</sup>

When in 1952 J. Leclercq edited the text discussed in the previous section<sup>11</sup> he interpreted it as the document presented to Pope Eugene and the curia by a delegation of two bishops and Abbot Suger. He surmised that the *Libellus* was a commentary on this document. Speaking of this text Leclercq makes the cautious remark: On aurait là, pour ainsi dire, les 'actes' de cette suite au concile de Reims.<sup>12</sup>

By inserting "pour ainsi dire" Leclercq must have meant to say that, strictly speaking, the text does not constitute the acts of the consistory. If this interpretation of the insertion is correct, Leclercq's view is acceptable for, as we have seen, all historical evidence speaks against the existence of such acts.

Unaware of Leclercq's publication F. Pelster<sup>13</sup> studied the same text and likewise interpreted it as the document submitted to Pope Eugene to enable him and the cardinals to weigh the evidence gathered against Gilbert.<sup>14</sup> Concerning the names, listed in this text, of the archbishops(10), bishops (13), abbots (8), and *magistri* (8) "who were present at the council" (= meeting) Pelster voices the view that it represents the list not of the members of the council but of those who signed the *symbolum*: Es ist die Liste der Unterzeichner des Symbolum.<sup>15</sup>

To substantiate his interpretation Pelster<sup>16</sup> points to Geoffrey's remark: ...subscripta sunt nomina singulorum qui aderant archiescoporum, episcoporum, abbatum et magistrorum de consensu et convenientia universorum.<sup>17</sup> He also notes a similar reference to a *symbolum* presented to the pope: subscriptis nominibus singulorum qui aderant...<sup>18</sup> Since Geoffrey speaks of ten archbishops and since our text actually lists ten archbishops, Pelster's conclusion seemed well founded. We shall see, however, that

<sup>10</sup> Cf. N. M. Haring, "Das sog. Glaubensbekenntnis," 82.

<sup>11</sup> "Textes sur Saint-Bernard et Gilbert de la Porrée," in: *MedSt* 14 (1952) 108-109.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem* 108.

<sup>13</sup> "Petrus Lombardus und die Verhandlungen über die Streitfrage des Gilbertus Porreta in Paris (1147) und Reims (1148)", in: *Miscell. Lombardiana* (Novara 1957) 65-73. Pelster (p. 68) draws attention to Mabillon's use of a document (*codex ottonianus*) which must have been very similar to, if not identical with, the text edited by Leclercq. See *Annales OSB* 75,5; ed. Lucca 6 (1745) 400-401. It was previously mentioned by L. Ott, *Unters. zur theol. Briefliteratur der Früh-scholastik*, in: *Beiträge* 34 (1937) 131.

<sup>14</sup> Petrus Lombardus 68.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*, 70.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibidem* 73, n. 49.

<sup>17</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 7; PL 185, 591D.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem* 13; PL 185, 595B.

there are strong arguments against Pelster's claim that "it is the list of the signatories of the symbolum."

Ignoring Leclercq's cautious qualification (*pour ainsi dire*) S. Gammersbach<sup>19</sup> simply designates the text as the "Reimser Aktenstücke" and, misled by Pelster, describes the list of those "who were present at the council" as the "Unterzeichner des Symbolums",<sup>20</sup> the signatories of the creed.

Since we have seen that the text cannot constitute "the acts" of the trial, the question still remains: did those "who were present at the council" sign the document submitted to the pope? After considering the available evidence we should be prepared to answer in the negative.

To begin with, Geoffrey does not say that those "present at the council" signed the document. He says only that the names of those present were *written under the scriptura* "with everyone's consent and agreement".<sup>21</sup> On a later occasion he declares that the document was presented to Pope Eugene *subscriptis nominibus singulorum qui aderant*.<sup>22</sup>

According to this account *all those present* agreed (*de consensu et convenientia universorum*) that their presence at the meeting<sup>23</sup> be recorded on the document to be submitted to the pope. It does not mean that all those present at the meeting personally signed and thus agreed with the contents of the document. The archdeacon from Châlons-sur-Marne, Master Robert de Bosco, spoke publicly at the meeting against one of the four propositions made by St. Bernard.<sup>24</sup> His name appears among the *magistri* listed in our text as being "present".<sup>25</sup> Thus the fact that he attended the meeting is well attested. However, we have neither evidence to show nor reason to assume that he changed his mind and by signing approved of what he had strongly rejected.

Another indication that we are not confronted with signatures is the

<sup>19</sup> *Gilbert von Poitiers* 80-84; 152. Leclercq's qualification "pour ainsi dire" is also ignored by M. Colker, "The Trial," 157.

<sup>20</sup> *Gilbert von Poitiers* 82; 84.

<sup>21</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 7; PL 185, 591D: *Propter quod eidem scripturae... subscripta sunt nomina singulorum qui aderant... de consensu et convenientia universorum.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ep. ad Albinum* 13; PL 185, 595B.

<sup>23</sup> The introduction of the list reads: *Nomina archiepiscoporum qui interfuerunt concilio* (Leclercq, "Textes" 109). As a general statement this introduction needs no correction, for all those listed can be presumed to have attended the council. But in this particular case we know that the meeting at St. Bernard's residence is meant by the ambiguous term "concilium". Pelster calls it more adroitly *conciliabulum*.

<sup>24</sup> *Hist. pont.* 8; pp. 19-20.

<sup>25</sup> Leclercq, "Textes" 109.

fact that, contrary to common usage,<sup>26</sup> no personal names but the *names of the cities and abbeys* of the attending archbishops, bishops and abbots are provided by the list with the exception of the German Premonstratensian Otto of Kappenberg (d. 1172). The reason for making this exception is not difficult to establish. It could be assumed that Pope Eugene was familiar with the incumbents of the bishoprics and abbeys of France named in the list, for he had spent a number of years in that country. This assumption would hardly apply to the name Kappenberg, and for that reason the incumbent's name Otto was added.

For a similar reason the *magistri* are listed by name, for they could not be sufficiently identified by the name of the city or the school at which they taught.

Worth noting is also the omission of *et alii plures* and *et alii multi* after the sees of the archbishops and bishops. This omission can be interpreted in the sense that the list of ten archbishops and thirteen bishops comprises the total number of the archbishops and bishops attending the meeting at St. Bernard's residence.

On the other hand, the list of the attending abbots is followed by *et alii plures*, while the list of the attending *magistri* ends with *et alii multi*.<sup>27</sup> These additions reveal that the number of abbots and *magistri* attending the meeting was larger than the number of the abbeys and *magistri* actually listed.

We know through John of Salisbury<sup>28</sup> that Gilbert's archdeacon of Brioux, Master Arnold Qui-Non-Ridet, and Master Robert of Melun, later bishop of Hereford (1163-1167), were at Rheims. Of these two, at least Master Arnold must have attended the meeting despite the fact that his name does not occur in the list. If Robert of Melun attended the meeting — and there are reasons to suppose that he did — he was likewise omitted by the compiler of the list. We also know that a cleric in the service of Count Henry I of Champagne (d. 1181), Master Stephen, was in attendance at the trial and on Gilbert's side.<sup>29</sup> If he attended the

<sup>26</sup> The witnesses of papal documents generally wrote *Ego* preceded by a cross-sign and followed by name, rank, titular church (if any) and *ss* (= subscripsi). The most common formulas used in charters were: *videntibus et audientibus...* or *huius rei testes...* or in *praesentia et audientia...*

<sup>27</sup> Also present *at the trial* was a *multitudo laicorum* (*Hist. pont.* 10; p. 24). Pope Eugene addressed them in French when he realized that they did not know why a certain book was being torn to pieces. He told them it was not the bishop's work and that the bishop "had been found orthodox in every respect and in harmony with apostolic doctrine".

<sup>28</sup> *Hist. pont.* 8; p. 17.

<sup>29</sup> The fact is stated by the Cistercian Helinand, *Chronicon* (ad ann. 1148); PL 212, 1038BC, who calls him *magister Stephanus de Alinerra*. He was a canon at the cathedral of Beauvais and *exercitissimus in omni genere facietarum utriusque linguae Latinae et Gallicae, avarissimus*

meeting, he must be included among the *et alii multi*.<sup>30</sup> Definitely present at the meeting was John of Salisbury who was at that time in the papal service and presumably entitled to the magisterial title. He is not mentioned in the list.

It is important in this context to distinguish if possible between those who attended the council, the trial, and the meeting at St. Bernard's residence. In dealing with our list J. Mabillon<sup>31</sup> mentions Folknand, abbot of Lorsch, as present, but it is not clearly established whether Mabillon's list contained the name of the abbey or whether he made use of a different source. The fact that at Rheims on 29 March 1148 Pope Eugene granted his monastery a *privilegium* cosigned by two cardinals and written down by chancellor Guido strongly favours Mabillon's mention of Folknand's presence.<sup>32</sup> But his presence at Rheims does not yet entitle us to assume that he attended the trial or the meeting.

John of Salisbury<sup>33</sup> has recorded the presence at the council of Reynold, then provost of Hildesheim, later (1156) chancellor of Frederick Barbarossa and archbishop of Cologne (1159-1167). We have already noted that "he and other Germans" objected to the prohibition of the use by clerics of multi-coloured fur coats. We do not know whether they stayed over for the trial or attended the meeting. Also present at the council was Reynold's friend Wibald, abbot of Stablo, who often refers to the council but never to the consistory or to Gilbert.<sup>34</sup> This silence is remarkable if we consider that a year later he boasts of having seen with his own eyes Anselm of Laon, William of Paris (Champeaux), Alberic of Rheims, and Hugh of Paris (of Saint-Victor).<sup>35</sup> There is nothing in his letters to suggest that he attended the trial or the meeting.

tamen... (1038C). He died a year after telling Helinand that St. Bernard failed to convict Gilbert. Helinand thinks that Stephen's death was due to this defamation. J. R. William, "The Quest for the Author of the *Moralium Dogma philosophorum*, 1931-1956", in: *Speculum* 32 (1957) 740, n. 40, suggests that he was the grammarian cited as "Stephanus Beluacensis" or "Stephanus Remensis" in R. W. Hunt, "Studies on Priscian in the Twelfth-Century", in: *Medieval and Ren. Studies* 2 (1950) 49.

<sup>30</sup> Leclercq, "Textes" 108, holds that Arnould de Poitiers désigné simplement comme "l'archidiacre" is listed among the *magistri*. But this title belongs to Walter of York who with his bishop, Henry Murdac, and the archdeacon Geoffrey of York attended the council. Cf. N. Haring, "Das sog. Glaubensbekenntnis" 84, n. 170.

<sup>31</sup> *Annales OSB* 79, 5; ed. Lucca 6 (1745) 401.

<sup>32</sup> Eugene, *Ep.* 265; PL 180, 1314C-1316A. Mabillon refers to this *privilegium*.

<sup>33</sup> *Hist. pont.* 3; p. 9: Raginaldus de Hildenesham et alii Teutones reclamaverunt decretum...

<sup>34</sup> See, for instance, *Ep.* 150 (131) to Bernard, bishop of Hildesheim; ed. Jaffé 245: Venimus ad synodum Remensem quae celebrata est mediante Quadragesima ubi dominus papa... sententiam... in verbis et scripto confirmavit.

<sup>35</sup> *Ep.* 167; p. 278.

## VI

## CONCLUSIONS

It has been asserted that the council of Rheims was "the first realization of the idea of papal world domination".<sup>1</sup> The author of this assertion is particularly incensed at the suspension of two German archbishops. It should, however, be admitted that the suspension of two leading German archbishops is in principle hardly less amazing than the suspension of all those English bishops and abbots who were afraid to cross the Channel against the order of their king.

Politically speaking, the basic aim of the council was a very modest one: not world domination but moral reform. But the preparation for its successful launching was so poor that its message was little more than the lifeless repetition of previously promulgated canons. However, to assure its success in a community absorbed and distracted by an enthusiastic devotion to a military undertaking inspired by the same pontiff, Pope Eugene resorted to threats and application of canonical sanctions rather than to gentle persuasion or invitation.

While he was in France, Eugene held two consistories to deal with the accusations made against Gilbert's orthodoxy. At the consistory of Paris in 1147 he realized that Gilbert's critics submitted charges without written evidence, for nobody had apparently thought of obtaining a copy of the controversial commentary on Boethius. The consistory of Rheims in 1148 again failed to convince Pope Eugene that Gilbert's teaching was unorthodox.

Since no official records of the consistory were kept, literary documents related to the consistory can only be of a private nature. The so-called "acts" should be judged accordingly. The text published by Leclercq had better be called Geoffrey's *scriptura*, for it was most likely Geoffrey's first draft of a work against Gilbert. It contains elements that date back to the consistory and, presumably, to Abbot Godescalc's collection. Until the time of the consistory only Abbot Godescalc was actively engaged in preparing the case against Gilbert. When St. Bernard took over, the opposition must have felt certain of Gilbert's defeat, although St. Bernard had even less time than the ailing Abbot Godescalc to familiarize himself with Gilbert's writings.

The so-called creed of Rheims was proposed and formulated when it

<sup>1</sup> H. Gleber, *Papst Eugen* 83.

became evident that the attack on Gilbert had collapsed. The question whether the commonly accepted version of this creed agrees with the text presented to Eugene and the curia is obscured by a comparison of its highly polished form with St. Bernard's more rudimentary statements as recorded by John of Salisbury. In fact, we do not know whether St. Bernard's original formula or the commonly known version or some intermediary form of the creed was submitted to the pope and his curia. In whatever form it was presented, it was never given an official status.

The various text traditions of the *capitula* of which the most primitive form has been recorded by Otto of Freising may have originated at the consistory of Paris. The various traditions agree in substance, though not in words.<sup>2</sup> The version found in the *scriptura* seems to have been more widely known than the other versions. Which version, if any, was submitted to Eugene is another problem for which an answer is not readily available. According to Geoffrey the four errors emerged gradually at Rheims during the debates — and in proper balance: two on the first day and two on the second.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. N. M. Haring, "Das sog. Glaubensbekenntnis" 86-88.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem* 61-62.

# The Role of the Expositor Contemplacio in the St. Anne's Day Plays of the Hegge Cycle

SISTER M. PATRICIA FORREST, O.S.F.

ONE of the perplexing problems of the so-called St. Anne's Day plays,<sup>1</sup> pageants 8 to 13 of the Hegge Cycle,<sup>2</sup> is the allegorical significance of the expositor, a personified abstraction named Contemplacio, whose speeches reveal that he is far more vital to the meaning of the drama than a mere announcer. Even his name sets him apart as somewhat unusual, for ordinarily the mystery plays, which employ Biblical characters, do not introduce allegorical persons into the drama to any extent; and although the Hegge plays are the most allegorical of the medieval mysteries, featuring a number of personified abstractions,<sup>3</sup> Contemplacio is the only character of this kind to fill a major recurring role. Indeed, in the St. Anne's Day plays—"The Conception of Mary" (8), "Mary in the Temple"

<sup>1</sup> E. K. Chambers, *The Mediaeval Stage* (Oxford, 1903), II, 126-127, concludes that the Hegge Cycle was performed on the Feast of St. Anne. Hardin Craig has established the most complete case for assigning the Hegge plays to Lincoln in his "Note on the Home of Ludus Coventriae," *The University of Minnesota Studies in Language and Literature*, No. 1 (Minneapolis, 1914), 72-83, and "The Hegge Plays," *English Religious Drama of the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1955), 265-280. In "Note on the Home of Ludus Coventriae," 75, Craig finds that the records of the Lincoln plays seem to point to a Corpus Christi play which was transferred to the Feast of St. Anne and was enacted regularly as a St. Anne's play until the middle of the sixteenth century.

<sup>2</sup> In this article, the plays will be referred to as the Hegge Cycle, rather than as the *Ludus Coventriae*. Robert Hegge, an early seventeenth century owner, wrote his signature on the manuscript in several places and thus unwittingly has bequeathed his name to the cycle. Since some of the remarks on the *Processus prophetarum* in this article are based on Marius Sepet's "Les Prophètes du Christ," it may be well to point out in the beginning that the present essay grew out of my dissertation, *The Sources and Style of the St. Anne's Day Plays in the Hegge Cycle* (The Catholic University of America, 1965), which was written in a context of study where an attempt at the rehabilitation and defense of the work of Marius Sepet is the guiding principle.

<sup>3</sup> The most outstanding allegorical characters in the Hegge Cycle are *Mors*, who summons Herod in Play 19, the Four Daughters of God, who appear at the beginning of the "Salutation" (11), and an allegorical retinue of maidens and priests given Mary in Play 9, "Mary in the Temple."

(9), "The Betrothal of Mary" (10), "The Parliament of Heaven" (Debate of the Four Daughters of God) and "The Salutation and Conception" (11), "Joseph's Return" (12), and "The Visit to Elizabeth" (13)—his role is pivotal. By introducing, accompanying, and concluding the action of these Marian pageants, which were presented on fixed scaffolds, or stages,<sup>4</sup> he binds the sequence together into a structurally independent play.<sup>5</sup> Although Contemplacio usually appears in these scenes as a traditional expositor, nonetheless, in a preface to the "Parliament of Heaven" before the "Salutation" play (11), he suddenly steps forth as an actor in the drama, paraphrasing Isaia and Jeremia in an earnest lyrical appeal to the Savior to hasten His coming. After this surprising change of character, he steps back into the role of expositor, concluding the "Visit to Elizabeth" (13) with a didactic epilogue.<sup>6</sup> Throughout the St. Anne's Day plays this enigmatic prologuist, whose identity is never explicitly made known, enacts the parts of commentator, priest, and prophet, often with far-reaching implications. An exploration of these implications yields some interesting possibilities.

In assuming the voices of Isaia and Jeremia as a prelude to the Annunciation, for example, Contemplacio speaks in the tradition of

<sup>4</sup> Contemplacio's prologue to the "Visit to Elizabeth" (13) is spoken while Joseph and Mary, according to the stage directions, "*et sic transient circa placeam*," walk about the *platea*, or open space between fixed scaffolds, or stages. K. S. Block, ed., *Ludus Coventriae or The Plaie called Corpus Christi*, E.E.T.S., E.S., No. 120 (London, 1922, reprinted 1960), 116. Richard Southern, *The Medieval Theatre in the Round* (London, 1956), 98, 220, and 222, refers to the use of a scaffold and *platea* in the stage directions of the *Ludus Coventriae*. Glynne Wickham, "Stages and Stage-conventions," *Early English Stages, 1300-1600* (London, 1959), I, 149-176, and Martial Rose, "Introduction," *The Wakefield Mystery Plays* (New York, 1962), 9-55, also discuss this aspect of the staging of the Hegge plays.

<sup>5</sup> The Marian group of plays, 8-13, which first introduces discrepancies into the numbering of the pageants and which makes the first use of English stage directions in the Hegge Cycle, has long been recognized as an independent unit. In what manner it was first incorporated into the cycle is still an open question.

<sup>6</sup> After this epilogue, Contemplacio disappears from the cycle until Play 29, "King Herod," the first pageant in a group of plays designated as "Passion Play II," which were apparently produced every other year, being alternated with "Passion Play I." K. S. Block, xxxiii-xxxiv, finds that the general evidence of the manuscript of the Hegge plays shows that the composite Contemplacio group (8-13) is a separate group of plays. She presents internal evidence in the use of pointing in the manuscript which indicates that the Contemplacio and Passion plays were inserted or reworked by the same compiler (xxvi-xxvii). This may account for the name of the expositor in Play 29, since this play is not otherwise related to the Contemplacio group and was obviously produced independently in alternate years.

the *Processus prophetarum*,<sup>7</sup> for these prophets regularly accompanied the long line of witnesses to the Divinity of Christ, which often served as a prologue to medieval Nativity plays.<sup>8</sup> The costumed procession of solemn prophets and other witnesses, each speaking in turn a few lines of Messianic hope, had developed from a spurious work attributed to St. Augustine, the *Sermo contra Judaeos*, a sermon apparently written during the fifth or sixth century and later used as one of the lessons in the Divine Office, often as the sixth *lectio* of Christmas Matins. The preacher, whose voice was regarded throughout the Middle Ages as that of St. Augustine, proposes to bring testimony, mostly from the Old Testament, to confute the disbelief of the Jews in the Divinity of Christ. He summons in turn a number of Messianic witnesses, reporting after each summons the prophet's message and adding a few words of explanation and commentary.<sup>9</sup>

Largely through the studies of Karl Young, the manner in which this *lectio* became a dramatic presentation is now well known. Individual characters were first assigned the parts of the prophets at

<sup>7</sup> A standard presentation of the development of the *Processus* and its relationship to the Old Testament plays is that of Marius Sepet, "Les Prophètes du Christ," *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 28 (1867), 1-27, 211-264; 29 (1868), 105-139, 261-293; and 38 (1877), 397-443. Karl Young, *The Drama of the Medieval Church* (Oxford, 1933), II, 125-171, gives the texts of the *lectio* and the *Ordo prophetarum* upon which Sepet bases his theory of the origin of the Old Testament plays. Hardin Craig, "The Origin of the Old Testament Plays," *MP*, 10 (1913), 473-487, and *English Religious Drama of the Middle Ages*, 58-67, challenges Sepet's theory that the Old Testament plays derived from the *Processus prophetarum* and maintains that these plays originated from the addition to the Passion play of a body of epical and homiletic material derived ultimately from the *lectiones* and accompanying ritual of the Church. Be this as it may, in the English plays there is a close connection between the *Prophetæ* and the Nativity. This can be seen, for example, in "The Pageant of the Shearmen and Taylors of Coventry," *Two Coventry Corpus Christi Plays*, ed. Hardin Craig, E.E.T.S., E.S., Nos. 87-88 (London, 1902), 1-2, in which Isaia speaks the entire prologue to the Nativity, and in the prologue to the "Annunciation" in the York Cycle, which is a summary of a prophet play. *York Plays*, ed. Lucy Toulmin Smith (Oxford, 1885), 93-98.

<sup>8</sup> See Sepet, "Le Prologue de la nativité," 38 (1877), 397-414, and Young, "The Christmas Play from Benedictbucern," II, 172-196. Pageant 7 in the Hegge Cycle is a unique *Radix Jesse* procession of prophets and kings, containing thirteen kings of the Family of David, ancestors of the Virgin, alternating with thirteen prophets, whose utterances concern the advent of the Blessed Virgin and emphasize her role as the Mother of the Messiah.

<sup>9</sup> Young, II, 125-132. Sepet gives the text of this *lectio*, 28 (1867), 3-8, as does Young, II, 126-131. Richard B. Donovan, *The Liturgical Drama in Medieval Spain* (Toronto, 1958), note p. 17, states that the *Sermo contra Judaeos* "is now attributed to Quodvultdeus, bishop of Carthage (437-453)."

Salerno as far as existing records testify; the prophecies were given an original literary form and were set to music at the Monastery of St. Martial at Limoges; a slight amplification of the roles of Simeon and Balaam and rubrics indicating the impersonation of all witnesses were added at the cathedral of Laon during the thirteenth century. At Rouen, during the following century, the individual speeches of Balaam and Nebuchadnezzar were developed into dramatic scenes, and the number of prophets was increased from thirteen to twenty-eight.<sup>10</sup>

As the *lectio* became dramatized, the function of summoning the prophets was taken over by a lector, or lectors, variously called *cantores*, *appellatores*, or *vocatores*.<sup>11</sup> In the Rouen play, these lectors, no longer reporting the messages of the witnesses, who now speak for themselves, comment upon and interpret the action.<sup>12</sup> In the vernacular mysteries, the lector's functions of commentary and interpretation sometimes fall to the expositor, who introduces and often interprets the action in the English cycles.

Contemplacio, therefore, in assuming the voices of Isaia and Jeremia in the "Salutation" prologue, may well be simulating a modified and miniature *Processus* of the conventional type. If so, he has a historical precedent for limiting the prophets quoted to these two. According to Karl Young, in some churches the original *lectio* was much abbreviated. In a French breviary of the thirteenth century, he finds it retaining only the introduction, the prophecies of Isaia, Jeremia, and Daniel, and the concluding prophecy of the Sibyl.<sup>13</sup> He discovers it in a still shorter form, used as the sixth *lectio* of Christmas at Saintes in the fourteenth century, where it "includes only the usual introduction and the prophecies of Isaiah and Jeremiah."<sup>14</sup> This is the compass of the prayer of Contemplacio prefacing the "Parliament of Heaven," which leads into the "Salutation" play. Although he does not call upon Isaia and Jeremia to bear witness to the Messiah, he does use their voices in imploring the Savior to come quickly. His basic voice assuming the voices of the prophets thus has an affinity with the pseudo-Augustinian voice in the *Sermo contra Judaeos*, and he speaks with the authority of an accepted preacher.

<sup>10</sup> Young, II, 125-171.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 138-171.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 168.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 131.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

This consistently elevated, and frequently hortative, manner of speaking, especially as characterized by changes in voice and address,<sup>15</sup> seems to offer the best clue to Contemplacio's problematic identity; and a stylistic analysis, the best solution to what he represents.

The basic voice in any literary work need not be the author's, of course, but may be even that of an abstraction.<sup>16</sup> In the speeches of Contemplacio, the basic voice is that of an allegorical character, whose name connotes his nature. In its earliest sense, as used in the *Ancrene Riwe* (ca. 1225), the term "contemplation" signified "religious musing and devout meditation."<sup>17</sup> The thirteenth-century *Mirror of Saint Edmund* distinguished three kinds of contemplation: of creatures, of Holy Scripture, and of God Himself.<sup>18</sup> Contemplacio's name, then, seems to represent the contemplation of Scripture, which had as its object to teach through example the practice of virtue and the avoidance of vice.<sup>19</sup> Accordingly, he often exhorts the audience to pay good heed to the Biblical and apocryphal scenes about to be enacted and sometimes interprets the action for the benefit of the "lewed."

Three of Contemplacio's speeches exemplify rather clearly the significance of his varied role within the miniature Marian cycle. These occur at the beginning of Play 8, where he inaugurates the St. Anne's Day group of plays; at the opening of the "Parliament of Heaven" (11), where he suddenly assumes a strikingly different voice; and at the end of Play 13, where he brings the St. Anne's Day plays to a close. A voice and address analysis of these pivotal speeches reveals that this expositor has a far more comprehensive function than that of a master of ceremonies.

<sup>15</sup> Professor James Craig LaDrière defines three forms of presentation based on voice and address structure: that of the speaker who speaks in his own voice; that of the speaker who assumes the voice of another, not offering anything in his own voice; and mixed speech, in which the basic voice is the speaker's own, but other personalities are assumed and their voices directly quoted. "Voice and Address," *Dictionary of World Literature*, ed. Joseph T. Shipley (Paterson, New Jersey, 1960), 442-443. The concept of voice and address may well have been known to medieval theorists, since it had its origins in classical antiquity. Distinctions in voice structure, elaborated by Plato and Aristotle (*The Republic*, III, vii, and *The Poetics*, III, 1-2), were taught by the Alexandrian Greeks and transmitted by the ancient Latin grammarians to the Middle Ages. Bede discusses them in his "De arte metrica," *Grammatica Latini*, ed. Heinrich Keil (Leipzig, 1880), 7, 259-260.

<sup>16</sup> LaDrière, 443.

<sup>17</sup> *Oxford English Dictionary*, ed. James A. H. Murray et al. (Oxford, 1933).

<sup>18</sup> "The Mirror of Saint Edmund," *Religious Pieces in Prose and Verse*, ed. George G. Perry, E.E.T.S., O.S., No. 26 (London, 1867, 1914), 21.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

Since Contemplacio speaks almost entirely in his own person, using assumed voices only in the prologue to the "Parliament" (11), his purpose seems to be chiefly one of pure exposition and narration. Yet as his reverent, religious tone often indicates, he stands in a more personal relationship to his auditors than that of a mere announcer. His first speech in the cycle, for instance, has some features of a typical Middle English sermon:

Cryst conserve þis congregacion  
 fro perellys past · present and future  
 and þe personys here pleand · þat þe pronunciacion  
 of here sentens to be seyð : mote be sad and sure [serious]  
 And þat non oblocucyon · make þis matere obscure [bad delivery]  
 but it may profite and plese eche persone present  
 ffrom þe gynnyng to þe endyng so to endure  
 þat cryst and every creature : with þe conceyte be content.

This matere here mad · is of þe modyr of mercy  
 how be joachym And Anne · was here concepcion  
 Sythe offred into þe temple · compiled breffly  
 than maryed to joseph · and so folwyng þe salutacion  
 Metyng with Elyzabeth · and þer with a conclusyon  
 in fewe wordys talkyd þat it xulde nat be tedyous  
 to lernyd nyn to lewd · nyn to no man of reson  
 þis is þe processe · Now preserve zow jhesus.

Perfore of pes I zow pray all þat ben here present  
 and tak hed to oure talkyn · what we xal say  
 I be-teche zow þat lorde þat is evyr omnyppotent  
 to governe zow in goodnes as he best may  
 In hevyn we may hym se  
 Now god þat is hevyn kynge  
 sende us all hese dere blyssyng  
 and to his towre he mote vs bryng  
 Amen ffor Charyte.

(1-25)<sup>20</sup>

In the embellished *ababbcb* double quatrain stanzas of this initial prologue, the basic voice heard is that of the expositor. The entire first stanza, a heavily alliterated prayer of petition, is addressed to God, conceivably to the Father, for the first two lines may echo the liturgical formula of a collect. Contemplacio, imploring a blessing for "þis congregacion" and "þe personys here pleand," seems to stand in a position of benevolent authority in regard to both groups. His tone is devout, governed by his respect for the Deity to Whom he addresses his speech.

<sup>20</sup> This and all subsequent quotations from the Hegge plays in this article are taken from the edition of K. S. Block.

The rhetorically embellished opening stanza bears a rather close resemblance to the *ante-theme* of the medieval sermon. G. R. Owst, in describing the construction of Middle English sermons, points out that the *ante-theme*, which immediately followed the opening theme, or Scriptural text, consisted of prayer and invocation.<sup>21</sup> Two elaborations of this prayer included a petition for special help for the speaker himself and a remembrance of all the people of God, living and dead.<sup>22</sup> Contemplacio's "Cryst conserve þis congregacion" expresses a prayer for the people, and his remembrance of "þe persons here pleand" implicitly includes a prayer for himself as among those who desire to please the assembled crowd with profitable entertainment.

The consistently religious tone of the prologue is a reminder that the medieval drama may owe something to the homily. Owst states that some thirteenth century plays were prefaced by a sermon and punctuated at intervals by various sacred discourses which continued the original theme begun in the sermon.<sup>23</sup> Contemplacio supplies some of the exhortative tone, as well as the instruction, of such "homiletic interludes."

In contrast to the preliminary invocation in the first stanza, the second is pure narration, or discourse designed to represent a connected succession of happenings. By a shift in address, Contemplacio speaks directly to the assembled audience, summarizing the plays about to be enacted. In the last line he formulates a blessing, "Now preserve ȝow jhesus."

The traditional mystery play plea for quiet is reduced to a minimum, being confined to the first two lines of the third stanza. The next three lines (19-21) constitute another prayer, a request that God help His people live good lives and so attain heaven. The last four lines (21-25), a final benediction, are implicitly addressed to God by the basic voice of the expositor. The first person plural pronoun reference in "to his towre he mote vs brynge" sweeps the players, the audience, and the expositor into one composite group, and the basic voice becomes representative of the people as a whole, a commonplace practice in medieval poetry. The reading, or listening, public of the

<sup>21</sup> *Preaching in Mediaeval England: An Introduction to Sermon Manuscripts of the Period c. 1350-1450* (Cambridge, 1926), 316. Cf. Woodburn O. Ross, *Middle English Sermons*, E.E.T.S., O.S., No. 209 (London, 1940), xlv-xlv.

<sup>22</sup> Owst, 317. See Ross, lii, for a list of the sermons in his edition which contain *ante-themes*.

<sup>23</sup> *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York, 1961), 472.

Middle Ages, greatly interested in the universal aspect of experience, heard Everyman in the "poetic I."<sup>24</sup> For the majority of medieval poets, as for Dante, therefore, two aspects of a composite "I" were necessary. The poet had to transcend the limitations of individuality in order to express universal experience, while at the same time he needed the voice of an individual personality in order that he might perceive and fix the matter of experience.<sup>25</sup> Thus the first person pronoun reference used by Contemplacio, especially when addressing God, often represents both an individual voice and the voice of mankind.

Contemplacio's concluding blessing, like his opening invocation, was a standard sermon feature. Owst finds that the good preacher left as a parting impression either the lurid flames of hell or the jubilant anthems of heaven, usually the latter,<sup>26</sup> and consequently Middle English sermons were frequently terminated with a formula similar to that used by Contemplacio.

Throughout this initial prologue to the St. Anne's Day plays, the tone of paternal benevolence revealed through the repeated requests that God might "conserve," "preserve," "governe," and "brynge to his towre" the assembled crowd reveals a solicitude in the basic voice for the spiritual welfare of those addressed. The fact that sixteen out of the twenty-five lines (1-8, 16, 19-25) are petitions to God for the temporal and spiritual welfare of the audience and players suggests that the basic voice is implicitly that of a priest who prays for the audience and actors in the first stanza, announces the plays to be enacted in the second stanza, and again implores God's blessing on those assembled for the performance in the third stanza.

In his next two speeches, the prologues to "Mary in the Temple" (9) and the "Betrothal" (10), the expositor addresses the assembled audience, impersonally narrating in his own voice the sequence of the action about to be performed.

Passing over these two prologues, one comes to the "Parliament of Heaven" (11), where the voice of Contemplacio suddenly breaks forth from its chrysalis of didactic expository verse to soar aloft in lyric poetry.<sup>27</sup> No stage directions describe his costume or actions in this

<sup>24</sup> Leo Spitzer, "Note on the Poetic and the Empirical 'I' in Medieval Authors," *Traditio*, 4 (1946), 416.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> *Preaching in Mediaeval England*, 330.

<sup>27</sup> Lyricism, as used in this context, here implies no more than the presence of unity in emotional attitude, a primary requirement of lyric verse. See Lu Emily Pearson, "Isolable Lyrics of the Mystery Plays," *ELH*, III (1936), 229.

pageant, but his words imply that he was here an actor in the drama, a patriarch or prophet with pleading eyes fixed on the stars in the last hours before the dawn of redemption, beseeching God to hurry the coming of the Son. In contrast to his previous matter-of-factness, his words are now charged with intense emotion, as he addresses the Deity:

Ffowre thowsand : sex vndryd · foure zere I telle  
 Man ffor his offens and ffowle foly  
 Hath loyn zerys · in þe peynes of helle  
 And were wurthy to ly þer-in endlesly  
 But thanne xulde perysche zour grete mercye  
 good lord haue on man pyte  
 haue mende of þe prayour seyð by Ysaie  
 lete mercy meke þin hyst mageste.

wolde god þou woldyst breke þin hefne myghtye  
 and com down here in to erth  
 And levyn zerys thre and threttye  
 thyn famyt ffolke with þi fode to fede  
 To staunche þi thryste lete þi syde blede  
 ffor erste wole not be mad redempcion  
 Cum vesyte vs in þis tyme of nede  
 of þi careful creaturys haue compassyon.

A woo to vs wrecchis of wrecchis be  
 ffor god hath haddyd ssorwe to sorwe  
 I prey þe lord þi sowlys com se  
 How þei ly and sobbe ffor syknes and sorwe  
 With þi blyssyd blood ffrom balys hem borwe  
 thy careful creaturys cryenge in captyvte  
 A tary not gracyous lord tyl it be to-morwe  
 The devyl hath dysceyved hem be hys iniquite.

A quod Jeremye : who xal gyff wellys to myn eynes  
 þat I may wepe bothe day and nyght  
 to se oure bretheryn in so longe peynes  
 here myschevys Amende · may þi mech myght  
 As gret as þe se lord · was Adamys contryssyon ryght  
 Ffrom oure hed is falle þe crowne  
 Man is comeryd in synne · I crye to þi syght  
 Gracyous lord · Gracyous lord · Gracyous lord come downe. (1-32)

This lyrical prayer is followed by the supplications of the *Virtutes*, or Virtues, one of the nine choirs of angels. They continue the theme of Contemplacio, but do not paraphrase the prophets:

Lord plesyth it þin hyz domynacion  
 On man þat þou made to haue pyte  
 Patryarchys and prophetys han made supplicacion  
 oure offyse is to presente · here prayerys to the

Aungelys · Archaungelys we thre  
 þat ben in þe fyrst ierarchie  
 Ffor man to þin hy mageste  
 Mercy · mercy · mercy we crye.

The Aungel lord þou made so glorious  
 whos synne hath mad hym a devyl in helle  
 he mevyd man to be so contraryous  
 man repentyd · and he in his obstynacye doth dwelle  
 Hese grete males good lord repelle  
 And take man on to þi grace  
 lete þi mercy make hym with Aungelys dwelle  
 of locyfere to restore þe place.

(33-48)

From the sudden shift of voice and address in the speech of Contemplacio and from the assertion of the *Virtutes*, "Aungelys - Archaungelys we thre ... crye," W. W. Greg concludes that the four stanzas assigned to Contemplacio in the manuscript were originally meant to be spoken by the Angels and the Archangels, each group reciting, like the Virtues, two stanzas.<sup>28</sup> A voice and address study of these four stanzas, however, makes clear that the compiler probably intended Contemplacio to speak the lines as the manuscript provides. The expositor here assumes the voices of the "Patriarchys and prophetys" referred to, rather than those of the Angels and Archangels, whose voices were implicitly included with those of the Virtues, fellow members of the "fyrst ierarchie" of celestial spirits. Hope Traver, in positing a French mystère as a hypothetical source for the "Salutation" play, points out that many of the extant mystères contain the laments of prophets and angels as a preliminary to the Debate of the Four Daughters of God.<sup>29</sup> Contemplacio, in this instance, apparently serves the part of the prophets. At the same time, he retains his basic expository voice, quoting the prophets as a third person rather than directly impersonating them. Whether he had this role in the original play or whether it was later given to him, the assigning

<sup>28</sup> *Bibliographical and Textual Problems of English Miracle Cycles* (London, 1914), 125-126, note.

<sup>29</sup> *The Four Daughters of God* (Philadelphia, 1907), 140. The Hegge Cycle is unique among the English mystery cycles in prefacing its "Salutation," or "Annunciation," play with the allegorical Parliament of Heaven, also known as the Debate of the Four Daughters of God, or the Reconciliation of the Heavenly Virtues. In the allegory the debate concerning the fate of fallen man takes place within the mind of God. Justice and Truth demand atonement for sin; Mercy and Peace plead for man's pardon. The Four Daughters, or Heavenly Virtues, are reconciled when God the Son offers to die in vicarious satisfaction for the sins of man. See Samuel Claggett Chew, *The Virtues Reconciled* (Toronto, 1947), 35.

of the "Parliament" prologue to *Contemplacio* in the manuscript shows that the compiler, if not the playwright, judged the prophetic quotations in this context appropriate to an expositor, as, indeed, they are.<sup>30</sup> In his comprehensive function as a unifying and directive force in the medieval drama, the expositor often voices the Scriptural texts brought into the vernacular from the Latin drama, which had been more closely related both to Scripture and to liturgy.<sup>31</sup>

The opening stanzas of the "Parliament" prologue, evidently spoken by a human being, and not by an angel, draw heavily upon Scriptural material. As an advocate for fallen man, *Contemplacio* pleads with God in the words of the prophets Isaia and Jeremia,<sup>32</sup> opening his four-stanza prologue with a stark picture of man's wretchedness prior to the Redemption. Whereas the first stanza, in its depiction of man's plight, seems to echo the preface to the Debate of the Four Daughters of God in the pseudo-Bonaventurian *Meditationes vitae Christi*,<sup>33</sup> the initial line in the second stanza, "wolde god þou woldyst breke þin hefne myghtye," is a free paraphrase of the prayer of Isaia, "O that

<sup>30</sup> Timothy Fry, O.S.B., "The Unity of the *Ludus Coventriae*, SP, 48 (1951), 527-570, argues that the controlling idea of the compiler(s) of the Hegge Cycle in its final redaction was the patristic abuse of power theory. According to Fry, the "Parliament of Heaven," the only play in the St. Anne's Day sequence essential to the theory, not only broadens the scope of the presentation of the doctrine of the Redemption, but also "adds immeasurably to the significance of *The Prophets*, and thus brings the Old and New Testament plays into a very definite coherence" (p. 551). I do not think, however, that the final redaction of the Hegge plays (ca. 1465-1470) wholly accounts for the change in the voice of *Contemplacio* in the "Parliament" prologue. I agree with Eleanor Prosser, *Drama and Religion in the English Mystery Plays: A Re-evaluation*, Stanford Studies in Language and Literature, No. 23 (Stanford, 1961), 54, that an entire mystery cycle should not be considered as "acts" of one long play. Certainly the Hegge plays, a compilation of independent units produced in different years, should not be considered as a structural unit. The St. Anne's Day plays, apparently presented without a break by one cast and unified by the recurring appearance of *Contemplacio*, are structurally independent. For this reason, I do not think that either the abuse of power theory suggested by Fry or the increased emphasis on the penitential immediacy of the cycle noted by Miss Prosser in *Passion Play I* (119-146) has any important bearing on *Contemplacio*'s change of "voice" in the "Parliament" prologue.

<sup>31</sup> See E. Catherine Dunn, "Lyrical Form and the Prophetic Principle in the Towneley Plays," *Mediaeval Studies*, 23 (1961), 80-82.

<sup>32</sup> Samuel Burdett Hemingway, *English Nativity Plays*, Yale Studies in English, 38 (New York, 1909), 243, notes, cites the Scriptural passages paraphrased by *Contemplacio* in this prologue.

<sup>33</sup> St. Bonaventure, *Opera omnia*, ed. A. C. Peltier (Paris, 1868), 12, 511. Hemingway, 243-245, notes, gives other parallels with the "Charter of the Abbey of the Holy Ghost." Cf. "The Charter of the Abbey of the Holy Ghost: Ms. Laud 210," *Yorkshire Writers: Richard Rolle of Hampole*, ed. Carl Horstman (London, 1895), 347-350.

thou wouldst rend the heavens, and wouldst come down" (Isaia 64:1).<sup>34</sup> Although the second and third stanzas are allusively reminiscent of this prayer (Isaia 64), the echoes are not so explicit as are those of the first line, especially since other details, like the "thre and threttye" years of Christ's life, are freely mingled with Old Testament allusions. The paradoxical imperative, "To staunche þi thyrste lete þi syde blede," seems to derive from the pious belief that the cry from the cross, "I thirst," represents primarily a spiritual thirst for souls. The line then means that this thirst for the souls of men can be quenched only if grace is given through the death of Christ, symbolized by the pierced heart. Although it does not directly paraphrase Isaia, the third stanza is animated with his sentiments, such as, "Be not very angry, O Lord, and remember no longer our iniquity: behold, see we are all thy people" (Isaia 64:9).

The entire prayer of Contemplacio, most of which is uttered in the assumed voices of Isaia and Jeremia, has the lyrical intensity of the great prophets. The first four lines may be addressed to the audience, but in the lines immediately following (5-8), Contemplacio speaks directly to God. In four rhythmical double quatrain stanzas, he pleads for mankind, referring metaphorically to Christ's Passion as the price of man's redemption. Although he speaks of mankind in the third person in the first stanza, Contemplacio identifies himself with sinful humanity in line 15, when he beseeches, "Cum vesyte vs in þis tyme of nede." It is noteworthy that the Virtues, as angels, never thus identify themselves with mankind, but consistently speak of man in the third person (lines 33-48). The Biblical Isaia, on the other hand, like Contemplacio, identifies himself with the people for whom he pleads, lamenting sin as common to both him and them, as when he mourns, "And we have all fallen as a leaf, and our iniquities, like the wind, have taken us away" (Isaia 64:6). The Virtues, as angels unfallen, never share man's guilt in this poignant, first person manner (a plausible argument, it seems, for not ascribing Contemplacio's prayer in Pageant 11 to the Angels and Archangels). Nor do the angels in their prayer for fallen man in the *Meditationes* borrow the words of Isaia and Jeremia,<sup>35</sup> as does the speaker of this prologue to the Hegge "Parliament."

<sup>34</sup> All Scriptural quotations in this article are from the Douay-Rheims translation from the Latin Vulgate.

<sup>35</sup> See "Meditationes vitae Christi," *Opera omnia*, ed. Peltier, 12, 511. A modern translation of the *Meditationes* is that of Isa Ragusa and Rosalie B. Green, eds., *Meditations on the Life of Christ* (Princeton, 1961).

The basic voice in the last line of the first stanza and throughout the entire second and third stanzas (lines 8-24) of the prologue seems to be the assumed voice of Isaia, the utterance being conceived as a free paraphrase of his prayer (Isaia 64). The New Testament references (lines 11-14) introduce a note of ambiguity into the identity of the basic voice, but such anachronisms, common to the cycle plays, may easily have been attributed to the voice of an Old Testament character.

Contemplacio assumes the voice of Jeremia in the fourth stanza, paraphrasing:

Who will give water to my head, and a fountain of tears to my eyes? and I will weep day and night for the slain of the daughter of my people.  
(Jeremia 9:1)

The words of Jeremia,

To what shall I compare thee? or to what shall I liken thee, O daughter of Jerusalem? to what shall I equal thee, that I may comfort thee, O virgin daughter of Sion? for great as the sea is thy destruction: who shall heal thee?  
(Lamentations 2:13)

sometimes interpreted as descriptive of the Virgin Mother's sorrows,<sup>36</sup> are given a different application by Contemplacio, "As gret as þe se lord - was Adamys contrysseyon ryght" (line 29). The freedom with which Jeremia is paraphrased makes it difficult to tell where the expositor is speaking in the assumed voice of the prophet and where in his own. Lines 30 to 32 may well be in either. There is a shift in pronoun reference from lines 30 to 31,

Ffrom oure hed is falle þe crowne  
Man is comeryd in synne : I crye to þi syght,

which seems to establish the poetical "I" of Contemplacio in the role of an intercessor for his people. In this concluding stanza, his voice rises to the solemnity of the prophet and the priest, addressing God officially in the words of Sacred Scripture, yet speaking as a member of the sinful human race. Here the basic voice is not one which predominantly teaches and exhorts, but one which intercedes and makes reparation.

Throughout the entire prologue to the "Parliament of Heaven," Contemplacio, at times oblivious of the audience in his fervent attention to God, appears as a dramatic character, speaking directly to

<sup>36</sup> St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori, *The Glories of Mary*, Pt. 2, trans. and ed. Charles G. Fehrenbach, C.S.S.R. (Baltimore, 1963), 2, 105-106.

God in the role of advocate for mankind, with whom he associates himself. The voices he assumes and the religious role he enacts give him allegorical dimensions more comprehensive than those of an announcer and teacher. As has been noted earlier, the assumed voices of Isaia and Jeremia, especially as used in a prologue to the Annunciation, seem to constitute a modified and miniature *Processus prophetarum*. This the playwright merges with the supplication of the angels prefacing the Debate of the Four Daughters of God in the *Meditationes* to create the prayer of Contemplacio.

After his lyrical plea for the advent of the Messiah, which heralds the "Parliament" and the subsequent Annunciation, Contemplacio does not appear again until the Visitation. In the preface to the "Visit to Elizabeth" (13), he drops back into his old role of prosaic expositor, narrating as a flashback the story of Zachary and Elizabeth. He retains this didactic role in the epilogue which brings the St. Anne's Day plays to a close:

lystenyth sovereynys here is conclusyon  
 how þe Aue was mad · here is lernyd vs  
 þe Aungel seyð · Ave gratia plena dominus tecum.  
 benedicta tu in mulieribus ·  
 Elizabeth seyð · et benedictus ·  
 fructus uentris tui · thus þe church addyd Maria And Jhesus · her  
 who seyth oure ladyes sawtere dayly · ffor A zer þus [sic]  
 he hath pardon · ten thousand And eyte hundryd zer.

. . . . .

Whan all was don oure lady fre  
 toke here leve than aftere this  
 At Elizabeth and at zakarie  
 And kyssyd johan and gan hym blys  
 Now most mekely we thank zow of zour pacyens  
 and beseke zou of zour good supportacion  
 If here hath be seyð ore don Any inconuenyens  
 we Asynge it to zour good deliberacion  
 Be-sekyng to crystys precious passyon  
 conserve and rewarde zour hedyr comynge  
 with Aue we be-gunne · and Aue is oure conclusyon  
 Ave regina celorum · to oure lady we synge. (1-8; 25-36)

In this epilogue, the basic voice heard is that of the expositor Contemplacio speaking to the audience, with whom he associates himself, summarizing the lesson that "here is lernyd vs." This is a marked change in voice from the assumed voices of the prophets in the "Salutation" prologue. The expositor's tone is more frankly didactic here than in any other of his speeches in the Marian cycle, for he speaks

almost exclusively as a teacher of religion. In lines 7 and 8, the basic voice is again implicitly that of a priest, since in stating an indulgence for the daily recitation of "oure ladyes sawtere"—"ten thousand And eyte hundryd zer"—<sup>37</sup> Contemplacio speaks in the name and with the authority of the Church.

The last lines of the epilogue (29-36) are more persuasively rhetorical than the preceding narrative stanzas and are addressed more personally to the onlookers. Contemplacio once more identifies himself with the producers of the drama, humbly concluding the St. Anne's Day plays with the conventional expression of gratitude to those who attended.<sup>38</sup> As he had begun the plays with a prayer for the assembled people, so he also ends with a prayer for them.

The expositor's primary and explicit purpose in the epilogue is to instruct the audience in the truths of their religion, concomitantly persuading and inspiring them to pray with devotion and to emulate the virtues of the holy persons whose actions are represented. His style is given dignity through the incorporation of Latin phrases and a sprinkling of aureate diction. In general, the manner of expression is solemn, serious, and free from rhetorical excess, though decidedly pedestrian. In the epilogue to the St. Anne's Day plays, then, as in the initial prologue, Contemplacio speaks as a teacher, a doctor of divinity, whose first object is to instruct and to edify.

As the excerpts considered show, all of Contemplacio's speeches, with the exception of the preface to the "Parliament of Heaven," are highly conventional, having many characteristics of the introductory speeches in the Old French and Provençal mystères.<sup>39</sup> His morally didactic tone and his repeated prayers for the welfare of the audience and players do not of themselves denote any special allegorical significance, certainly, since many of the mystery play expositors speak in a similar vein. Yet his allegorical name, his consistently dignified and elevated manner of speaking, his almost constant preoccupation with religious teaching and exhortation, and his shifts of voice and address, taken together, make a cumulative case for an allegorical significance over and above the functions of a mere announcer.

<sup>37</sup> The stating of indulgences for prayers recited is also a feature of the medieval sermon. Ross, *Middle English Sermons*, 58-59.

<sup>38</sup> David Hobart Carnahan, *The Prologue in the Old French and Provençal Mystery*, Doctoral dissertation (New Haven, 1905), 75-79, points out that a humble tone is often adopted by the prologist in the French mystery plays.

<sup>39</sup> These traditional features include sermon elements, analysis of the preceding or following play, apology for subject matter or manner of presentation, a setting forth of the reasons for producing, and pleas for silence. *Ibid.*, 7.

Like the ideal Christian orator described by St. Augustine, Contemplacio, whose name bears the connotation of "looking at God and loving Him,"<sup>40</sup> seems to be vitally concerned with making his discourse clear, enjoyable, and persuasive,<sup>41</sup> generally with the emphasis on the first and the last of these aims. Thus he employs both a dignified plain style for instruction, especially in such narrative passages as those in the epilogue to the St. Anne's Day plays, and a higher style, one more charged with lyric emotion, as in the prologue to the "Salutation" play (11). His use of the plain style in serious instruction tends to make prosaic verse, but his more fervent flights into an appropriate higher style create passages of poetic beauty, such as those found in the prologue to the "Salutation and Conception" (11). In teaching, exhorting, and blessing the audience, he speaks in the manner of the typical expositor, or prologuist, as a remote descendant of the chorus or choir director in the Latin liturgical drama.<sup>42</sup> When he performs these priestly functions, as well as when he assumes the voices of Isaia and Jeremia in the "Salutation" prologue, begging God to hasten the coming of the Messiah and interceding for mankind in the words of Sacred Scripture, he approaches what Marius Sepet terms in the *Mystère d'Adam* "*la voix de l'Eglise*," a voice heard citing the sacred texts and speaking the language of the liturgy, often through choric responses.<sup>43</sup> If Contemplacio is conceived as the voice, or representative, of the Church, his changes in voice and address are readily explained, because the Church both speaks to man about God and intercedes with God for the needs of man. Then, too, his exhortations and benedictions take on added dimensions.

Since Contemplacio, the "exposytour in doctorys wede" [garments], apparently was represented as a doctor of theology in all of his appearances in the Hegge Cycle, except, perhaps, in that of the prologue to the "Salutation," it is not unlikely that he was conceived as representing the Church in its functions of teaching the Scripture and thereby sanctifying the people of God. Sepet cites a *Processus* in a French mystère, MS. 904 at the Bibliothèque Nationale, dated 1488, in which the expository role is given to an allegorical character named

<sup>40</sup> OED.

<sup>41</sup> See Sister Thérèse Sullivan, *De doctrina Christiana, IV*, The Catholic University of America Patristic Studies, Vol. 23 (Washington, D.C., 1930), 121-123.

<sup>42</sup> Dunn, "Lyrical Form and the Prophetic Principle ...," 80-82, discusses the relationship of the expositor to the presenter, or choir director, in the liturgical drama.

<sup>43</sup> Sepet comments on the expository parts of the *Mystère d'Adam* in "Les Prophètes in Christ," *Bibliothèque de Pécole des chartes*, 29 (1868), 134-135.

*Ecclesia*.<sup>44</sup> By whatever name the expositor in the mystery play is called, however, he usually appears as a priest, the accepted representative of the medieval Church.<sup>45</sup> As his frequent invocations, blessings, and exhortations make clear, *Contemplacio*, too, functions in such a capacity. Consequently his presence serves not only to unify the St. Anne's Day plays, but also to underline the moral and doctrinal import of this miniature Marian cycle.

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<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 38 (1877), 422-423.

<sup>45</sup> Carnahan, 90-91, finds that most of the fully developed, fifteenth century prologues in the Old French and Provençal *mystères* were spoken by priests.

# Heathen Form and Christian Function in "The Wife's Lament"

A. N. DOANE

THE kinds of problems which have constantly vexed critics of *The Wife's Lament*<sup>1</sup> are practically summed up in the very title which has been most often assigned the poem. That is, critics have concerned themselves almost wholly with the relationship of an implied "wife" to an assumed "husband" or "lover", with the precise nature of the couple's lamentable situation, their love, turmoil and exile, and with the identification of the poem's "argument", such as it is, with some saga-story or common Germanic theme. It has been assumed that the poem is essentially narrative or dramatic and there has been a tendency, stated or unstated, on the part of most critics, to identify the predicament of the "wife" with the situation set forth in the so-called *Husband's Message*. At the same time, this preoccupation with foredoomed attempts to pin down the story and situation of the poem has tended to close doors to other lines of approach. The structure of the poem, its semantics, its genre — issues which might very well be settled by modern scholars and which hold the only key to "solution" of the poem — have been virtually ignored.<sup>2</sup> The purpose of this article is to attempt to unwind the great mass of commentary surrounding the *WL* in order to see anew its form, its meaning, its generic connections. This criticism is bound to be largely negative but out of it may possibly be established another and more satisfactory basis for speculation than that which has served for several generations.

The poem is obviously made up of three parts: an introduction or statement of purpose and theme (1-5), a description of the speaker's own situation (6-41), and an apparently gnomic passage (42-53). This may be roughly outlined thus:

## I. Introduction

- A. "Ic þis giedd wrece" (1-2a) (Statement of genre)
- B. "Ic þæt secgan mæg" (2b-5) (Statement of speaker's own condition)

<sup>1</sup> Henceforth referred to as *WL*. All OE poetical quotations are from G. P. Krapp and E. V. K. Dobbie, *The Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records*, 6 vols., (New York, 1931-53), henceforth K-D.

<sup>2</sup> A tentative approach to internal analysis has been recently attempted by R. D. Stevick, "Formal Aspects of *The Wife's Lament*," *JEGP*, 59 (1960), 21-25.

## II. Amplification of I.B., description of speaker's condition

- A. "Ærest mín hláford gewát" (6-8)
- B. "Ðá ic mé féran gewát" (9-10)
- C. "Ongunnan þæt þæs monnes" (11-14)
- D. "Hét mec hláford mín" (15-26)
- E. "Heht mec mon wunian" (27-32a)
- F. "Ful oft mec hér wráþe begeat" (32b-41)

## III. Gnomie passage

- A. "Á scyle geong mon" (42-47a) (subjunctive mood)
- B. "þæt mín fréond siteþ" (47b-52a) (indicative mood)
- C. "Wá bið þám þe sceal" (52b-53)

Although these arbitrary divisions, which no doubt could be juggled and revised endlessly, indicate neither points in an action nor progressions in narration, they do serve to indicate changes of essential topics. Thus, all of division II is an expansion of the statement: "Ic þæt secgan mæg,/ hwæt ic ymþa gebád..." (2a-3b). "Hét mec hláford mín hérheard niman" (15) and "heht mec mon wunian on wuda bearwe" (27) are parallel statements emphasizing a static condition. Likewise, this paralleling is seen in: "mín hláford gewát" (6a) and "ic mé féran gewát" (9a); "áhte ic léofra lýt on þissum londstede,/holdra fréonda" (16-17a) and "frýnd sind on eorþan,/léofe lifgende" (33b-34a); and in the repetition of certain key words ("úht—" [7b, 35a], "áctréo" [28a, 36a], "ful oft" [21b, 32b]). The number of these parallels indicates that they are not fortuitous, but that they are intended to show a static physical state, the *now* of the speaker. Indeed, the poem continually emphasizes the closely felt presence of the speaker (e.g., "nó má þonne nú" [4b], "is nú \*\*\* swá hit nó wære" [24], the use of the present tense when the speaker is referring to herself). Against this continuous present is cast a pattern of references to the past, a pattern perhaps intentionally vague and certainly not chronological or logical in its effect. Most of the confusion about the poem arises when one tries to force these recollections of former occasions into a preconceived *narrative* pattern. The presence of connectives such as "ærest" (6), "ðá" (9), and "forþon" (17) only add to the trouble for they tempt one to read as a time sequence what is really only a sequence of parallel statements very general in meaning.

What is being described in the middle section of the poem can be summed up in the last line of the whole passage: "[ic æfre ne mæg gerestan]... ealles þæs longapes/þe mec on þissum life begeat" (41). As a physical situation, it is precisely about "þissum life" which the speaker is talking, her physical isolation in a particular spot, not the past events of her life. Indeed, she is not really describing her past at all — the middle section is not a bit of autobiography — but she is concerned with her spiritual

If the middle section is looked upon primarily as the description of a static state of being, and not as a narration, as the establishment of a mood rather than the telling of a story, it assumes a different importance than that usually assigned it by critics. Instead of being the essential center of the poem around which the "Introduction" and "Gnome" are mere conventional frills of "exile poetry", it becomes a necessary but auxiliary amplification of the statement in the introduction. In the introduction, the speaker tells us two things:

- <sup>4</sup> All word counts are based on Grein-Wülker, *Angelsächsischer Sprachschatz* (Heidelberg, 1912). I do not include poetic compounds in these counts.

Grouping the uses of the word in context by connotations, we find that in 6 cases it definitely means song or lyric; twice a riddle; 16 times it is associated with wisdom and 5 times with sadness.<sup>5</sup> It therefore seems to mean a wise, sad, perhaps obscure song. Eleven times, one-third of the total, "giedd" occurs with "wrecan", a word which seems to be especially associated with it.<sup>6</sup> In all but one case of "giedd" with "wrecan" (*Beow.* 1065) it definitely means "wise speech" rather than "song". It is used particularly of Hrothgar's sententious speeches: "[Hé] gyd áwræc/sóð ond sárlic" (*Beow.* 2108-09).<sup>7</sup>

The speaker seems to be announcing, then, that what follows is a significant, coherent, wise utterance, neither a mere private lament nor an idle lyrical outburst. If we take section II as the significant "giedd" by itself, it puzzles precisely because of its lack of coherence. What seems to be referred to is the last part, that strange passage partly in the subjunctive, which taken by itself makes some kind of sense. This "giedd" (lines 42-53), it seems to me, is the crucial heart of the poem. It has all the earmarks of a formal curse.

The idea that the *WL* might contain a curse element is, of course, not new but those who have mentioned it have generally thought of the curse section itself as just a gratuitous close for an otherwise narrative or monodramatic poem.<sup>8</sup> The story (section II) was still the chief unit. The necessity of the curse and therefore the unity of the poem were not really touched upon. On the other hand, if we look at this curse not as a rhetorical tag but as the consummation of the poem, every part becomes necessary to the whole and the obscurities become, if not transparent, at least accountable to the requirements of magic ritual. The sudden shift of grammatical mood, for instance, is no longer a bothersome crux: it is just what we should expect in a curse.<sup>9</sup> The speaker is drawing miseries

<sup>5</sup> A single occurrence of "giedd" sometimes falls into more than one category, bringing the total somewhat above 29.

<sup>6</sup> "Wrecan", in the sense "to utter", occurs 11 times, 8 times with "giedd". The use of "wrecan" in *WL* is almost identical with that in the *Seafarer*: "Maeg ic be mé sylfum/sóðgied wrecan" (1).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. "gidding", a dark saying, riddle or prophetic, divine speech (B-T Supp., sense II (1), (3)).

<sup>8</sup> Stanley Greenfield is, as far as I know, the latest critic to mention the curse idea, which goes back to Brandl and Sieper; cf. "The Wife's Lament Reconsidered" *PMLA*, 68 (1953), 907, n. 2 and *Paul's Grundriss* (Strasbourg 1901-09), II, i, p. 977.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. for instance, the *gríð* in *Grettis saga*:

Sé sá gríðniðingr, er gríðin rýfr eða tryggðum spillir, roekr ok rekinn frá guði ok góðum mǫnnum, ór himinríki ok frá öllum helgum mǫnnum, ok hvergi hefir manna í milli ok svá frá öllum út flæmör sem víðast varga reka eða kristnir menn kirkjur sökja, heiðnir menn hof blóta, eldr brennr, jörð grœr, etc. (*Íslensk Fornrit* (ed. G. Jónsson) vol. 7 (Reykjavík, 1936), 232.)

upon someone's head, specifically her *own* miseries. "Géomormód" (42b), "blífe gebæro" (44a), "-cearo" (44b), "dréogan" (45a) are precisely the terms which she has been using of herself throughout the second section. It is as if the middle section exists primarily to establish a concrete fact of misery which can be transferred to the person being cursed. A curse or charm cannot exist as a mere imprecation; as a practical matter it must present some ciphers which can represent the magical realities being manipulated and this involves a certain amount of elaboration. The ritual or form is itself the most important part of magic.<sup>10</sup> The extant charms, both in Old English and in Old High German, give some story or situation which relates to and is identified with the occult purpose at hand. Literary magic ritual, even when it exists for purposes no longer magical, retains the forms of real magic with even increased elaboration and self-consciousness, as, for instance, with Skírnir's "bann" against Gerðr in the Skírnismál (sts. 25-36).<sup>11</sup> Considering its structure, the *WL* could well be a "literary curse" made in an age which still remembered and perhaps still feared pagan magic rites. It seems akin to the charms, even if it is not one of them. The Anglo-Saxon charms seem to be real relics of an age of magic preserved by chance; the *WL* seems to be a deliberate recollection of magic form for a literary purpose.<sup>12</sup> That the *WL* is not a poem dealing with heroic legend is fairly certain from one of its most obvious peculiarities: the absence of any proper names. In Anglo-Saxon poetry, references to heroic legend are made, not by recalling the plot, but by recalling the name. On the other hand, it is natural that no names should be mentioned in a curse.<sup>13</sup>

But if this is a curse, who is the "geong mon" (42a) being cursed? Is he, as is generally thought nowadays, identical with the "hláford" of the earlier lines? This cannot be assumed to be the case, for the sudden shift of grammatical mood indicates that if not two persons, at least two distinct states of being are being dealt with. Further, as we shall discuss again later on, it seems unlikely that one just addressed as "hláford" and "fréond" could be suddenly addressed or thought of as "geong mon". More troubling still is the exact nature of the speaker's relationship to this "hláford/geong mon". Whether there be one man or two, it has always been taken for granted that the poem is spoken by a "wife" or "mistress" who has been

<sup>10</sup> Cf. G. Storms, *Anglo-Saxon Magic* (The Hague, 1948), 40-41.

<sup>11</sup> *Semundar Edda*, edd. F. Detter and R. Heinzel (Leipzig, 1903), I, 40-41.

<sup>12</sup> It might even be a representative of a "lost" genre of literary magic.

<sup>13</sup> Grimm mentions this as the most striking feature of a curse. Cf. *Teutonic Mythology*, trans. J. S. Stallybrass (London, 1888), chap. 38.

cast out and who is lamenting her separation from her sexual partner in terms personal and passionate. This lady has been calmly accepted without question<sup>14</sup> in spite of the fact that she is thus making a unique and by all rights amazing contribution to the poetry of passionate love some centuries before it is supposed to have been invented. It is assured that the speaker is feminine. Beyond this assumptions must begin. Let us examine the basis of the prevailing assumptions.

The words establishing the existence of a "husband" (and by implication, of a "wife") are: "hláford" (6a, 15a), "monn" (10a, 18b, 27a), "fréond" (17a, 47b), "wine" (49a, 50b), "fréa" (33a);<sup>15</sup> those indicating "passion" are: "léof" (16a, 26a, 53b), "longian" (14b, 41a, 53a), "fréondscipe" (25a), "béotian" (21b).<sup>16</sup>

"Hláfórd" occurs poetically 49 times (not including the *WL*) and while it has a legal sense of "husband"<sup>17</sup>, this is far from the most important meaning and does not occur in the poetry. Poetically, its meaning falls into two groups — that of a human lord, particularly a battle-lord (occurrence 29), and a divine lord (occurrence 15) — though in many cases both meanings shade into one another. In all cases it has the meaning of a superior over inferiors. It is not the term a lover would likely use familiarly, even though "léof" is frequently coupled with "hláfórd", even in prose.<sup>18</sup> "Léof" is generally used of God or a superior and we have such phrases as "éalá léof hláfórd" (glossed "O mi domine" in *Ælfric's Coll.*), "hláfórd léofne" (*Beow.* 3142), "léof léodcýning" (*Beow.* 54), "léof landfruma" (*Beow.* 31), "léof fæder" (*Rid.* 40.34). "Fréond" is used of a follower or equal, and seems to imply a closer and more personal relationship than "hláfórd". But the speaker only uses it once to refer to the person otherwise called "hláfórd" (47b). The use in line 17a is referring to generalized hypothetical companions and in line 33b the use is a general and ironic parallel to the use in line 17a. While "fréond" is used in the sense of lover or, more properly, betrothed in *Juliana* (102), it is used with "fríg", which is the Old English word which has connotations of sexuality. Its absence in a poem supposedly dealing entirely with thwarted passion is in itself reasonable grounds for doubt about the correctness of the pre-

<sup>14</sup> With the exception of Schücking's rightly discredited attempt to change the "wife's" sex in "Das angelsächsische Gedicht von der 'Klage der Frau'", *Zeit. f. deut. Alt.* 68 (1906), 436-49. Cf. W. W. Lawrence, "The Banished Wife's Lament", *MP* 5 (1907-08), 387-405.

<sup>15</sup> "léodfruma" (8a) will be discussed below.

<sup>16</sup> Included under a single word are all forms having the same root (e.g., *longian*, *longoðe*).

<sup>17</sup> B-T Supp., s.v. "hláfórd", sense II, 2, a. A term "hús-hláfórd" occurs meaning "master of a house" but not necessarily husband in the modern sense.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. B-T, s.v. "wihl": "gif se wihl cwið, 'Mé is mán hláfórd léof.'"

vailing notions. Similarly, "fréondscipe" (25a), which Grein defines "amicitia, familiaritas, insbesondere auch zwischen Ehegatten," and which is generally taken to mean something like "marriage" or "love affair" in this poem, in fact means something quite different in 7 out of the 8 other poetical usages: 6 times it refers to God's friendship, once to the friendship between peoples (Danes and Heathobards, *Beow.* 2069), and once it is used in the *Husband's Message* (18), meaning perhaps "marriage". At any rate, it seems to indicate a relationship of a personal nature (except *Beow.* 2069): the alternation between "hláford" and "fréond" is a feature of the poem which should be taken into account.

"Wine" occurs poetically 34 times (not including the *WL*) and definitely means "husband" or "lord of a wife" once (Adam as "friendly lord" of Eve, *Gen.* 824).<sup>19</sup> "Fréa" occurs 141 times (not including the *WL*), 47 times meaning a "lord of men", 90 times "God" or "Christ" and 4 times "husband". Twice "fréa" refers to Abraham as husband to Sarah (*Gen.* 1822, 2783), once to Adam as husband to Eve (*Gen.* 655), once to Wealhtheow's lord, Hrothgar (*Beow.* 641). Statistically, these words mean "lord of men" and the meaning "husband" is, historically, a minor metaphorical extension of the original meaning. More importantly for our poem, in all cases when "wine" and "fréa" mean husband they emphasize the man's domination over the woman in an hierarchical society. Abraham is the "fréa" exercising his property rights, Adam the righteous lord led to sin by a weaker subject; Wealhtheow performing her ceremonial function in the *comitatus* is "fréolico folccwén" (*Beow.* 641a). These words lack any personal denotation, such as we should expect in a love poem. The "wife's" lament goes not outward to her "lover", but inward to her own sorrows and her attitude towards that "lover" or "husband" is inexplicably equivocal. Again, the use of "monn" confirms nothing about a marriage or love affair: its meaning ranges from a technical one of "husband" to the vaguest indication of any human creature. The use of "þæs monnes" (11a) seems to be neutral. In line 18b it could mean husband, but this is not certain, and seems cancelled by the way it is used in line 42a.

The lack of passion in this poem, which is supposed to be dealing with passion, is perhaps best seen by examining the word which is supposed most certainly to be expressing it: "longian". Nowhere does it have sexual overtones: it is used of Adam's desire for God (*Gen.* 496), Noah's desire for land (*Gen.* 1431), the gleeman's desire for the harp (*Ex. Gn.* 170). It seems especially to have spiritual connotations, suggesting the sickening

<sup>19</sup> In *Waldere*, Hildegund may be addressing Walter as "wine": "Nalles ic ðe, wine mīn, / wordum cīde" (1.12). The situation, however, is so obscure as to prove nothing either way.

agitation of an objectless desire opposed to God's will: the "géomor"'s that punctuate the rhythm seem almost the results of a hopeless state of longing. This certainly seems to be its use in *Guthlac A*: the devils came to Guthlac from their "unhæle eardas" (351) desiring that he should again seek "monlufan" (353) but the angel

...him giefte sealde,  
 þæt hine no meahte meotudes willan  
 longað gelettan, ac hé on þæs láréowes  
 wære gewunade.

(357-360)

Guthlac says of himself:

"Ic eom dryhtnes þéow,  
 hé mec þurh engel oft áfréfreð.  
 Forðon mec longeþas lýt gegrétað,  
 sorge sealdun..."

(314-317)

and this repose, this lack of desires, is the exact contrary of the state of the devils:

Tó þon caldféondas ondan nóman,  
 swá hí singales sorge dréogað.  
 Ne mótun hí on eorþan eardes brúcan,  
 ne hý lyft swefeð in léoma ræstum,  
 ac hý hléoléase háma þoliað,  
 in cearum cwíþað...

(218-223)

The use of "longoþ" in this context suggests that the "wife's" torment, presented in very similar terms, might be more spiritual than bodily, and might have more in common with those devils than first meets the eye. At any rate, translations, or rather, transcriptions, that deliberately slant "longian" and "longoþ" towards a coloring of sexual passion are no doubt misleading and misled. The same may be said of "béotian" (21b), which in this poem is taken as some sort of love betrothal: it is an heroic word tinged with belligerence, not a lovers' promise, and has no tender connotations. The term "gemæcne" (18a) presents some difficulty. This is the only occurrence of the word in an adjectival form, but as a noun "gemæcca" it means one of a pair. It is applied to turtle doves, the soul-body relationship and in some cases refers to married couples. The word in the *WL*, however, seems to mean "well-matched", "equal", referring to the state of mind prevailing in both the speaker and her "hláford". This is confirmed by her choice of words: she says of herself, "is mín hyge géomor" (17b) and then of the man that he is "hygegeómorne" (19b).<sup>20</sup> We can there-

<sup>20</sup> I would revise K-D's punctuation for ll. 17-18: comma for period after "fréonda"; period after "géomor, capitalize "Ðá".

fore take "gemæcne" neither as a term of affection nor as referring to matrimony, but merely as a statement of the similarity of mind which existed between the speaker and the "hláford" at some time in the past. Another troubling point is the word "folgap": if it means "a band of retainers" why would a woman seek that and usurp a warrior's function? Or if it means "service", how could she seek it in her apparently isolated and exiled condition? Further, "folgap" as "service" only means the service of a lord, and if she goes to seek service of another lord, her relationship to him would presumably be the same as to the one she just left. That certainly throws a dark cloud over our supposed lady's reputation, and brings another unnecessary complication into her history.

It may be objected that while no single word or usage in the *WL* clearly means "husband" or "lover", surely the agglomeration of terms we find there point that way. In reply, it may be said that certainly the terms point one way, but what that way is must be determined by factors other than the terms "hláford", "fréond", "wine", themselves. Since the poem is about the association, the "fréondscipe", of a female and a lord, it is natural for us to jump to conclusions and hopefully transliterate the poem so as to justify our romantic expectations. But would these related terms have suggested to an Anglo-Saxon audience, as they do to us, marriage, betrothal or romance? Was this the only relationship that they would have considered possible? Look at the Vercelli *Body and Soul*:

"Wine léofesta, þeah ðe wyrmas gyt  
gifre grétaþ, nú is þín gást cumen,  
lægere gefrætewod, of mínes fæder rice,  
árum bewunden. Éalá, mín dryhten,  
þær ic þé móste mid mé lédan,  
þær wyt englas ealle gesáwon,  
heofona wuldor, swylc swá ðú mé ær hér scrife!" (135-141)

Here through a mere historical accident we happen to know the situation and the identity of the speaker: the passage appears in a context which makes these clear, and we still identify "worms" and such with a roughly analogous graveyard situation. While no doubt the poem elicits a different idea from us than it did from the original audience, there is still no mistaking the tender language of the departed soul for that of a separated lover. The question is, then, not so much one of determining the finer points of the relationship of the speaker to her lord, but more broadly, to establish the nature of the speaker herself, within the given factors of the poem. It is clear that the simple view of a "lover" and his "lady" is not so much incorrect as misleading: the Anglo-Saxon poets saw the "lover" arrangement extending in all directions and applying to all sorts of things besides men and women. It was, in short, a grand analogy (I hesitate to

say "allegory") for almost any sort of harmonious and meaningful relationship.

In this respect, we should consider whether the "wife" is human at all, let alone an abandoned mistress. That she is a woman is the fundamental assumption that all modern critics have cheerfully made. The *WL* has, besides the many features which place it beside the "elegiac" poetry, many other features which link it to the riddles. Perhaps the compiler of the Exeter Book himself felt this, for he placed it at the end of a large group of riddles. The word "giedd", as was mentioned above, sometimes means riddle (*Ridl.* 55.14; 80.10; 47.3; ?*Wulf* 19). More importantly, the *WL* is linked to the riddles in that it is a variation upon the usual role of a riddle: for insofar as a riddle is serious at all, it is an attempt to define the essence of a thing exclusive of its all-powerful name. The *WL*, on the other hand, as a curse, tries to find an essence, or a *mood*, as I have called it, and then not to name it, but to transfer it to another object. As inconsequential as it may sound, it is a fact that the *WL* is one of only four poems which share a peculiarity with the overwhelming majority of riddles by beginning with the word "ic": all three are, I think, generically linked with the *WL* (i.e., the *Rhyming Poem*, itself a cousin-german to the riddles, the *Exeter Gnomes* and the *Seafarer*). The introduction contains the phrases "Ic þæt secgan mæg", "siþþan ic up wéox" and "níwes oppe ealdes nó má þonne nú", which have a riddling look about them. Further, many of the words through-out the poem are "riddling" words, that is, they are words which occur with disproportionate frequency in the riddles (e.g. "hláford", "léof", "wudu", "bearo", "dún"). This is by no means proof of a real connection, but it will serve to remind us that even as the *WL* has several features in common with the riddles, so one of those may be a speaker which is non-human.

But the *WL* presents another series of references which may supply a clue to the nature and significance of the speaker as well as to the meaning of the whole. It is a series of references so all-pervading and consistent that we might even call it a theme — though it is a theme which has been strangely overlooked or ignored by critics — that is, the religious theme, a careful system of references to *pagan* religious objects and practices. When the speaker calls the man her "hláford", an easy translation of "husband" can perhaps be accepted. But when, a few lines later, she addresses him as "léodfruma" (8a), we can recognize that there is no merely personal note in her lament. For "léodfruma" means only the lord of a people, not of a wife. It is not an heroic pleonasm, applicable to either a prince or a husband, as "fréa" and "wine" sometimes are. It seems to be an exclusively poetic word, occurring nine times and only twice used of a human lord in his princely role (cf. Hrothgar, *Beow.* 2130; *Met. Boet.*,

1.27). In all other cases it seems to mean "patriarch", a leader who brings a new religion to a people or leads them through some pressing religious crisis. It is used of Moses leading the people (*Exod.* 354), of Andreas as leader of the disciples in a heathen land (*And.* 1660) and as one specially under God's protection (*And.* 989), of Constantine when he receives baptism (*Elene* 191), of Seth as the founder of the race of man (*Gen.* 1246), of Isaac as the founder of the Hebrew people (*Gen.* 2334) and of the Christ-Phoenix (*Ph.* 345).<sup>21</sup>

The references to pagan things are numerous and obvious, so much so that it is remarkable that there are no signs of Christianization to cover them up. The speaker is ordered to dwell in a "herh-eard" (15b).<sup>22</sup> The term is used of a heathen idol as opposed to Christian altars in the Old English translation of Bede's History<sup>23</sup> and ON "hörgr" is "an altar of stone... erected on high places, or a sacrificial cairn... built in open air, and without images..."<sup>24</sup> In Anglo-Saxon texts it is glossed "lucum" and represents the grove or sacred place of Germanic heathendom, though we do not know much about it except its name.<sup>25</sup> OE "hearg", OHG "harug" is synonymous with OE "bearo", OHG "baro".<sup>26</sup> Line 15 with "herheard" exactly parallels line 27: "Heht mec mon wunian on wuda bearwe." "Wudu" is a neutral word, apparently used pretty much as the modern "wood" in all its senses but "bearo", besides meaning a heathen sacred grove, still, in the historical period, elicits the idea of a flowering or fruit bearing plant and the forces of life itself. Its vital meaning was very much alive to the Anglo-Saxon poets, particularly the poet of the *Phoenix*,

<sup>21</sup> The exact meaning of this word as it is adapted to various Christian contexts is perhaps lost to us. But even in *Beowulf*, where the use is no doubt inherited from older times, it is used at a moment of supreme stress as Beowulf tells of Hrothgar's grief at the death of Æschere:

þæt wæs Hrōðgare      hréowa tornost  
þára þe léodfruman      lange begéate. (2129-30)

The occurrence in the historical introduction to the *Meters* of Boethius (1.27) refers to the ephocal confrontation of the *Arian* Goths and the orthodox Romans and to the emperor, who would have been the representative of order, civilization and true religion to an educated Englishman of Alfred's day.

<sup>22</sup> i.e., "hearg-eard", for MS "her heard". The respacing "herheard" is accepted by Grein, Toller, K-D and most later editors. The syntactical difficulties of "herheard" and the sheer peculiarity of such a line make unlikely a translation such as: "My *hard* lord bade me take (dwelling) *here*." But cf. *Beow.* 376a.

<sup>23</sup> *Ecc. Hist.*, II, 15; cf. B-T, s.v. "hearg".

<sup>24</sup> Cleasby-Vigfusson, *Icelandic-English Dictionary*, 2d. ed. (Oxford, 1957), s.v. "hörgr".

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Grimm, *op. cit.*, 69.

<sup>26</sup> Jan de Vries, *Algermanische Religionsgeschichte I* (*Religion der Südgermanen*) in *Paul's Grundriss* (Berlin & Leipzig, 1935), vol. 12.1, 266f.

to whom it has become a symbol of light (*Ph.* 67, 71, 80, 122, 148, 432): extraordinary connotations continued to play over it long after the heathen period was over. The double mention of "áctréo" (28a, 36a) is remarkable because here, in the *WL*, are the only poetic occurrences of "ác" as a tree. "Ác" is a runic letter, remembered as such in the riddles (42.10, 55.9). In the *Runic Poem*, "ác" is mentioned only as oak-wood for the ship's timbers and acorns for mast (77-80); the significance of the oak as a holy tree to the heathen English is deliberately avoided, as we should expect. It is strange, to say the least, that in our poem it should be recalled so emphatically, in company with other references to pagan things. The oak tree is connected with "dim vallies" and "steep dunes" while the speaker crouches in an "eorþscræf" (28b, 36b). These words certainly suggest the barrows of a heathen burial place, one sacred and now abandoned. The use of "eorþsele" (29a) seems to confirm this, for while "eorþscræf" is quite common and occurs in various contexts simply as "grave", the former word has only two other occurrences, both referring to the lair of the dragon in *Beowulf* (2515, 2410) which itself appears to be an old heathen burial mound.<sup>27</sup>

Perhaps it would be well to summarize the argument thus far. The *WL* is a tripartite poem consisting of an introduction, a mood-spell and a gnome which comprise a formal curse. The poem's tone is one of sustained sadness in an intensely felt present which is concretized and meant to be transferred by a spell to a "geong mon". The curse is spoken by a female being, concerned in some obscure misfortune with a man whom she looks upon as a superior, a patriarch and yet an equal, though not a lover. She is connected somehow with a heathen burial place, enduring an exile painful to her but not clearly delineated to us. These circumstances are the facts of the poem as I read it, and it brings us to the point where bald speculation must begin. It is the point where most readings begin but the above data does not lead to the usual conclusions about the poem's meaning.

The religious setting suggests that the relationship of the man, the "hláford" and the speaker is religious rather than human and personal — given the speaker's attitude towards him, he seems to have a priestly function. The poem, I think, is a literary curse conceived as made by a cast-off heathen minor deity, or attendant household spirit, one of those innumerable female spirits which came to be called in Norse tradition the *disir*. She is lamenting the recent conversion of some priest-chief whom she

<sup>27</sup> Certain West Germanic grave sites have shown traces of having been heathen temple sites as well (cf. De Vries, *op. cit.*, p. 271).

considered her special "man" (e.g., as Hrafnkell was "Freysgoði"). Bede's story of the heathen priest Coifi's conversion<sup>28</sup> offers a famous and typical instance of just this situation, and shows the importance the Anglo-Saxons gave to the conversion of the head men as the representatives and leaders of society. It is not inconceivable that they would be willing to look at the story from the other side in poetry, just as in *Christ and Satan* the devils relate their own misery. The poem presents the old heathen spirit dwelling in the abandoned spot formerly dedicated to the worship of herself or her fellows, while men continue to dwell in distant towns with the new gods (which she doesn't really understand) — the situation, in fact, that we have in *Guthlac A*. This view explains the "fæhðu" of the man as a kind of interdiction or formal exorcism practiced upon her, perhaps the breaking of her altar, certainly the loss of offerings. Not the least of the results of this approach is the natural and immediate identification of the "geong mon". The curser is attempting to bring down on his head a fate identical to her own, so that he too may be "ful wíde fáh" (46b) to match her own "fæhðu" — and it follows that a spirit would conceive this possible only of another spirit.<sup>29</sup> The young man<sup>30</sup> must be the god who won away the "goði" — Christ.

If the *WL* does indeed contain a reference to Christ, the "new force", it roughly parallels the movement in the later *Völuspá*, where after a prophecy of the downfall of the old gods is delivered, there is a nameless hint of the arrival of a new and greater god. The opposition of Christ and the old heathen gods seems to have been an everyday way of thinking during the times of the conversion of the Germanic peoples. It was a way of thought forced on the new Christians by the very missionaries, if Boniface's Old Saxon oath, forswearing the old gods and pledging loyalty to the new, is any indication. The later legends of King Olaf Tryggvason present the demise of the heathen gods as a direct encounter between Olaf and

<sup>28</sup> *Ecc. Hist.*, II, 13.

<sup>29</sup> The wounding of Odin in the *Hávamál* shows that the Germanic gods were subject to charms, curses, spells, etc. Snorri (*Ynglinga saga*, chap. 7) refers to all the gods as "galdra smiðr," "charm smiths" (cf. G. Storms, *op. cit.*, 33).

<sup>30</sup> Anglo-Saxon poetry seemed to reserve a special place for the term "geong", for while it is used sometimes with our neutral sense of the word, in a great number of cases it is used with the idea that attached to it is a great life force. Vitality and eternity are associated with it — it often has a sacred connotation similar in mood to that surrounding "bearo" — and it is used of the shooting, the growing, the lasting, the ever-young. "Geong hæleð" (Christ) in the *Dream of the Rood* (39) comes immediately to mind. "Geong" is used of Mary, of the Phoenix, of Beowulf in his glory and of Andreas' spiritual state, although he is not necessarily young in years.

Thor himself. Even the lower spirits are involved in the legends of Christ's coming:

One day shortly before the coming of Christianity Thorhall lay in his bed looking out through a window; he smiled, and his host, the powerful Sidu-Hall, one of the first men who accepted baptism, asked him what he was smiling at. Thorhall answered: "I am smiling to see many a mound opening up and all living beings, great and small, packing their belongings and moving elsewhere."<sup>31</sup>

In the *WL*, the fact that no names are mentioned is explainable by the necessity of the curse, a certain delicacy on the part of the author when he is treading such possibly dangerous ground, and the dramatic situation, where the heathen spirit would no more mention the name of an alien deity than a Christian would mention the name of a heathen one.

We should note that the purpose of the curse does not seem to be to destroy the new god outright but to reduce him to the same position of misery which the old goddess feels is hers, outcast and unheeded. At the same time the curse is automatically directed at her former "goði", for its purpose is to deprive him of his new god, as well as his old, and reduce him, on a human level, to the same wretchedness which she now suffers on a divine level. The last few lines of the poem describe hardships of a decidedly physical nature: while she, the spirit, suffers longing for lost followers and service, and wishes the same fate for the new god, the human wretch is "wætre beflówen" and "storme behrímed". This explains the shift from "hláford", her anointed as it were, to "fréond", an equal in misery, if not in being, and an ironical comment on the result of their broken relationship. She sees beyond the curse to its accomplishment, as far as the human is concerned.

More than in any other poem except *Beowulf* itself, reminiscences of the old religion stand clearly forward. Furthermore, there are no signs whatever of Christianizing interpolation.<sup>32</sup> How is it possible that this poem alone of all others has escaped unscathed? Or is it really a heathen poem at all? It seems to me that if it were, it would not have been preserved in its present form, that the very boldness and prominence of the heathen element points to its having been written by Christians around a heathen setting, with a heathen subject, in a heathen form, precisely to further Christian doctrine. And it is with this in mind that the first audiences would have received it.

<sup>31</sup> *Piðranda Páttir Stövu-Hallssonar*, cited by P. A. Munch, *Norse Mythology: The Legends of Gods and Heroes*, rev. Magnus Olsen, Trans. S. B. Hustvedt (London, 1926), 309-10.

<sup>32</sup> That is, assuming as I do, that "pissum life" (41b) refers to the preset situation of the speaker and does not imply a future life.

The subject seems to be the continual sorrow and sense of loss suffered by the old god, now a demon, deprived as she is of the light of bliss and truth as well as of followers. It thus is similar to the sort of thing which the poets of *Guthlac*, *Juliana*, and *Christ and Satan* were attempting: to present forcefully and from the mouths of heathens and devils themselves the agony and loss which the non-Christian suffers. "Ic eom fáh wið god" cries the old enemy of God (*Chr & Sat* 96b), and is not this the cry of the demon of the *WL*? In this context "géomor" becomes a kind of technical word expressing the sorrow of that "tódæled" one, the unspeakable "wéa-bearfe" of the spiritually blind. That the Anglo-Saxon poets were able to abstract themselves sufficiently to do this sort of thing is seen in *Juliana* where Christ can be denounced and the heathen gods praised for dramatic and didactic purposes. The Christian poet would have inevitably seen the exile, the wanderings, the loneliness, the never-ending woe, the dwelling among the dead as a typical presentation of the essential darkness of mind which marks the heathen. The poem takes its shape around an old spirit who makes an ignorant and futile attempt to call down a curse on the true God as if he were another equal spirit, a mere "fréond", a fellow "wergþu" whose joys depended on followers and sacrifices. The viewpoint of the speaker is that of the heathen mind as it was conceived and strained through the mind of the Christian poet and insofar as he could sympathize with it. Thus was produced the anomaly, common enough in Anglo-Saxon poetry, of the heathen spirit condemning herself out of her own mouth: "morþor hycgende wit" (20b), "we two planning great sin" (idolatry?, blasphemy?). As in Bede's account of the conversion of Coifi, the heathen is necessarily unable to make a good case.

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# The Concentration of Responsibility in Five Villages

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## I

A RECENT survey<sup>1</sup> of the elementary behavioural map of five villages of Huntingdonshire as found in court rolls for the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries revealed three divisions among villagers: main, intermediate and outsiders. It was clear that outsiders and intermediate persons tended to appear as isolated individuals, the former because of their incidental activity in the village, the latter because of their lack of status as responsible *nativi*. The broad categories of this description did not permit investigation of concentration at various points, of specific persons. There still remains to describe in a general statistical fashion the concentration of material about main family names. Such will be the purpose of the following article.

'Main families' are here defined as those identified on the court rolls by the performance of major official obligations. One may properly designate such obligations as juror or taster as major, because of the expertise involved; and the formal appointment to these duties as well as the community involvement, above all in pledging, qualifies them as official. Table I lists the family names associated with major duties in the village. It will be immediately remarked from the total entries for these families that the degree of their involvement in the village varied widely. Some of the detail of these variations may be explained by the variety in the number of extant court rolls from village to village, and by the fact that the incidence of court roll survival would reflect more on some than others within the same village. But there still emerges a general pattern<sup>2</sup> in these variations that may be grouped

<sup>1</sup> J. A. Raftis, "Social Structure in Five East Midland Villages: a study of possibilities in the use of court roll data," *The Economic History Review*, Second Series, Vol. 18, no. 1, 1965, 83-100.

<sup>2</sup> In the broad survey of this article we are not able to touch upon the many points discussed by Sylvia L. Thrupp, "The Problem of Replacement Rates in Late Medieval

for convenience into four main categories: A) main families with continuity, B) families disappearing, C) new families appearing in the village records for the first time, D) families continuing in a minor role, that is, assuming major obligations only once or twice over the whole period.

The number of family names disappearing are surprising—from 10% of this total group at Upwood, to 16% at Warboys, 22% at Broughton, 23% at Wistow to 24% at Abbots Ripton.<sup>3</sup> These figures are to be explained apparently by failure to provide sons as heirs. The considerable number of persons associated with the persons of this B group, as may be seen in the last column of the table, indicates how many could be effected when a competent heir was not found in the family. At the same time, there is evidence for daughters surviving in many instances where no sons are mentioned, so that through marriage properties would remain in the 'blood'<sup>4</sup> of these families. From our evidence there is no reason to assume that these families had not been long associated with the village, and on the other hand, desertion of the village by the heir is a rare phenomenon.<sup>5</sup>

Those new names appearing on the village rolls are fewer in number than the names of those disappearing,<sup>6</sup> but are still quite numerous—from 5% at Broughton, to 8% at Upwood, 11% at Warboys, 12% at Abbots Ripton to 18% at Wistow. These new people, attesting to recruitment from beyond the local community, have important implications for the social history of the village. By indicating an open-ended villein group they challenge, for example, the meaning of the term 'class' as applied to the villein. They may explain too why we

English Population," *The Economic History Review*, Second Series, Vol. 18, no. 1, 1965, 101-119.

<sup>3</sup> While it is difficult to recognize changes in surnames from court roll entries, changes in main family surnames appear to have been rare, and the more important the family the easier can such changes be traced.

<sup>4</sup> See J. A. Raftis, *Tenure and Mobility, studies in the social history of the mediaeval English village*, Studies and Texts, 8 (Toronto, 1965), Chapter Two.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 33-6, for the few occasions in which the court had to proclaim vacancy in a customary holding.

<sup>6</sup> Many other persons who were not of this important category would be coming into the village. See "Social Structures in Five East Midland Villages", pp. 90-4. It has not yet been possible to explain the differential between the size of C and B groups. Nor is there evidence that some families simply moved up the ladder from intermediate to main families as opportunities allowed.

fail to find evidence for concern about inbreeding in the village.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, our evidence for these new people is very unsatisfactory. A large percentage clearly come after the Plague.<sup>8</sup> From the last column it may be observed that very often a numerous family does not yet seem to surround those listed under the C group. It is difficult to suppose that strangers would be allowed to move on to the village so as to be entrusted immediately with major responsibility.<sup>9</sup> But our evidence does not make it possible to establish when and why these persons moved into the village or, in instances where they were accepted very readily, just who the friends in the village were that would make this possible.

TABLE I  
MAIN FAMILIES<sup>10</sup>

*Upwood* (1278-1353: 31 rolls)

Names	Grouping	Total Entries	Persons
Alkoc	D	42	7
Arnold	B	10	2
Aspelon	A	75	6
Attewelle	A	28	3
Aubus	D	8	4
Aubyn	A	79	9
Austyn	D	5	3
Ayse	D	18	5
Balle	C	4	2
Baron	D	73	10
Bigge	A	83	14
Brun	A	63	15
Buckworth	A	52	8
Carter	A	32	10
Chirche(atte)	A	21	6
Cook	A	108	26
Couhyrde	A	49	10
Couper	A	50	6
Crane	A	71	7
Curteys	A	45	7

<sup>7</sup> Professor Karl Helleiner has called my attention to the wide significance of this point for the canon law of marriage as well as natural family grouping.

<sup>8</sup> 3 or 4 of 7 at Upwood, 6 or 7 of 17 at Wistow, 3 of 10 at Warboys, 2 of 9 at Abbots Ripton and 1 of 3 at Broughton. The rolls used here do not likely carry far enough into the 1350's and '60's, however, to measure the full impact of the Plague.

<sup>9</sup> Although outsiders could enter customary tenements through marriage to the widow, see *Tenure and Mobility*, pp. 36-42.

<sup>10</sup> There are a few families not included in this table because of peculiar difficulties in identification and tracing. For example, at Upwood one family has clearly appropriated the name and the office of Reeve, but it is extremely difficult to identify members of this family since references to the reeve are so impersonal.

TABLE I cont'd

Names	Grouping	Total Entries	Persons
<i>Upwood</i> cont'd			
Edward	D	43	6
Eliot	D	1	1
Elys	D	14	4
Fleming	A	71	7
Fontem	B	13	6
Frere	A	70	7
Fryth	D	3	2
Galyon	A	58	6
Geffrey	D	3	2
Gernoun	A	64	10
Godeson	A	57	8
Gouler	A	32	5
Grenam	D	25	6
Haringmonger	D	53	10
Haukyn	A	69	10
Henry	D	42	6
Herbert	B	16	4
Hering	A	77	6
Hilhayl	D	29	3
Holy	A	50	5
Houghton	A	51	7
Kymbolton	D	10	1
Kyng	A	28	3
Lanerok	D	58	13
Lone	C	16	1
Lonere	B	5	2
Lyly	D	1	1
Man	A	43	7
Miles	A	78	7
Montem	D	11	3
Nedham	C	6	1
Newman	A	119	7
Nicholas	D	35	6
Papeworthe	C	13	1
Peretre	A	27	8
Pykeler	A	65	9
Ralph (son of)	B	1	1
Richard (son of)	C	16	7
Robert	B	8	4
Robyn	C	22	3
Sabyn	A	22	6
Simon (son of)	A	47	6
Snape(ate)	A	50	7
Stale(ate)	B	2	1
Suel	A	43	4
Sutbury	D	24	7
Sywewell	A	41	6
Thacher	A	30	5
Tixtor	D	3	1
Tylur	D	31	8
Wadilond	A	22	4
Walter	D	11	4
Warboys	A	64	8
Warin	D	14	7
Wauk	C	24	6
Webester	D	15	6
Wennington	A	91	9
West	D	24	5

TABLE I cont'd

Names	Grouping	Total Entries	Persons
<i>Upwood</i> cont'd			
Weston	D	11	5
William (son of)	D	13	5
Wodestrate	A	21	2
Wold	A	23	3
Wotton	B	1	1
Wrce	B	2	2
<i>Wistow</i> (1278-1353: 38 rolls)			
Abovebrok	B	10	2
Akerman	D	53	11
Andrew	B	49	8
Angulo	B	17	4
Arnold	D	31	10
Aspelon	A	33	4
Atebrok	B	47	10
Ategate	C	13	3
Atchalle	D	18	5
Atewelle	C	17	4
Austyn	A	25	5
Aylmar	A	62	6
Barker	D	35	6
Barun	A	105	14
Beneyt	A	35	5
Bercarius	D	57	14
Bissop	A	20	7
Bonyere	D	31	4
Bronnenote	A	59	8
Broughton	B	3	3
Brun	A	33	4
Burgeys	B	70	1
Claxton	A	15	3
Clericus	B	21	8
Clervaux	A	39	5
Cotes	C	33	4
Crane	A	51	10
Curteys	A	33	8
Daye	C	9	3
Drinere	C	5	1
Ecclesiam	D	33	10
Elyot	C	17	3
Faber	D	117	19
Fleming	B	11	3
Fontem	B	24	5
Frere	A	54	12
Germoun	A	105	12
Gouler	A	38	9
Harrow	C	1	1
Haukyn	A	97	11
Herni	D	19	9
Herod	C	20	6
Hime	D	7	3
Hobbe	C	18	6
Hosebonde	A	71	6
Hyché	C	23	4
Jowel	A	24	7
Katelyne	A	104	8
Keyse	B	40	4

TABLE I cont'd

Names	Grouping	Total Entries	Persons
<i>Wistow cont'd</i>			
Kyde	C	2	2
Lacy	B	25	2
Lanerok	A	72	8
Lauwe	B	28	9
Lone	A	37	5
Longes	B	60	6
Manger	D	51	9
Margery	A	35	4
Martyn	D	31	9
Mowyn	C	10	2
Myce	D	16	2
Oliver	D	36	7
Onty	A	90	9
Palmer	A	139	12
Parys	D	24	8
Patrick	D	19	7
Penetour	C	5	2
Portam	A	23	6
Prepositus	D	125	12
Pusker	B	34	5
Randolf	A	31	5
Raveley	B	11	6
Rede	A	101	12
Richard	A	44	9
Robbesson	C	19	2
Roger	A	17	10
Ruffus	B	11	2
Rypam	D	2	1
Sabyn	A	85	10
Stephen	B	25	4
Sutor	D	36	12
Thedwar	B	50	4
Thomas	B	4	2
Upton	B	6	2
Vernoun	C	5	1
Walter	D	64	11
Wardeboys	A	10	2
Warin	A	145	10
Wenington	C	18	2
Whyte	B	24	4
Willeesson	C	19	2
Wrighte	D	12	2
Wysman	D	24	5
<i>Warboys (1290-1353: 34 rolls)</i>			
Agace	B	26	4
Albyn	A	83	13
Alot	D	13	2
Attewode	D	22	8
Aula	B	5	2
Baroun	B	11	3
Beneyt	A	72	6
Bercarius	D	35	10
Berenger	A	96	9
Bissop	D	21	5
Bonde	A	163	25

TABLE I cont'd

Names	Grouping	Total Entries	Persons
<i>Warboys cont'd</i>			
Broughton	D	11	7
Brounyng	A	39	7
Brun	A	82	12
Bryd	D	87	8
Bugge	D	43	12
Catoun	A	89	11
Cecilia	A	27	6
Chaumon	D	23	8
Clericus	A	116	14
Collesone	C	19	5
Couhyrde	D	43	13
Dereworth	D	22	6
Dike	D	38	4
Egdon	B	16	5
Faber	D	90	13
Fine	D	96	16
Fleming	C	13	1
Folyet	B	19	5
Fot	D	27	7
Galeway	B	10	2
Galfridus	C	31	5
Gerold	A	150	10
Godwyne	D	14	4
Gosse	A	45	8
Grendale	B	31	4
Haliday	B	13	2
Harsine	A	39	6
Haugate	D	34	7
Herbert	D	32	6
Hering	D	25	3
Hey(ward)	D	19	5
Hygeney	A	148	13
Hyrst	D	21	5
Isabel	B	31	7
Kaunt	D	41	8
Lawrence	C	13	5
Lenot	D	87	10
London	D	37	10
Lone	A	53	8
Long	D	14	3
Lucas	D	35	6
Margerete	A	30	6
Martyn	D	20	4
Mercator	B	11	3
Molt	A	41	6
Nel	D	54	6
Nicholas	C	20	6
Noble	A	77	8
Nunne	D	30	5
Pakerel	A	83	15
Palmer	C	16	6
Pilche	D	86	16
Pilgrim	A	64	11
Plumbe	D	44	9
Prat	B	3	1
Prepositus	D	182	6
Puttok	D	44	5

TABLE I cont'd

Names	Grouping	Total Entries	Persons
<i>Warboys cont'd</i>			
Raven	A	178	18
Rede	C	27	5
Richard	C	18	3
Robert	B	13	7
Robyn	D	19	5
Rolf	A	61	8
Sculle	D	11	4
Scut	A	77	11
Segeley	A	63	8
Semar	A	114	14
Smart	A	80	3
Sperner	D	42	10
Sutor	D	11	6
Swan	D	15	7
Thurberne	B	4	2
Top	B	25	10
Tortorin	D	13	3
Tymme	C	25	3
Unfrey	B	24	2
Vicory	C	20	2
Walter	A	28	9
Wennington	D	18	5
Wilkes	D	46	9
Wodekoc	A	74	6
<i>Abbots Ripton</i> <sup>11</sup> (1274-1356: 21 rolls)			
Abovestrete	B	17	3
Adam	D	10	4
Agnes (son of)	B	10	4
Akerman	A	17	2
Alloc	D	5	4
Andrew	D	6	4
Anyn	D	10	3
Atedam	A	55	7
Atehill	A	29	9
Attetall	A	29	9
Attelane	D	38	7
Aylmar	B	21	2
Balle	A	18	3
Bestesson	D	6	3
Bonde	A	33	6
Brewster	C	11	2
Buckworth	B	21	5
Buk	A	29	7
Burcester	D	3	3
Burg	D	13	2
Carpenter	D	55	9
Carter	C	8	4
Clerk	B	24	7
Colle	C	30	7
Colyer	A	29	10

<sup>11</sup> The fewer rolls for this village magnify the problems of identification. Adam and Andrew may be the same family, as with Anyn and Clerk.

TABLE I cont'd

Names	Grouping	Total Entries	Persons
<i>Abbots Ripton cont'd</i>			
Crucem	B	6	3
Derlyng	B	30	5
Donedale	D	3	2
Dyneker	B	12	4
Ecclesiam (ad)	A	16	5
Estthorp	B	3	2
Faber	D	31	14
Frere	C	5	2
Gerold	B	17	1
Gothynde	D	35	6
Haulond	A	73	9
Hayward	B	18	3
Henry	A	38	11
Horseman	D	14	5
Hubert	A	48	5
Hugh	D	24	6
Hughlot	D	34	7
Hurnote	B	4	1
Hyche	A	10	3
Hyrst	A	22	4
Jordon	D	7	3
Ladde	A	24	7
Lucas	B	5	3
Maggesden	C	5	1
March	A	58	8
Margaret	D	6	3
Martyn	A	35	10
Nene	C	23	6
Ode	C	15	2
Oliver	A	32	6
Onty	A	59	8
Philip	D	6	2
Prepositus	D	105	14
Pressy	B	4	2
Reynold	B	14	7
Robert	A	26	5
Sabyn	D	51	11
Sarrason	C	5	1
Scocia	D	11	5
Stukeley	C	5	1
Swon	D	24	7
Thedwar	A	29	4
Thomas	D	58	8
Upende	B	10	3
Vernoun	A	52	13
Wake	D	92	11
Walter	B	36	10
Warde	D	7	2
Warewyk	B	8	2
Wassingle	A	9	3
West	A	49	8
Willem	A	37	5
Wodeward	B	23	3

TABLE I cont'd

Names	Grouping	Total Entries	Persons
<i>Broughton</i> (1288-1340: 33 rolls)			
Abbot	A	39	4
Ad Crucem	C	25	4
Ad Pontem	A	45	5
Ad Portam	A	71	7
Aleyn	B	56	7
Aspelon	A	29	3
Atedam	A	23	5
Atehille	A	26	4
Ategate	C	19	4
Balde	A	46	10
Ballard	B	35	6
Bayloff	A	38	7
Beneyt	D	46	8
Bigge	B	16	1
Blosme	A	36	5
Bluntisham	B	8	1
Boteler	A	36	5
Broughton	A	133	13
Camera	B	7	2
Carpenter	D	10	5
Cateline	D	81	8
Catoun	B	3	1
Clericus	A	149	12
Cook	A	42	8
Crane	A	88	11
Cuper	A	56	7
Edward	D	17	8
Elecok	B	37	3
Everard	B	81	8
Faber	A	60	16
Fisher	A	18	4
Gernoun	A	27	3
Gilbert	A	73	7
Gore	A	47	6
Hanecok	D	24	2
Henry	A	102	7
Heyneston	C	3	2
Hobbe	A	124	9
Horseman	D	18	7
Hugh	A	89	17
Joceline	B	53	4
John	B	25	3
Justice	A	25	3
Kyng	B	28	7
Le Bon	A	41	6
Le Longe	D	4	3
Lomb	B	35	5
Maud	D	1	1
Merton	B	12	3
Mohaut	A	40	6
Nel	A	12	3
Nunne	A	21	5
Onty	A	101	11
Othewold	A	26	4
Parsun	D	27	7
Pellag	A	48	8
Prat	D	22	4

TABLE I cont'd

Names	Grouping	Total Entries	Persons
<i>Broughton cont'd</i>			
Randolf	A	80	10
Roger	A	85	10
Russell	A	52	5
Waleboy	A	33	6
Wistow	B	18	2
Woodward	A	51	5
Wylymot	A	38	4

## II

Despite the disappearance and appearance of various families, more than fifty percent of the main families in these villages survived in full vigour over these decades. Such continuing main families are usually characterized by a dominant figure in each generation. Table II lists these more prominent persons along with the number of their entries and the number of years for which entries are available.<sup>12</sup> This table also lists the number of other apparent members of these families noted in the court rolls and the total entries for such persons. The final column conveys, therefore, a general impression of how the total family group was also much involved in village life. Despite the great variety from the nature of record survivals, the number of years for central figures indicates the consistency of their appearance. Others in their families appear in such a scattered fashion that the years indicate no pattern and have not been tabulated. The grouped members of the same family shows the tendency for central figures to succeed one another in the family, that is, offices are handed on from father to son. Occasionally, of course, several branches of one family have been able to produce prominent members at the same time.

<sup>12</sup> Table II is illustrative only, and does not pretend to supply an exhaustive list of all main persons. That is to say, certain main persons who do not stand out simply because of the incidence of surviving court rolls for their village, or other reasons unknown to us, have been omitted for reasons of space from this table. While it might be useful to consider entering the terminal years of main persons in Table II, the uneven incidence of court roll survivals makes such a tabulation of questionable value.

TABLE II  
CENTRAL FIGURES AND THEIR FAMILY GROUPS

*Warboys*

Central Figure	Number of Years	Entries	Others of Family	Entries for Others
Albyn, Robert	14	21	11	60
Beneyt, Hugh	21	46	5	26
Beneyt, Reginald	10	18	5	54
Berenger, William	12	15	8	81
Berenger, Robert	17	35	8	61
Bonde, Richard	11	27	22	136
Brun, Henry	18	38	11	44
Catoun, John	9	16	10	73
Catoun, John jr.	10	25	10	64
Clericus, John	20	43	13	73
Galfridus, John (son of)	7	17	4	14
Gerold, Richard	10	23	9	127
Gerold, William	15	34	9	116
Gerold, Simon	19	41	9	109
Hygeneye, John de	14	50	12	98
Hygeneye, Hugh de	6	12	12	136
Margrete, Robert	10	16	4	11
Raven, Thomas sr.	18	42	17	136
Raven, Thomas jr.	13	51	17	127
Rede, John	11	16	4	11
Semar, Henry	10	19	13	95
Semar, Albinus	9	19	13	95
Semar, Richard	15	30	13	84
Smart, Robert	29	64	2	16
Smart, William	10	15	2	65
Wodecok, William	15	23	5	51
Wodecok <sup>13</sup> , John	11	15	5	59
Wodecok, John jr.	3	6	5	68
Wodecok, Richard	7	13	5	61

*Broughton*

Abbot, William	18	26	3	13
Ad Crucem, Thomas	8	19	3	6
Ad Pontem, William	11	19	4	26
Ad Portam, Henry	5	10	6	61
Ad Portam, John	12	30	6	41
Ad Portam, William	8	21	6	50
Aleyn, Absolon	9	21	6	35
Atedam, John	9	15	4	8
Ategate, John	6	14	3	5
Ballard, John	13	26	5	9
Baylof, William	8	15	6	23
Bigge, John	8	14	—	—

<sup>13</sup> John Wodekoc and John Wodekoc junior are good examples of the junior and senior combinations that are often very difficult to distinguish. For the purposes of these tables, when the court record ceases to make the distinction between junior and senior, it is assumed that the junior member alone has survived.

TABLE II cont'd

Central Figure	Number of Years	Entries	Others of Family	Entries for Others
<i>Broughton cont'd</i>				
Blosme, John	14	26	4	10
Boteler, John	17	29	4	7
Broughton, John de	14	67	12	66
Clericus, Ralph	18	62	11	87
Crane, Robert	15	29	10	59
Cuper, William le	7	16	6	40
Cuper, John le	14	26	6	30
Elecock, Ralph	13	32	2	5
Everard, Ralph	6	11	7	70
Everard, John	15	29	7	52
Gernoun, John	10	16	2	11
Gilbert, Reginald	14	35	6	38
Gilbert, John	9	22	6	51
Gore, John	6	14	5	33
Gore, Thomas	11	25	5	22
Henry, William	14	35	6	67
Henry, John	15	40	6	62
Hobbe, John	8	23	8	101
Hobbe, William	15	50	8	74
Hobbe, John jr.	7	24	8	100
Joceline, John	11	45	3	8
Justice, John	10	10	2	15
Justice, Adam	7	13	2	12
Le Bon, John	12	23	5	18
Lomb, Richard	18	25	4	10
Mohaut, Thomas	13	19	5	21
Nel, John	4	5	2	7
Nel, Simon	4	4	2	8
Onty, Andrew	6	11	10	90
Onty, John	16	43	10	58
Onty, William	10	21	10	80
Othewold, William	5	9	3	17
Othewold, John	5	7	3	19
Pellage, Simon	11	19	7	29
Randolf, John	10	27	9	53
Russell, William	11	26	4	26
Russell, Thomas	9	19	4	33
Waleboy, Thomas	13	22	5	11
Woodward, Alexander	10	24	4	27
Woodward, Simon	9	19	4	32
Wylymot, John	12	28	3	10
<i>Abbots Ripton</i>				
Akerman, John	9	14	1	3
Atedam, Oliver	9	15	6	40
Attehall, Philip	7	14	8	15
Aylmar, Thomas	11	20	1	1
Balle, William	5	9	2	2
Bonde, Andrew	8	13	5	20
Bonde, John	9	12	5	21
Bukworth, Augustin	8	15	4	6
Colle, Philip	5	13	6	17
Derlyng, Roger	5	20	4	10
Ecclesiam, Hugh ad	5	7	4	9
Gerold, Richard	8	17	—	—

TABLE II cont'd

Central Figure	Number of Years	Entries	Others of Family	Entries for Others
<i>Abbots Ripton cont'd</i>				
Gothyrd, Robert	10	26	5	9
Haulond, William sr.	8	17	8	56
Haulond, William jr.	8	21	8	52
Hubert, Nicholas	12	37	4	11
Hughlot, William	9	22	6	12
Ladde, William	8	13	6	11
Martyn, John	6	11	9	24
Merch, Roger	9	11	7	47
Nene, Thomas	6	15	5	8
Ode, Nicholas	6	10	2	5
Ode, John	5	5	2	10
Oliver, William	10	14	5	18
Onty, Martin	9	15	7	44
Robert, John	10	19	4	7
Thedwar, John	9	15	3	14
Vernoun, John	11	29	12	23
West, Robert	9	19	7	30
Willem, John	5	12	4	25
Willem, Stephen	5	12	4	25
<i>Wistow</i>				
Andrew, John	16	23	7	26
Angulo, Thomas in	9	11	3	6
Aspelon, John	11	21	3	12
Aylmar, John	20	37	5	25
Barun, William	9	17	13	88
Beneyt, Thomas	13	21	4	14
Bronnote, Robert	19	39	7	20
Clervaux, Ralph	14	20	4	19
Cotes, Robert de	14	27	3	6
Crane, Robert	11	21	9	30
Fontem, Richard ad	10	12	4	12
Frere, Alxcander	14	22	11	32
Gernoun, Walter	12	24	11	81
Haukyn, Robert	18	38	10	59
Hosebonde, Robert	15	37	5	34
Kateline, Stephen	14	22	7	81
Kateline, John	14	42	7	61
Lacy, Robert	13	21	1	4
Lanerok, Thomas	22	41	7	31
Long, Richard	16	34	5	26
Margery, William	6	10	3	25
Margery, Alexander	7	9	3	26
Margery, John	7	11	3	24
Onty, Thomas	10	18	8	72
Onty, Andrew	14	31	8	59
Onty, William	11	23	8	67
Palmer, Michael	18	47	11	92
Portam, John ad	6	8	5	15
Portam, Robert ad	5	9	5	14
Rede, Godfrey	20	47	11	54
Rede, Robert	18	27	11	74
Sabyn, Walter	13	33	9	52
Sabyn, John	10	29	9	56
Stephen, Robert	10	21	3	4

TABLE II cont'd

Central Figure	Number of Years	Entries	Others of Family	Entries for Others
<i>Wistow cont'd</i>				
Thedwar, Henry	16	42	3	8
Wardeboys, John de	8	9	1	1
Warin, John	22	47	9	98
Warin, Thomas	14	25	9	120
Wenington, John de	6	17	1	1
<i>Upwood</i>				
Aspelon, Thomas	17	40	4	35
Aspelon, William	13	22	5	53
Attewelle, John	11	22	2	4
Aubyn, William	9	25	8	54
Aubyn, Stephen	6	28	8	51
Bigge, Thomas	13	17	13	66
Buckworth, William de	16	27	7	25
Carter, John le	12	14	8	17
Chirche(atte), Stephen	9	14	5	7
Cook, Robert	13	36	25	72
Couper, William le	16	26	5	24
Couper, John	9	21	5	29
Crane, John	12	51	6	20
Curteys, John	10	29	6	16
Fleming, Robert	20	40	6	31
Frere, Thomas	8	32	6	38
Frere, William	13	28	6	42
Galion, Alexander	6	12	5	26
Galion, John	10	15	5	23
Gernoun, William	10	22	9	42
Gernoun, John	9	17	9	47
Gouler, John	11	22	4	10
Haukyn, Godfrey	10	37	9	32
Henry, Thomas	17	30	5	12
Hering, William	19	59	5	18
Holy, Robert	10	14	3	35
Holy, Richard	11	22	3	27
Houghton, William de	16	37	6	14
Kyng, John	7	25	2	2
Man, Richard	12	26	6	17
Miles, John	12	35	6	43
Newman, William	16	28	6	91
Newman, Robert	11	26	6	93
Pykeler, Aspelon	7	16	8	50
Pykeler, John	13	22	8	44
Sabyn, William	8	12	5	9
Snape (atte), Thomas	10	21	7	29
Suel, Richard	15	33	3	10
Thacher, Hugh le	11	23	5	7
Wadilond, William	4	15	3	7
Warboys, Augustin de	8	18	7	46
Warboys, John de	12	17	8	47
Wenington, John de	19	34	8	57
Wenington, William de	12	26	8	65
Wodestrate, Robert de	6	19	1	2
Wold, William of the	9	16	2	10

## III

In Table III the types of entries to be found for central figures have been tabulated in order to obtain a more detailed picture of their responsibility in the village. Most of such entries serve to indicate the various duties performed by these main villagers, that is to say, administrative functions of villagers loom more significant than their violations of local law. Among such duties, that of juror appears most consistently, that of pledge more frequently, but in greater variety. The explanation for this is, of course, the fact that the twelve jurors are listed upon every court roll, whereas pledging appears to have been a private arrangement and if the principal performed his legal obligation there would be no reason for his name and that of his pledge to appear on the roll. Among other official tasks, that of taster was regularly noted. There were usually two tasters elected for each of the five villages; of the attached hamlets, Caldecote (Warboys) and Wenington (Abbots Ripton) each had one taster, Little Ravely (Wistow) and Great Ravely (Upwood) each had two. While the villager would have other important tasks, especially that of capital pledge, this latter office was only noted on the rolls when there was question, in the words of the court roll, of defect in duty. In addition, it is very unusual that one can discover from the court rolls the main manorial offices of villagers, especially that of reeve. Since the beadle was involved very often in pledging of various sorts, he can be more frequently identified in the court rolls. Important artisan occupations and trades, such as tanner, carpenter or butcher, seem to have been rarely pursued by the leading villagers. It has not been possible to discover why the 'affeerers'—assessors or auditors—were listed so infrequently at the foot of the rolls.

Some patterns may be noted in the tenure of offices. First, there is a distinct tendency to spread duties so that one individual holds only one office that year. This is to be found for the reeve and beadle, very time-consuming posts that could have left little opportunity for these men to work personally on their own properties.<sup>14</sup> No doubt

<sup>14</sup> The work of the reeve of Wistow, for example, stayed largely in the hands of one family, and of the 125 entries in the court rolls under Reeve, only three times is he mentioned as juror (and among other duties, only once as affeerer). Those who were able to assume the offices of reeve or beadle would hire others to service their own tenements. The tax roll noted below (see Note 18) shows the reeve and beadle to be among the most wealthy in the villages of Upwood and Wistow.

the obligations of a major villein tenement also prevented the important villeins from functioning as fully licensed carpenters or butchers. But even for other offices, it is significant that at Broughton the duties of juror and taster are never both assumed in the same year, this was the tendency in other villages also, although occasionally at Warboys a man may be found as both juror and taster in the same year. Finally, while the duties of juror may be found regularly assumed by these leading figures in the villages, the work of taster was spread less widely. The juror and taster, as well as the reeve and beadle, were 'elected' by the village,<sup>15</sup> presumably from the confidence their fellow villagers had in their competence. Since none of these duties were associated with the services owed for villein tenements as such in the extents, and since the burden of the offices was not spread evenly among the villagers, it must be assumed that some salary was allowed for such special services.

The court roll supplies a much less complete record for other actions of the villager. It is only because some issue had arisen that the court recorded conveyance of land, farming of the mill, a plea for recovery of debt, or simply a concord (settlement of dispute). In personal actions the villager may be as often 'sinned against' as sinner, but in other actions the villager is usually the defendant. That is to say, he has failed in some of the above-mentioned official tasks (more often dereliction is charged for the taster than for the juror); he has failed in performing some services owed to the lord (*opera*); he has trespassed on the property of the lord or of his neighbour; he has received an outsider wrongly, etc.

TABLE III  
STRUCTURE OF ENTRIES FOR MAIN PERSONS<sup>16</sup>

Name	Juror	Pledge	Other Duties	Plaintiff	Defendant
<i>Abbots Ripton</i>					
Akerman, John	2	2	plea, concord, farm of mill	—	3 tr., 4 op.
Atedam, Oliver	2	5	concord	—	3 tr., 2 op., debt, fold

<sup>15</sup> The only election consistently reported on the court rolls is that of the office of taster. The roll for Upwood in 1350 has the unusually complete record of elections of reeve, beadle and akermen.

<sup>16</sup> Again (see Notes 10 and 12 above) the following names are not necessarily all the main persons in each village. The purpose here is illustration rather than definitive

TABLE III cont'd

Name	Juror	Pledge	Other Duties	Plaintiff	Defendant
<i>Abbotts Ripton cont'd</i>					
Attehall, Philip	2	9	capital pledge	tr.	tr.
Aylmar, Thomas	6	2	4 tast.	—	5 tr., op., 2 etc.
Balle, William	4	5	—	—	—
Bonde, Andrew	2	3	2 tast., concord, op., 2 etc.	—	2 tr.
Bonde, John	2	5	2 tast.	plea	deficit in duty, rec.
Buckworth, Augustin	—	7	2 tast.	tr., etc.	4 op.
Colle, Philip	2	—	—	tr.	8 tr., 2 op.
Derlyng, Roger	4	3	tast.	2 plea, 2 defam., etc.	2 tr., op., 4 etc.
Ecclesiam, Hugh ad	2	1	2 tast.	conc.	tr.
Gerold, Richard	4	6	tast.	will	4 tr., debt
Gothyrd, Robert	1	3	land, farm of mill	—	16 tr., debt, 3 etc.
Hubert, Nicholas	4	16	3 concord	—	7 tr., 6 op., debt
Hughlot, William	1	10	land	debt	3 tr., 5 op., etc.
Ladde, William	2	6	—	etc.	op., rec., tr., fold
Nene, Thomas	2	1	tast.	—	9 tr., 2 op.
Ode, Nicholas	5	—	—	—	3 op., 2 tr.
Ode, John	1	—	—	hue	2 tr., op.
Oliver, William	2	8	concord	—	tr., op., rec.
Robert, John	6	4	farm of mill	—	5 tr., 3 op.
Thedwar, John	5	4	2 tast.	—	3 tr., default
Vernoun, John	2	16	—	2 hue, plea, debt, tr.	6 tr.
West, Robert	3	7	—	—	8 tr., op.
Willem, John	4	3	cap. pledge	—	tr., 3 op.
Willem, Stephen	1	1	—	—	6 op., 4 tr.
<i>Broughton</i>					
Abbot, William	11	7	2 land	claim	2 tr., op., 2 etc.
Ad Crucem, Thomas	4	2	2 tast., concord	debt	2 op., debt, rec., delict, 3 etc.
Ad Pontem, William	7	5	3 cap. pledge, concord	hue	2 tr.

record. Etc. in the following tabulation refers to some charge, usually involving criminal violation, that is difficult to list in a simplified tabulation. Tr. indicates trespass, whether on land of the lord or fellow villager, and is usually a result of farming activities of the main person. Op. (*opera*) indicates neglect in services owed to the lord. The taster (tast. — *tastator*) is of course the officer overseeing the assize of ale. The concord likely indicates some contractual obligation, so that this column of 'Other Duties' embraces more than official responsibilities. Rec. indicates the villager wrongly receiving someone not in tithing, or prohibited the village. 'Deficit in duty' indicates a specific charge of failure in some official task. Other shortened forms, as defam. (defamation) and cap. pledge (capital pledge) are self explanatory.

TABLE III cont'd

Name	Juror	Pledge	Other Duties	Plaintiff	Defendant
<i>Broughton cont'd</i>					
Ad Portam, Henry	2	2	3 cap. pledge	—	2 tr., etc.
Ad Portam, John	5	11	5 tast.	debt, 3 plea	tr., op., debt, deficit, etc.
Ad Portam, William	4	10	land	tr., concord	4 tr.
Aleyn, Absalon	6	8	land, 2 concord	—	tr., 2 op.
Aspelon, John	9	4	3 tast.	—	4 tr., rec., op., etc.
Atedam, John	6	3	2 concord	debt	2 tr., rec.
Ategate, John	3	7	tast.	—	op., plea, etc.
Ballard, John	5	14	cap. pledge, 2 land	—	4 tr.
Baylof, William	3	7	land, concord	hue, assault	deficit
Bigge, John	5	3	3 tast.	—	tr., op., etc.
Blosme, John	4	10	tast., 3 land	hue	2 tr., 2 op., 2 deficit, etc.
Boteler, John	6	13	tast., land	etc.	tr., 2 op., debt, 2 deficit, etc.
Broughton, John de	—	24	2 tast., 3 land, concord	debt, 2 etc.	18 tr., 6 op., 2 rec., 7 deficit, etc.
Clericus, Ralph	7	39	tast., 3 cap. pledge, 3 land, etc.	tr.	2 tr., 2 op., 2 pleas, etc.
Crane, Robert	4	6	3 tast.	debt	4 tr., 5 op., rec., 2 debt, deficit, 2 etc.
Cuper, William	4	8	concord	—	tr., 2 op.
Cuper, John	4	11	2 concord, land	hue	2 tr., op., 2 plea, etc.
Elecock, Ralph	2	15	2 concord	tr., hue, deficit	tr., 7 op., debt, plea
Everard, Ralph	2	3	3 cap. pledge	—	tr., op., defam.
Everard, John	3	7	2 butcher, land, concord	etc.	6 tr., 4 op., etc., 2 debt, deficit
Gernoun, John	6	1	3 tast., land	—	4 tr., op.
Gilbert, Reginald	4	21	2 concord	deficit	4 tr., op., 2 etc.,
Gilbert, John	—	8	4 tast., butcher, 2 concord	hue	2 tr., 2 op., rec., deficit
Gore, John	2	3	3 cap. pledge, house	2 etc.	op., 2 debt
Gore, Thomas	—	3	butcher, 2 land, concord	4 debt, hue, 2 plea	3 tr., op., debt, 6 etc.
Henry, William	3	14	3 cap. pledge, land	etc.	tr., 2 op., 2 rec., 4 debt, hue, deficit, 2 etc.
Henry, John	3	22	6 tast., bed., concord	—	tr., rec., 3 debt, 2 etc.
Hobbe, John	3	7	tast., land, 3 cap. pledge	tr., debt, etc.	3 tr., op., etc.
Hobbe, William	6	19	2 tast., 3 concord	2 etc.	7 debt, 3 tr., 4 op., 4 etc.
Joceline, John	6	30	3 cap. pledge	—	4 tr., op., plea
Justice, John	3	3	—	—	2 op., rec., plea
Justice, Adam	6	—	land, will, concord	—	2 tr., plea, etc.

TABLE III cont'd

Name	Juror	Pledge	Other Duties	Plaintiff	Defendant
<i>Broughton cont'd</i>					
Le Bon, John	5	7	3 cap. pledge	—	3 tr., 4 op., etc.
Lomb, Richard	11	7	tast.	theft	3 tr., debt, rec.
Mohaut, Thomas	1	10	2 tast., concord	—	2 tr., 2 rec., deficit
Nel, John	3	—	concord	—	tr.
Nel, Simon	3	1	—	—	—
Onty, Andrew	4	2	land, concord	—	3 op.
Onty, John	10	22	2 tast., land, concord	tr., etc.	tr., op., rec., 2 deficit
Onty, William	5	6	2 tast., land	hue	5 tr., etc.
Othewold, William	3	2	land	—	rec., 2 etc.
Othewold, John	3	1	2 tast.	—	tr.
Pellage, Simon	3	7	tast., land	debt. etc.	2 tr., 2 op., etc.
Randolf, John	3	10	3 cap. pledge, concord	tr., plea	tr., 4 op., 2 deficit, etc.
Russell, William	3	13	—	—	4 tr., 3 op., 2 rec., etc.
Russell, Thomas	3	2	3 tast.	hue	4 tr., 4 op., 2 rec.
Waleboy, Thomas	7	10	tast.	—	tr., 3 op.
Woodward, Alexander	6	4	3 tast., 3 cap. pledge	3 etc.	2 tr., op., deficit, etc.
Woodward, Simon	8	7	concord	etc.	2 tr.
Wylymot, John	5	14	reeve, land	2 tr.	2 op., rec., 2 deficit
<i>Upwood</i>					
Aspelon, Thomas	2	5	ploughman, concord	debt, plea	16 tr., 6 op., debt, 5 etc.
Aspelon, William	7	2	—	etc.	tr., rec., 3 op., 3 deficit
Attewelle, John	1	2	tast., beadle	plea	9 tr., 5 op., deficit, etc.
Aubyn, William	5	12	rent	—	5 tr., debt, op.
Aubyn, Stephen	4	10	4 tast.	hue, etc.	2 op., 4 deficit, 2 etc.
Bigge, Thomas	4	4	concord	—	4 tr., op., debt, 2 etc.
Buckworth, William	3	7	2 tast., 6 land	tr.	5 tr., 3 op.
Carter, John	3	3	—	hue, debt	3 tr., deficit, 2 etc.
Chirche (Atte), Stephen	2	3	—	—	7 tr., 2 op.
Cook, Robert	6	15	2 tast., 5 cap. pledge	plea	2 debt, 2 deficit, plea, 2 etc.
Couper, William	2	6	—	3 tr.	10 tr., op., 2 rec., 2 etc.
Couper, John	4	1	2 tast., concord, land	debt	3 tr., op., debt, rec., deficit, 4 etc.
Crane, John	2	34	2 tast., bed., cap. pledge	tr.	5 tr., op., 3 deficit, 2 etc.
Curteys, John	5	16	7 cap. pledge	—	deficit
Fleming, Robert	5	17	9 tast.	tr.	4 tr., op., 2 deficit

TABLE III cont'd

Name	Juror	Pledge	Other Duties	Plaintiff	Defendant
<i>Upwood cont'd</i>					
Frere, Thomas	3	16	beadle	—	8 tr., 4 deficit
Frere, William	2	1	tast., land, rent, concord	2 tr.	12 tr., 3 op., debt, 3 etc.
Galion, Alexander	3	1	2 cap. pledge	plea	3 tr., 2 deficit
Galion, John	4	—	2 cap. pledge	—	5 tr., 4 deficit
Gernoun, William	1	3	5 tast., land	—	4 tr., 6 op., deficit, etc.
Gernoun, John	3	5	rent, 2 concord	etc.	2 tr., 3 op.
Gouler, John	1	4	5 tast., rent	debt, hue	2 tr., 3 op., 2 debt, 2 deficit
Haukyn, Godfrey	1	1	5 tast.	plea, concord	11 tr., 9 op., 2 deficit, 4 debt, 2 etc.
Henry, Thomas	2	5	—	plea, debt, tr.	9 tr., 11 op.
Hering, William	9	33	tast., land, affeerer	plea, 3 etc.	5 tr., 3 op., rec., deficit
Holy, Robert	7	—	—	etc.	tr., 2 deficit, 3 op.
Holy, Richard	4	6	2 tast., reeve	—	3 tr., op., debt, 5 deficit
Houghton, William	4	5	2 tast.	—	15 tr., 3 op., 2 debt, 4 deficit, plea, etc.
Kyng, John	7	2	—	debt	8 tr., 7 op., deficit
Man, Richard	3	7	4 tast., land, 2 cap. pledge	tr.	2 tr., rec., plea, 3 deficit, etc.
Myles, John	3	8	tast., land	debt	7 tr., 9 op., 3 debt, 2 etc.
Newman, William	4	6	—	2 tr.	13 tr., 3 op., deficit, etc.
Newman, Robert	5	11	5 tast., land	—	tr., 2 deficit, etc.
Pykeler, Aspelon	2	4	—	—	3 tr., 6 op., etc.
Pykeler, John	8	—	3 tast.	debt, etc.	5 tr., rec., 3 deficit
Sabyn, William	4	1	4 tast.	—	2 tr., op.
Snape(atte), Thomas	10	5	cap. pledge	—	5 tr.
Suel, Richard	7	15	6 tast., 2 cap. pledge	—	tr., 2 deficit
Thacher, Hugh	3	9	tast.	hue	6 tr., 2 rec., deficit
Wadilond, William	1	1	tast.	—	6 tr., 3 op., 2 rec., etc.
Warboys, Augustin	4	4	tast., 5 cap. pledge	—	4 deficit
Warboys, John	1	3	—	etc.	5 tr., op., 6 etc.
Wennington, John	1	8	2 tast., custodi- an of marsh, 2 hawkery, 2 cap. pledge, 5 land	tr., 2 etc., 2 concord	plea, deficit, 4 tr., 2 op.
Wennington, William	4	7	—	tr., 2 hue	6 tr., 3 op., rec., deficit, etc.

TABLE III cont'd

Name	Juror	Pledge	Other Duties	Plaintiff	Defendant
<i>Upwood cont'd</i>					
Wodestrate, Robert de	5	7	custodian of marsh	—	tr., 3 op., 2 plea
Wold, (of the), William	5	7	—	etc.	3 tr.
<i>Warboys</i>					
Albyn, Robert	9	9	cap. pledge	—	tr., op.
Beneyt, Hugh	8	24	3 tast.	—	5 tr., 3 op., rec., debt, deficit
Beneyt, Reginald	4	9	tast.	—	3 tr., op.
Berenger, William	7	4	bed., cap. pledge	—	tr.
Berenger, Robert	2	4	land	hue, debt, etc.	7 tr., 12 op., 4 debt, hue
Bonde, Richard	5	14	tast., concord, cap. pledge	—	—
Brun, Henry	10	12	tast., 3 warren	—	6 tr., 3 op., hue, 2 deficit
Catoun, John	2	6	4 cap. pledge	—	3 tr., etc.
Catoun, John jr.	9	5	8 tast., land, afferer	—	tr.
Clericus, John	12	18	—	tr., hue, debt, etc.	2 tr., 4 op., 2 hue, 3 deficit
Gerold, Richard	8	7	beadle	—	4 tr., 3 op.
Gerold, William	7	15	6 tast.	—	tr., 4 deficit, debt
Gerold, Simon	5	26	2 tast.	debt, 2 etc.	tr., 5 deficit
Hygeneye, John	3	13	tast., warren, 2 cap. pledge	5 tr., 2 hue, 5 debt, 3 etc.	2 tr., 3 debt, 3 plea, 2 hue, 5 etc.
Hygeneye, Hugh	3	1	tast., cap. pledge	tr., hue	tr., hue, deficit, etc.
Margrete, Robert	5	4	—	—	3 tr., 4 op.
Raven, Thomas sr.	1	30	beadle	plea, 2 hue,	2 tr., rec., debt, deficit, plea
Raven, Thomas jr.	2	20	9 tast., land, afferer	hue	7 tr., 4 op., debt, rec., hue, 2 deficit, etc.
Rede, John	6	4	5 tast.	—	tr.
Semar, Henry	6	2	4 tast., 2 land, cap. pledge	—	4 tr.
Semar, Albinus	5	5	cap. pledge, concord, 4 warren	—	3 tr.
Semar, Richard	7	8	3 tast., cap. pledge	—	4 tr., 6 op., deficit
Smart, Robert	10	28	2 tast., cap. pledge	debt, hue	3 tr., 13 op., 2 rec., deficit, 2 etc.
Smart, William	4	1	—	—	3 tr., 3 op., debt, deficit, 2 etc.
Wodekoc, William	3	2	—	fine, hue, debt	6 tr., 8 op., rec.
Wodekoc, John	—	4	warren	2 hue	6 tr., op., etc.
Wodekoc, John jr.	—	2	—	debt	3 tr.
Wodekoc, Richard	2	4	—	2 debt	3 tr., 2 op.

TABLE III cont'd

Name	Juror	Pledge	Other Duties	Plaintiff	Defendant
<i>Wistow</i>					
Andrew, John	9	9	—	—	2 op., debt, deficit, etc.
Angulo, Thomas in	4	3	—	—	2 tr., 2 etc.
Aspelon, John	5	5	—	—	10 op., etc.
Aylmar, John	5	6	tast., constable	—	8 tr., 6 op., 3 debt, 6 etc., deficit
Barun, William	6	2	—	—	4 tr., 4 op., hue
Beneyt, Thomas	3	6	—	—	2 tr., 6 op., 4 etc.
Bronnote, Robert	7	22	tast., 2 concord	etc.	4 tr., op., etc.
Clervaux, Ralph	8	7	affeerer	hue	3 deficit
Cotes, Robert	7	11	3 affeerer, 2 concord	—	5 etc.
Fontem, Richard ad	6	2	cap. pledge	—	3 op.
Haukyn, Robert	3	13	tast., affeerer, 2 concord	—	8 tr., debt, 3 op., 2 deficit, 3 etc.
Hosebonde, Robert	2	22	land	—	tr., 4 hue, rec., 6 etc.
Kateline, Stephen	3	8	2 concord	tr., hue, etc.	tr., deficit
Kateline, John	7	24	2 tast., affeerer, concord	—	3 op., plea, 3 etc.
Lacy, Robert	3	3	2 tast.	—	6 debt, 7 etc.
Lanerok, Thomas	4	24	reeve, beadle, concord	tr., 3 etc.	plea, hue, 3 etc., 2 deficit, op.
Long, Richard	2	10	2 concord	—	5 tr., 6 op., 2 deficit, 3 rec., 2 hue, plea, etc.
Margery, William	1	—	4 tast.	—	3 op., 2 deficit, rec.
Margery, Alexander	7	1	—	—	hue
Margery, John	1	6	butcher, land	—	4 op., deficit, etc.
Onty, Thomas	4	8	reeve, land	—	3 op., deficit, etc.
Onty, Andrew	4	17	7 tast.	—	op., deficit, etc.
Onty, William	4	1	3 tast.	debt	9 op., debt, 4 etc.
Palmer, Michael	4	23	tast., 2 concord	5 etc.	3 tr., 2 op., 2 hue, plea, 4 etc.
Portam, John ad	5	2	—	—	4 tr., op., etc.
Portam, Robert ad	1	2	—	—	—
Rede, Godfrey	10	22	2 tast., 2 concord	hue	7 tr., 3 etc.
Rede, Robert	6	7	5 tast.	—	3 tr., 3 deficit, rec., 2 etc.
Sabyn, Walter	5	8	4 tast., concord	—	11 op., deficit, 2 etc.

TABLE III cont'd

Name	Juror	Pledge	Other Duties	Plaintiff	Defendant
<i>Wistow</i> cont'd					
Sabyn, John	5	3	5 tast.	—	3 tr., 6 op., debt, 2 deficit, 4 etc.
Stephen, Robert	6	7	—	—	tr., 2 op., plea, rec., 2 deficit, etc.
Thedwar, Henry	8	17	5 tast.	—	tr., 8 op., hue, 2 etc.
Wardeboys, John	2	4	affeerer	—	op., deficit
Warin, John	1	30	3 tast., 2 concord	hue, etc.	tr., rec., 6 deficit
Warin, Thomas	7	7	concord	—	7 tr., 2 op., etc.
Wennington, John	1	2	2 tast.	—	6 tr., 6 etc.

## IV

While manorial extents first bring the ordinary villagers as a group into history,<sup>17</sup> the above tables illustrate from court rolls how leading customary villagers can be isolated. There is a levelling note about the entries for villager or serf that are met in the extent or survey: he owes a wide number and variety of services to the lord in precisely the same way as fellow tenants on holdings of the same size. But for the score and more leading villagers that appear on the court rolls of the five villages of Abbots Ripton, Broughton, Upwood, Warboys and Wistow the distinguishing characteristic is leadership rather than simply the ability to perform services (*opera*) listed in the extents. Such leadership sometimes becomes 'professional' in the sense that a villager may retain the office of reeve, for instance, long enough to appropriate the title of the office as surname. To a lesser degree officials remained in the office of beadle, and to a lesser degree still that of taster. On the whole, however, villagers tended to dedicate leadership to the village economy itself. That is to say, they developed family holdings and assumed various duties in relations to these, rather than vice versa.

Fortunately the relatively important economic base of the main families can be corroborated for two of the five villages. This can be done since an eleventh tax assessment of Upwood and Wistow for

<sup>17</sup> See *Tenure and Mobility*, Chapter One, Section I.

the late thirteenth century is extant.<sup>18</sup> Along with the leading free 'lords' of these villages—John de Clervaux, John de Den, and William le Moyne of Upwood and John de Wistow of Wistow—are listed 43 other villagers for Upwood and 34 for Wistow. For both villages these are the surnames of the 'main families' found in Table II above. At the same time, the taxable revenues of these villagers varied widely.<sup>19</sup> While John de Wistow of Wistow or John de Den of Upwood might have three or four times the taxable revenues of the most taxed villagers, in each village a dozen or so had three or four times the taxable wealth of the least persons recorded in this document. Apparently the success of the villagers in acquiring wealth varied widely.

Wealth was accumulated by the villager through control of other resources as well as land. From the court roll can be seen clearly the leading villagers' access to labour and his ability to exploit opportunities beyond the village. As we have noted elsewhere,<sup>20</sup> various indictments of leading families for 'receiving' persons of no legal status or who had broken the law, provide a useful indication of the tendency of these leading families to employ outsiders. Thirteen persons from Abbots Ripton, twenty-five from Broughton, eighteen from Upwood, thirty-four from Wistow and fifty-four from Warboys received others illegally in one way or another. Almost all those so receiving were from main families.

In addition, there is some evidence for more permanent employees of these families in the indictments of servants. Fifty-one servants are mentioned in the court rolls of these five villages for the period under discussion.<sup>21</sup> Three of the fifty-one, John de Southwood, Henry de Broughton and Simon le Pykeler appear to be sub-officials of some importance. But for forty-eight of these servants no surname is given, that is, they take their local identity from their masters. Indeed, of seventeen of the fifty-one the court records do not even bother to give the Christian name! There can be no certainty about the actual number of servants employed by the leading families since references to servants only appear at all because of personal wrongs, such as assault, answering to the hue and cry, or trespass. It may be assumed

<sup>18</sup> See Additional Charters 39716 and 39920.

<sup>19</sup> At Wistow, for example, there were 8 persons with taxable wealth between 11 and 18 shillings, 14 villagers with taxable wealth between 21 and 29 shillings, 9 between 31 and 39, 3 between 40 and 44, and one worth £6. 7s. 6d.

<sup>20</sup> "Social Structures in Five East Midland Villages", pp. 93 and 97.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97 for examples from Wistow.

that the many offences in performance of manorial services by this group were borne personally by their masters.<sup>22</sup> In general therefore, from our knowledge of those received by a prominent family for seasonal labour, and those servants likely hired upon a more permanent basis, it may be suggested that the leading family as well as the lord had access to extensive labour services.<sup>23</sup>

An earlier study of these villagers<sup>24</sup> has pointed out how the economic activities of main villagers over a wider area than that of the village itself can be traced through the appearance of these villagers in neighbouring courts. It is also possible to discover from the court roll material that leading villagers very frequently lived outside their native villages for a few years, undoubtedly attracted by some economic advantage. Some seven or eight main villagers moved at Wistow and Broughton respectively in this way, about twelve at Abbots Ripton and at Upwood, and more than a score at Warboys. Since movement from the village touched the whole spectrum of social and economic life for all ages and levels of society,<sup>25</sup> tabulation is difficult, so for reasons of space movement will be indicated by some examples. John Warin of Wistow, after holding several important posts, went abroad with licence for at least eight years, and then returned to assume responsible tasks. Thomas Cateline, an important citizen from the same village, was abroad with licence for sixteen years before he returned. Thomas, the son of Michael Palmer, clearly one of the most influential men at Wistow, was abroad with licence for one year (at Upwood?), and for another year at Houghton; this Thomas then returned to follow in his father's footsteps. From Warboys much the same type of movement is exemplified by Reginald the son of Godfrey Clerk, Simon Gerold, Robert Harsine, Robert Margarete, and William Semar. For Upwood could be noted Alexander Galion, John Gouler, William Houghton and Robert de Wenington, for Broughton, Simon Crane, John the son of William Cateline and John Kyng, for Abbots Ripton, John son of the Carpenter, Richard Sabyn, William the son of Thomas and William Wake.

<sup>22</sup> For example, Thomas Puttok of Warboys was fined for trespassing in the lord's woods 'per garconem suum'. But for the greatest number of trespasses only the principal, the 'master', is noted.

<sup>23</sup> It may be asked whether the leading villagers did not have a sort of 'economic' jurisdiction over lesser persons because of their influence as chief pledges, jurors and pledges.

<sup>24</sup> "Social Structures in Five East Midland Villages", pp. 87-90.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, especially p. 93 and 97.

Modern students have described the tendency for voluntary human activity to 'pyramid'<sup>26</sup> about certain persons. The above general survey has attempted to illustrate this phenomenon among villagers once uniformly catalogued as villeins. Through such court roll evidence it may yet become possible to measure the true human contributions of such persons to peasant society and related institutions.

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<sup>26</sup> E.g. G. C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York, 1950), 103 ff.

# Aquinas and the Proof from the "Physics"

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## I

TO note that in a few places St. Thomas Aquinas regarded the primary immobile movent of the Aristotelian *Physics* as an immanent sphere soul, while in most passages he identified it with the transcendent God of Christian revelation, is not to say anything new. Three decades ago, when development theories in the wake of Jaeger's *Aristoteles* (Berlin, 1923) were dominant in explaining alleged discrepancies within the teachings of the Stagirite, a corresponding change in views with the course of time could readily be attributed to Aquinas as well.<sup>1</sup> Today, however, there are hesitations enough about the interpretation of the data in the sense of genuine doctrinal development in these thinkers, and about the worth of development theories for a real understanding of the philosophical tenets at stake. In this particular case, the problem at issue is the correct understanding of St. Thomas' *prima via* for proving the existence of God. Of all five *viae* in the *Summa Theologiae* (1, 2, 3c) the argument from motion is characterized as "the first and more manifest."<sup>2</sup> It is accordingly presented as the outstanding argument, the clearest and most compelling argument, for that key metaphysical truth. But it

<sup>1</sup> "Saint Thomas, quand il commente la *Physique* s'en tient, il est vrai, à l'opinion traditionnelle et identifie le Premier Moteur à Dieu. Le commentaire à la *Métaphysique* trahit, touchant ce problème, quelque hésitation. Lisons, par contre, le chapitre de la *Somme contre les Gentils* où l'Aquinate tâche à prouver l'existence de Dieu (I, 13). Il s'inspire à cette fin d'Aristote, et résume, fidèlement, l'exposé de la *physique*." Jean Paulus, "La Théorie du Premier Moteur chez Aristote." *Revue de Philosophie*, 33 (1933), 405. Cf. "Saint Thomas—il ne sera pas toujours de cet avis, nous le verrons plus tard—enseigne en son commentaire à la *Physique*, que le Premier Moteur n'est dit résider à la surface extérieure du Ciel, qu'en tant que son action s'exerce là..." Ibid., p. 279.

<sup>2</sup> For St. Thomas' evaluation of the arguments, see Jules A. Baisnée, "St. Thomas' Aquinas's Proofs of the Existence of God Presented in Their Chronological Order," in *Philosophical Studies in Honor of the Very Reverend Ignatius Smith*, ed. John K. Ryan (Westminster, Md., 1952), 64. On one occasion (*In Joan.*, Prologus) the way corresponding to the *quinta via* of the *Summa Theologiae* is declared *efficacissima*. On the other two occasions of its use, that label is applied to the argument from motion.

is likewise presented in the framework of an argument from the Aristotelian *Physics*, an argument that in its original context did not reach anything like the transcendent God of Christian tradition.<sup>3</sup>

The problem, therefore, stands out clearly enough. If the Aristotelian argument from motion in the *Physics* reaches only an immanent sphere soul, and St. Thomas realizes that it is confined to the order of physical inherent movents, how can it be used in the *prima via* and elsewhere by him to prove the existence of the Christian God? If in Aristotle the demonstration concludes only to the form of something material, how can the result appear to St. Thomas sometimes as just a sphere soul that for him is non-existent, and at other times as the God whose very nature is to exist? Back of these questions lies the further philosophical problem whether any genuinely physical argument, that is, any argument that proceeds from the principles of natural philosophy and functions on the level of natural philosophy, can reach an infinite prime movent. In a word, can any demonstration in the sphere of natural philosophy prove the existence of God, as God is understood against a Christian background? In the event of a negative answer, the question why St. Thomas can nevertheless regard the argument from motion as demonstrating the existence of God will still remain.

The general problematic of the issue is of course too extensive for a single article. It touches some very sensitive nerves in Thomistic tradition. It still divides earnest interpreters of Aquinas. In spite of today's atmosphere of relative tolerance, it easily gives rise to pained reactions in any exchange of radically opposed views. Well it may! It concerns deeply the relevance of Thomistic metaphysics to present-day culture. Not only the apologetic aid furnished to religious faith by the philosophical demonstration of God's existence, but also the very structure and constitution of metaphysics as one science among the other pertinent philosophical sciences, depend in the Thomistic framework upon the way one conceives the nature of being. But the nature of being is the existence of God. That truth is too clearly spelled out in St. Thomas to occasion any hesitancy. The divine essence and the divine existence coincide,<sup>4</sup> the nature of God is to be.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly one may expect an exceptionally keen sensitivity

<sup>3</sup> Paulus, p. 406, n. 18, shows how in the middle ages Henry of Ghent as well as St. Thomas Aquinas saw that the primary movent of the *Physics* was the immanent movent of the first sphere, and did not refer to God, the entirely separate movent.

<sup>4</sup> E.g., "Sua igitur essentia est suum esse." *ST*, I, 3, 4c, Secundo.

<sup>5</sup> E.g., "Sed si in Deo addatur aliquid per quod designetur designatione essentiali,

among interpreters when faced with views that appear to them to undermine the thoroughly and peculiarly demonstrative force of what for St. Thomas is "the first and more manifest" way of proving God's existence. It is a point on which solidarity and agreement are of prime importance if Thomistic metaphysics is to have proper relevance at the present critical stage of both intellectual and religious life.

Each interpreter, therefore, wants more than just to be convinced to his own personal satisfaction by the Thomistic demonstration. He wishes likewise to have his convictions shared by his co-workers in the field of Thomistic studies. To the extent that he takes his work seriously, he cannot help but be troubled by interpretations that appear to him to do away with the demonstrative character of the Thomistic proof, or that cannot be made to fit into the historical background against which St. Thomas reasoned, or that do not remain true to the order and method of presentation in the actual text of Aquinas himself. The interpreter's commitment to the study of St. Thomas and his estimate of its profound worth for modern thinking play too great a role to allow this to be any other than an extremely sensitive nerve point.

The extent and sensitivity of the problem side, then, suggest that perhaps the approach should be stepwise. The first task might be a confrontation of the texts in which St. Thomas views the argument in the *Physics* as a demonstration of a sphere soul, on the one hand, and on the other, the texts in which he regards it as a demonstration of God's existence. On account of the suggested possibility of doctrinal development, it might be well to examine these texts in chronological order, to see if they exhibit any evolution in St. Thomas' understanding of the Aristotelian argument. A comparative study of these texts may be expected to yield initial information about the attitude St. Thomas took towards the proof from motion in the *Physics* and its continuation in the *Metaphysics*, and perhaps indicate some of the reasons why he could view it in two such different ways. Aristotle's arguments should be watched for indications about the type of scientific consideration they are being subjected to in the commentaries upon them. Is St. Thomas dealing with them from the viewpoint of a theologian, bent on finding in them aid for the apologetic proof of God's existence? If so, is his theology making use of the principles of natural

oportet quod illud constituat ei cui additur rationem propriae ejus quidditatis seu naturae: nam quod sic additur, acquirit rei esse in actu; hoc autem, scilicet esse in actu, est ipsa divina essentia..." CG, I, 24, Item quod.

philosophy, or of the principles of metaphysics, or both, as it brings the Aristotelian arguments to new life? These and any other considerations that may have a bearing on his interpretation of the Aristotelian texts should be noted in the examination of the pertinent passages.

The information obtained in this way can be only preliminary to deeper study and evaluation of St. Thomas' thought. The present article, however, will limit itself to gathering this information. Further analysis and development of the theme in its various important facets may accordingly be left for later inquiry.

## II

The argument from motion, as it is presented in the *Physics*, has been examined carefully and thoroughly in modern Aristotelian studies. As a result the bearing of the argument in its original location, while not entirely beyond doubt, seems restricted in scope to the material universe. The argument, it is true, is developed in different ways in the last two books of the *Physics*. Yet in neither book can one be at all assured that it arrives at any immobile movent other than the immanent form of something material.<sup>6</sup>

In the seventh book of the *Physics*, the argument is presented quite in the lines of the skeleton form that is found repeated in different places in St. Thomas. Aristotle's wording of it is lucid enough: "Everything that is in motion must be moved by something. ... let us take the case in which a thing is in locomotion and is moved by something that is itself in motion, and that again is moved by something else that is in motion, and that by something else, and so on continually: then the series cannot go on to infinity, but there must be some first movent" (*Ph.*, VII 1,241b24-242a20; Oxford tr.). The arguments used in book VII to prove these premises are entirely on the plane of natural philosophy. For the first premise, the divisibility of anything mobile makes the motion of the whole depend upon the motion of the parts, and accordingly does not allow anything to be "in motion essentially and primarily" (242a10; Oxford tr.); i.e., it does not permit anything to be in motion of itself. Everything in motion, therefore, has to be moved by something. For the second

<sup>6</sup> See Paulus, art. cit., 259-294; 394-424. Also Aug. Nolte, *Het Godsbegrip bij Aristoteles* (Nijmegen-Utrecht, 1940), 89-139; 172-175. For a brief survey of the various interpretations in regard to the Aristotelian movents, see my article "The Reality of the Aristotelian Separate Movers," *Review of Metaphysics*, 3 (1950), 319-324.

premise, the finite time in which the local motion takes place is incompatible with the infinite extent involved in the sum of the motions of an infinite series of movents: "Therefore the series must come to an end, and there must be a first movent and a first moved" (b71-72; Ross lineation, Oxford tr.). This first movent is then identified as an efficient cause, in express contrast to the final cause of the motion, "the first movent of a thing—in the sense that it supplies not 'that for the sake of which' but the source of the motion" (2,243a3-4; Oxford tr.).

There need not be any doubt, consequently, that the argument in the seventh book of the *Physics* concludes to an efficient cause of motion. An efficient cause, however, is not for Aristotle a form that has existence separate from matter. According to the *Metaphysics* the immaterial forms function as final causes, and have their whole perfection entirely within themselves, while elsewhere (*Ph.*, III 3,202a13-b22; *De An.*, III 2,426a4-10) the perfection or actuality of efficient causality is located in the patient. The first efficient cause of motion, then, is not for Aristotle an immaterial or supersensible separate substance. From this viewpoint it can in the present book of the *Physics* be explicitly contrasted with a first movent that functions as final cause.<sup>7</sup> In the Aristotelian framework, accordingly, the primary movent of *Physics* VII exercises a type of causality it could not elicit if it were an immaterial form.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> See Paulus, 399. Cf. "Le Premier Moteur de la *Physique* engendre le mouvement à titre de cause efficiente, et, pour ainsi parler, l'imprime au Premier Ciel, en quoi nous savons qu'il est immanent. L'Acte Pur de la *Métaphysique* suscite le mouvement à titre de fin et cette fin est rigoureusement séparée des êtres qui subissent son attrait. La contradiction demeure insoluble pour qui prétend identifier ces deux principes, et les ramener au même sujet concret." Ibid., 400. Paulus, 282, also draws attention to the character of the proof against infinite regress in *Physics* VII as "un raisonnement de nature physique," and notes (p. 282, n. 34) that the ambiguous phrase "a first movent and a first moved" (*Ph.*, VII 1,242b34; Ross lineation, b72) is in the alternate version "that which first is moved," as though the reasoning in *Physics* VII is intended to reach a primary self-movent.

However, for an interpretation that recognizes the opposition of the two types of causality in Aristotle, yet attributes them to the same primary movent with the claim that the Stagirite failed to unite them because he did not reach the notion of creation, see Marcel De Corte, "La Causalité du Premier Moteur dans la Philosophie Aristotélicienne," *Revue d'Histoire de la Philosophie*, 5, (1931), 105-146, esp. 145.

<sup>8</sup> Efficient causality, the *Physics* (III 3,202a13-b22) had maintained, has its actualization or perfection in the effect. For separate substance, in contrast, the *Metaphysics* (A 7,1072b10-11; 9,1074b21-35) mentions only final causality, and does not allow it, in its entirely self-contained perfection, even knowledge of anything outside itself.

The one conclusion indicated, therefore, is that the primary movent established by the reasoning of *Physics* VII is not an entirely immaterial or supersensible movent. What is it, then? The text of *Physics* VII provides no further definite information. In the following book the discussion is more extensive. Does the presentation of the topic in the eighth book, then, serve to pinpoint the type of efficient cause required for this role?

The first tenet established in the closing book of the *Physics* (VIII 1, 250b11-252b6) is the eternity of motion and of time. The eternal duration of motion is shown to require a primary movent that is exempt from being moved even in accidental fashion:

Since there must always be motion without intermission, there must necessarily be something, one thing or it may be a plurality, that first imparts motion, and this first movent must be unmoved. ...there must necessarily be some such thing, which, while it has the capacity of moving something else, is itself unmoved and exempt from all change, which can affect it neither in an unqualified nor in an accidental sense (*Ph.*, VIII 6, 258b10-16; Oxford tr.).

While any motion, therefore, requires an unmoved movent as its ultimate source, the eternity of cosmic motion adds a further condition for its special primary movent. The movent cannot be subject to motion in accidental fashion, as for instance the souls of animals or men are moved locally with the locomotion of their bodies. An "unmoved movent" in this context means accordingly any of the innumerable instances of souls in living things, both perishable and celestial, with one of the unmoved movents supreme over all: "It is clear, then, that though there may be countless instances of the perishing of some principles that are unmoved but impart motion, and though many things that move themselves perish, ... nevertheless there is something that comprehends them all" (258b32-259a4; Oxford tr.). Perishable unmoved movents cannot in fact account for the eternity of cosmic motion, and lower celestial spheres are not uniform in their motion:

So the necessity that there should be motion continuously requires that there should be a first movent that is unmoved even accidentally... (We must distinguish, however, between accidental motion of a thing by itself and such motion by something else, the former being confined to perishable things, whereas the latter belongs also to certain first principles of heavenly bodies, of all those, that is to say, that experience more than one locomotion)" (6, 259b22-31; Oxford tr.).

These "first principles of heavenly bodies" are obviously enough the sphere souls, just as the unmoved movents in plants and animals are

the perishable souls. Because perishable first movents go along with their bodies, they go in this way from place to place. Accordingly they move themselves in accidental fashion: "Moreover in all these self-moving things the first movent and cause of their self-motion is itself moved by itself, though in an accidental sense: that is to say, the body changes its place, so that that which is in the body changes its place also..." (6,259b16-19; Oxford tr.). The lower spheres, as noted in the previously cited text, are affected by the motion of the higher ones. In consequence, the primary movent that causes the first eternally continuous and invariably simple motion in the universe has to be immobile even accidentally, in both senses. This movent occupies the circumference of the universe:

So, too, in order that the motion may continue to be of the same character, the moved must not be subject to change in respect of its relation to the movent. Moreover the movent must occupy either the centre or the circumference, since these are the first principles from which a sphere is derived. But the things nearest the movent are those whose motion is quickest, ... therefore the movent occupies the circumference" (10,267b5-9; Oxford tr.).

The primary immobile movent to which the argument in *Physics* VIII leads is accordingly the soul of the first heaven.<sup>9</sup> It is clearly the immanent form of a material thing. For Aristotle (*Ph.*, VIII 4,255a34-256a3), once a sensible thing has been generated, the actuality given it by its form is such that to exercise efficient causality it requires merely contact with the patient and removal of impediments. In this framework, the reasoning of the *Physics* could not hope to reach anything more than the immanent form of a material movent. "First movent," consequently, may mean a self-movement,<sup>10</sup> or the immobile part of the

<sup>9</sup> Cf.: "Et le livre VIII ne fera rien d'autre que développer cette idée d'une cause première du mouvement qui se mouvrait elle-même." Paulus, art. cit., 267. "... nous croyons avoir montré que la *Physique* identifie le Premier Moteur à l'âme du Ciel." Ibid., 283. "La *Physique*, en sa recherche des causes du mouvement, s'élève, on se le rappelle, à un *Premier Mû par soi*, qu'il faut concevoir sur le modèle des êtres vivants, et qui n'est autre que le ciel." Ibid., 394. Accordingly, the reasoning of the *Physics* cannot attain to God: "La *Physique* n'aboutirait point à Dieu, ni à la cause absolument Première, mais à la cause Première seulement dans l'ordre physique." Ibid., 401. Yet in the sense in which terrestrial souls are moved locally in accidental fashion, a celestial sphere is immobile: "... la sphère est immobile, puisqu'elle occupe toujours le même lieu." Ibid., 276.

<sup>10</sup> "... if then everything that is in motion must be moved by something, and the first movent is moved but not by anything else, it must be moved by itself." *Ph.*, VIII 5,256a19-21; Oxford tr. Cf. "If, then, it is moved in virtue of some part of it being moved by that part itself, it is this part that will be the primary self-movement..." Ibid., 257b30-31.

self-movent,<sup>11</sup> the soul. The framework was inherited from Plato, for whom the origin of motion was the self-movent.<sup>12</sup> Where Aristotle speaks disjunctively about reaching either an unmoved movent or a self-movent,<sup>13</sup> the disjunction apparently belongs within this framework. Likewise his use of the argument that a thing imparts motion insofar as it is actual, but is moved insofar as it is potential, is clearly placed in the setting of a self-movent.<sup>14</sup> The self-movent is established in *Physics* VIII, as the source or efficient cause of motion, by means of an inductive study of the various types of motion (4-5,254b7-258b9). The soul of the outermost heaven is then shown to be the cause of the first and invariably simple cosmic motion.

The way is left open, however, for the *Metaphysics* to take its point of departure from the eternity of motion and the efficient causality of the sphere souls as established in the *Physics*, and to show that the cosmic motions require further causes entirely without matter—immaterial forms that will function as final causes of the motions, through being loved and desired. This means that for Aristotle metaphysics presupposes natural philosophy. For him, metaphysics

11 "...there is no necessity for the movent part to be moved by anything but itself: ...then there will be a part that is moved and a part that is an unmoved movent." Ibid., b20-23.

12 The pertinent Platonic passages may be found assembled in René Arnou, *De Quinque Viis Sancti Thomae ad Demonstrandum Dei Existentiam* (Rome, 1932), 11-18. The Platonic phrase "the source of motion" (Lg., X,895A) seems quite obviously to lie in the background of Aristotle's technical term for efficient cause.

13 "...whether the series is closed at once by that which is in motion but moved by something else—deriving its motion directly from the first unmoved, or whether the motion is derived from what is in motion but moves itself and stops its own motion, on both suppositions we have the result that in all cases of things being in motion that which primarily imparts motion is unmoved." *Ph.*, VIII 5,258b5-9; Oxford tr. Cf. texts supra, nn. 10-11. Paulus, art. cit., 267, remarks: "Aristote considère la cause première du mouvement comme mue en toute hypothèse." The disjunction is also mentioned at 257a26-27. Yet Aristotle is concerned only with the question of a self-movent, as he immediately continues: "But if there were any need to consider which of the two, that which moves itself or that which is moved by something else, is the cause or principle of motion, every one would decide for the former..." Ibid., a27-30; Oxford tr. Likewise at 5,257b24-25 and 258b5-9, the context is the self-movent.

14 *Ph.*, VIII 5,257b2-13. Cf. *ibid.*, 4,255a15-b29. In seeking the movent for the natural local motion of light and heavy things, aside from the removal of an impediment, Aristotle passes over from the order of accidental change to that of generation, substantial change: "...light and heavy things, which are moved either by that which brought the thing into existence and made it light and heavy, or by that which released what was hindering and preventing it..." Ibid., 4,256a1-2; Oxford tr.

requires the argument from the *Physics*, in order to reach separate substances. For Aristotle, accordingly, natural philosophy is the only road to metaphysics available to the human intellect. For him, one cannot reach the supersensible order except by way of natural philosophy. But the extension of the reasoning process, begun in natural philosophy, to the supersensible takes place only in metaphysics. Within natural philosophy itself the argument from motion, as presented in the *Physics*, shows fully the limitation noted incisively by Suarez,<sup>15</sup> that it cannot reach an immaterial substance, let alone an uncreated one.

### III

St. Thomas Aquinas began very early in his teaching career to make use of the Aristotelian argument from motion, and continued to do so into the final period of his life. His use of the argument, accordingly, may be followed chronologically through the different works in which it occurs.<sup>16</sup>

#### 1) The Commentary on the Sentences

In the commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*, St. Thomas cites the argument in a *Contra* section as an authoritative assertion that God is entirely immutable:

Praeterea, sicut probat Philosophus, VIII *Physic.*, omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Si igitur illud a quo movetur mobile ipsum, etiam movetur, oportet quod ab aliquo motore moveatur. Sed impossibile est ire in infinitum. Ergo oportet devenire ad primum motorem, qui movet et nullo modo movetur; et hic est Deus. Ergo omnino est immutabilis (*In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, *Contra*; ed. Mandonnet, I, 211).

This explicitly acknowledged Aristotelian formulation of the argument reaches by way of motion the God with whom St. Thomas is concerned as a Christian theologian, and on the basis of the reasoning goes on to show that God is entirely immobile. The *Solutio* of the

<sup>15</sup> "Hoc autem medium per se ac praecise sumptum multis modis invenitur inefficax ad demonstrandum esse in rerum natura aliquam substantiam immaterialem, nedum ad demonstrandum primam et increatam substantiam..." *Disp. Metaph.*, XXIX, 1, 7; in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Vivès (Paris, 1856-1877), XXVI, 23a.

<sup>16</sup> For a chronological survey of the various ways used by St. Thomas for proving the existence of God, see Baisnée, art. cit., 62-64.

article makes clear that St. Thomas himself is reasoning in a context in which the analysis of motion in terms of actuality and potentiality, as given in Aristotle, opens the way to pure actuality, identified with God:

Respondeo dicendum, quod omnis motus vel mutatio, quocumque modo dicatur, consequitur aliquam possibilitatem, cum motus sit actus existentis in potentia. Cum igitur Deus sit actus purus, nihil habens de potentia admixtum, non potest in eo esse aliqua mutatio (ibid., Solut.).

Noteworthy is the extension of the principles involved in Aristotle's definition of motion. They are seen extending to all motion or change, of whatever kind—*quocumque modo dicatur*. The following article, continuing in the same context, shows that all creatures, even those that do not come under the scope of natural philosophy, are mutable: "Cum igitur omnis creatura habeat aliquid de potentia, quia solus Deus est actus purus, oportet omnes creaturas mutabiles esse" (ibid., a. 2; p. 213). Creatures depend for their whole being upon God, the text continues, and this gives rise to a certain mutability, a mutability that is not a proper sense of the term because of lack of a subject that could change. The article, however, recognizes a wider sense of mutability, in which any kind of reception is regarded as "being moved":—"accipiendo large mutationem, secundum quod omne recipere dicitur pati quoddam et moveri" (ibid.).

Although the Aristotelian formulation of the argument was not included in the three "ways" of going from creatures to God—"vias deveniendi ex creaturis in Deum"—that had been previously explained in the *Commentary* (d. 3, div. lae p. textus; I, 88), the reasoning from the mutability of creatures entered into the proof. Following the division of the pseudo-Areopagite, St. Thomas had placed the probative force of all three ways in the possession of being from another:

Dicit enim quod ex creaturis tribus modis devenimus in Deum: scilicet per causalitatem, per remotionem, per eminentiam. Et ratio hujus est, quia esse creaturae est ab altero. Unde secundum hoc ducimur in causam a qua est (ibid.).

Though the three are different ways (*viae*), they are all based on one and the same demonstrative process—a creature has its being from something else. This should mean that they all are being regarded as one and the same demonstration, developed in different ways. Potentiality seems to be the starting point of the first way: "Sed omnes creaturae habent esse ex nihilo: quod manifestatur ex earum imperfectione et potentialitate. Ergo oportet quod sint ab aliquo uno primo,

et hoc est Deus" (ibid.). Likewise in the second way the mutability of creatures leads to an entirely perfect immobile being, God: "Item, omne incorporeum mutabile de sui natura est imperfectum. Ergo ultra omnes species mutabiles, sicut sunt animae et angeli, oportet esse aliquod ens incorporeum et immobile et omnino perfectum, et hoc est Deus" (ibid.; p. 89).

Though these ways do not use the Aristotelian framework, they illustrate clearly enough the wider setting of mutability in which St. Thomas was able to view the Aristotelian principles of motion when citing (d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, Contra; I, 211) the argument from *Physics* VIII. In this setting St. Thomas can take the argument in skeletal form and see it leading in terms of potentiality and actuality straightway to the Christian God, who is pure actuality. In the context, however, he shows sufficient awareness that in the *Physics* itself the argument was geared to a self-movant. He notes (ibid., ad 2m; p. 212) that the divine intellection and volition may in a wide sense be regarded as self-motion. He cites Plato in the *Parmenides*, which he had no means of knowing directly,<sup>17</sup> for the saying that "God moves himself." The notion of the self-movant as composed of one part that does the moving and another part that is moved, is placed with express reference to *Physics* VIII in the argument handed down through philosophical tradition:

Unde secundum philosophos, VIII *Physic.*, omnia mobilia reducuntur ad primum mobile, quod dicebant motum ex se, quia est compositum ex motore et moto. Sed hoc ulterius oportet reducere in primum simplex, quod est omnino immobile" (ibid., ad 3m; p. 212).

St. Thomas, then, when introducing the Aristotelian argument, realizes clearly enough that in its original setting it functioned in the framework of a self-movant. He himself requires, however, that the reasoning lead back further to a simple first principle, a "primum simplex."

The use of the Aristotelian argument in the *Commentary on the Sentences* shows accordingly that St. Thomas, while aware of the import it had in the *Physics*, can nevertheless see in it a skeleton reasoning process that may be grounded in a wider setting of immutability<sup>18</sup> and

<sup>17</sup> On the knowledge of the *Parmenides* at the time, see R. Klibansky, "Plato's *Parmenides* in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, 1, (1943), 281-284.

<sup>18</sup> The argument from mutability, quite as in the early commentary on the *Sentences*, is still used by St. Thomas in the last period of his life: "... viderunt enim quod quicquid

lead directly through the principles of actuality and potentiality to the Christian God. Lacking, however, is the strong existential cast that is given the starting point in later versions with the explicit statement that some things are in fact being moved. In the *Commentary on the Sentences*, rather, the argument proceeds as though in conditionalized form. It commences by stating that everything being moved is being moved by another, but without the express assertion that something is actually being moved. Apparently St. Thomas at this point in his teaching was not too interested in the Aristotelian argument as a proof for the existence of God, since he does not use its framework in explaining the three "ways" taken from Dionysius. He does regard the argument, nevertheless, as reaching a first movent that is God, and as showing, on the basis of the Aristotelian analysis of motion into the principles of actuality and potentiality, that God is entirely immutable.

## 2) The Commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate*

In the commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate* an omission of the Aristotelian argument from motion, in a context that would seem to require it as outstanding among examples mentioned, may have some interest for the question of the scientific level on which the argument was considered to function. In regard to the respective priorities of divine science (i.e., metaphysics) and the other sciences, the commentary (V, 1; ed. Decker, p. 172.3-11) grants that many notions used by divine science, such as generation, corruption, and motion, are dealt with in the natural sciences and in mathematics. Accordingly divine science should be learned only after these sciences. Nevertheless, any principles that divine science takes from these other sciences are not proven by means of principles taken from divine science. They are established, rather, on the basis of immediately evident principles. Correspondingly, the first philosopher (i.e., the metaphysician) does not

est in rebus, est mutabile; et quanto aliquid est nobilius in gradibus rerum, tanto minus habet de mutabilitate. Puta, inferiora corpora sunt secundum substantiam et secundum locum mutabilia: corpora vero cœlestia, quae nobiliora sunt, secundum substantiam quidem immutabilia sunt, et secundum locum tantum moventur. Secundum hoc ergo evidenter colligi potest, quod primum principium omnium rerum, et supremum et nobilius, sit immobile et aeternum." *In Joan.*, Prol.; ed. Vivès, XIX, 670a. Cf.: "Adhuc, nihil incipit esse, aut desinit nisi per motum, vel mutationem: Deus autem omnino est immutabilis, ut probatum est. Impossibile est igitur, quod esse incoeperit, vel quod esse desinat." *Comp. Theol.*, c. VII.

prove the principles he gives the natural philosopher by any principles accepted from natural philosophy, but by other self-evident principles.

The point of interest in this explanation is the aid given metaphysics by natural philosophy. Drawing upon a passage of Avicenna, St. Thomas lists examples of this aid. The text of Avicenna reads:

Sed post naturales, ideo quia multa de his, quae conceduntur in ista, sunt de illis quae iam probata sunt in naturali, sicut generatio et corruptio et alteritas et locus et tempus et quod omne quod movetur ab alio movetur et quae sunt ea quae moventur ad primum motorem etc. (*Metaph.*, I, 3C; ed. Venice, 1508, fol. 71r2).

If metaphysics was regarded by St. Thomas as receiving its primary object, separate substance, from a demonstration in natural philosophy, this would have been the leading example to be expected for the aid given by natural philosophy to metaphysics. Yet instead of repeating the explicitly worded references of Avicenna's list, St. Thomas contents himself with a vague reference to motion: "ut generatio, corruptio, motus et alia huiusmodi" (*In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 1, ad 9m; p. 172.7-8). Rather, he treats the point in a separate item, worded in a manner open to the strict Aristotelian setting yet not committed to it:

Praeterea, effectus sensibiles, ex quibus procedunt demonstrationes naturales, sunt notiores quoad nos in principio, sed cum per eos pervenerimus ad cognitionem causarum primarum, ex eis apparebit nobis propter quid illorum effectuum, ex quibus probabantur demonstratione quia. Et sic et scientia naturalis aliquid tradit scientiae divinae, et tamen per eam sua principia notificantur. Et inde est quod Boethius ultimo ponit scientiam divinam, quia est ultima quoad nos (*ibid.*; p. 172.21-173.4).

At first reading this might seem to mean that an argument within natural philosophy demonstrates the existence of the separate substances, and that the knowledge so obtained gives a *propter quid* explanation of the effects as they constitute the starting point of natural philosophy. Yet the text does not say this. It does not require a confusion of the two levels of demonstration, that of metaphysics and that of natural philosophy. It says that the demonstrations of natural philosophy proceed from sensible effects. Through these effects (*per eos*, not *per eas*) one reaches knowledge of the first causes. The text does not say that the first causes are reached by the demonstrations of natural philosophy. In the context "the first causes" should refer back to the Aristotelian separate substances that had just been mentioned (p. 172.9-10) along with the heavenly spheres. In Aristotle, the separate substances are reached in metaphysics, in a process of reasoning

that takes its starting point from the demonstrations of the eternity of cosmic motion in natural philosophy. In this setting, natural philosophy is of necessary help to metaphysics. Using the neutral phrasing of "first causes" instead of "separate substances," St. Thomas is able to view the argument from sensible effects as demonstrating the first causes and also as allowing natural philosophy to contribute aid to metaphysics. He is explaining some one else's philosophy, the Peripatetic order of the sciences as handed down through Boethius. The wording of his answer permits a definitely Peripatetic problem to be given a characteristically Peripatetic solution, and at the same time leave open the possibility of a direct procedure from the sensible effects to their first cause.

Avicenna himself had noted that metaphysicians were concerned with an efficient cause of being, while natural philosophers were dealing only with an efficient cause of motion:

... divini philosophi non intelligunt per agentem principium motionis tantum, sicut intelligunt naturales, sed principium essendi et datorem ejus, sicut creator mundi. Causa vero agens naturalis non acquirit esse rei nisi motionem aliquam ex modis motionum; igitur acquirens esse naturalibus est principium motus, finem vero intelligimus causam propter quam acquiritur esse rei discretum ab ea (*Metaph.*, VI, 1A; ed. Venice, 1508, fol. 91r2).

Avicenna accordingly distinguished the cause of motion from the cause of being. The cause of motion was established in natural philosophy, the cause of being in metaphysics. However, the cause of being is now an efficient cause, against the background of the revealed doctrine of creation. It is no longer a final cause only, as it was for Aristotle. In this setting St. Thomas was able to view the one argument in basic outline as reaching the supreme cause and yet as aid given to metaphysics by natural philosophy. The technique seems to be the same as that already noticed in his *Commentary on the Sentences*.

### 3) The *Contra Gentiles*

The most detailed and enlightening treatment of the Aristotelian proof that has been left by St. Thomas is found in the *Contra Gentiles* (I, 13). It is presented as though Aristotle had undertaken to develop the proof from motion in two different "ways," and as though the Stagirite himself had intended to prove by it the existence of God, as demonstrated by Catholic teachers:

... procedamus ad ponendum rationes quibus tam philosophi quam doctores Catholici Deum esse probaverunt.

Primo autem ponemus rationes quibus Aristoteles procedit ad probandum Deum esse. Qui hoc probare intendit ex parte motus duabus viis" (ibid.).

The first of these two *viae* repeats the demonstration as it is given in *Physics* VII. But as a second and third proof of the premise that "everything moved is being moved by another," it draws upon arguments taken from *Physics* VIII. The one is through induction (*Ph.*, VIII 4,254b7-256a3), the other<sup>19</sup> through the analysis of motion into actuality and potentiality. Likewise for the premise that an infinite regress is impossible,<sup>20</sup> it draws a second and third reason from the arguments of *Physics* VIII (5,256a4-33). In this composite manner the first "way" of the *Contra Gentiles* is constructed. Through it Aristotle is declared to prove that a first immobile movent exists—"qua probat Aristoteles esse primum motorem immobilem"—without explicit mention of God at this stage (ibid., Et sic).

The second "way" in the *Contra Gentiles* commences with arguments taken from *Physics* VIII (5,256b4 ff.). It proves that not every movent is being moved by something external to itself: "Ergo reliquitur quod oportet ponere aliquod primum quod non movetur aliquo exteriori" (CG, I, 13, Ergo). This does not immediately show that the first movent is entirely immobile. If it is immobile, then the desired conclusion, namely that there is a first immobile movent, has been reached. But it could also be a self-movement, and therefore something mobile. Yet even in this self-movement, there has to be one part that moves the whole, a part that itself is immobile. This disjunctive way of proceeding is attributed to Aristotle himself.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> *Ph.*, VIII 5,257b6-12; cf. 257a1-14; b2-6. The argument is used by Aristotle within the discussion of the self-movement, to prove that the self-movement has to be moved by a part. St. Thomas shows awareness of that setting, for he immediately (CG, I, 13, Sciendum) discusses the Platonic background of the self-movement and strives to harmonize it with Aristotle: "... nihil enim differt devenire ad aliquod primum quod moveat se, secundum Platonem; et devenire ad primum quod sit omnino immobile, secundum Aristotelem." Ibid. The actuality and potentiality argument is also incorporated by St. Thomas, in much briefer form, into the second "way" of the *Contra Gentiles* (I, 13, Non autem). Here it remains in the context of the self-movement.

<sup>20</sup> In his commentary on the eighth book of the *Physics*, St. Thomas looks upon the proof here as more certain than the one in the seventh book: "Et hoc quidem esse impossibile supra probatum est in *Septimo*; sed hic probat certiori via, quia in infinitis non est aliquid primum." In *VIII Phys.*, lect. 9, Angeli-Pirotta no. 2184.

<sup>21</sup> CG, I, 13, Quia vero. On the disjunction in Aristotle (*Ph.*, VIII 5,257a26-27), see

In the self-movents that we know, namely terrestrial animals, the part that functions as immobile movent is the soul (*CG*, I, 13, *Sed quia*). The eternity of cosmic motion, however, requires a movent that is not moved in accidental fashion as are terrestrial souls:

“Relinquitur igitur quod oportet esse aliquod movens seipsum perpetuum, quod causat perpetuitatem generationis in istis inferioribus moventibus se. Et sic motor eius non movetur neque per se neque per accidens” (*ibid.*, *Quod autem*).

Here St. Thomas is clearly understanding the primary immobile movent as a sphere soul, according to Aristotle—“secundum suam positionem” (*ibid.*). He contrasts it from this viewpoint with the movents of the inferior spheres, spheres subject in motion to the higher:

Nec est contra hanc rationem quod motores inferiorum orbium movent motum sempiternum, et tamen dicuntur moveri per accidens. Quia dicuntur moveri per accidens non ratione sui ipsorum, sed ratione suorum mobilium, quae sequuntur motum superioris orbis (*ibid.*, *Nec est*).

What the argument in *Physics* VIII leads to in general, then, St. Thomas recognizes, is soul, and, on the basis of the eternity of cosmic motion, to sphere souls. From the primary immobile movent reached by this process, a further kind of reasoning is necessary to arrive at an entirely separate movent, identified with God: “Sed quia Deus non est pars alicuius moventis seipsum, ulterius Aristoteles, in sua *Metaphysica*, investigat ex hoc motore qui est pars moventis seipsum, alium motorem separatum omnino, qui est Deus” (*ibid.*, *Sed quia*). The reason is that the animate movent has to desire something entirely immobile.

To reach God, St. Thomas realizes, the Aristotelian reasoning has to pass over to metaphysics. Aside from the identification of the Aristotelian separate primary movent with the Christian God, this is correct Peripatetic procedure. There is the acknowledgement that the pertinent argument in the *Physics* leads only to a soul, to the form of a material thing, and that on the basis of the material self-movent one reasons in *metaphysics* to an immaterial and supersensible movent. It is in this way that natural philosophy is in the Aristotelian setting an indicated preliminary for the procedure of metaphysics, as St. Thomas had noted in his commentary on Boethius’ *De Trinitate*.

supra, n. 13. Cf. *Ph.*, VIII 5,256a13-21, where the meaning entirely remains within the context of a self-movent. The example of the movent that is not being moved by anything else is the man (a7-8).

The objections that the eternity of the world is rejected by Catholics and that the animation of the heavens is not accepted by many, are answered: "Nam si mundus et motus de novo incoepit, planum est quod oportet poni aliquam causam quae de novo producat mundum et motum...; cum nihil educat se de potentia in actum, vel de non esse in esse" (ibid., Et ad hoc). The argument, as St. Thomas accepts it, is here allowed to go over to a beginning of motion that is not brought about through a preceding motion, and to a production of the world in being where nothing of the world existed before. The Aristotelian reasoning, accordingly, is made at this stage to pass over into a metaphysics of existence, in order to be acceptable. St. Thomas is fully aware that Aristotle himself based the argument on the eternity of cosmic motion,<sup>22</sup> yet allows the argument to be retained and to become more manifest when the original production of motion and the world in time is taken into account. Accordingly he is viewing the argument again in the wider setting in which the reception of anything, including the reception of being in creation, comes under its range. Just as Aristotle<sup>23</sup> himself could within the argument pass over from local motion and alteration to generation, St. Thomas can correspondingly pass over to creation and still consider himself as remaining within the argument. This, however, is in answer to an objection arising from the argument's procedure through the animated heavens in Aristotle and its basis in the eternity of the world. As an answer to an objection in a definite context, it need not at all imply that St. Thomas, in his own skeletal form of the argument, would have to make it pass through the stage of creation in order to reach God. In his own direct presentations of the argument that have already been seen, he appears quite clearly to remain within the line of accidental change in proceeding to its first cause.

With regard to the animation of the heavens, the text in the *Contra Gentiles* continues:

... si primum movens non ponitur motum ex se, oportet quod moveatur immediate a penitus immobili. Unde etiam Aristoteles sub disiunctione hanc conclusionem inducit: quod scilicet oporteat vel statim devenire ad primum movens immobile separatum, vel ad movens seipsum, ex quo iterum devenitur ad movens primum immobile separatum (ibid., Et ad hoc ... si primum).

<sup>22</sup> CG, I, 13, Praedictos. Cf. *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1, no. 1990; lect. 2, no. 2043; *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 5, no. 2496.

<sup>23</sup> See *supra*, n. 14.

Here the notion of the disjunction is repeated.<sup>24</sup> The argument can be viewed either as proceeding directly to a separate immobile movent, or as going through the self-movent. In the immediate context, the disjunction seems applied only to the second "way" of the *Contra Gentiles*. Yet the reason given, namely that Aristotle passes over to the *Metaphysics* in order to reach a separate movent, would seem to indicate that that first "way," as found in Aristotle, did not just by itself arrive at separate substance. At its conclusion, it will be remembered, St. Thomas did not identify the movent with God. Against the Christian background of divine providence, there could be no qualms in seeing God as the first efficient cause of all cosmic motion. There were no inhibitions against the direct route of the argument to God in the line of efficient causality. That consideration allows one of the perspectives in which a Christian can view the argument in its skeletal form. But St. Thomas sees that it was not presented in this perspective in the *Physics*. He sees that in Aristotle's own procedure, metaphysical reasoning has to continue the argument in order to bring it to separate substance. To make it satisfactory by that route for himself, St. Thomas, after denying the eternity of cosmic motion, has to view it through the original giving of being in creation, that is, through a metaphysics of existence that goes far beyond the argument's ancient setting in Aristotle.

The *Contra Gentiles*, accordingly, illustrates very tellingly St. Thomas' technique in using the Aristotelian argument. In general, the Aristotelian framework is respected, but is manipulated in detail and is viewed against a Christian metaphysical background. Where in *Physics* VII the arguments are restricted to the plane of natural philosophy, they are supplemented by St. Thomas with arguments taken from *Physics* VIII, introducing into the structure of the argument the more general considerations of actuality and potentiality, considerations that extend to the metaphysical order. So taken, the premises are in fact left open to the Aristotelian conclusion of a first efficient cause that is not separate from matter, or to the Christian one of an infinite and provident God. Likewise the procedure in *Physics* VIII can be viewed as leading disjunctively either to the soul of the outermost sphere in genuinely Aristotelian fashion, and then as passing over in metaphysics to separate substance; or it can be viewed as allowing another alternative in which the path to God is direct. In either case, however, the question will arise how St. Thomas understands actuality and

<sup>24</sup> See *supra*, nn. 13 and 21.

potentiality in a way that leads, not to a plurality of finite separate substances that are final causes only, as in Aristotle, but to a pure actuality that is unique and infinite, and is an efficient as well as a final cause. All that immediately appears from the *Contra Gentiles* in this regard is that St. Thomas has no hesitation in reading the argument against the background of a creationist metaphysics.

The treatment in the *Contra Gentiles*, though, shows clearly enough that the problem of St. Thomas' different estimates of the argument cannot be solved by chronological considerations.<sup>25</sup> Here in the same chapter the interpretations of the argument as leading in the *Physics* to a sphere soul and to God occur side by side, without any feeling of embarrassment being shown by the writer. The two disjunctive ways of viewing the Aristotelian proof seem regarded as doctrinally compatible.

#### 4) The *Summa Theologiae*

In the *prima via* of the *Summa Theologiae* (I, 2, 3c) the argument from motion appears in its sharpest outlines. a) Things in the sensible world are evidently being moved. b) Whatever is being moved is being moved by another. c) Since infinite regress is impossible, there is a first movent that is not being moved by anything. d) This all understand to be God. In the argument motion is analyzed in terms of actuality and potentiality, and on the basis of these terms the reasoning develops into the conclusion.

Clearly enough, the skeletal lines of this *via* are taken from the arguments in the *Physics*, with the exception of the final statement that all understand the first movent to be God. St. Thomas, this shows pointedly enough, could see a skeleton structuring the complicated Aristotelian argument, framed in terms of actuality and potentiality. He can respect the skeletal outlines, and yet view the argument as leading to the unaristotelian conclusion of an infinite and necessarily unique separate substance.

#### 5) The *Commentary on Physics VII*

In general, St. Thomas in his commentary on the argument from motion in book VII of the *Physics* reports the details of the Aristotelian procedure quite objectively. A few points emerge, however, that have an important bearing on the question of his use of the Aristotelian arguments.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

First, St. Thomas takes for granted the solidarity of the thought in *Physics* VII with that in *Physics* VIII, even though in the Aristotelian collection the two books do not show any direct link with each other.<sup>26</sup> For him both books are concerned with a disjunctive way of arguing, directly to an external primary immobile movent, on the one hand, and, on the other, indirectly through a self-movent:

... procedit ad propositum ostendendum dupliciter. ... Vult autem per primum mobile AB, quod totum movetur et a principio interiori movente, intelligi aliquod corpus animatum quod totum movetur ab anima. ... Hoc enim ei convenit inquantum una pars aliam movet, scilicet anima corpus, ut in *Octavo* plenius ostendetur.

Secundo ... Ostendit directe, quod omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, tali ratione (*In VII Phys.*, lect. 1, Angeli-Pirotta nos. 1762-1765).

In commenting upon book VII, consequently, St. Thomas has no hesitation in using the framework of the self-movent and its movent part, as sketched in book VIII, and also book VIII's disjunction<sup>27</sup> of a direct and indirect argument, as norms of interpretation. The two books were presenting the same argument, the present text assumes, with book VIII giving greater detail. This helps explain why the first *via* in the *Contra Gentiles* (I, 13) could be constructed with arguments taken from both books. Why need St. Thomas have any hesitation in using arguments from book VIII to supplement those of book VII, if this was his understanding of the Aristotelian text?

As an explanation of Aristotle's own thought, however, the understanding of AB as body and soul in the above text is difficult. Aristotle goes on in the following paragraph to divide the two parts Alpha and Beta by a Gamma (*Ph.*, VII 1,242a5-7), without any indication that a different subject is meant by AB.<sup>28</sup> The division is

<sup>26</sup> See W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford, 1936), 11-19.

<sup>27</sup> See *supra*, n. 13. Cf. nn. 21 and 24.

<sup>28</sup> Rather, a backward reference to the AB at 241b27-28 seems clear: "For AB, which has been taken to represent that which is in motion..." (242a5). Ross, *op. cit.*, 668, looks upon this section as a "refutation of the possibility of a self-mover," directed against Plato. Yet the requirement of a self-movent is exactly what the passage seems to establish in its conclusion, 242b34; see Paulus, *art. cit.*, 282 (*supra*, n. 7). In the setting of book VIII 5,258a4-32, however, the "parts" are meant as body and soul.

In regard to the metaphysical character of the principle invoked from Aristotle, *Metaph.*, a 1,993b24-27, to show that motion because divisible cannot have a primary instance, one may note that St. Thomas expressly cites this passage at *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 2, no. 2001, and lect. 3, no. 2074. Lect. 21, no. 2491, applies the general notion to the participation of being from the primary substance.

clearly enough a division of material parts, and not a division of matter and form, as would be the case in the division of soul and body. The only apparent reason why St. Thomas interprets the text in this way is his assumption that the same proof is being presented in books VII and VIII. Likewise the disjunctive contrast in the above text from book VII is not in fact between an argument that passes through the intermediate stage of a self-movent and one that does not. The contrast, rather, is between the assumption of no movent because none is observable, on the one hand, and a positive demonstration that there is such a movent at work, on the other. These considerations have their importance in showing how St. Thomas takes for granted that he is dealing with the same proof in both books VII and VIII.

Secondly, in inquiring whether the proof of the premise "whatever is being moved is being moved by another" is a *propter quid* or *quia* demonstration, St. Thomas invokes a principle from the *Metaphysics* to explain the nature of the argument:

... aliquid movere seipsum nihil aliud est quam esse sibi causa motus. Quod autem est sibi causa alicuius, oportet quod primo ei conveniat; quia quod est primum in quolibet genere est causa eorum quae sunt post. Unde ignis, qui sibi et aliis est causa caloris, est primum calidum. ... Non potest ergo inveniri primum, cuius motus non dependeat ab aliquo priori... Sic ergo ostendit Aristoteles causam quare nullum mobile movet seipsum: quia non potest esse primum mobile cuius motus non dependeat a partibus (*In VII Phys.*, lect. 1, nos. 1777-1778).

This interpretation quite evidently lifts the reasoning to a metaphysical plane. It is not used by Aristotle himself. It would in fact render unnecessary the following premise about the impossibility of an infinite regress. Reaching the first cause of motion, the unmoved movent, at once and without intermediary stage, it would by-pass the other premise. It shows again, however, that St. Thomas feels no uneasiness in viewing the argument from motion against a metaphysical background.

Finally, Aristotle's remark that the first movent is being taken here in the sense of efficient cause and not of final cause (*Ph.*, VII 2,243a3-4), is explained by St. Thomas as not referring to the first cause in a series, but as the proximate or immediate cause that is contact with the thing being moved:<sup>29</sup>

Sed aliquid dicitur moveri dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut finis movet agentem, et tale movens aliquando distans est ab agente quem movet; alio modo, sicut

<sup>29</sup> This interpretation goes back to Simplicius, ad loc. (*In Phys.*, p. 1048.15-16). It is maintained by Ross, op. cit., 421. On the question, see Paulus, 283, n. 35.

movet id quod est principium motus, et de tali movente hic intelligit. ... Intelligit autem hic de immediate movente, et ideo dixit *primum movens*, ut per *primum* significetur immediatum mobili, non autem id quod est primum in ordine moventium (*In VII Phys.*, lect. 3, no. 1799).

Again this is an interpretation difficult to sustain in the Aristotelian context. Just four lines earlier (*Ph.*, VII 1,242b72) the term "first movent" was used clearly in the sense of the first in a series, as it had been used all along in the text. A sudden change of meaning in the same technical term, without warning or explanation, seems inadmissible unless there are weighty grounds to justify it. Eight lines further on (2,243a11), locomotion is called the "first" of motions. Here "first" obviously means first in the series, not the proximate motion. In a self-movent, the Aristotelian text continues (a14-15), the first movent is contained within the self-movent itself, and is therefore without intermediate. The contact, accordingly, follows from the notion of self-movent, not from what is expressed by "first." Similarly, contact had been shown to be necessary for any movent, not just the "first": "This is universally true wherever one thing is moved by another" (a5-6; Oxford tr.). The observation would be meaningless if "first" signified "proximate" in this context. On the other hand, to say that, just as every other movent, the first movent in a series is in immediate contact with what it moves, is unobjectionable.

The attention of St. Thomas in these comments, then, is not focused upon the distinction between movents that are efficient causes, and movents that are final causes only. Rather, the way is left open to interpreting the proof in the *Physics* as reaching in line of efficient causality an immaterial first movent that may be identified with God. However, nowhere in his commentary on *Physics* VII does St. Thomas expressly identify the primary movent with God. It is just left open as primary movent in general, without identification of nature. To that extent the Aristotelian text is fully respected.

To sum up, the *Commentary on Physics VII* shows that St. Thomas views the proof in both books of the *Physics* as the one identical demonstration, presented in both in the disjunctive form of proceeding either directly to an unmoved movent or by way of a self-movent. It shows also that he assesses the proof on a metaphysical level, and, finally, that he interprets the Aristotelian contrast of first efficient cause of motion and final cause of motion to mean a distinction between proximate efficient cause of motion and final cause.

## 6) The Commentary on Physics VIII

In commenting upon the eighth book of the *Physics*, St. Thomas reports faithfully the Aristotelian teaching on the eternity of cosmic motion. In the course of the discussion he seems to contrast natural philosophy with the "science of the first principle" as found both in the present book of the *Physics* and in the *Metaphysics*:

... scire veritatem huius quaestionis est praeopere, idest pernecessarium, non solum ad considerationem Scientiae Naturalis sed etiam ad scientiam de primo principio: quia in hoc *Octavo* et *XII Metaph.* ad probandum unum principium utitur aeternitate motus (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1, no. 1990; cf. lectio 2, no. 2043).

This would suggest that the proof of the first principle, both in *Physics* VIII and in the *Metaphysics*, is viewed as a procedure that belongs outside natural philosophy. No thought of distinguishing between the first principle in the *Physics* as an efficient cause, and the first principle in the *Metaphysics* as a final cause only, enters the consideration. Both *Physics* VIII and the *Metaphysics* are concerned with proving "unum principium," and both find their ground in the eternity of cosmic motion, from Aristotle's viewpoint. The impression given is that the whole process of reasoning to the one first principle is somehow regarded by St. Thomas as outside natural philosophy and as belonging in consequence to the realm of metaphysics.

The metaphysical setting is illustrated in what immediately follows. This way of proving that the first principle exists, St. Thomas continues, is of the highest efficacy; for once it is granted that the necessity of admitting a first principle follows from the eternity of the world, all the more will it follow from the premise that the world is not eternal:

Haec enim via probandi primum principium esse est efficacissima, cui resisti non potest. Si enim mundo et motu existente sempiterno necesse est ponere unum primum principium, multo magis sempiternitate eorum sublata; quia manifestum est quod omne novum indiget aliquo principio innovante (*ibid.*, no. 1991).

The ensuing development of the theme leaves no doubt that by the "principium innovans" St. Thomas is understanding a creator of the world out of nothing and an efficient cause that initiated motion without any preceding motion (*ibid.*, lect. 2, nos. 2002-2054). In this discussion the first principle is expressly and repeatedly identified with the Christian God (nos. 2002, 2003, 2041, 2047, 2050), and the original production of things is identified with the creation that is

believed through Christian faith (2002-2004, 2041-2044, 2051-2052). Against that background Plato and Aristotle are regarded as having reached not only the causes of accidental change, and of substantial change, but also the principle of all being: "... postremi vero, ut Plato et Aristoteles, pervenerunt ad cognoscendum principium totius esse" (ibid., no. 2007); "Ex quo patet, quod quamvis Aristoteles poneret mundum aeternum, non tamen creditit quod Deus non sit causa essendi ipsi mundo, sed causa motus eius tantum ut quidam dixerunt" (ibid., lectio 3, no. 2074).

Though it is literally true that for Aristotle separate substance is the cause of being to all else, the causality involved gives no evidence of getting outside final causality. St. Thomas, however, is clearly thinking in terms of efficient causality. He does not separate the first cause of being from the first cause of motion, as others<sup>30</sup> were credited with doing in their interpretation of Peripatetic teaching. In the context St. Thomas is understanding that the argument from motion reaches the Christian God not just as the cause of substantial change, as might be expected on the plane of natural philosophy, but as the principle of all being, in which all of the being is made from nothing: "totum ens, quod est fieri ens inquantum est ens" (ibid., lect. 2, no. 2006). This is the formula of the subject for metaphysics. The framework of the reasoning is on the metaphysical level. Against this background St. Thomas can readily maintain that if you start with the Aristotelian premise of the eternity of motion, you can reach the first principle; and therefore, *a fortiori*, one must reach the first principle from the other alternative, since the need for an innovating cause is then so manifest: "Hoc ergo solo modo poterat videri, quod non est necessarium ponere primum principium si res sunt ab aeterno. Unde etiam si hoc posito sequitur primum principium esse, ostenditur omnino necessarium primum principium esse."<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> St. Thomas does not identify the "quidam" at the end of lect. 3, no. 2074. Avicenna (*Metaph.*, VI, 1A; fol. 91r2), as has been seen, described natural philosophers as seeking a principle of motion only, in contrast with the metaphysicians, who seek a principle of being. Cf. St. Thomas' reference to Avicenna's comparison of the causes: "Sicut enim dicit Avicenna, lib. I Sufficientiae, cap. XI, haec est differentia inter agens divinum et agens naturale, quod agens naturale est tantum causa motus, et agens est causa esse." *In I Sent.*, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 857.

<sup>31</sup> *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1, no. 1991. The Blackwell-Spath-Thirikel translation of the first sentence runs: "Therefore, only if things exist from eternity can it seem to be unnecessary to posit a first principle." *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics by St. Thomas Aquinas* (New Haven, 1963), 474.

The disjunctive way of proceeding either directly to an immobile movent or indirectly through a self-movent, is noted:

In prima ostendit, quod necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum, quod vel sit immobile vel moveat seipsum. In secunda ostendit, quod etiam si deveniatur ad aliquod primum quod moveat seipsum, necesse est tamen ulterius devenire ad aliquod primum movens immobile..."<sup>32</sup>

Within the disjunction the argument to first immobile movent can end in a soul: "Relinquitur ergo quod pars movens in movente seipsum est omnino immobilis" (lect. 10, no. 2238); "et ostendit ulterius, quod moventis seipsum una pars est movens immobile, et sic utrobique accidit quod primum movens sit immobile... scilicet anima" (lect. 12, no. 2255). The argument to the first immobile movent, accordingly, is allowed to appear in two ways, in one way as reaching the Christian God, in the other way as reaching an immanent soul. The reasoning based on the analysis of motion into actuality and potentiality is kept in the limited setting of the self-movent.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, in the closing prayer Aristotle is said to end his general treatment of natural things in the first principle of nature, God:

Et sic terminat Philosophus considerationem communem de rebus naturalibus in Primo Principio totius naturae, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen (ibid., lect. 23, no. 2550).

This seems to be the closest St. Thomas comes to saying that natural philosophy can prove the existence of God. Yet he does not say it, nor do the words necessarily imply it in the context. Motion did not originally begin by way of nature, he had insisted (lect. 2, nos. 2044-2045), but through the creation of things in time. Aristotle, however, was regarded (no. 2007) as having reached the principle of all being—*principium totius esse*—and therefore as having reached the first principle under the aspect in which it was the original cause of motion. This is the level of metaphysics, not of natural philosophy. Yet in closing St. Thomas can refer to this principle as "the first principle of all nature." Similarly in explaining in the closing texts how the primary movent can be located at the circumference of the universe, he uses language that could apply equally to the soul of the outermost heaven or to the transcendent God: "dicitur primum movens esse in aliqua

<sup>32</sup> In *VIII Phys.*, lect. 9, no. 2180. Cf. lect. 11, no. 2254 and lect. 12, no. 2256, for the continued use of the disjunctive way of viewing Aristotle's demonstration. On the disjunction itself, see supra, nn. 13, 21, 24, and 27.

<sup>33</sup> In *VIII Phys.*, lect. 10, nos. 2218-2222. Cf. supra, n. 19.

parte sui mobilis non per determinationem suae substantiae, sed per efficientiam motus, quia ex aliqua parte sui mobilis movere incipit" (lect. 23, no. 2535). But this primary movent is the first principle of all nature, in which the last book of the *Physics* reaches its termination.

In his commentary on *Physics* VIII, then, St. Thomas continues to view the proof from motion against a metaphysical background that makes it lead to God, while at the same time allowing it an interpretation that takes it to the soul of the outermost sphere.

### 7) The Commentary on the *Metaphysics*

In explaining the text of the *Metaphysics*, St. Thomas has occasion to remark that Aristotle repeats his reasoning by which pure actuality is reached, in order to show more explicitly the method for arriving at the primary being.<sup>34</sup> With this purpose in mind St. Thomas assembles once more the proof from the *Physics*:

Cum enim omne quod movetur, ab alio moveatur, ut in physicis probatum est; si caelum est perpetuum, et motus est perpetuus, ... necesse est, quod ponatur aliquod sempiternum movens quod non movetur. Probatum est enim in octavo *Physicorum*, quod cum non sit abire in infinitum in moventibus et motis, oportet devenire in aliquod primum movens immobile: quia et si deveniatur in aliquod movens seipsum, iterum ex hoc oportet devenire in aliquid movens immobile, ut ibi probatum est.

Si autem primum movens est sempiternum et non motum, oportet quod non sit ens in potentia; quia quod est ens in potentia natum est moveri; sed quod sit substantia per se existens, et quod eius substantia sit actus (*In XII Metaph.*, lect. 6, Cathala-Spiazzi nos. 2517-2518).

The order in which Aristotle is seen proceeding to the primary being, therefore, is by reasoning from the perpetuity of cosmic motion to an eternal and immobile first movent, since infinite regress is impossible; and this reasoning may proceed either directly or through a self-movement. Then the reasoning of the *Metaphysics* (A 6,1071b8-20) is added to show that the primary movent has no potentiality but is only actuality.

This explanation, one sees readily enough, continues St. Thomas'

<sup>34</sup> *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 6, no. 2518. The order is to proceed through a self-movement to an immobile movent in *Physics* VIII, and then by the reasoning of the *Metaphysics* to show that this same movent is self-existent and that its substance is actuality. On Paulus' (405, n. 17) interpretation of the procedure in this commentary as betraying a certain hesitation, see passage quoted supra, n. 1. St. Thomas, however, does not express himself here as though he had any hesitation in his own mind.

disjunctive way of interpreting the Aristotelian proof. It remains open on the one hand to an understanding of the argument as reaching a sphere soul in the *Physics* and then pure actuality by further reasoning in the *Metaphysics*. On the other hand it allows—and suggests—an understanding of the argument in the sense that the same primary movent reached as efficient cause in the *Physics* is shown in the *Metaphysics* to be pure actuality.<sup>35</sup>

The commentary on the *Metaphysics*, nevertheless, acknowledges as true for Aristotle the necessity that the outer heaven know and desire the primary movent, in order that the motion take place:

... necesse est enim, si primum movens movet sicut primum intellectum et desideratum, quod primum mobile desideret et intelligat ipsum. Et hoc quidem verum est secundum opinionem Aristotelis, inquantum caelum ponitur animatum anima intelligente et desiderante (ibid., lect. 8, no. 2536).

On the other hand, the commentary keeps the way open for the identification of the primary efficient cause and the separate movent:

Considerandum est autem quod Philosophus intendit ostendere, quod Deus non intelligit aliud, sed seipsum, inquantum intellectum est perfectio intelligentis, et eius, quod est intelligere. ... Nec tamen sequitur quod omnia alia a se sint ei ignota; nam intelligendo se, intelligit omnia alia. ... Cum igitur a primo principio, quod est Deus, dependeat caelum et tota natura, ut dictum est, patet, quod Deus cognoscendo seipsum, omnia cognoscit (ibid., lect. 11, nos. 2614-2615).

This way of understanding the perfection of knowledge in separate substance, one may note, is attributed by St. Thomas to Aristotle himself.

Just as with the animation of the heavens, though, there is no hesitation in acknowledging that Aristotle's reasoning is based upon the eternity of cosmic motion. As in the *Commentary on the Physics*,<sup>36</sup> however, the conclusions are seen to follow with necessity, even though the truth of the premise is rejected. The reason, likewise as in the other commentary, is that of an existential metaphysics—the production of the world in being:

Quia si non fuerit mundus aeternus, necesse est quod fuerit productus in esse ab aliquo praexistente. Et si hoc non sit aeternum, oportet iterum quod sit productum ab aliquo. Et cum hoc non possit procedere in infinitum, ut supra in secundo probatum est, necesse est ponere aliquam substantiam

<sup>35</sup> Cf. supra, n. 30. On the disjunctive view of the proof, see supra, nn. 13, 21, 24, 27, and 32.

<sup>36</sup> See supra, n. 31.

sempiternam, in cuius substantia non sit potentia, et per consequens immaterialem (ibid., lect. 5, no. 2499).

In this way St. Thomas is able to assess the Aristotelian proof critically, detach it from its necessary basis in the eternity of cosmic motion, place it in the framework of an existential metaphysics, and see it concluding by a different route to the eternity and immateriality of the primary substance. This conclusion Aristotle had reached by demonstrating an immanent efficient cause in the *Physics* and a transcendent final cause in the *Metaphysics*, a procedure that commences in natural philosophy and passes over into the metaphysical order to reach separate substance. St. Thomas feels no uneasiness in transposing the whole proof to the metaphysical realm.

The commentary on the *Metaphysics*, accordingly, strengthens the conclusion that St. Thomas is able to view the whole proof from motion against an entirely metaphysical background. On the other hand, he can also see it strictly in its Aristotelian setting, in which it is based upon the eternity of the world and the animation of the heavens and proceeds via the self-movement to separate substance, passing over from natural philosophy to metaphysics. The solemn concluding prayer, however, emphasizes (lect. 12, no. 2663) that Aristotle had called the primary movement God.

### 8) The *Compendium Theologiae*

In the *Compendium Theologiae*<sup>37</sup> the truth of God's existence, known through revelation, is also proven by reason. The demonstration given is that from motion:

... credendum est Deum esse, quod ratione conspicuum est. Videmus enim omnia quae moventur, ab aliis moveri... Hoc autem in infinitum procedere impossibile est. Cum enim omne quod movetur ab aliquo, sit quasi instrumentum quoddam primi moventis, si primum movens non sit, quaecumque movent instrumenta erunt. ... Oportet igitur primum movens esse, quod sit omnibus suoremum. et hoc dicimus Deum (*Comp. Theol.*, c. III).

The familiar skeletal form of proof, concluding to the Christian God, appears again in this presentation. The impossibility of infinite regress is proved by an argument taken from *Physics* VIII (5,256a21-b3), an

<sup>37</sup> Early testimony places this work towards the end of St. Thomas' life, though some modern critics place it earlier on doctrinal grounds. See I.T. Eschmann's note in E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, tr. L. K. Shook (New York, 1956), 411-412.

argument that in Aristotle leads to a self-movant (a33-34), but which St. Thomas interprets as meaning that every moved movant is as it were an instrument of the primary movant. The other premise "all things that are being moved are being moved by others" is proved in the immediately following chapter (*Comp. Theol.*, c. IV) by the regular argument from the analysis of motion in terms of actuality and potentiality, while the argument from *Physics* VII (1,242a5-15) is again<sup>38</sup> interpreted as applying to a self-movant and as leading immediately to a primary movant that is entirely immobile. The pure actuality reached by the proof is further shown to be what is naturally desired and therefore identical with ultimate actuality, that is, with being itself:

... ultimus autem actus est ipsum esse. Cum enim omnis motus sit exitus de potentia in actum, oportet illud esse ultimum actum, in quod tendit omnis motus, et cum motus naturalis in hoc tendat, quod est naturaliter desideratum, oportet hoc esse ultimum actum, quod omnia desiderant. Hoc autem est esse. Oportet igitur, quod essentia divina, quae est actus purus et ultimus, sit ipsum esse (*Comp. Theol.*, c. XI).

The proof from motion is accordingly read in this text against a background that makes it identify with existence itself the pure actuality in which it results. The natural desire for being is seen to bear ultimately upon God whose essence is existence, and not, as with Aristotle, upon finite separate forms. The *Compendium Theologiae*, therefore, shows once more that St. Thomas can interpret the proof from motion in the framework of an existential metaphysics, thereby making it lead directly to the God revealed in Christian faith. The analysis of motion in terms of actuality and potentiality provides the sinews for the reasoning, but with actuality understood in such a way that pure actuality means subsistent existence, and not finite forms. The use of the argument from *Physics* VII to lead directly to a primary movant likewise shows that the level on which St. Thomas is interpreting the argument is metaphysical. Nevertheless the skeleton

<sup>38</sup> See supra, n. 28. For the reasoning, see St. Thomas. *In VII Phys.*, lect. 1, nos. 1777-1778. Undoubtedly *Ph.*, VIII 5,257a27-258b5, lies in the background of St. Thomas' thought, but there (257a28-31) the *per se* instance is the self-movant, as he himself acknowledges in his commentary on the passage: "...probabile est apud omnes, quod primum movens sit movens seipsum. Semper enim causa quae est per se est prior ea quae est per alterum" (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 9, no. 2214). Cf., in contrast: "Quod autem est per se, prius est eo quod non est per se. Non potest igitur primum movens esse, si ratione suae partis hoc ei conveniat. Oportet igitur primum movens omnino immobile esse." *Comp. Theol.*, c. IV.

form in which the outlines of the argument are sketched is equally able to underlie the original Aristotelian development of the proof, except for the ultimate identification of the primary movent with the Christian God.

#### IV

What immediate results emerge from this doxographical survey of the passages in which St. Thomas deals with the argument from motion in the Aristotelian *Physics*? If one accepts the results of studies like that of Paulus,<sup>39</sup> the meaning of the argument in its original Greek setting is definite enough. The argument from motion in the *Physics* reaches only sphere souls as immobile movents. These cause the motions in the sublunar world efficiently. They are efficient causes. The *Metaphysics*, on the other hand, continues the argument to arrive at immaterial movents. But these function only as final causes, not as efficient causes. In rather sharp contrast, one may note the following characteristics in St. Thomas' presentation of the argument.

First, St. Thomas sees clearly in the Aristotelian arguments the skeleton form of a demonstration that leads directly to the Christian God, yet a skeleton that can equally well sustain the original Aristotelian flesh. The skeletal outline starts with the observed fact of motion in the sensible world, specifically with local and qualitative motion. The premises "whatever is being moved is being moved by something else" and "infinite regress in moved movents is impossible" then result in the conclusion that the motion is being caused ultimately by an unmoved movent that is straightway seen to be identical with the God of Christian faith. Except for this last identification with the Christian God, the skeletal form is also seen by St. Thomas as developed in the Aristotelian *Physics* through a self-movement to an immanent soul as immobile movent. The further development to reach separate substance is then seen as taking place in the *Metaphysics*. These two ways of viewing the argument cannot be explained on a chronological basis,<sup>40</sup> since they occur side by side in works throughout

<sup>39</sup> See *supra*, n. 6.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *supra*, nn. 1, 19, 21, 22, and 25. At *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 6, no. 2518 (see *supra*, n. 34), St. Thomas can explain the procedure in the *Metaphysics* as establishing the pure actuality of the primary movent already demonstrated in the *Physics*, while fully aware (*ibid.*, no. 2517; cf. lect. 7, 2533) that the *Physics* proceeds by way of the self-movement.

the various periods of St. Thomas' career, and most clearly in the *Contre Gentiles* (I, 13).

Secondly, the proof is seen invariably by St. Thomas as developing in terms of actuality and potentiality, notions common to natural philosophy and to metaphysics. Aristotle, in contrast, develops the proof in *Physics* VII without bringing in these notions. When using the proof from *Physics* VII, accordingly, St. Thomas<sup>41</sup> supplements it with the actuality and potentiality argument that he finds in *Physics* VIII.

Thirdly, St. Thomas tends to view the whole proof in a strongly metaphysical setting, in which the principles of actuality and potentiality, first known in motion, are extended to every kind of mutability and reception of being, including the reception of being in creation. In this setting pure actuality appears as subsistent existence, the very nature of the God believed in through Christian faith. Nowhere is there any definite indication of a view on the part of St. Thomas that a demonstration on the level of natural philosophy can prove the existence of God.

Fourthly, the metaphysical cast of the proof does not at all mean that there is in it any passage from the line of accidental change (local motion and alteration) to that of substantial change or of creation, in its direct procedure to God. Only in contexts where he is concerned with the Aristotelian tenet of the world's eternity, does St. Thomas introduce creation out of nothing into the argument, to safeguard a revealed doctrine. In all other contexts the proof seems clearly enough to remain in the line of accidental change until it reaches the primary movent.

Fifthly, St. Thomas expressly acknowledges that the probative force of the Aristotelian demonstration is based upon the eternity of cosmic motion and the animation of the heavens, and that it passes over to metaphysics in order to reach separate substance. Yet he sees Aristotle arguing disjunctively in the proof either directly to first movent or indirectly through a self-movement. The alternative consisting in the direct route, and without the premise of the world's eternity, he considered much more cogent. Aristotle, in contrast, did not consider this alternative worth discussing, since for him cosmic motion was in fact caused efficiently by an animated sphere.

<sup>41</sup> *QG*, I, 13, Tertio. On *Comp. Theol.*, c. IV, where in the proof of a disjunction the two arguments are used side by side, see *supra*, n. 38. On the background of the actuality and potentiality argument in Maimonides, see Arnou, *op. cit.*, 82-83.

Finally, St. Thomas had no hesitation in rearranging the Aristotelian arguments, even amalgamating those from book VIII of the *Physics* with those of book VII, and introducing revealed doctrines like creation in time into their discussion. This last consideration could raise the issue whether throughout all his treatment of the proof from motion he is speaking as a theologian, and absorbing both the natural philosophy and the metaphysics into the higher unity of theology.<sup>42</sup>

What does this doxographical study show? It indicates at least that the reasoning of St. Thomas in the proof from motion cannot be interpreted in the same way as that of Aristotle. For instance, because the proof for Aristotle begins on the level of natural philosophy, it does not follow that St. Thomas begins it on the same plane. The notions of actuality and potentiality, into which motion is analyzed for both thinkers, and in terms of which the procedure finally leads to pure actuality, are metaphysical as well as physical in character. An investigation of their use by St. Thomas in the proof from motion is accordingly of first importance. That, however, is a task that lies outside the strictly doxographical scope of the present study.

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<sup>42</sup> On this general theme, though in the context only of the two *Summae*, see A. C. Pegis, "Sub Ratione Dei: A Reply to Professor Anderson," *New Scholasticism*, 39 (1965), 141-157.

# Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century \*

JAMES A. WEISHEIPL, O.P.

IN an earlier study<sup>1</sup> we tried to reconstruct the normal curriculum of arts at Oxford in the early fourteenth century on the basis of extant statutes, the "common practice" of other schools and other periods, as well as incidental references found in manuscript notations and passing statements of contemporary authors. We noted that the normal curriculum at Oxford in the early fourteenth century did not differ radically from the "common practice of the schools" in the late thirteenth century. The University curriculum covered the whole of the *trivium*, *quadrivium* and the three philosophies variously understood and classified in previous centuries.<sup>2</sup> However, there were significant developments at Oxford in the early fourteenth century that need to be further investigated. It was in this period that the Oxford schools of logic and physics attracted the attention of the whole academic world with their "English subtleties" and "calculations".<sup>3</sup>

The two main pillars of Oxford education in the early fourteenth century were logic and natural philosophy. This dual emphasis, however, did not originate at Oxford. It can be seen to a certain extent in the School of Chartres. William of Conches in particular made a sharp distinction between sciences which deal with "expression", namely grammar, dialectics and rhetoric, and those which deal with real things, namely arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> J. A. Weisheipl, "Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the early Fourteenth Century," *Mediaeval Studies*, 26 (1964) 143-185.

<sup>2</sup> J. A. Weisheipl, "Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought," *Mediaeval Studies*, 27 (1965) 54-90.

<sup>3</sup> Richard de Bury, *Philobiblon*, chap. 9, ed. and trans. by E. C. Thomas (London, 1888), 212, already noted in "Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts," *loc. cit.*, 185.

<sup>4</sup> William of Conches, *De philosophia mundi*, lib. IV, c. 41. PL 172, 100.

Although there had always been some distinction between the *trivium*, called "scientiae sermocinales", and the *quadrivium*, often called "scientiae reales", the introduction of the new Aristotelian books into the Latin academic world rendered a sharp distinction between "real" and "verbal" sciences less secure, particularly when schoolmen were conscious of the "abstract" nature of mathematics. Nevertheless it can be said that by the middle of the fourteenth century "scientiae sermocinales" at Oxford were basically represented by the *libri logicales*, while among "scientiae reales" physics and mathematics predominated with mathematics serving as a handmaid to the *libri naturales*.

This duality of emphasis conspicuous in the Oxford curriculum was reflected in distinct *studia* established by religious Orders in the fourteenth century. Early constitutions of religious orders, reflecting certain traditional views toward secular learning,<sup>5</sup> excluded members from the faculty or arts. Later, when young men entered religious life without some previous training in philosophy and arts, an equivalent education had to be provided, not only as a preparation for studying the *divina pagina*, but also as a requirement for entering the faculty of theology. By the second half of the thirteenth century Dominicans had established not only major *studia generalia* in principal university centers, but also *studia artium* in every Province of the Order. The Dominican General Chapter of 1325, held in Venice, made a distinction between the teaching of *logicalia* and *naturalia*. Friars destined to become lectors were obliged to hear logic for three years and natural science for at least two before they could be sent to a *studium theologiae*.<sup>6</sup> The General Chapter of the Austin Friars about

<sup>5</sup> The Dominican constitutions of 1228 declared: [Studentes] in libris gentilium et philosophorum non studeant, etsi ad horam inspiciant. Saeculares scientias non addiscant nec etiam artes quas liberales vocant ... sed tantum libros theologicos tam iuvenes quam alii legant. Ed. H. Denifle, *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, 2 (1885) 222. This reflected not only the general view that monks should not devote themselves to secular literature, but also various prohibitions against clerics studying pagans, medicine and civil law, e.g., Gratian, *Decretum*, dist. 37, c.1: Episcopus libros gentilium non legat, ed. A. Friedberg (Leipzig, 1879), col. 135; Council of Tours in 1163, c.8: Ut religiosi saecularia studia vitent, Mansi, 21, 1179; letter of Honorius III, Nov. 1219, *Chart. Univ. P.*, I, 90-93, n. 32, etc. See G. C. Meersseman, "In libris gentilium non studeant. L'étude des classiques interdite aux clercs au moyen âge?" *Italia Medioevale e Umanistica*, 1 (1958) 1-13.

<sup>6</sup> Volumus et ordinamus, quod nullus mittatur ad studium generale, nisi ad lectoriam ydoneum reputetur, et nisi prius fuerit duobus annis in particulari studio theologie eruditus; nec aliquis ad studium theologie assignetur, nisi saltem duobus annis naturalia audierit, nec assignetur studio naturarum, nisi prius audierit loycalia tribus annis; nec

four years later ordained that every Province of the Order was to have two *studia*, if possible, one for natural philosophy, the other for logic; the whole of logic was to be covered in three years and the whole of natural philosophy in three years.<sup>7</sup> At present our knowledge of these *studia* is too meager to make further comparisons with the curriculum of studies in the faculty of arts at Oxford or elsewhere.<sup>8</sup> All the evidence, however, seems to indicate that the principal courses of study in *studia* administered by religious Orders consisted of the *libri logicales* and the *libri naturales*.

### A. *The Libri Logicales and Their Significance*

The division of textbooks of logic into *ars* or *logica vetus* and *ars* or *logica nova* was merely an accidental one due to the chronological order in which the Aristotelian books reached the West.<sup>9</sup> By a happy coincidence this chronological order of translation harmonized perfectly with the logical order as seen by schoolmen of the thirteenth and

aliquis ponatur ad legendum naturalia, nisi saltem theologiam audierit duobus annis; nec ad legendum loycalia nisi duobus annis in naturalibus studuerit cum profectu. *Acta Cap. Gen.*, II (MOPH IV) 157-8.

<sup>7</sup> Diffinimus et ordinamus quod in qualibet provincia nostri Ordinis ordinentur duo loca, si ad hoc sint ibi duo apta, in quorum uno sit studium naturalis philosophie, et in alio studium logice, ita quod lector qui legit philosophiam teneatur infra triennium naturalem philosophiam perficere. Lector vero qui leget logicam teneatur similiter infra triennium perficere totam logicam .... Si vero sit aliqua provincia in qua non sint duo loca que ad huius studia sint apta, saltem ordinetur ibidem unus locus ubi sint duo lectores, quorum unus per triennium leget philosophiam, alter logicam eo modo quo superius dictum est. *Chart. Univ. Par.*, II, 328, n. 893. A. Gwynn does not advert to this ordinance and hence omits the *studium naturalis philosophiae* from the organization of studies in his work *The English Austin Friars in the Time of Wyclif*, Chap. III (Oxford, 1940).

<sup>8</sup> For studies on the studia in religious orders see H. Denifle, *Die Entstehung der Universitäten des Mittelalters* (Berlin, 1885) 710-723; A. G. Little, "Educational Organization," *Trans. Royal Hist. Soc.*, N.S., 8, 49-70; W. A. Hinnebusch, *The Early English Friars Preachers* (Rome, 1951) 332-342; A. Gwynn, *op. cit.*, 26-34.

<sup>9</sup> One of the earliest official uses of these terms is to be found in the statutes of Robert Courson for Paris in 1215: Et quod legant libros Aristotelis de dialectica tam de veteri quam de nova in scolis ordinarie et non ad cursum. *Chart. Univ. Par.*, I, 78, n. 20. But this terminology was already in use in the twelfth century. C. H. Haskins dates the reception of the *logica nova* between about 1121 and 1158. *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), 225-6. See also *Aristoteles Latinus: Codices*, I, 44-49.

fourteenth centuries. The terms themselves persisted in statutes and commentaries throughout the rest of the Middle Ages.

As a science concerned with correct processes of reasoning, logic was usually divided "secundum diversitatem actuum rationis",<sup>10</sup> that is, according to the three mental acts of simple apprehension, judgment and reasoning. By the first act of the mind was meant the perception of simple terms, things, or classes (*incomplexa*) without affirming or denying anything about them. To this part of logic belonged the *Predicamenta* of Aristotle together with the *Isagoge* of Porphyry and the *Liber de sex principiis* of Gilbert of la Porrée. By the second act of the mind was meant the enunciation of a proposition affirming or denying the predicate of the subject. The basic elements of this part of logic were contained in the *Perihermeneias* (*De interpretatione*) of Aristotle, around which many specialized treatises developed concerning modal propositions, future contingent propositions and the conversion of propositions. The third act of the mind, scientific reasoning, was considered as a "resolution" to first and proper principles of both the matter and the form of reasoning. This highest part of logic, which discussed the proper subject matter for the whole science of logic,<sup>11</sup> was called *analytica*, following translations made from the Greek. Analysis, or resolution, however, was of two kinds: resolution to formal principles of syllogistic reasoning and resolution to the matter contained in the premises. Formal resolution was the subject of Aristotle's *Analytica Priora*. Resolution to the matter or nature of the propositions was subdivided according to the certitude of the premises. Necessary and *per se* propositions proper to strictly scientific knowledge were discussed in Aristotle's *Analytica Posteriora*. Probable propositions proper to dialectical knowledge were discussed in his *Topica*; this part of logic was often called *logica inventiva* because probable reasons are useful in the discovery of truth and is sometimes the only kind of certitude possible.<sup>12</sup> False and sophistical propositions were discussed in Aristotle's *De Sophisticis Elenchis* and in other treatises entitled *De Fallaciis*.

<sup>10</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *In lib. Post. Anal.*, prooem., n. 3.

<sup>11</sup> Est autem haec scientia ut de subiecto de syllogismo demonstrativo; de hoc enim inquit differentias et passiones et modos quibus fiat. Albertus Magnus, *In I Post. Anal.*, tr. I, cap. 1, ed. Borgnet, II, 2b. Subiectum autem in logica est syllogismus, partes vero ipsius sunt propositio et oratio. Robertus Anglicus, *Expositio in Introductiones Petri Yspani*, MS, Vat. lat. 3049, fol. 1vb.

<sup>12</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *In lib. Post. Anal.*, prooem., n. 6; sec Albertus Magnus, *Prooemium in lib. I Topicorum*, c. 1, ed. cit., II, 233a-235b.

Throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the basic texts of logic were those of Aristotle. But from about the middle of the thirteenth century onward various introductions, summaries and supplements were introduced, at least for private use. A certain Magister Robertus Anglicus, commenting on the *Introductiones*<sup>13</sup> of Peter of Spain, explains the need for introductory and summary texts:

Verum quia in libris Aristotelis est dyalectica tradita difficiliter, ideo ratione intelligencie amplioris studuerunt diversi auctores temporis retromissis [*sic*] quosdam libros seu tractatus introductores in arte huiusmodi compilare, quibus cognitis sciencia Aristotelis limpidius elucescat.<sup>14</sup>

Among the better known *Introductiones* of the thirteenth century are those of Peter of Spain († 1277), William of Shyreswood († after 1267) and Lambert of Auxerre (fl. after 1250).<sup>15</sup> These introductions are nothing more than elementary texts intended for beginners in logic.<sup>16</sup> By the fifteenth century there were even more elementary introductions consisting of definitions, divisions and rules to be memorized by beginners.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>13</sup> This work is commonly known as the *Summulae logicales*, but at least in the commentary of Robertus Anglicus the title is *Introductiones Magistri Petri Yspani*, MS, Vat. lat. 3049, fol. 2rb. This conveys better the original function of the treatise.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 2ra. This unique manuscript of the thirteenth century has been discussed by M. Grabmann in "Handschriftliche Forschungen und Funde zu dem philosophischen Schriften des Petrus hispanus, des späteren Papstes Johannes XXI († 1277)," in *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1936, Heft 9 (Munich, 1937) 65-67; however we do not follow his transcription, which is faulty in places. Unfortunately the colophon is completely unintelligible: *Finita ista compilacio super tractans a magistro Roberto Anglico in qua connati potest materiam explanandi dacio magistri Petri Yspani anno domini M<sup>o</sup> ducentesimo septimo mense maii tercia decima, die sole existente in vire <fol. 81v> octavo gradu thauri*. Grabmann assumed that Robertus Anglicus is Robert Kilwardby and dates the commentary between 1248 and 1261, at which time Kilwardby became Prior Provincial of the Dominican Order in England. However, there is not sufficient evidence to prove that this Robertus Anglicus is Kilwardby, whose regency in arts at Paris was "probably from 1237 to 1245 or thereabouts" according to D. A. Callus, "The 'Tabulae super Originalia Patrum' of Robert Kilwardby," *Studia Mediaevalia R. J. Martin* (Bruges, 1948) 247.

<sup>15</sup> These have all been discussed in detail by Grabmann, especially in the above-mentioned paper and in his "Die Introductiones in logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood," in *Sitzungsberichte der Bay. Akad. d. Wissen.*, 1937, Heft 10 (Munich, 1937).

<sup>16</sup> There were others in the second half of the thirteenth century, such as the anonymous "Cum sit nostra presens intentio ad artem dialecticam ..." preserved in London MS, B.M., Royal 12. F. XIX, fol. 90-105v; Oxford Bodl. Libr., Digby 2, fol. 26-95; Digby 24, fol. 17-47; Bodl. Auct. F. 5. 23, fol. 167 ff. Other MSS of this text have been noted by Grabmann in "Handschriftliche Forschungen," *ed. cit.*, p. 41.

<sup>17</sup> For example the text of magister Berlinganus contained in Bodl. MS lat. Misc. e. 100,

Among supplementary texts in logic the best known today is the *Syncategoremata* of William of Shyreswood,<sup>18</sup> although similar texts have been ascribed to Peter of Spain, Nicholas of Paris and John Pagus.<sup>19</sup> Syncategorematic terms are adjectives such as "omnis", "nullus", "aliquis", and "solus" which specify in a quantitative way the supposition of the term they modify. By themselves they do not, strictly speaking, signify anything, but as quantifiers of other terms they are said to "co-signify".<sup>20</sup> Many *sophismata* of the thirteenth century involve the use of syncategorematic terms; hence special treatises were written to establish rules for correct usage. By the middle of the fourteenth century, however, *syncategoremata* were no longer discussed in special treatises exclusively devoted to their use, but seem to have been absorbed into treatises on supposition.<sup>21</sup>

There is no evidence that any of these introductory or supplementary texts were ever used as textbooks at Oxford in the early fourteenth century.<sup>22</sup> Instead, separate and fuller treatises seem to have entered the curriculum of arts. Of these, four in particular deserve special attention: *Textus de suppositionibus*, *Textus de consequentiis*, *Textus de obligatoriis* and *Textus de insolubilibus*.

fol. 44-62, beginning: Ad [h]abendum bonam noticiam terminorum sequens tractatus supposicionum memorie debet commendari....

<sup>18</sup> Ed. J. R. O'Donnell, "The Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood," *Mediaeval Studies*, 3 (1941) 46-93.

<sup>19</sup> M. Grabmann, "Handschriftliche Forschungen," *ed. cit.*, 129.

<sup>20</sup> Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicales*, ed. I. M. Bochénski (Turin, 1947), n. 1.05, pp. 2-3. "Et dicitur syncategorema consignificativum, id est, cum aliis significativum, scilicet cum categorematicis... quia non habet significationem finitam et determinatam." Burley, *De puritate artis logicae* (tract. brevior), ed. P. Boehner (St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1955), p. 220, lines 8-11.

<sup>21</sup> We know that Burley wrote certain questions on syncategorematic terms (Erfurt, MS Amplon. Q. 276, fol. 19v-21v, beginning: Queritur de obliquis utrum possit fieri syllogismus...) and in his earlier version of the *De puritate artis logicae* he says: Et hanc particulam secundam 'Tractatum syncategorematum' volumus appellare. *ed. cit.*, p. 220, lines 6-7. But by the middle of the fourteenth century these ideas are discussed in other treatises of logic. Perhaps this was unfortunate, because it led to a confusion of the essential difference between terms properly so called and syncategorematic words. Cf. P. T. Geach, "The Doctrine of Distribution," *Mind*, 65 (1956), esp. 72-73.

<sup>22</sup> It is possible, however, that some of the minor logical works by Burley, e.g., *de relativis*, *de abstractis*, *de toto et parte*, etc., may be related to some common text which is not that of Aristotle.

i. *Textus de Suppositionibus*

The question of the supposition of terms in various statements necessarily arises in a discussion of *Perihermeneias* I, 7, although the question may originally have been raised independently by grammarians. Supposition, as distinct from signification, is usually defined as "that which a term represents in a particular statement." Thus, if in the statement "Man is a rational animal" the term "man" is taken to represent a mental concept or a three lettered word, the statement is false. Strictly speaking only subject terms can have supposition, but Peter of Spain had already extended supposition to predicates.

Early in the fourteenth century Walter Burley wrote a youthful work on suppositions, a very exhaustive and complex treatise in which he generally follows William of Shyreswood, although he attributes supposition to both subject and predicate.<sup>23</sup> Burley's treatise is perhaps the most exhaustive treatment of suppositions as such. However it is difficult to estimate the influence of Burley's work on later treatises *De suppositionibus*.

Undoubtedly the greatest impact on the study of supposition was made by William of Ockham, for the basic tenet of nominalism, namely that universal natures are in no way to be found apart from the *intentio animae*, is synthesized in Ockham's doctrine of supposition.<sup>24</sup> Because Ockham rejected the objective reality of universal natures, he had to reject the traditional understanding of *suppositio simplex*, which was "quando dictio supponit significatum pro significato".<sup>25</sup> Already in his *Commentary on the Sentences* he declared: *Falsa est opinio quae dicit quod suppositio simplex est quando terminus supponit pro suo significato*.<sup>26</sup> For Ockham "suppositio simplex est quando terminus

<sup>23</sup> *Suppositio est proprietas extremi secundum quod unum extremum ordinatur ad aliud in propositione, et sic suppositio non debetur extremo extra propositionem, sed solum in propositione.* Burley, *Suppositiones*, London, MS Royal 12. F. XIX, fol. 130rb. For Peter of Spain see *Summulae logicae*, tr. VI, ed. cit., n. 1.06-7, pp. 58-59.

<sup>24</sup> Ockham's doctrine will be discussed more fully later. See C. Michalski, "Le criticisme et le scepticisme dans la philosophie du xiv<sup>e</sup> siècle," *Bulletin international de l'Académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres. Classe d'hist. et de phil.*, 1925, pp. 55-71; "La physique nouvelle et les différents courants philosophiques au xiv<sup>e</sup> siècle," *idem*, 1927, pp. 121-122; P. Vignaux, art. "Nominalisme" in *DTC*, XLI, col. 733-754; W. & M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford, 1962), 265-270.

<sup>25</sup> William of Shyreswood, *Introductiones in logicam*, ed. M. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, p. 75, line 15. Cf. Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicae*, ed. cit., n. 6.05, p. 58; Roger Bacon, *Summulae dialectices*, ed. Steele, *Opera hact. ined.*, fasc. 15 (Oxford, 1940), 269, line 4.

<sup>26</sup> Ockham, *Comm. in Sent.*, I, dist. IV, q. 1 F, ed. Lyons, 1495. Also *Summa logicae*, P. I, c. 64, ed. Boehner, p. 178, lines 27-38.

supponit *pro intentione animae*".<sup>27</sup> Other types of supposition, namely *personalis* and *materialis*, were interpreted in the traditional sense of individual designated and material words or sounds. It was after Ockham's systematic *Summa logicae* that Walter Burley wrote his longer version of *De puritate artis logicae*, the first part of which is an explicit attack on Ockham's doctrine of simple supposition. Because of the prolixity of both Ockham and Burley ("nimis esse prolixa"<sup>28</sup>) some simple treatise had to be established for beginners in the Oxford schools of logic.

One anti-Ockhamist text was written by William Sutton, a Fellow of Merton College. This *Textus de suppositionibus* begins: Ut iuvenes habeant faciliorem cognitionem in supposicionibus terminorum, breves regule atque generales sunt ponende... It is a short text consisting of basic definitions and divisions of suppositions, including that of relative terms, together with eleven rules governing their distribution.<sup>29</sup> Sutton's treatise is based largely on William of Shyreswood and explicitly rejects Ockham's doctrine of *suppositio simplex*:

Ex quo patet illorum error qui credunt cum dicitur 'homo est substantia' predicatum huius propositionis supponere pro intencione anime simpliciter, quoniam si intencio anime nec possit esse [nec] de pluribus predicari, constat quod terminus pro ea supponere non potest.<sup>30</sup>

A Munich MS, Clm. 4384, fol. 123v-131v, written about 1340,<sup>31</sup> contains an anonymous commentary on Sutton's text that is said to have been "edite a magno cetu philosophorum in Anglia".<sup>32</sup> William Sutton was

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Sed causa efficiens [tractatus supposicionum] fuit Wilhelmus Okham et Walterus Werley, ambo anglici, qui sententia prolixa tradiderunt scienciam de supposicionibus terminorum, et hoc quantum ad causam principalem. Sed alteri modernorum videntur dicta sua nimis esse prolixa et viris anglicis qui collegit illum librum de supposicionibus ex libris aliorum de quo nomine nichil curretur. *Scriptum magistri Sifridi anglici super textum de supposicionibus Suttonis Anglici*, Vienna, Dominikanerkloster MS 160/130, fol. 91vb-92ra.

<sup>29</sup> Sutton's text is contained in Vienna, Dominikanerkloster MS 160/130, fol. 123ra-rb, and Munich, Clm. 4397, fol. 198; a commentary on this text is preserved in Munich, Clm. 4384, fol. 123v-131v, and *sophismata curialia* on the text are contained in the above mentioned Vienna MS, fol. 96r-100v.

<sup>30</sup> Vienna, Dominikanerkloster MS 160/130, fol. 123ra.

<sup>31</sup> The previous item, a *reportatio* on the *De fallaciis*, concludes with: finitus est liber iste per me iudocum anno domini 1340 proxima die veneris ante festum sancti Thome (fol. 123v).

<sup>32</sup> Inc.: Primo elenchorum dicitur, 'Qui virtutes vocabulorum ignari sunt de facili paralogizantur'. In ista proposicione duo tanguntur ....

admitted to Fellowship at Merton in 1330.<sup>33</sup> Thus it would seem that this treatise *De suppositionibus* was written some time between 1330-1340. Whether this text was in use for any considerable time in Oxford cannot be ascertained at present.

The scope of this part of logic grew rapidly in extent during the second quarter of the fourteenth century and in some cases subordinate treatises developed. Burley, Ockham and Sutton had discussed the supposition of relative terms; from this developed new treatises *De relativis*, for example the one by William Heytesbury. Ockham furthermore discussed the supposition of such terms as "incipit" and "desinit"; from this developed the various treatises *De incipit et desinit*. Heytesbury himself discussed the supposition of comparative and superlative adverbs and adjectives in the fifth chapter of his *Regulae solvendi sophismata*, "De maximo et minimo", written in 1335. To these may be added the problems of *scire* and *dubitare* when the object of a term is unknown; these problems were discussed in the treatises of Heytesbury (*Regulae*, c.2, and *Probationes*, c.1<sup>34</sup>), in the *Sophismata* of Kilmington<sup>35</sup> and in the *Conclusiones* of Billingham.<sup>36</sup> Many such problems, however, became confused and involved with *insolubilia* so that the real extent of supposition was lost. Once scholastics lost the original and real role of supposition as a function of subject-terms and of no other part of speech, the subject matter of texts *De suppositionibus* became obscured and intermingled with other problems of logic and philosophy.

When discussion of supposition developed beyond the scope of Sutton's text, Richard Billingham, another Fellow of Merton College (fl. 1344-1361), wrote an influential *Speculum iuvenum*, or *De probatione propositionum*, some time after Heytesbury's *De sensu composito et diviso*.<sup>37</sup> This *textus Billingham*, which became a standard textbook in many continental universities during the fifteenth century,<sup>38</sup> is a good

<sup>33</sup> A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the Univ. of Oxford* (Oxford, 1957-59), III, 1826.

<sup>34</sup> This chapter, which begins: A est scitum a te et idem A est tibi dubium ... is found in various MSS as the first or third chapter (as in the printed edition of Venice, 1494).

<sup>35</sup> The last four *sophismata*, MS Vat. lat. 3066, fol. 23vb-24vb.

<sup>36</sup> Inc.: Tu credis aliquam propositionem ... MS Vat. lat. 3065, fol. 21-25v.

<sup>37</sup> Sed ubi duo essent mediati, bene differet, ut A scis et scis A, ut patet in alio compendio De sensu composito et diviso. *Speculum iuvenum*, Florence, Naz. Cent., MS Magl. V. 43, fol. 11r. Billingham may here be referring to his own treatise *De sensu composito et diviso*, contained in Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 14715, fol. 79-82 (inc.: Pro sensu composito et diviso est sciendum et primo ...), but this clearly depends upon the treatise by Heytesbury.

<sup>38</sup> See C. Michalski, "La physique nouvelle ...", *ed. cit.*, pp. 111-112.

example of the extent of this part of logic by the middle of the fourteenth century. The treatise may be divided as follows on the basis of terms:<sup>39</sup>

1. Immediate terms, e.g., *ego*, *tu*, *iste*, *hoc iste*, *sum*, etc. Propositions involving these terms cannot be demonstrated, for their supposition is evident.
2. Mediate terms are subdivided:
  - a. *resolubiles*, i.e., any word in a sentence; propositions involving these terms can be demonstrated by reduction to an immediate term, its logical inferior.
  - b. *exponibiles*, i.e., terms that are convertible with their "exponents", e.g., "*dictio exclusiva*, *dictio exceptiva*, *signum universale affirmativum*, *differt*, *aliud*, *non idem*, *incipit*, *desinit*, *comparativus gradus et superlativus*, *primum*, *ultimum*, *maximum*, *minimum*, *immediate*, *primo*, *fine*, etc.". Propositions involving such terms are proved by a conversion to the exponent of those terms.
  - c. *officiales*, i.e., terms that imply some positive or privative function, e.g., "*scire*, *percipere*, *credere*, *dubitare*, *intelligere*, *imaginare*, *et similia*" or "*appeto*, *desidero*, *debeo*, *possum promittere tibi pomum*"; likewise such terms as "*possibile*", "*impossibile*", "*contingens*", "*necesse*", the verb "*est*" when it is used impersonally and "*non*". Propositions involving these terms can be demonstrated according to certain rules listed by Billingham.

Although Billingham's purpose in this treatise was to teach the correct method of argumentation by demonstrating various propositions, he believed that the main fallacies arise from ignorance of the proper supposition of terms and the rules governing their verification.<sup>40</sup>

Thus the part of logic which discussed supposition was extended to embrace the following new treatises: (i) *De relativis*, (ii) *De incipit et desinit*, (iii) *De maximo et minimo*, (iv) *De scire et dubitare*. To these may be added the treatise *De insolubilibus*, because the solution of *insolubilia* depends radically on one's doctrine of supposition. Treatises *De insolubilibus*, however, seem to have had another origin and so can be considered separately. It should be noted here that these five new

<sup>39</sup> Inc.: *Terminus est in quem resolvitur propositio ...* Passages quoted are taken from the text in Florence, Naz. Cent. MS Magl. V. 43, fol. 1-12. In Cambridge, Corpus Christi College MS 378, of the fifteenth century, Billingham's treatise is called the *Tractatus aureus*.

<sup>40</sup> Et credo quod maior pars deficiencium ex defectu alicuius istarum regulam deficit tam arguendo quam respondendo in diversis facultatibus. Ex quo sequitur ex predictis quod omnis huiusmodi defectus est penes aliquam fallaciam, sed fallacie communiter ad has reducuntur que per illas regulas cognoscuntur. *Ibid.*, fol. 11r.

treatises constitute the subject matter of the first five chapters of Heytesbury's *Regulae solvendi sophismata*.<sup>41</sup>

From what has been briefly indicated we can see the gradual extension of this part of logic devoted to supposition. For the historian of medieval logic this development of supposition is perhaps the most important element in the early fourteenth century.<sup>42</sup> Two crucial issues were involved. First, Ockham's rejection of the traditional notion of *suppositio simplex* based on his rejection of any true universality existing in objective reality.<sup>43</sup> Second, and perhaps more significant, was the attempt to find a supposition for various parts of speech, forgetting that supposition belongs properly only to subject-terms. These two issues were closely associated, particularly in Ockham's thorough nominalism which denied the objective reality of all things (*res*) apart from substance and quality. Nevertheless, the two issues were distinct in the fourteenth century, for even those who rejected Ockham's nominalism elaborated complex classification of suppositions and established rules governing supposition in argumentation. Treatises *De suppositionibus* were studied simply as an introduction to the more important treatises that discussed various types of argumentation.

## ii. *Textus de Consequentibus*

The most practical treatise for the undergraduate was that dealing with inferences, or *De consequentiis*. P. Boehner has claimed that "This is, perhaps, the most important new element of scholastic logic, for it deals with inferences from one simple or compound proposition to another simple or compound proposition."<sup>44</sup> Whatever may be the

<sup>41</sup> Heytesbury's *De incipit et desinit* and *De maximo et minimo* have been discussed in detail by C. Wilson in his *William Heytesbury: Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical Physics* (Madison, 1956), 29-114.

<sup>42</sup> See W. & M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford, 1962), 246-274.

<sup>43</sup> W. & M. Kneale (*ibid.*, 268-270) do not seem to appreciate sufficiently the significance of Ockham's nominalism. The significance is more easily seen in Ockham's discussion of motion and time. Since for Ockham motion is not a reality over and above the individual physical substance, the *suppositio personalis* of the term 'motion' in a given statement would be an individual body itself in one place after another without interruption; the *suppositio simplex*, however, is the complex mental image of 'motion' that can be supposed in any universal discussion of motion. *Suppositio materialis* can apply not only to the written or spoken word 'motion', but also to the complex mental image (*intentio animae*) when this is intended in a discussion of 'motion'.

<sup>44</sup> P. Boehner, *Medieval Logic, an outline of its development from 1250-c.1400* (Manchester, 1952), 15-16.

truth of this claim, it should be noted that the whole of Aristotelian logic was directed to knowing the nature and necessary rules of correct inferences. The purpose of these elementary treatises was to give the undergraduate a list of practical rules of inference to help him in scholastic disputations.<sup>45</sup> These treatises presented general rules of inference from propositions containing exclusive (only, alone), excepting, disjunctive and conditional clauses as well as propositions containing terms that were later called *exponibiles*, such as *incipit* and *desinit*.

There are numerous treatises *De consequentiis* dating from the first half of the fourteenth century and there are many commentaries on standard texts. An early treatise by Walter Burley, beginning: *Quia in sophismatibus probandis et improbandis consequentiis utimur, et ideo circa naturam consequenciarum multa oportet scire...*,<sup>46</sup> considers rules of inference involving exclusive, or excepting, terms in conditional and categorical propositions. This text seems to have been the source of a more widely used *Textus de consequentiis* by William Sutton, beginning: *Quia in sophismatibus probandis et improbandis utimur consequentiis, que circa ut iuniores materia dyalectica collatione animus anime... Est autem consequentia antecedens et consequens cum consequentie nota...*<sup>47</sup> Sutton added a section on *incipit* and *desinit*, which he did not discuss in his *De suppositionibus*; thus it would seem that the *De consequentiis* is a later work. An anonymous commentary on Sutton's text informs us that Swyneshed, most probably Roger Swyneshed, also wrote a treatise on consequences in which he defines inference as follows: *Consequentia est totum aggregatum ex antecedente et consequente cum nota consequentie*.<sup>48</sup> Swyneshed's treatise has not been discovered. At least no known treatise *De consequentiis* is ascribed to Roger or Richard Swyneshed.<sup>49</sup> But the treatises of both Swyneshed

<sup>45</sup> Sed causa finalis tangitur in littera ubi dicitur 'ut iuniorum probitas in collatione dyalectica', i.e., ut iuvenes promcius possint disputare in diversis facultatibus hoc opus fuit compilatum. Anon., *Exposicio super textum de consequenciis* [Sutonis Anglici]. Vienna, Dominikanerkloster MS 160/130, fol. 100vb.

<sup>46</sup> We have used the text in Florence, Laurenz. Plut. XII, sin. cod. 2, fol. 203v-212, and Cambridge, Caius College MS 434/434, fol. 1-6; fol. 6va-10 of the Cambridge MS contain part of Burley's *Tractatus obligationum*, which is a distinct work.

<sup>47</sup> Vienna, Dominikanerkloster MS 160/130, fol. 123rb-124rb.

<sup>48</sup> Nota Sweinheit Anglicus in suo tractatu de consequenciis consequenciam sic diffinivit: *consequencia est totum aggregatum ex antecedente et consequente cum nota consequencie*. Vienna, Dominikanerkloster MS 160/130, fol. 101ra.

<sup>49</sup> There are numerous works beginning with this definition, but apparently none are

and Sutton were known to the Parisian master, Jean Buridan, when he wrote his treatise of the same title.<sup>50</sup> One other standard text on consequences was known to the anonymous commentator on William Sutton: "Nota alius videtur consequenciam sic diffinire et melius: consequencia est habitudo antecedentis ad consequenciam per notam consequentie denotata."<sup>51</sup> This treatise has not been identified, but it may very well be the basis for the numerous treatises that define inference as *habitudo*.

The rules of inference depend intimately on the doctrine of supposition; thus as supposition was extended to include more and more terms, the treatises *De consequentiis* proportionally included a greater number of rules.<sup>52</sup> Basically, however, these treatises were intended to be practical guides for sophisters obliged to take part in various types of disputation.

### iii. *Textus de Obligatoriis*

This treatise of logic was designed to give the beginner basic rules of inference in purely logical exercises. These sophistic exercises of *positio* and *impositio* should not be confused with the disputations *de sophismatibus* or *de quaestione*. The *ars obligatoria*, or *exercitativa*, was not concerned with the truth or falsity of any doctrine or question. It was concerned only with the formal consistency, or non-contradictory character, of inferences. The original *positio* might be false in itself, although not necessarily impossible. The role of the opponent was to force the respondent to admit an impossible, or self-contradictory, conclusion apparently following from the original premise. The role of the respondent was to uphold the original premise so that nothing impossible could be drawn from it.<sup>53</sup> These were strictly ingenious

identified as his. See also G. E. Mohan, "Incipits of Logical Writings of the XIIIth-XVth Centuries," *Franciscan Studies*, 12 (1952) 380-381.

<sup>50</sup> *Consequencie mag. Jo. Buridani*, Florence, Naz. Cent. MS Magl. V. 43, fol. 33r.

<sup>51</sup> Vienna, Dominikanerkloster MS 160/130, fol. 101ra.

<sup>52</sup> In the same Vienna MS there is a *Loyca Segeri* or Rogerii [*sic* in colophon] beginning: Loycam Boecius in libro de disciplina scholarium magnis extollens laudibus.... in which 520 rules are given for the whole of logic (fol. 25ra-56va).

<sup>53</sup> *Opus opponentis est sic inducere oracionem ut faciat respondentem concedere impossibilia que propter positum non sunt necessaria concedere. Opus autem respondentis est sic sustinere positum ut propter ipsum non videatur aliquid impossibile sequi, set magis propter positum. Igitur intencio opponentis et respondentis circa enunciabile versatur ad quod respondens est obligatus.* Burley, *Obligaciones*, London, Royal MS 12. F. XIX. fol. 138rb.

exercises among school boys and had little objective value, although P. Boehner saw in them the nucleus of rules for an axiomatic method somewhat similar, though in a rather crude form, to that of modern axiomatics.<sup>54</sup>

As early as the thirteenth century there were treatises instructing beginners on the procedure of scholastic disputations. M. Grabmann has pointed out a rather famous thirteenth century treatise, *De arte opponendi et respondendi*, preserved in Bibl. Nat. lat. 16617, fol. 131-161v, between the works of Shyreswood and Lambert of Auxerre.<sup>55</sup> This anonymous treatise is divided into four parts dealing with (i) the art of opposing, (ii) the manner of responding, (iii) sophismata together with their solutions and explanation of the distinctions employed, (iv) the art of opposing and solving *obligationes*.<sup>56</sup>

A number of treatises *De obligationibus* are attributed to Walter Burley alone. The earliest is perhaps that contained in British Museum MS Royal 12. F. XIX, fol. 138-148, beginning: In disputacione dyalectica due sunt partes, scilicet opponens et respondens.... From the colophon we learn that Burley wrote this treatise in 1302: Explicit optimus tractatus de obligacionibus datus a mag. Waltero de Burley anno domini Millesimo trecentesimo secundo.<sup>57</sup>

There are extant numerous treatises *De obligationibus* emanating from the early fourteenth century, and a great many are by Oxford logicians. The most important, judging from its extensive use, was that of Roger Swyneshed beginning: Cum in singulis scienciis secundum materiam subiectam sit certitudo querenda .... It is a comparatively short treatise

<sup>54</sup> P. Boehner, *Medieval Logic*, ed. cit., 14-15.

<sup>55</sup> Inc.: Ut scribitur in libro primo elenchorum, duo sunt opera sapientis, scilicet non mentiri de quibus novit et mentientem posse manifestare .... This work was printed four times in the fifteenth century under the name of Albertus Magnus. See M. Grabmann, "Handschriftliche Forschungen ...," *Sitzungsber. d. Bay. Akad.*, 1936, Heft 9, p. 40.

<sup>56</sup> In prima trademus artem opponendi in generali. In secunda modum respondendi. In tertia de sophismatibus et eorum solutionibus et intellectu distinctionum in his accidentibus disputabimus aliqua. In quarta autem opponendi obligationes solvendi. MS cit., fol. 131v, quoted by Grabmann, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>57</sup> This text is also found in Venice, Marc. Z. lat. 301 (1576), fol. 47-57v and in Bruges, Bibl. de la Ville 500, fol. 72-81. A shorter version is found in the above mentioned Venice MS, fol. 37rb-41rb; it is anonymous and called *brevia insolubilia et utilia secundum usum Esonie*. At least two other treatises *De obligationibus* are also attributed to Burley: a very short one beginning: Cum ars obligatoria sit... (Erfurt, MS Amplon. O. 76, fol. 34v-36) and another beginning: Obligatio secundum quod nos utimur hoc nomine in sophismatibus est prefixio enunciabilis... (Erfurt, MS Amplon. Q. 259 (a.d. 1340), fol. 209-214; Paris, B.N. lat. 16130, fol. 110v-114; and Venice, Marc. Z. lat. 302 (1873), fol. 151 ff.).

containing two parts, the first *De obligationibus*, the second *De insolubilibus*<sup>58</sup> The first part contains five *particule*: (i) prooemium, (ii) a series of definitions, divisions, suppositions and conclusions concerning the solution of *obligationes*, (iii) *de impositione*, (iv) *de propositione*, (v) *de positione*. All of these chapters contain rules for conceding or rejecting inferences in logical exercises, rules which clearly depend on a particular doctrine of supposition.

Although Swyneshed's treatise was a required text at certain continental universities in the late fourteenth century and the fifteenth, it is much too long and complicated to have been used eagerly by beginners. There must have been a shorter text in use for beginners that would be of more practical value. Perhaps this is the short treatise known on the continent as *Obligaciones secundum usum Oxonie*, beginning: *Obligacio est quedam ars qua opponens potest ligare respondentem ut ad placetum suum respondeat ad proposicionem sibi positam affirmative vel negative ....*<sup>59</sup> The wide use of this treatise is attested to by the numerous copies still extant, sometimes together with commentaries, and its frequent attribution to various authors.

The *Obligaciones* of a later Oxford master, Ralph Strode (fl. 1359-1387), was used as a prescribed text at the University of Padua during the second half of the fifteenth century, and it received a number of printings in Venice.<sup>60</sup>

#### iv. *Tractatus de Insolubilibus*

*Insolubilia* are propositions in a certain qualified case from which one can infer that the proposition really contradicts itself. For example, if Socrates utters this statement and no other, "Socrates is telling a lie", then if the statement is taken to be true, it follows that it is false; and if the statement is taken at face value, namely that he is in fact telling a lie, it follows that the statement is not true. Variants of the Liar paradox were discussed in the twelfth century.<sup>61</sup> In the

<sup>58</sup> List of MSS given in J. A. Weisheipl, "Roger Swyneshed, O.S.B., Logician, Natural Philosopher, and Theologian," *Oxford Studies Presented to Daniel Callus* (Oxford: O.H.S. 16, 1964), 243.

<sup>59</sup> The work has this title in three MSS examined: MS Vat. lat. 3065 (15th cent.) fol. 95v-98v; Padua, Univ. 1123 (membr. 14th cent.), fol. 3vb-5va; and Padua, Bibl. Anton. XIX, 407 (a.d. 1469), fol. 34v-36. The slight verbal differences in these MSS are insignificant, although cataloguers of *initia* would separate them.

<sup>60</sup> A. B. Emden, *op. cit.*, 3, 1807-8.

<sup>61</sup> See W. & M. Kneale, *op. cit.*, 227-229.

early fourteenth century such paradoxes were used in the schools as purely logical exercises; from their use arose various treatises on insoluble propositions.<sup>62</sup> In later compendia of logic such propositions are invariably discussed after the nature and rules of inference. The intimate relation between *insolubilia* and *obligationes* is evidenced in the work of Roger Swyneshed, previously mentioned, in which these two treatises constitute one work. The solution of such paradoxes was considered to be ultimately a question of supposition. The statement "Sortes dicit falsum" was thought to be an insoluble proposition because the predicate "falsum" seems to refer to the proposition itself, otherwise it would seem to have no supposition.

There were almost as many solutions to *insolubilia* as there were Oxford logicians. Ockham held that a part of a proposition, e.g., "Falsum", could not refer to the whole of which it is a part. Denying this, Swyneshed held that the proposition is not true, because it "falsifies" itself. John Dumbleton held that, although such sentences signify something, they cannot be called propositions, and so were neither true nor false. Richard Kilmington held that every proposition must be either true or false; consequently *insolubilia* are propositions that are true in a certain sense and false in another. Heytesbury held that some statements cannot be taken to mean what they say.

Oxford texts *De insolubilibus* were very numerous and it is impossible to determine which one, if any, was in common use. The University of Vienna, on the other hand, specifically stated that the *Obligationum et insolubilium tractatus* of John of Holland was to be used.<sup>63</sup> John of Holland, it would seem, studied for a time at Oxford before incepting at Prague.<sup>64</sup>

Because of the lively discussion among Oxford masters and their different views, it would seem that no one textbook *De insolubilibus* would have been in "common use" in the logic schools of Oxford in the early fourteenth century. Although treatises *De insolubilibus* were intended to help young sophisters in purely logical exercises, the subject was of great concern to masters both in arts and in theology; it was discussed even in commentaries on the *Sentences*.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>62</sup> G. Wallerand, it would seem, has not made a sufficient distinction between purely scholastic exercises (*de obligationibus et insolubilibus*) and *sophismata* and *quaestiones*. See his *Les Œuvres de Siger de Courtrai* (Les Philosophes Belges, 8, Louvain, 1913), 24-33. It is true that all *obligationes* and *insolubilia* were *sophismata*, but the converse is not true.

<sup>63</sup> J. Aschbach, *Geschichte der Wiener Universität* (Vienna, 1865), 90.

<sup>64</sup> A. B. Emden, *op. cit.*, 2, 951.

<sup>65</sup> See, for example, the commentary of Roger Roseth, O.F.M., on the *Sentences*, given

From what has been indicated briefly concerning the new books of logic it is clear that logic was one of the most important developments in the faculty of arts at Oxford. The "English subtleties which [the Parisians] denounce in public" and which were "the subject of their furtive vigils" centered around the doctrine of supposition. Ockham and his followers denied that terms could represent universal natures in some way existing in reality. The only universality admitted was an *intentio animae* that designated individual substances and qualities. Therefore the simple supposition of terms was the mental complex. Further, since every term was supposed to have some kind of supposition, the treatise on supposition was extended by both Ockhamists and non-Ockhamists to embrace every part of speech. The treatise included many terms that involve a doctrine of physics, such as *incipit*, *desinit*, *maximum*, *minimum* and relative terms. When scholastics of the fourteenth century extended the notion of supposition to every term in a statement, they necessarily embraced a whole range of problems that properly belong to physics.

### B. *The Libri Naturales*

The study of natural science was not augmented in the same way as logic. It was not so much an introduction of new treatises into the curriculum as a new approach to Aristotelian physics. Nevertheless certain new texts of physics did originate at Oxford in the early fourteenth century and became set books at Oxford and elsewhere.

In medieval thought the whole of natural philosophy was considered a single science having a specific unity. Within this unity Aristotle's *De physica auditu* was considered a general introduction presenting a general physical theory of the whole of natural science. In the *Physica* Aristotle discussed the general principles and causes of change, the nature of motion and time, the different kinds of real motion and their causes. Every physical theory must give some explanation of these phenomena in nature. In the Middle Ages, notably in the fourteenth century, the sharpest controversies ranged around theoretical problems discussed in the *Physica*, e.g., the reality of motion, quantity of motion, quantity of matter, intension and remission of forms, the continuum and the infinite.

at Norwich before 1337, q.1. a.2. and the lengthy discussion by the anonymous commentator on the *Sentences* preserved in MS. Vat. lat. 896, fol. 113 ff. (= lib. III, q.1, a.1-3), in which the opinion of Ockham, Roseth and Kilmington are rejected.

While the eight books of the *Physica* dealt with general problems of nature and motion, the other books of natural philosophy considered more particular aspects. *De caelo et mundo* considered problems of locomotion in the universe, both rectilinear and circular; the *Meteora* examined more particular cases of locomotion, such as meteorites, comets, winds, rivers and rain. *De generatione et corruptione* considered problems of alteration, particularly those leading to substantial change; this aspect of natural philosophy, that subsumed alchemy, eventually developed into chemistry. *De anima* and subsequent books (*Parva naturalia* and *De animalibus*) considered problems of living things; this part of natural science was later developed into various branches of psychology and biology.

Thirteenth century commentaries on the *libri naturales* were limited to a close exposition or paraphrase of the Aristotelian text. The problems discussed by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Siger of Brabant, Adam of Bockfield, John of Jandun and Walter Burley are conspicuous for their fidelity to the Aristotelian text in the sense that the type of question raised was governed by the text and the commentary of Averroes. This does not mean that such commentaries did not disagree strongly with Aristotle or other scholastics or that the personal views and observations of the author were not expressed vigorously; it merely means that the problem under discussion was inherent in the text.

Treatises and *quaestiones* originating from Oxford during the second quarter of the fourteenth century reveal a striking characteristic, vastly different from earlier commentaries. A new type of question was raised in the Oxford schools of physics, and the manner of discussing it would have appeared strange to philosophers of the thirteenth century. This new type of question is partly revealed in the *Summa philosophiae naturalis* of John of Dumbleton, written between 1335 and 1349. The work will be discussed in greater detail in a later study. For our present purpose it is sufficient to note that the general outline of the *Summa* corresponds to all the *libri naturales*, except for the first part, which is a summary of new questions in logic. An analytical division of the chapters in Part II and III of the *Summa*, corresponding to Aristotle's *Physica*, will help to indicate the new type of question raised at Oxford in the second quarter of the fourteenth century. The *Summa* of John Dumbleton has never been printed. An analytical division of Part II and III, however, can easily be compared to the printed treatises of William Heytesbury and Richard Swyneshed.

*Pars Secunda*<sup>66</sup>

## I. De primis principiis.

A. De significatione horum nominum, scilicet principium, causa et elementum. (cap. 1-2)

B. De principiis intrinsicis rerum naturalium.

1. Opiniones antiquorum: Parmenides, Melissus, etc. (cap. 3)

2. Opinio Platonis. (cap. 4-5)

3. Opinio Aristotelis. (cap. 6)

[Dub. I]: Numquid tantum tria sint prima principia rerum naturalium. (cap. 7)

[Dub. II]: Utrum principia sint contraria. (cap. 8)

[Dub. III]: De numero principiorum restat dubia solvenda: 1° si tria principia sufficiant ad generationem rei naturalis; 2° si plura tribus essent superflua. (cap. 9)

[Dub. IV]: Iam restat inquirere numquid materia prima habeat ex se longitudinem et latitudinem. (cap. 10)

[Dub. V]: Cum materia prima sit in potentia ad omnes formas elementares queritur numquid potentia in ipsa sit qualitas aliqua vel sit ipsa materia. (cap. 11)

[Dub. VI]: Cum materia prima dicatur ens in potentia inquirendum est qualiter est in potentia et numquid magis habeat esse et perfectior sit in sua natura quam forma vel compositum. (cap. 12)

[Dub. VII]: Sequitur inquirere numquid materia prima vel forma vel compositum ex hiis sit subiectum immediatum et primum qualitatum primarum. (cap. 13)

II. Postquam sit determinatum de materia et forma sequitur investigare qualiter aliquid magis et minus suscipiat.

A. De formis substantialibus in abstracto:

[Dub. I]: Utrum substantia naturalis, puta forma substantialis, magis et minus suscipiat in abstracto. (cap. 14)

[Dub. II]: Numquid una species alia imperfectior sive perfectior in infinitum excedat vel excedatur, ut corpus excedat lineam, et linea exceditur a corpore in infinitum. (cap. 15)

[Dub. III]: Numquid corpus habeat infinitam longitudinem et latitudinem. (cap. 16)

[Dub. IV]: Dubitatur qualiter aliquid alio est magis substantia, dum nihil sit magis homo alio homine. (cap. 17)

[Dub. V]: Numquid illa quae sunt naturaliter priora sunt perfectiora posterioribus. (cap. 18)

<sup>66</sup> The chapter divisions given here follow those found in MS, Vat. lat. 6750, which in general has proved more satisfactory and logical than the divisions found in other MSS of Dumbleton's *Summa*.

## B. De intensione qualitatem simplicium:

[Dub. I]: Sequitur inquirere qualiter qualitates intenduntur et remittuntur. Circa quam materiam multae sunt opiniones. Quatuor tamen sunt circa quas disputatio moderna maxime versatur:

1. Contra primam opinionem. (cap. 19)
2. Contra secundam opinionem. (cap. 20)
3. Contra tertiam opinionem. (cap. 21)
4. Contra aliam opinionem. (cap. 22)
5. Quarta opinio quae tenenda est, ponit quod nulla qualitas intenditur vel remittitur, sed subiectum qualitatis intenditur et remittitur per acquisitionem et remissionem realem qualitatem, sicut quantum maioratur vel minoratur per appositionem partium et amotionem earundem. (cap. 23)

[Dub. II]: Istis positis restat inquirere qualiter qualitates diffformes remissae sunt et intensae, et quomodo latitudo in sua natura per se et proprie est intensa, et numquid alicui gradui intrinseco sui ipsius correspondet.

Circa istud tres sunt opiniones.

1. Contra primam opinionem. (cap. 24)
2. Contra secundam opinionem. (cap. 25)
3. Post haec tertiam opinionem, quae vera est, exprimamus. (cap. 26)

[Dub. III]: Ultimo determinetur utrum omnis qualitas intensibilis divisibilis sit in infinitum sicut omnis quantitas in infinitum est divisibilis quantitative vel quod cuiuscumque latitudinis in infinitum remissae sit aliquis gradus. (cap. 27-28)

## C. De qualitatibus secundis:

[Dub. I]: Sequitur inquirere qualiter qualitates secundae intensionem et remissionem suscipiunt. (cap. 29)

[Dub. II]: Sequitur qualiter mixta qualitatibus sunt talia et qualia.

1. Et primo improbandae sunt quaedam opiniones, scilicet tres. (cap. 30)
2. Quarta opinio quae tenenda est, est haec: quod omne mixtum est ita intensum precise sicut excessus per se acceptus per quod intensior qualitas excedit suum contrarium, non tamen proportionaliter, sed quod una excedit aliam intensive, ut si sit A mixtum habens tres quartas caliditatis et unam quartam frigiditatis. (cap. 31)

## D. De intensione formae substantialis:

[Dub.]: Sequitur inquirere numquid forma substantialis aliqua intenditur et remittitur. (cap. 32-33)

*Pars Tertia*

## I. De motu.

## A. In quibus predicamentis sit verus motus:

1. Quod sola substantia vere movetur per susceptionem aliarum rerum in aliis predicamentis. (cap. 1)

2. Sequitur causam assignare quare tantum in tribus predicamentis, scilicet qualitate, quantitate et ubi, sit verus motus, in substantia vero et in aliis motus improprie dictus. (cap. 2)

[Dub.]: Propterea dubitatur qualiter probatur quod in substantia non est motus per hoc medium quod substantiae nihil est contrarium (cap. 3)

3. Post hoc instat assignare causam quare non in habitibus nec in figuris nec in finibus, ut asserunt Aristoteles et Commentator, est verus motus. (cap. 4)

B. Qualiter velocitas in motibus veris et successivis producit et causatur:

1. Et primo de motu locali:

[Dub. I]: Penes quid sequitur velocitas motus. Tres possunt esse opiniones.

a. Contra primam opinionem. (cap. 5)

b. Contra secundam opinionem. (cap. 6)

c. Opinio propria:

i. Sequitur dicere qualiter motus sequitur proportionem et primo modo exemplariter exprimemus ut qui in geometria non sunt experti exemplis grossis et sensibilibus veritatem ingrediantur et eius causam videant. (cap. 7)

ii. Sequitur solvere argumentum quod est alterius positionis, scilicet secundae, fundamentum. (cap. 8)

[Dub. II]: Numquid latitudo motus suo medio gradui correspondeat.

1. Probationes. (cap. 9-11)

2. Quaedam conclusiones ex hoc. (cap. 12)

[Dub. III]: Cum motus fit secundum proportionem maioris inequalitatis, numquid finitum posset agere in infinitum dubitatur (cap. 13)

[Dub. IV]: Ulterius est dubitandum quantum est in divisione corporis quod cum agens applicatur parti super quam ducatur, quare eam non dividit et cessat a motu, ut gravum iacens super terram super aliam partem illius dominatur et tamen eam non dividit. (*ibid.*)

2. De motu alterationis:

[Dub. I]: Penes quid attenditur velocitas alterationis. Tres sunt opiniones veritatem in tota vel in parte negantes.

1. Contra istas opiniones. (cap. 14-15)

2. Quarto opinio quae tenenda est talis est, quod omnis motus et eiusdem velocitas alicuius predicamenti respectu distantiae unitae istius predicamenti attenditur non ita quod motus localis attenditur penes quantitatem et quod motus alterationis vel velociter alterari penes qualitatem et quantitatem, cum nulla predicamenta naturaliter faciunt ad aliquam distantiam [continuam] alicuius unius predicamenti. (cap. 16)

[Dub. II]: Sequitur dicere qualiter mixta alterantur et quomodo attenditur in eis velocitas alterationis, cum non proprie et primo alterantur primis qualitatibus, sed ex consequenti mediantibus elementis existentibus in illis. (cap. 17)

3. De motu augmentationis:

[Dub.]: Penes quid attenditur velocitas augmentationis. (cap. 18)

4. De motu condensationis et rarefactionis.

[Dub. I]: Numquid tam latitudo densitatis quam raritatis latitudo sit infinita. (cap. 19)

[Dub. II]: Utrum rarefactio est augmentatio et condensatio est diminutio; [et utrum] corporibus proportionaliter et equevelociter acquiruntur. (cap. 20)

C. Quid sit motus. (cap. 21-25)

D. Qualiter motus et quies se habent respectu mobilis. (cap. 26)

II. De tempore.

A. Dicto de motu, naturam temporis inquiramus. Quatuor sunt opiniones

1. Contra primam opinionem. (cap. 27)

2. Contra secundam opinionem. (cap. 28)

3. Contra tertiam opinionem. (cap. 29)

4. Quarta positio tenenda est, scilicet quod motus et tempus idem sunt secundum rem, diversa tamen secundum rationem. (cap. 30)

B. Quaedam dubia:

1. Quid significat 'numerus' qui positus est in definitione. (cap. 31)

2. Numquid tempus sit sine anima. (cap. 32)

3. Numquid motus et tempus sunt alia et alia, quia illa non sunt res permanentes. (cap. 33-35)

4. Ulterius dubitatur qualiter tempus est per se causa corruptionis et causa per accidens generationis. (cap. 36)

III. Restat dubia communia quaedam de motu et tempore solvere.

[Dub. I]: Primo arguitur quod si tempus est motus et mobile, igitur annus est equalis diei, et menses horae, et tempus instanti, quod videtur falsum. (cap. 37)

[Dub. II]: Qualiter non sunt duo instantia immediata in tempore ut arguit Philosophus in 4° probando quod nullum continuum ex indivisibilibus componitur et per consequens nec tempus ex instantibus componitur. (cap. 38)

[Dub. III]: Qualiter ex motu alterationis tempus et duratio habent esse. (cap. 39)

Our purpose here is not to present the doctrine of John Dumbleton or to give a complete division of his work. It is simply to show the new concerns in natural philosophy as seen in the only Oxford work of the period claiming to be a *Summa philosophiae naturalis*. While some of the questions raised are traditional, others reflect the new

interest of Oxford masters who taught physics. It is clear that the principal concern of the second part of the *Summa* is the intension and remission of forms, while that of the third is determination of velocities in various kinds of moving body. The problem of intension and remission of forms had been discussed by theologians in the thirteenth century, but in the fourteenth century it predominated in all discussions of physics. The absorbing interest in velocities, on the other hand, is one of the novel characteristics of physics at Oxford in the early fourteenth century, as can be seen in the writings of William Heytesbury, Roger Swyneshed, Richard Swyneshed, John of Holland and the large anonymous treatise *De motu* preserved in the Bodleian Library MS, Digly 190. Variations in various kinds of velocity were discussed in the tedious form of argumentation known as the *calculaciones*, or "letter-calculus". This development characteristic of Oxford physics was not due to William of Ockham, but to the genius and influence of Thomas Bradwardine.

The *Tractatus de proportionibus velocitatum in motibus*, "editus a mag. Thoma de Bradwardin a. D. 1328",<sup>67</sup> was an attempt to express variations of velocity in a mathematical law that would be universally valid for all cases. The contents of this work will be discussed in a later study. Here we are interested in it only as it affected the curriculum of arts. Judging from the number of extant commentaries and *quaestiones* on the text, Bradwardine's treatise must have been widely used in the schools both in England and on the continent. However, undergraduates were introduced to Bradwardine's doctrine of geometrical proportionality more often through shorter and simpler treatises *De proportionibus*. Besides Albert of Saxony's well-known treatise produced at Paris, two in particular were commonly used in English and continental schools. The earlier and shorter "proportionibus breves"<sup>68</sup> "extractus ex proportionibus longis mag. Thome Bradwardin"<sup>69</sup> consisted of three chapters dealing with proportions and proportionality in general, the erroneous opinions concerning kinematics and the solution of Bradwardine.<sup>70</sup> The second covered the same matter together with conclusions pertaining to rotational motion

<sup>67</sup> Paris, B.N. *lat. nouv. acq.* 625, fol. 70v; this date is also to be found in B.N. *lat.* 14576, fol. 261v, and B.N. *lat.* 16621, fol. 212v.

<sup>68</sup> Vienna, Nat. Bibl., MS *lat.* 4784, fol. 231.

<sup>69</sup> Vienna, Nat. Bibl., MS *lat.* 4953, fol. 19.

<sup>70</sup> Edited in M. Clagett, *The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages* (Madison, 1959), 481-494.

in five chapters, but in greater detail.<sup>71</sup> Bradwardine's novel solution to the problem of proportional variations of velocity and his mathematical propensity directly influenced Heytesbury, Dumbleton, Swyneshed and a host of other Oxford masters.

In his little-known treatise *De continuo* Bradwardine clearly professed his belief in the power of mathematics to reveal the secrets of nature. After rejecting the opinion of "Plato ac Waltherus modernus", who believe the continuum to be composed of a finite number of indivisible points, he commended mathematics as the first science to reveal the error.

Ipsa enim suis ceteris sororibus acutius contemplatur, inflexibilis telum iacit, et se protegit clypeo tutori. Nullus enim physico certamine se speret gavisurum triumpho nisi mathematice utatur consilio, et auxilio confortetur. Ipsa enim revelatrix omnis veritatis sincere, et novit omne secretum absconditum, se omnium litterarum subtilium clavem gerit. Quicumque igitur ipsa neglecta physicari presumpserit, sapientiae ianuam se numquam ingressurum agnoscat. Arismetica igitur, prima totius mathematicae mater et ianua, sic ordinatur certamine.<sup>72</sup>

The theoretical success of Bradwardine's kinematic law revived interest in the mathematical aspects of various changes, both physical and non-physical. Later Mertonians, although less successful in determining mathematical laws for non-physical change, were able to prepare the way for a mathematical and less Aristotelian approach to the philosophy of nature. Bradwardine's treatise and ideal influenced not only the numerous *calculaciones de motu* that originated in the fourteenth century, but also the improbable *calculaciones* employed by commentators on the *Sentences*. Their use gave an impression of scientific precision and respectability, even if they could not be reduced to Bradwardine's law of geometrical proportionality. The most successful use of the *calculaciones* in problems of natural philosophy was made by Richard Swyneshed in his *Liber calculationum*, written around 1350. Although highly influential, this work apparently never became a textbook in the arts faculty.

For the beginner in natural philosophy an introductory treatise of definitions and divisions came into use at Oxford, beginning "Natura

<sup>71</sup> Inc.: Omnis proportio aut est communiter dicta, proprie dicta, vel magis proprie dicta ....

<sup>72</sup> *Tractatus de continuo*, Erfurt, MS Amplon. Q. 385, fol. 31v, also MS Torun, 4<sup>o</sup>. 2, page 171. I am indebted to Dr. John E. Murdoch of Harvard for allowing me to utilize his transcription of these two MSS.

est principium motus et quietis....” According to a Munich manuscript of the fourteenth century, Clm 8997, this list of definitions was “compilata a mag. Wilhelmo Hesbri” (fol. 167r); other manuscripts describe it as “secundum usum Oxonii”. The number of extant commentaries on this elementary treatise, including that of John Garisdale,<sup>73</sup> give some indication of its popularity. However, it is difficult to determine whether this naive summary was used as a text in the schools or whether it was simply a beginner’s guide to the set books. Variations of this treatise were drawn up later on the continent and apparently used by students who wanted simple definitions of terms with few distinctions. Although not treatises of mathematics, these works do summarize Oxford views of physics and show the influence of mathematics on concepts of natural philosophy.

While logic and physics remained distinct disciplines in the faculty of arts, each with its own subject matter and formality, they easily fused in the *sophismata*. *Calculaciones de motu* were apt matter for logical subtleties. For this reason the *Sophismata* of Heytesbury and Kilmington abound in problems of natural philosophy. This fusion, however, in *quaestiones de sophismatibus* should not lead us to minimize the formal distinction between logic and physics at Oxford in the early fourteenth century.

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<sup>73</sup> Oxford, New College MS 289, fol. 38-50v.

## Thomas Wimbleton's Sermon: "Redde rationem villicacionis tue"

NANCY H. OWEN

THE earliest complete text of Thomas Wimbleton's<sup>1</sup> English sermon, "Redde rationem villicacionis tue," preached in 1388 at Paul's Cross, has never been printed.<sup>2</sup> The text, MS Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, 357,<sup>3</sup> deserves attention for several reasons. Any Middle English prose text is valuable to scholars as a link in the history of English prose, and is also of possible value in the historical study of the English language. Furthermore, the text which has been printed—MS Hatton 57—is not a good one. It bears the marks of a careless or hurried copy. It omits, for example, many key words and phrases without which the meaning is blurred.

The sermon is interesting too as an example of one type of Middle English prose sermon, the scholastic, that kind of sermon marked by the elaborate divisions and subdivisions of scholastic rhetoric. Wimbleton's sermon has, for example, the following main divisions:<sup>4</sup> Theme (text); Protheme, Re-statement of Theme; Process (plan);

<sup>1</sup> See Nancy H. Owen, "Thomas Wimbleton," *Mediaeval Studies*, 24 (1962), 377-81.

<sup>2</sup> Only MS Bodleian Library, Oxford, Hatton 57, has been printed in modern times. See K. F. Sundén, *A Famous Middle English Sermon* (Göteborg, 1925).

<sup>3</sup> See M. R. James. *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Corpus Christi College Cambridge* (Cambridge, 1912), 2, 190-1. The sermon is extant in fifteen other MSS: Trinity Coll. Cbg. B. 14.38 (TC), early 15th cent.; Sidney Sussex Coll. Cbg. 74 (SS), late 15th cent.; Pepys 2125 (P), late 14th or early 15th cent.; Hatton 57 (HT), ca. 1400; Univ. Coll. Oxf. 97 (U), 15th cent.; Add. 37677 (AD), early 15th cent.; Harleian 2398 (HR), 15th cent.; Royal 18A XVII (RA), 15th cent.; Royal 18 B XXIII (RB), mid-15th cent.; Helmingham Hall L.J.II.2 (H2), late 14th cent.; Bodleian Eng. Theology f. 39, formerly Helm. Hall L.J.II.9 (H9), ca. 1400; Hunt. Libr. 502 (HN), early 15th cent.; Trinity Coll. Dublin C.5.7 (TD), early 15th cent.; Univ. Libr. Cbg. II. III.8, Latin (LI), late 14th cent.; Gonville and Caius Coll. Cbg. 334 (727), Latin (L), mid-15th cent.

<sup>4</sup> For discussions of the type of sermon, see "A Late Mediaeval Tractate on Preaching," *Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James A. Winans*, ed. and trans. Harry Caplan (New York, 1926); Harry Caplan, "Classical Rhetoric and Mediaeval Theory of Preaching," *Classical Philology*, 28 (April 1933), 87; and "Henry of Hesse' on the Art of Preaching," *PMLA*, 48 (June 1933), 340-61; Edwin C. Dargan, *A History of Preaching*, 2 vols. (New York, 1913). Wimbleton's sermon divisions have been marked in the text which follows.

Principals (divisions); Subdivisions of the Principals; Conclusion; Benediction. Finally, the sermon is interesting because it attracted a good deal of attention in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Mistaking it for an early Reformatory tract, printers published it in over eighteen separate editions between 1550 and 1635 and included it in John Foxe's *Actes and Monuments*.<sup>5</sup> The sermon was not, of course, a Reformatory tract but merely a standard catalogue of abuses common in fourteenth-century England.

#### THE MANUSCRIPT

MS Corpus Christi College Cambridge 357. Paper and vellum; 2+268+1+13; 10 7/10×7 3/5 in.; 2 vols.; fifteenth- or early sixteenth-century, and fourteenth-century hands.

- I. f. 1a Skelton's translation of *Diodorus Siculus*.<sup>6</sup>  
f. 258a-268b blank; vellum flyleaf and one blank paper leaf follow.
- II. f. 270a Wimbledon's sermon: vellum; rough clear hand of the fourteenth century.

#### THE TEXT

The text contains occasional emendations indicated by square brackets. These emendations are of two kinds: corrections of the most obvious scribal errors; corrections made when the basic text is so inferior that it must be emended to make the meaning clear. Emendations supplied from other MSS will be indicated in the Notes. Letters which are unclear in the original owing to damage to the manuscript are also enclosed in square brackets. Alterations made by the original scribe are enclosed in arrow brackets. Expuncted letters or words are printed as they appear in the original. Punctuation and capitalization have been added. Abbreviations have been silently expanded. A diagonal bar is placed in the text at the end of the *a* column of each page of the MS folio. A parenthetical note in the text will indicate the end of each MS folio.

<sup>5</sup> See *A Short-Title Catalogue of Books... 1475-1640*, compiled by A. W. Pollard and G. R. Redgrave (London, 1926), nos. 25824 ff., and nos. 11222 ff. See also Nancy Lee Hughes, *A Critical Edition of Thomas Wimbledon's Sermon Preached at Paul's Cross 1388/89* (University of London, unpublished thesis, 1958), pp. xxiii-xxvii; and Millar Maclure, *The Paul's Cross Sermons*, (Toronto, 1958), pp. 144, 121-22.

<sup>6</sup> See F. M. Salter and H. L. R. Edwards, ed., *The Bibliotheca of Diodorus Siculus translated by John Skelton*, Early English Text Society, 233 (London, 1956). The two texts in the Corpus manuscript have no relationship to one another, except that they happen to be bound together in the same book.

## TEXT

## [THEME]

(*fol.* 270a) REDDE RACIONEM VILLICACIONIS TUE.  
LUCE, SEXTO DECIMO

## [PROTHEME]

My dere ferendis, ze shullen vndirstonde pat Crist Ihesus, auctour and doctour of trewþe, in his book of þe gospel liknyng þe kyngdom of Heuene to an housholdere seiþ on þis manere : Lik is þe kyngdom of Heuene to an housholdyng man þat wente out first on þe morwe to hire werkemen into his vine. Als[o] aboute þe þridde,  
 5 sixte, nyenþe, and eleuene houris he wente out and fond men stondyng ydel and sey to hem, "Go zee into my vyne, and þat riȝt is I wole zeue zow". Whanne þe day was ago he clepid his styward [and heet] to zeue eche man a peny. To spiritual vndirstondyng, þis housholdere is oure Lord Ihesu Crist þat is heed of þe household of holichirche. And þus he clepiþ men in diuerse houris of þe day, þat [is di]uerse  
 10 ages of þe world : as in tym[e] of law[e] of kynde he clepide by enspyryng Abel, Ennok, Noo, and Abraham ; in tyme of þe Olde Lawe, Moyses, Daud, Ysaye, and Jeremie ; and in tyme of grace, apostelis, martiris, and confessoures, and virgines. Also he clepeþ men in diuerse agis : summe in childhod as Jon Baptist ; summe on stat of wexenge as Jon þe Euangelist ; summe instat of manhod as Peter and Andrew ;  
 15 and summe in old age as Gamaliel and Josep of Aramathie. And alle þese he clepiþ to trauayle / on [his] v[yn]e þat is þe chirche, and þat on diuerse maneres. For riȝt as zee seep þat in tilienge of þe material vine þere beþ diuerse laboreris, for summe k[u]tyn away þe voyde braunchis, summe maken forkes and rayles to beren vp þe veyne, and summe diggen away þe olde erþe fro þe rote and leyn þere fattere.  
 20 And alle þese offices ben <so> nescessarie to þe veyne þat zif eny of hem fayle it schal <harne> gretly or distroye þe [v]ine. For but zif þe vine be [kut] he schal wexe wilde, but zif she be rayled she shal be ouergoo wiþ netles and wedis, and but zif þe rote be fettid with donge she for febleness shold wexe barayne. Riȝt so in þe chirche beþ nedeful þes þre offices : presthod, kynȝthod, [and] laboreris. [To]  
 25 prestes [it falliþ to] k[ut]t[e] away þe voyde braunchis of synn[i]s wiþ þe swerd of here tonges. To knyȝtis it falliþ to lette wrongis and þeftis to be do and to mayntene Goddis Lawe and hem þat ben techeris þerof, and also to kepe þe lond fro enemyes of oþer londes. And to laboreris it falleþ to trauayle bodily and wiþ here sore swet geten out of þe erþe [b]odily liflode for hem and for oþer parties. And þese statis beþ also nedeful  
 30 to þe chirche þat non may wel ben wiþouten oþer. For zif presthod lackede (*fol.* 270b)

REDDE, *etc.* *Luke* 16:2.

3-7 Lik ... peny, *Matthew* 20:1-8.

7 *om.* MS, *from* HN.

8-9 oure ... holichirche, *Colossians* 1:18.

þe puple for defaute of knowyng of Goddis Lawe shulde wexe wilde on vices and  
 deie gostly. And zif þe knythod lackid and men to reule þe puple by lawe and hard-  
 nesse, þeues and enemies shoden so encesse þat no man sholde lyuen in pes. And  
 35 zif laboreris weren not, boþe prestis and knyztis mosten bicom acremen and heerdis,  
 and e'lis þey sholde for defaute of bodily sustenaunce deie. And herfore seiþ a gret  
 clerk, Auycenne : þat euery vnresonable beest, zif he haue þat þat kynde haþ ordeyn-  
 ed for hym, as kynde haþ ordeyned it, he is sufficiant to lyue by hymself wiþouten  
 eny oþer of þe same kynde. As zif þere were but one hors oþer oon sheep in þe  
 world, zit zif he hadde graas and corn as kynde haþ ordeyned for suche bestes he  
 40 shulde lyue wel jnow. But zif þer were but oon man in þe world, þouȝ he hadde  
 al þat good þat is þerin, zit for defaute he scholde die, or his lif shulde be worse þan  
 zif he were nouȝt. And þe cause is þis. For þyng þat kynde ordeyneþ for a mannis  
 sustenance withoutyn oþer arayng þan it haþ of kynde acordiþ nouȝt to hym. As  
 þouȝ a man haue corn as it cometh fro þe erþe, zit it is no mete acordyng to hym  
 45 into it be by mannis craft chaungid into bred. And þouȝ he haue flesch oþer fisch,  
 zit w<h>ile / it is raw as kynde ordeyneþ it, forto it be by mannis trauayle  
 be soþen, rosted, oþer bake, it acordiþ not to mannis liflode. And ryȝt so wolle  
 þat þe sheep beriþ mot by many diuerse craftis and trauaylis be chaungid er it be  
 able to cloþe eny man. And certis o man bi hymself shulde neuere don alle þise la-  
 50 bouris. And þerfore seiþ þis clerk : It is nede þat summe beþ acremen, summe  
 laboreris, summe makeris of cloþ, and summe marchaundis to fecche þat þat o lond  
 fauteþ from anoþer þer it is plente. And certis þis shulde be o cause why euery staat  
 shul loue oþer, and men of o craft shulde neiþer hate ne despise men of anoþer craft,  
 siþ þey beþ so nedeful euerych to oþer. And ofte þilke craftis þat semen most vn honest  
 55 myȝthen worst be forbore. And o þyng I dar wel seye : þat he þat is neiþer trauay-  
 lyng in þis world on prayeris and prechyng for helpe of þe puple as it falliþ to prestis,  
 neiþer in fyȝtinge aȝenis tyrauntis and enemyes as it falliþ to knyztis, neiþer trauayl-  
 yng on þe erþe as it falliþ to laboreris. Whanne þe day of his rekyng comeþ, þat is þe  
 ende of þis lif, ryȝt as he lyuede here wiþoutyn trauayle so he shal þere lacke þe  
 60 reward of þe peny þat is þe endeles ioye of Heuene. And as he (*fol.* 271a) was here  
 lyuyng after noon staat ne <ordre>, so he shal be put þanne in þat place þat noon  
 ordre is inne but euerelastyng horror and sorwe, þat is in Helle. Herfore euery  
 man see to what astat God haþ clepid hym, and dwelle he þerinne by trauayle  
 acordyng to his degre (*Prima Corinthios, septimo*). þou art a laborer or a crafti man,  
 65 do þis trewli (2 *Thimotheum, quarto*). zif þou art a seruant oþer bondman, be soget  
 and low in drede of displesyng to þy lord (*Prima Petri, secundo*). zif þou art a mar-  
 chaunt, disceyue nouȝt þy broþer in chafferyng (*Prima Thessalonicenses, quarto*).  
 zif þou art a knyzt oþer a lord, defende þe pore man and nedy fram his houndis

36-52 Ḥusain Ibn 'Abd Allāh, "De Anima," *Sextus Naturalium*, V, *Auicēne perhypatetici philosophi* ... (Venetijs, 1508), f. 22.

61-62 in ... sorwe, *Job* 10:22.

63-64 *I Corinthians* 7:20, 24.

64-65 *II Timothy* 4 is an incorrect reference. It may be an elaboration of the general charges in *I Timothy* to various orders of society to lead Christian lives; or it may be from the unidentified gloss referred to in 1.72.

65-66 *I Peter* 2:18.

66-67 *I Thessalonians* 4:6.

68-69 *Psalms* 81:3-4.

pat willen harmen hym (*Psalmus*, 81). zif þou art a iustise oper iuge, go nouzt into  
 70 þe ryzt honde by fauor, neyþer into lefte hond to punysche eny man for hate (*Prouer-*  
*biorum*, quarto). zif þou art a prest, vndernymen, praye, and reprove in all maner  
 pacience and doctrine (*Secunda Thimotheum*, quarto, glossa). Vndirnymen pilke þat  
 beþ negligent. Praie pilke þat beþ obedient. Reprove hem þat ben vnobedient to  
 God. And so eueri man trauayle in his degre, for whanne þe euen is come þat is þe  
 75 ende of þe world, þanne euery man shal take reward, good oper euyl, after þat he  
 haþ trauayled here (*Prima Corinthios*, tercio).

[RE-STATEMENT OF THEME]

[M]y wordes þat I haue taken to maken of þis sermoun beþ þus myche to seye. /  
 zilde rekenynge of þy bailie. Crist, auctor of pite and louere of þe saluacion of his  
 peple, in þe processe of þis gospel enformeþ euerich man þat is his baile by maner of  
 80 a parable of a bayly þat he spekeþ of to araye hym to answeere of þe goodis þat God  
 haþ bytaken hym whanne þe day of streyt rekenyng shal come, þat is þe day of doom.  
 And so I at þis tyme þourz þe helpe of God, folwyng hym þat is maister of so gret  
 auctorite, by þe cause þat I knowe no þyng þat shulde more drawe away mannys  
 vnresounable loue fro þe passynge ioie of þis world þan þe mynde of þat dredful reke-  
 85 nyng. As myche as I suffice for now I shal shewe zow how ze shal dispose zou to  
 auoide þanne þe vengeance of God, whan þer shal be tyme of so streyt dome þat  
 we shulle zelde rekenyng of euery ydel word þat we hauen spoken. For þanne shal it be  
 sayd to vs, and we shul not mow flee it, zelde rekenyng of þy baylie.

[PROCESS, PART I]

But for oure proces of þis firste partie of þis sermoun zeshal wite þat þer beþ þre bay-  
 90 leis þat shullen be clepid to þis streyte rekenyng : tweyne to answeere for hemself and  
 for oper, þat beþ prestis þat han cure of mennys soulis, and temperal lordis (*fol.* 271b)  
 þat hauen gouernayle of peplis ; and þe þridde baylie shal acounte only for hymself,  
 and þat is euerich oper Cristene man of þat he haþ resceyued of God. And euerich  
 of þyse shal answeere to þre questiouns : þe firste questioun, how hast þou entred ?  
 95 þe secunde, how hast þou reulid ? and þe þridde, how hast þou lyuyd ? And zif  
 þou canst wel assoyle þese þre questiouns, was þer neuere noon erpely lord þat so  
 rewardþ his seruauant withoute comparisoun as þy Lord God shal reward þe, þat  
 is with lif and ioie þat euere shal laste. But on þat oper side, zif þou wilt now be reche-  
 les of þyn owen welfare and take noon hede of þis rekenyng, zif þat deþ take <þe>  
 100 sodeynly so þat þou passe hennis in dedly synne, as þou wost neuere what shal falle  
 to þe, alle þe tongis þat euere weren oper shal be mowen not telle þe sorwe and woo  
 þat þou shalt suffre. perfore þe desire of so gret ioie and þe drede of so gret payne,  
 þouz loue drede of God were not in þyn herte, sholde make þe to penke euermore þat  
 þou shalt zeue rekenyng of þy baylie.

69-70 *Proverbs* 4:27.

71-72 *II Timothy* 4:2.

75-76 *I Corinthians* 3:8.

78-81 *Luke* 16:1-13.

87 zelde ... spoken, *Matthew* 12:36.

## [PRINCIPALS AND SUB-DIVISIONS, PART I]

- 105 þerfore, as I seie, þe first questioun þat shal be proposid to þe firste baylif þat is a prelate oþer a curat of mennis sowlis is þis. How hast þou entred? Frend, how entredist þou hidir? / Who brouȝte þe into þis offys? trewþe oþer symonie? God or þe deuyl? grace or monye? þe flessch or þe spirit? zif þou þy rekenyng zif þou canst. zif þou canst nouȝt I rede þat þou tarie nouȝt to leerne, for vpon hap, or nyȝt þou
- 110 shalt be clepid. And zif þanne þou stonde dowmbe for vnkunnyng, or ellis for confusioun of þy conscience þou falle into þe sentence þat anon folwiþ: Byndiþ his hondis and his feet, and þroweþ hym into vttrewarde of derkenesses; þere shal be wepyng and gryntyng of teþ. þerfore I conseyle þe þat þou averse þe how <þou> wilt answer to þis questioun, how hast þou entrid? wheþer by cleping [or bi] þyn
- 115 owen procuringe, for þou woldist trauayle on Goddis Gospell, oþer for þou woldest ben richelich arayed. Answer to þyn owen conscience now as þou shalt or longe aunswere to God. þou þat hast take þe ordre of prest, wheþer þou be curat or no; who stirid þe to take vpon þe so hiȝe astaate? wheþer þou woldest lyue on Goddis contemplacion oþer forto lyue a delicious lif vpon oþer mennis trauayle and þysel
- 120 trauayle nouȝt. Why also setten men here sones oþer here cosyns to scole? wheþer to gete hem grete auancementis oþer to (*fol.* 272a) make hem þe betere to knowen how þey shulden serue God. þis men may see openly by þe science þat þey setten hem to. Why, I praye ȝow, putteþ men here sones rapere to lawe syuyle and to þe kyngis court to writen lettres or writis þan to philosophie oþer deuinite, but for þey
- 125 hopen þat þyse ocupacions shul be euere menis to make hem grete in þe world. I hope þat þer wole no man seie þat þey ne shulde betere lerne reule of go<o>d lyuyng in þe book of Goddis Lawe þan in eny bokes of mennys worldly wysdom. But certis now it is soþ þat Seynt Jon Crisostome seiþ: Moderis beþ lowynge þe bodies of here children, but þe soule þey dispiseþ. þey desireþ hem to welfare in þis world,
- 130 and þey takeþ noon hede what þey shul suffre on þat oþer. Summe ordeynen fees for here childeren, but noon ordeynen hem to godwar[d]. þe lost of þer bodies þey wolleþ dere bygge, but þe helpe of here soule þe reccheþ nouȝt to take of ȝifte. zif þey <sec> hem poore þey sorweþ and sykeþ, but þouȝ þey see hem synnen þey sorwen nouȝt; and in þis þey sheweþ þat þey brouȝten
- 135 forþ þe / bodies but nouȝt þe soules. And zif we taken hede trewly what abhominacions [ben] scaterid in þe chirche nowadayes among prestis, we shulde wel wite þat þey alle comeþ nouȝt into þe folde of Crist by Cristis clepyng forto profite, but by oþer weyes to gete hym worldly welþe. And þys is cause of many errouris among þe puple. And herfore it is writen in þe Book of Mornyng where þe prophete spekeþ
- 140 þus to God: þe enemye haþ put his hond to alle þyngis desirable to hym, for he haþ seyn folk laweles entrid into þe seyntewarie, of þe wiche þou haddist coumaundid

106-7 How ... hidir, *Matthew* 22:12.111-3 Byndiþ ... teþ, *Matthew* 22:13.114 *Om.* MS, from HT, H2.128-35 S. Joannes Chrysostomus, "Opus Imperfectum", In *Matthaeum Homilia XXXV* [spurious], in J.-P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca* (Paris, 1854-66), 56, 826. Hereafter this work will be abbreviated as PG.136 *om.* MS, from HT, H2.140-2 þe enemye ... chirche, *Lamentations* 1:10.

pat þey shulde not entre into þy chirche. þis enemye is Satanas, as is name sownep, pat haþ put his hond to al þat hym likeþ. What synne I praie wolde þe fend haue sowe on men þat it nis now vsid? In what plente is pride, enuye, wraþe, and couey-  
 145 tise? whanne were þey so grete as þey beþ now, and so alle oþer synnes? And why trowest þou, but for þer beþ lawles peple entrid into þe temple þat neyber kepeþ in hemself þe lawe of God ne kunne teche oþere. And to euerych such seyþ God by þe prophete Osee: For þat þou hast put away kunnyng I shal putte þe away þat þou shalt (*fol.* 272b) vsen no presthod to me. Lo, þat God expressly here on Holy  
 150 Writ forbediþ men to take þe stat of presthod on hem but þey haue kunnyng þat nedep hem. þou pat canst neyþer reule þyself ne oþer aftir þe lawe of God, be war how þou wolt answeere to God at his dredeful dom when he shal seye to þe þat I tok to my teme. zelde rekenyng of þy balie. How þou hast entrid.

þe secunde questioun þat euery curat and prelat of holychirche shal answeere to is  
 155 þis. How hast þou reulid? þat is to seye, þe soulis of þi sugetis and þe goodis of pore men. zeue now þyn acounte. First, how þou hast gouerned Goddis folk þat was taken þe to kepe? as an herde ouþer as an hyred man þat doþ al for þe loue of his bodily hire? as a fadir ouþer a wolf þat etip þe shep and kepet hem nouzt? Seye whom þou haast turnid fro here cursid lyuynge by þy deuout preching? Whom hast  
 160 þou tawth þe lawe of God þat was arst vnkunnyng? þer shal ben herd a greuious acusynge of fadirles children and an hard alleggyng þat þey haue lyued by here wa/ges and not don away here synnes. zelde also <pe> rekenyng how þou hast reulid and spendid þe goodis of pore men. Here what seiþ Seyn[t] Bernard: Dredep clerkis, dredip mynistris of þe chirche, þe whiche in þe place of seyntis þat þey  
 165 doþ so wickidly, þat þey nouzt holdyng hem apaied wiþ swyche wagis þat were sufficiant to hem, þat ouerplus þat nedy men sholde be susteyned by. þey beþ not shamed to waste in þe houses of here pride and here lecherie and wiþholdip to hemselue wickidly and cursidly þe liflode of pore men. Wiþ dowble wickidnesse trewly þey synnep. First, for þey reueþ oþer mennes goodes, and sibbe for þey mysuse holy  
 170 þyngis in here vanites and in here filphedis. Euerych such bailie perfore be war, for anoon to þe laste ferþyng he shal rekene. Trowist þou not þanne þat þou ne shalt be disalowid of God þat þou hast dispendid in fedyng of fatte palfreies, of hou[n]des, of hawkes. And ȝif it so be þat is worst of alle, on lecherous wommen. Here what is seid of suche: þey haue lad here dayes in welþe, and in a poynt þey beþ go doun  
 175 into Helle. þenk þerfore I rede þat þou shalt ȝilde rekenyng (*fol.* 273a) of þy baylie.

þe þridde questioun þat þis first baylife shal answeere to is þis. How hast þou lyued? what lizt of holynesse hast þou shewid in þy lyuynge to þe puple? or what meroure hast þou be of holynesse to hem? zeue now þy rekenyng. How þou hast lyued?  
 180 as a prest oþer a lewid man? as a man or as a best? It is to wondry trewly how þe lif of prestis is chaunged: þey beþ cloped as knyȝtes; þey speken as vnhonestly as cherlis, oþer of wynnyng as marchaundis; þey riden as princes. And al þis þat is þus spent is of goodis of pore men and of Cristis heritage. Herfore seiþ an holy doctour:

148-9 Osee 4:6.

156-8 First ... nouzt, See *John* 10:11-13.

163-70 Dredep ... filphedis, S. Bernardus, "Sermones in Cantica," Sermo XXIII, in J.-P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina* (Paris, 1844-66), 183, 891. Hereafter this work will be abbreviated as *PL*.

174-5 þey haue ... Helle, *Job* 21:13.

pe clay of Egipte was touȝ, stynkyng, and medlid wiþ blood. þe sclattes weren harde to be vndo, for þey were bake wiþ þe fier of coueytise and wiþ þe lize of lustis.  
 185 In þise trauayleþ riche men ; in þise þey wakeþ awaytyng pore men. In þis trauayleþ prelatis þat beþ blente wiþ to myche schynynge of riches, þat makeþ hem housis lich chirches in gretnesse, þat wiþ diuerse peyntoures colouren her chaumbres, þat wiþ diuerse clopyng of coloures makeþ ymagis gaye. But þe pore man for defaute of cloþes beggeþ and wiþ an emp/ti wombe criep at þe dore. And ȝif I shal soþ  
 190 seþe, seiþ þis doctour : Ofte tymes pore men ben robbed forto cloþen wiþ trees and stones. To swiche spekeþ þe prophete Ysaye : Hoo art þou here ? or as who art þou here ? Here þou art occupieng þe place of Petir, oþer of Poul, oþer of Thomas, oþer of Martyn. But how as Judas was among þe apostelis, as Symound Magus was amonge disciplis, as a candel newe queynt þat stynkeþ al þe hous in stede of a lyȝt lanterne,  
 195 and as a smoke þat blendeþ mennys eizen [in place] of clier fier, ȝif þou contrarie þus þe forme of lyuyng þat Crist and his apostelis leften to prestis. þefore seiþ þe prophete Jeremye : þey haueþ entrid, and þey haueþ had and not ben obedient ; þey haueþ wiþ fals tytle oþer fals and corrupt intencion ; and þey haueþ had pore mennes goodis to here mysvsyng ; and þey haueþ not ben obedient to þe lawe of  
 200 God in here owne lyuyng. þefore it is writen þat þe hardeste dom shal fallen vpon suche : an hard dom (*fol.* 273b) for þey haueþ mysentrid ; an hardere dom for þey haueþ mysreulid ; and þe hardeste dom for þey haueþ so cursidly lyued. þenk þefore I rede how þou wolt zelde rekenyng of þy baylye.

þe secunde baylif þat acounteþ at þis dom for hymself and also for oþere is he þat  
 205 kepyng haþ of eny comunyte, as kynges, princys, maires, and schyreuys, and justices. And þise schullen also answeere to þe same þre questiouns. þe firste question : how hast þou entrid, þat is to seye, into þyn offis ? oþer for helpe of þe peple to destroe falsed and forþeren trewþe ? oþer for desir of wynnyng ? oþer werldly worship ? ȝif þat þou take such an offys more for þyn owne werldly profyt þan for helpe  
 210 of þe comunyte, þou art a tiraunt, as þe philosophre seyþ. For it is to drede last þer ben manye þat desiren / suche states þat þey may þe rapere oppresse þilke þat þey hateþ and take ȝiftes to spare to punysche þilke þat haued trespaced and so makeþ hem partineres of here synnes. And many suche whan þey beþ so heye þey þenkeþ not þat þey beþ pore mennys breþreryn, but þey weneþ to passe hem in kynde as þey  
 215 passeþ in werldly worchipe. þat is but wynde, of wheche God seiþ by þe prophete : þey haueþ regyned but not of me ; þey haueþ be princes but I knowe nouȝt. So we redeþ of Roboam þat was þe sone of Kyng Salamon. What tyme he was first kyng, þe puple of Israel comen to hym and seyden to hym : "þy fadre in his laste dayes putte vpon vs a gret charge. We prayeþ þat þou wole sumwhat make it lyȝttere, and we  
 220 wole serue þe". And þe (*fol.* 274a) kyng tok conseil of þe olde wise men, and þey

183-91 It has been impossible to locate this passage, credited in the margin to Hugh of St. Victor.

191-2 Hoo ... here, *Isaias* 22:16.

197-8 þey ... intencion, *Jeremias* 32:23.

200-2 þe hardeste ... lyued, *Wisdom* 6:6-9.

209-10 ȝif ... tiraunt, Aristotle, "Ethica Nichomachea," VIII, x, *Aristotelis Opera omnia Graece et Latine* (Paris, 1850), 2, 99.

216 *Osee* 8:4.

217-25 *II Kings* 10:1-18.

- conseileden to answer hem fa/re, and þat shulde be for þe beste, but he lefte þis olde mennis conseyl and dide after þe conseyl of children þat weren his pleiferen and seyde to þe peple whan þey comen azen : "My lest fyngere is grettere þan my fadres rygge. My fadir greued zow sumwhat, but I wole eken more". And þe peple herden þis and rebelledyn to hym and toke hem anoper kyng. And siþe come neuere þe kyngdom azeen hool. And þerfore it is good þat euery lowere of comunytes þat þey be not lad be foolis ne be none ere rowneres þat he ne haue an eyge of loue to be comynite þat he haþ to reule. For wyte he wel, be he neuere so hiȝ, þat he shal come byfore his heizere to zelde þe rekenyng of his bayle.
- 225 þe secunde questioun : how hast þou rewlið ? þat is to seye, þe peple and þe office þat þou haddist to gouerne. þat þou hast ben a juge in causis of pore men, how hast þou keped þis hest of God ? þou schalt not take hede of þe persone of a pore man to be to hym þe hardere for his pouert, ne þou schalt not beholde a riche mannis semblaunt to spare oþer to fauoure hym in wrong for his richesse. O Lord God, what
- 235 abusiou is þer among officeres / of here boþe lawes nowadayes. zif a gret man plete wiþ a pore to haue owt þat he holdeþ euerich officer schal be redy al þat he may and hiȝe þat þe riche man myȝt haue suche an ende as he desireþ. But zif a pore man plede with a riche man þan þat oþer schal be so many delays þat þouȝ þe pore mannes riȝt be open to al þe comite, for pure faute of spendyng he shal be glad to
- 240 cese. Schirreues and ballies wollep retorne pore mennes writis with 'tarde venit', but þey felen mede in her handes. And zit I here men seye þat han asayed boþe lawes þat þilke court þat is clepud Cristen court is moche more cursed. þerfore it is write : ziftes þey take owt of mennes bosomes to ouerturne þe weyes or riȝt dom. But it is to drede þe word of Crist : In what dom ȝe demeþ ȝe schulleþ be demed whan
- 245 ȝe comen to rekenyng of ȝoure baylie.
- þe brid questioun is : how hast þou liued ? þou þat demest and punysshist oþer men for her trespas. A gret doctour seiþ : þe behoueþ to flee þe wikkednesse of oþer men þat þou chastisest for here trespacis ; for zif þyselȝ do vnlawfulliche in demynge oþer men þou dampnest þyselȝ, siþ þou dost þat þou dampnest. And Poul seiþ :
- 250 Whi techist þou not þyselȝ þat techist opere ? Why stelist þou þat techist not oþer men to stele ? Seynt Gregory seiþ : He schal [not] take gouernayl of opere þat can (*fol.* 274b) not go byfore hem in good lyuyng. And whan any man stant byfore hym in dom he most take hede tofore what juge he shal stonde hymself to take his dom after his dedis. But it is to drede þat many fareþ as þe tweye false prestis þat wolde
- 255 haue dampned to deþ holy Susanne, for sche nolde nouȝt assente to here lecherie. Of which it is writen : þey turneden away here eizen, for þey wolde not se Heuene ne haue mynde of ryȝtful dom. So it happiþ ofte : þey þat were more worpy to be honged dampneþ hem þat beþ lasse worpy. As a clerk telleþ of Socrates þe philo-

232-4 þou schalt ... richesse, *Leviticus* 19:15.

243 *Proverbs* 17:23.

244-5 *Matthew* 7:2.

247-9 It has been impossible to locate this passage, credited in MSS H2 and L1 to Hrabanus Maurus.

250-1 *Romans* 2:21.

251 *om.* MS, from H2.

251-2 He ... lyuyng, Gregorius Magnus, "Moralium," XXIV, xxv, q 54, *PL*, 76, 318.

254-7 But ... dom, *Daniel* 13:1-41.

sofre : Vpon a day a man axkid of hym why he leyzed, and he seyde, « For I see  
 260 grete þeues lede a litil þef to hongynge ». I preie wheþer is þe grettere þef þat byne-  
 meþ a man his hous and his lond fro hym and from his eyres for euermore oþer he  
 þat for makynge of a gret nede stelep a schep oþer a calf. Wheþer trowe ȝe now  
 þat it happe suche extorcionieris to be oþer wile juges and deme men þus to dep.  
 But I rede þe þat þus demest oþer, þynke on þat dom þat þou shalt come to to zelde  
 265 þe rekenyng of þy balie.  
 þe þridde bailif þat schal be cleped to þis dredful acounte schal be euery Cristene  
 man þat schal rekene to his Lord God for þe goodis þat he haþ had of hys. / And here  
 I wole speke but of þe firste questioun þat is þis : How entredist þou ? And here be  
 war ȝee þat haueþ geten any worldly good oþer take by extorciones, by raueyne,  
 270 by vsure, oþer by disceit. Woo shal be to þe at þis dredful day. As Seynt Austen  
 seyþ : ȝif he be cast into þe fier þat haþ nouȝt ȝeuen of his owne good, where trowest  
 þou he schal be cast þat haþ reued oþer mennes from hem ? And ȝif he schal brenne  
 with þe fend þat haþ nouȝt cloþed þe nakede, where trowest þou schalt <he>  
 brenne þat haþ maad hym nakid þat was erst cloþed ? But as Seynt Gregory seiþ :  
 275 To þyngis makeþ men to lyue þus by raueyne of þer neizebrores : þat beþ desir of  
 hyeznesse and drede of pouerte. And what vengeaunce falliþ of þis synne of coueytise  
 I may se by figure in Holy Writ, whan þe aungel seide to þe prophete Zacarie :  
 “Rere vp þyn eizen and see what is þat goþ owt”. And þe prophete seyde, “What is  
 it” ? þan þe aungel seyde, “þis is þe pot goynge owt ; þis is þe eize of hem on al þe  
 280 erþe”. And þere was a whizt of led ybore, and þer was a womman sittande in þe  
 myddel of þis pot. And þe aungel seyde, “þis is impiete”. And he tok here and cast  
 here into þe myddle of þe pot, and he tok þe gobet of led and keste it into þe pottis  
 mouþ. And þe prophete lifte vp his eizen, and he saye to wommen co- (fol. 275a)  
 mynge owt and spiritis in here wyngis ; and þey hadde wynges lik to kites oþer gledis,  
 285 and þey rered vp þis pot bytwyn Heuene and erþe. And þan þe prophete spak to  
 þe aungel : “Whider wole þese bere þis pot” ? And he seyde, “Into þe lond of Sennar”.  
 þis pot is coueytise, for ryȝt as a pot haþ a wid open mouþ, so coueytise euermore  
 gapiþ after worldly goodis ; and ryȝt as þe licour in þe pot profiteþ not to þe pot but  
 to men þat drawen and drynkeþ þerof, so worldly goodis profiteþ not to chynchis but  
 290 to opere þat comeþ after. As it is write : He þat [haþ] moneye shal haue no fruyt of  
 hit. And þis coueytise is þe eize of coueytouse men, for þey beþ blynde to see how  
 þey shulle go to Heuene ; but to wyngyng of worldly þyng þey se<eþ> many weies  
 lik to owles and nytcrowes þat seen betre be nyȝt þan by day. þe gobet of led is þe  
 synne of obstinacion. þe womman sittynge in þe pot is vnpite, as þe aungel seyde,  
 295 þat folweþ auarice. For þurgh auarice a man leseþ þe pite þat he schulde haue of þe  
 myschef of his sowle, <siþ ofte men lesiþ þe lif of here sowle> by dedly synne þat

259-60 Vpon ... hongynge, The marginal reference is to Valerius Maximus, Libro vii. A search through *Valerij Maximi factorū et dictorum* ... (Strasburg, 1470 ?), failed to locate the passage.

271-4 S. Aurelius Augustinus, “Sermone lxxv(a),” *PL*, 39, 1890.

275-6 Gregorius Magnus, “Moralium,” XV, xxv, *PL*, 75, 1096.

278-86 *Zacharias* 5:5-11.

290 *om.* MS, from HN, HT, H2.

290-1 He ... hit, *Ecclesiastes* 5:9.

293 Lik ... day, Bartholomaeus Anglicus, *Bartholomeus de proprietatibus rerum* [Westminster, 1495 ?], XII, vi, xxviii.

þey doiþ to haue wyninge. And also þey leseþ þe pite þat þey schulde haue to here  
 body, puttyng himself to many to grete bodily trauayles and perilis, boþe of se and  
 of lond, and al makeþ coueytise. þis pot / is stoppid with þe gobet of led, whan vnþite  
 300 is þus by synne of obstinacion closid in coueytise þat he may not go owt of þe chynches  
 hertes by penaunce. As Job seiþ : Whan he is fulfillid he schal be stoppid. þe tweye  
 wommen þat baren vp þis pot beþ pride and lust of flesch þat beþ clepid in Holy  
 Writ þe tweye dowȝtren of þe waterleche crying, "Bryng, bryng". And þey hadden  
 wengis. [þe firste woman þat is pride haþ two wenges] : þe firiste wenge is  
 305 grace spiritual, as cunnyng, wisdom, and conseyl, and many oþere, for whiche  
 giftes ofte men wexiþ proude ; þe secunde wenge is bodily grace, as strengþe, fayrhed,  
 gentrie, and oþer suche, of whiche men wexeþ proude ofte. þe wengis of þe secunde  
 womman þat is fleschly desir beþ glotonye and slewþe. Of glotonye spekeþ Seynt  
 Gregory : Whan þe wombe is fulfillid þe prikket of lecherie beþ meued. And of  
 310 slewþe seiþ Seynt Austen : Loth, wil he in bysinesse dwellyng among schrewes in  
 Sodome he was a good man, but whan he was in þe hil slow for sikernes he in his  
 dronkynschipe lay by <his> doutren. And þese wommen hadden wengis lik to  
 kitis þat with a crying vois sekeþ here mete, as Bartholomeus seiþ. And þus fareþ  
 coueytise of men. Witnessyng Seynt Austyn : What is þe gredynesse of fleschly desir  
 315 siþ rauenes fisches haueþ sum mesure ? whan þey hungreþ þey rapeþ, but whan  
 þey beþ fulle þey spareþ. Only coueytise of men may not be fulfillid. Euere he  
 takiþ (*fol.* 275b) and neuere haþ ynow. Neuere he dredeþ God ne shameþ men.  
 He ne spareþ fadir, ne knowiþ moder, ne acordeþ wiþ broþer, ne kepeþ trowþe to  
 his frend. He oppresseþ wydues and harmeþ moderles children. Fre men he makeþ  
 320 bonde, and bryngþ forþ fals wittenesse, and occupieþ dede mennys þyngis as þey  
 shulde neuere dye. What manhede is þis ? seiþ þis doctour, þus to lese lyf of grace  
 and gete deþ of soule ; wyne gold and lese Heuene. And herfore seiþ þe prophete :  
 [þey] trauayle in þe middes þerof and [vseþ] vnriȝtwisnesse. Also Innocent spekyng  
 of þe harmes þat han come of coueytise seiþ þus : O, how many men haþ coueytise  
 325 disseyued and spilt. Of coueytise þat Balaham wolde for giftes þat þe kyng profrede  
 hym haue acursid Goddis peple ; his owne asse reprouede and hurt his foot toȝenes  
 þe walle. Achor was stoned for coueytise made hym to stele gold and cloþes aȝenis  
 þe comaunment of God. Gyezy was smyte with meselrye for he solde a mannes helpe  
 þat cam of Goddis grace. Judas for coueytise solde Crist and afterward heng hym-  
 330 self. Ananye and Saphira his wyf weren dede sodeynly for þey forsoke to Petir her

301 *Job* 20:22.

303 *Proverbs* 30:15.

304 *om.* MS, from HN.

309 Gregorius Magnus, "In Librum Primum Regnum," V, i, *PL*, 79, 315.

310-2 Loth ... doutren, S. Aurelius Augustinus, "De Conflictu Vitiorum et Virtutum [suppositious]", ch. xiv, *PL*, 40, 1098.

313 Bartholomeus Anglicus, XII, xxvii.

314-22 Augustinus, "De Verbis Domini," Sermones 367, *PL*, 39, 1651.

323 *om.* MS, from P.

323 *Psalms* 54:11-2.

324-31 O ... hadden, Innocentius III, "De Contemptu Mundi," II, ix, *PL*, 217, 720.

325 Balaham, *II Peter* 2:15, *Numbers* 22:1-27.

327 Achor, *Josue* 7:19-26.

328 Gyezy, *IV Kings* 5: 20-7.

330 Ananye, *Acts* 5:1-10.

monye þat þey hadden. And coueytise makeþ also þat riche men etip þe pore, as bestis  
 don here leswes holdynge hem lowe. þis may we see in dede al day, I drede. / For ȝif  
 a riche man haue a feld and a pore man haue in þe myddis or in syde þerof, oon acre,  
 or ȝif a riche man haue al a strete saue oon hous þat sum pore broþer of hys oweþ,  
 335 he cesseþ neuere into þat he gete þat out of þe pore mannys hondis oīþer by prayere,  
 oīþer by byggyng, oīþer by pursuyng. þus ferd it by a kyng, Achab, þat þurw his  
 fals quenes engyn slow þe pore man, Nabyoth, for he wolde nouȝt sille hym his vyne-  
 zerd þat was nyȝ to þe kyngis pales. Vpon whiches processe þus seiþ Seynt Ambrose :  
 How fer wole ȝe riche men strecche ȝoure coueytise? Wole ȝe dwelle alone vpon þe  
 340 erþe and haue no pore man with ȝow? Why putte ȝe out ȝowre felawe in kynde  
 and chalengeþ to ȝoureself þe possessioun commune by kynde? In comune to alle,  
 riche and pore, þe erþe was maad. Why wole ȝee riche men chalenge propre ryȝt  
 herinne? Kynde knowiþ no richessis þat bryngeþ forþ alle men pore, for we beþ  
 nouȝt gete wiþ riche cloþis, neiþer bore with gold ne wiþ siluer; ynakid he bryngeþ  
 345 vs into þe world, nedy of mete, cloþyng, and drynke; nakid þe erþe takeþ vs as sche  
 nakid brouȝte vs hider. Sche can nouȝt close wiþ vs oure possessionis in þe sepulcre.  
 Kynde makeþ no difference bytwyn pore and riche in comyng hidre, neiþer in  
 goyng hennes. Alle oon in a maner he bryngeþ forþ. Alle oon in a manere he closeþ  
 (fol. 276a) in þe graue. Whoso makeþ difference of pore and riche, abide al forto  
 350 þey haue leye a litel wile in þe graue, and þanne opene and loke among dede bones;  
 who was riche and who was pore? But ȝif it be with þis þat moo cloþes roteþ wiþ  
 þe riche þan wiþ þe pore, and þat harmeþ to hem þat beþ on lyue and profiteþ not  
 to þe dede. þis seiþ þe doctour of suche extorcioneres, it is writen: Oþer mennes feld  
 þey repeþ, and þe vyne of hym þat þey harmeþ oppressid; þey plukkiþ away þe grapes;  
 355 þey leueþ men nakid and takeþ away here cloþes þat haueþ not werwiþ to hile hem  
 in cold. And þey leften vp þis pot bytwene Heuene and erþe, for coueytouse men  
 neiþer haue charite to here breþeren vpon erþe, neiþer to God in Heuene. And  
 þey bar þis pot into þe lond of Sennar, þat is to seye, into þe lond of stench þat is Helle.  
 For þer schal be stench in stede of soote smellyng, as Ysaye seiþ. Be war I rede þat  
 360 ȝe <be> nouȝt wiþ þis pot ne with þe womman þerinne, and on al manere þat ȝe  
 be not weddid to hire, for þanne ȝe most be boþe oon. þis is þilke fowle, lecherous  
 womman þe kyngis and þe marchaundis of þe erþe haueþ do lecherie, and of here  
 vertu þey haueþ be maad riche; whos dampnacion is write in þe Bok of Priuytes in  
 þes wordis: In oo day shal come alle þe vengeaunces of here: deþ, wepyng, and  
 365 hungre and fier shal brenne hire; for strong is God þat shal venge hym on hire.  
 And þan schulleþ wepe and weyle vpon hire þe kyngis of þe erþe þat haueþ do leche-

331 And ... pore, *Ecclesiasticus* 8:2-3.

335-8 *III Kings* 21:1-16.

339-53 Ambrosius, "De Nabuthe Jezraelita," ch. II, *PL*, 14, 731-2.

353-6 Oþer ... cold, *Job* 24:6-7.

356-8 These lines are perhaps a paraphrase of Gregory's explication of *Zacharias* 5:5-11. See "Moralium," Liber XIV, *PL*, 75, 1073.

359 *Isaias* 3:24.

362 þe kyngis ... lecherie, *Apocalypse* 18:9.

364-5 *Apocalypse* 18:8.

366-7 kyngis ... brennyng, *Apocalypse* 18:9.

rie with hyre and han lyued in delicis. Whan þey schulleþ see smok of hire brennynge, stondynge afeer, wepynge and weylynge, and seyinge, "Alas, alas, þilke grete citee þat was cloped wiþ bisse, and purpre, and brasile, and ouergilt with gold and precious stones, and perles, for in on hour alle þese grete richessis beþ distroied". þan  
 370 schulleþ þey seye þat shulleþ be dampned wiþ hire: "We haue erred froþe wey of trewþe and of ryȝtfulnesse. Liȝt haþ not schyned to vs, and þe sunne of vndirstondyng haþ not rysen to vs. We haueþ be maade wery in þe wey of wikkednesse and of loost. And we haueþ go harde weyes, but þe wey of God we knewe not. What haþ pride  
 375 profited to vs? oþer þe book of oure richesse? what haþ it brouȝt to vs? al is go as a schadewe of deef. And we mowe now schewe no tokene of holynesse in oure wikkednesse. We beþ wasted away". þynk þefore I rede þat þou schalt zelde rekenyng of þy balye. Here endiþ þe <first> partie of þis sermoun. (*fol.* 276b). Here bygynneþ þe secunde part.

[PROCESS, PART II]

380 In þis secunde partie, þurgh helpe of God, I wole schewe first who shal clepe vs to þis rekenyng, afterwar[d] byfore what iuge we shulleþ rekene, and last what puny-schyng shal be do to hem þat ben fonden false seruauantis and wickid, and what reward schal be ȝeue to hem þat ben founden goode and trewe. For þe firste ȝe shal wyten þat þer shullen be tweye domes: þe firste anoon after þe departyng of þe  
 385 body and þe soule, and þis shal be special, and of þis rekenyng oþer doom spekeþ þe gospel of Luk; þe secunde rekenyng oþer dom shal be anoon after þe general resurreccion, and þat shal be vniuersal, and of þis it is spoke in þe gospel of Matheu. To þe first eueriche man shal be cleped after oþer as þe world passiþ. To þe secunde alle schulle come togidere in þe strook of an eiȝe. To þe first men schulleþ be clepid  
 390 with þre somoners oure seryauantis: þe firste is sekenesse, þe secunde is elde, and þe þridde is deþ; þe first warneþ, þe secunde þretenþ, and þe þridde takiþ. þis is a cundelich ordre. But oþer wile it fallyt vnkyndelich, for summe we seeþ dye þat wisten neuere / what was sekenesse ne elde, as childeren þat beþ sodenly slayn. And summe, ȝe þe most part þat dieþ nowadayes, dieþ bifore here kynde age of þe deþ.

[PRINCIPALS AND SUB-DIVISIONS, PART II]

395 þefore I seye þat þe first þat clepeþ to þis special rekenyng is sekenesse, and þis is double: for sum is sekenesse þat folwiþ al mankynde so þat euery man haþ it; and sum is sikenesse þat sum men haueþ, but not alle. ȝit þe first sekenesse is double for sum is wiþinne in þe myȝttes of þe soule, and sum is wiþouten in feblenesse of þe body þat nedis most be distroied, on wham, tyme by hymself is cause of corrup-

368-70 *Apocalypse* 18:15-7.

371-6 We ... deef, *Wisdom* 5: 6-9.

384-6 *Luke* 16:2.

386-7 *Matthew* 25:31-46.

389-91 men ... takiþ, See Hugo de Sancto Victore, "De Claustro Animae," II, xv, *PL*, 176, 1064.

400 cion. As <þe> filosofre seiþ : þat þere be feblennesse and sekenesse may we see  
 herby : þat þouȝ a man schutte out of þe hous of his herte al maner of worldly an  
 fleschly þouȝtis, ȝit vnneþe schal a man for out þat he can do þenke on God only  
 þe space of a Pater Noster þat sum oper þouȝt of þyng þat is passyng entrīp into þe  
 soule and drawiþ hire fro þat contemplacion. But, o Lord God, what sekenesse is þis  
 405 and heuy birdene vpon þe sones of Adam. þat foule muk and fen of þe world we  
 mowe þynke longe ynow, but vpon þat þat þe soule shulde most delectacion haue by  
 kynde mowe we not (*fol. 277a*) þynke only so litle a space, but ȝif þe kokkil entre among  
 þe whete. Of þis sekenesse spak Poule whan he seide : I se a lawe in my lymes fyȝt-  
 tyng aȝenis þe lawe of my spirit and takyng me into þe lawe of synne. So þat it  
 410 fareþ by vs as by a man þat wolde loke stedefastly aȝens þe sunne and may [not]  
 do it longe for no þyng, and certis þat is for no defaute þat is in þe sunne for sche  
 is most cler in herself and so bi resoun best shulde be yseye, but <it> is for feblennesse  
 of þe mannes eyȝe. Ryȝt so siþ Adam oure first fadre was put out of Paradis al his  
 ospryng haþ be þus sek. As þe proph[e]te seiþ : Oure fadres haueþ bite a bytter grape,  
 415 and þe teef of þe children ben woxe on egge. þe secunde sekenesse þat is comune  
 to alle mankynde cometh of feblennesse of þe body, as hungre and þrust, cold and hete,  
 sorwe and werynesse, and many opere. As Job seiþ : A man þat is borne of a womman  
 lyuynge a litle wile is fulfillid wiþ many mysesses. But þer is oper siknesses þat cometh  
 420 to sum men but not to alle, as lepre, palesie, feuere, and dropesie, and blyndnesse,  
 and manye opere. As it was seid to þe puple of Israel in Holy Writ : But ȝif þou kepe  
 þe mawdementis þat beþ wryten on þis book God schal eken þe sekenesse of þe and  
 of þy seed, grete sekenesses and abidyng worst / and euerelastyng. And ȝe schulle  
 vnderstonde þat God sendiþ oper wile suche sekenesse to goode men and oper wile  
 to schrewis. To goode men God doþ it for two causis. And þat is sop of sykenesse  
 425 I wole to be vnderstonde, also of alle maner tribulacion. þe first cause : for þey shul-  
 den euere knowe þat <þey> haueþ no perfeccion of hemself but of God only and to  
 ekene here mekenesse. And þus seiþ Poule : Lest þe gretnesse of Reuelaciouns rere  
 me vp into pride, me is ȝiue a prikke of my flesch, þe au[n]ȝel of Sathanas to smyte  
 me on þe necke ; wherfore I haue pryþes prayed God þat he schulde go fro me, and  
 430 he au[n]swerede me, "My grace is sufficiant to þe, for vertu is fulfillid in sykenesse".  
 Wheron þus seiþ þe glose : þe fend askyng Job to be temptid was herd of God and  
 nouȝt þe apostle axinge his temptacion to be remowid. God herde hym þat schulde  
 be dampned, and so he herde not hym þat he wolde saue ; for ofte þe seke man axkiþ  
 many þyngis of þe leche þat he wole not ȝyue hym, and þat is forto make hym hool  
 435 of his sykenesse. Also God sendiþ seyntis often sykenesse and persecucion to ȝyue  
 vs senful wrecchis ensauple of pacience. For (*fol. 277b*) ȝif he suffre his seyntis to  
 haue suche tribulacion in þis world, and þey þankyn hym þerof, moche more wrechis  
 þat God sendiþ to nouȝt þe hondrid parte of here sorwe, shulde bere it mekely siþ  
 we haue disserued a þousand so moche as þey haueþ. Wherfore of Tobie : þat an a

400 ff. This passage could not be located.

408-9 *Romans* 7:23.

410 *om.* MS, from HN, HT, H2.

414-5 Oure ... egge, *Ezekiel* 18:2.

417-8 A man ... mysesses, *Job* 14:1.

420-2 *Deuteronomy* 28:58-9.

427-30 *II Corinthians* 12:7-9.

431 ff. This gloss could not be located.

439-50 þat ... pacience, *Tobias* 2:10-14.

440 day whan he was wery of buryenge of pore men, þe whiche schulde haue leyen vn-  
 buried and han ben etyn of houndis and foulis, as carienes of opere vnresonable  
 bestis. Whan for werynesse he had leid hym to reste, and þourh Goddis sufferaunce  
 þe swalwes þat bredden aboue on his hous maden ordure into his eizen, and he wexe  
 blynd. þus it is write: þis temptacion forsoþe God suffride to come to hym þat to  
 445 hem þat comen after schulde be zeue ensauple of pacience, as by þe temptacion  
 of holy Job. For siþ fro his childhod euermore he dredde God and euere keppe  
 his hestis. He was not agreued azens God þat þe myscheues blyndenesse fel to hym,  
 but, vnmouable, dwellide in þe drede of God þankyng hym alle þe dayes of his lif.  
 Lo, þat Holy Writ seiþ expressly þat God suffrede þis holy man to haue þis sykenesse  
 450 to zeue hem þat shulden comen after hym ensau[m]ple of pacience. Also oper wile  
 God / sendiþ siknesse and tribulacion to wickid men, and on two causis. First, for  
 þey schulde þe rapere drede God and leue here synne, as it is writen, þer siknesse  
 haueþ be multiplied; and [a]fter þey haue hizid to Godward. For we seþ ofte men in  
 sekenesse knowehere God þat neuere wolden haue turned to hym while þey hadden ben  
 455 hoole. Also God sendiþ hem sykenesse ofte to agaste oper men leste þey foleweden  
 here synnes, as þe sekenesse of Antioche, whom God smot wiþ suche a sekenesse þat  
 wermes skatered out of his body while he lyuede. In so ferforþ þat he stank so foule  
 þat [his freinds were] heuy þerwiþ and myzt not suffre it. And at þe laste þat he  
 ne myzt nouzt hymself suffre his owne stynch. And þan he gan to knowe hymself  
 460 and seyde, "It is ryztful to be suget to God, and a dedly man nouzt to holde hymself  
 euene to God". And þe story seiþ þat he axkid mercy of God of whom he schulde  
 no mercy haue and made a uow to God þat he schulde make þe citee of Jerusalem  
 free and þe Jewes to make hem as free as men of Athenis, and þat (*fol.* 278a) he  
 wolde honoure Goddis temple wiþ precious aray and multiplie þe holy vesselis and  
 465 fynde of his owne rente, cost and spensis pertynynge to þe sacrise, and he wolde  
 bycome a Jew and go ouer al þe lond and preche Goddis myzt. And zit God gaf  
 hym no mercy. And I trowe certeyn þat þat was for he axkid it to late. What mede  
 was it to [him to] forsake his wickidnesse whan he was vnmlyti to do good opere  
 euel? And by þys vengeau[n]ce þat God tok of þis kyng schulde men see what it is  
 470 to be vnobedient to God. And also it is [to] take hede þat whan so euere sekenesse  
 comeþ, euere it scheweþ þat he þat suffreþ is dedly, and þat he schal nede dye, for  
 þow3 he may skape his siknesse zit may he not skape þe deþ. And so þou most nedis  
 come to þy rekenynge.

þe secunde somner þat schal clepe þe to þis perticuler dom is elde. And þe condi-  
 475 cion of þis is þis: þat þou3 he tarie wiþ þe he wole not leue þe til he brynge þe to þe  
 pridge þat is deef. But þer be many þat þou3 þey haue þis somenour wiþ hem þey  
 taken none hede: he seþ his hed hory, his bak crokeþ, his breþ stynkeþ, his teef  
 falleþ, his eizen derkeþ, his visage reueliþ, his eren wexeþ heuy to here. What meneþ  
 al þis, but þat elde somounneþ þe to þe dom. But / what more madhede may be

452-3 þer ... multiplied, *Psalms* 15:4.

456-67 Antioche ... mercy, *II Machabees* 9:1-18.

458 he was MS, from HT.

468 om. MS, from HN, HT.

470 om. MS, from HN, HT.

477-8 In "Old Age from Horace to Chaucer," *Speculum* 9 (July 1934), 249-77, George R. Coffman traces the development of the theme of old age.

480 þan a man be clepid and drawe to so dredful a rekenynge. þere but he au[n]swere  
wel, þere he forfeteþ boþe body and soule to dampnacion foreuere. ȝif he seeynge a  
litle myrþe on þe weye þinke so mochel þeronne þat he forȝetiþ who draweþ hym oþer  
whedir he draweþ hym, so doþ he þat is smyten wiþ age and lykeþ so on þe false  
worldlis welþe þat he forȝetiþ whodir he is aweye. Herfore seiþ þe holy doctour :  
485 þat among alle þe abusiones of þe world, most is a olde man þat is obstinat for he þyn-  
kiþ not on his owȝt goynge of þis world, ne of his passyng into þe lyf þat is to come.  
He heereþ massangeres of deþ and he leueþ hem nouȝt. And þe cause is þis : for  
þe þrefold cord þat suche an old man is bounde wiþ is hard to breke. þis cord is  
custom þat is of þre plytis : þat is of ydel þouȝt, vn timerly speche, and wickid dede ;  
490 þe whiche ȝif þey growe wiþ a man fro þe childhod into mannes age þey make a  
treble corde to bynde þe olde man in custom of synne. Herfore seiþ Ysaye : Breke þe  
bondes of synne. þynke herfore who so euere þat þou be þat art þus somened þat  
þou myȝt not skape, þat þou ne schalt ȝelde rekenynge of þy bailie.

þe þridde somenour to þis rekenyng is deþ. And þe condicion of þis is þis : þat  
495 whanne so euere he comeþ, first oþer secunde oþer last, he ne spareþ neyþer powere  
ne ȝougþe, (*fol.* 278b) ne he ne dredeþ no þretyng, ne takiþ hede of no praiere,  
ne of no ȝifte, ne he ne graunteþ no respite, but wiþouten delay he bryngeþ forþ to þe  
dom. Herfor seiþ Seynt Austyn : Wel auȝte euery man drede þe day of his deþ.  
For in what state souere a mannes laste day fyndeþ hym whan he goþ out of þis  
500 world, in þe same state he bryngeþ hym to his dom. Herfore seiþ þe wyse [man] :  
Sone þenk on þy laste [ende], and þou schalt neuere synne. þerfore I rede þenk  
þat þou schalt ȝelde rekenynge of þy bailie.

I seyde also þat þer schulde be anoþer dom to þe whiche alle men schullen come  
toȝedre, and þis schal be vniuersel. And riȝt as to þat oþer dom euery man schal be  
505 clepid wiþ þre somenoures, so to þis dom al þis world schal be clepid wiþ þre general  
cleperis. And riȝt as þe oþere þre messageþ a mannes ende, so þese telleþ þe ende of  
þe world. þe firste is þe worldlis sykenesse ; þe secunde is feblennesse ; and þe þridde is  
his ende. And þe sekenesse of þe world þou schalt knowe by charites acoldyng ; his  
elde and his feblennesse þou schalt knowe by tokenes fulfillynge ; and his ende þou  
510 schalt knowe by Antecristis pursuynge.

First I seye þou schalt knowe þe {worldlis sykenesse by charites acoldyng. Clerkes  
þat treteþ of kyndis seiþ þat a body /is sik whan his kyndely heete is to lytle or whanne  
is [vn]kyndely heete is to moche. Siþ <pan> al mankynde is oo body whos kyndely  
heete is charite, þat is loue to oure God and to oure neyȝebore, vnkyndely heete is  
515 lustful loue to oþre creatures. Whan þerfore þou seest þat þe loue of men to Godward  
and to here neyȝebore is litle and feynt, and þe loue to worldly þyngis and to lustes  
of þe flesh is gret and feruent, þanne wite þou wel þat vnkyndely hete is to gret  
and kyndely heete is to lytle. þat þis be a knoweleche of þis siknesse may I preue by

485-7 þat among ... nouȝt, Hugo de Sancto Victore, "De Claustro Animae," II, xv, *PL*, 176, 1064.

487-9 for ... plytis, Hugo de Sancto Victore, *PL*, 176, 1064.

491-2 Breke ... synne, *Isaias* 58:6.

498-501 These passages cannot be located.

500, 501 *om.* MS, *from* HN, HT.

511-3 Clerkes ... moche, See Bartholomaeus Anglicus, IV, i.

513 *om.* MS, *from* HN, HT.

- auctorite of Crist, for he himself gaf hem as a sygne of þe drawynge to þe ende of þe  
 520 world : for þat wickednesse schal be in plente, charite schal acolde. þerfore whanne  
 þou seest charite þus litl in þe world and wickednesse encresse, knowe wel þat þis  
 world passip and his wilþe, and þat þis somenour is come. And þus seiþ Seynt Poule :  
 Wite þou wel þat in þe last dayes schal come perilous tymes, and þere schulleþ be  
 525 fadre and modre, vnkynde felowes wipouten affeccion, wipouten pees, blameres,  
 vncontinent, vnmylde wipouten benigne, traytours, rebel swellynge, loueres of  
 lustes (*fol.* 279a) more þan of God, hauynge a liknesse of pite and denyenge þe vertu  
 þerof. And þes flee whan þou seest þe peple byside on suche condicions. Wite wel  
 þat þe first somenour warneþ al þe world þat þe day of rekenynge draweþ toward.  
 530 þe secunde somenour þat warneþ al þe world is elde of þe world and his feblenesse.  
 And þis schewip tokenes fulfilling. But I knowe wel þat we be not sufficiant to  
 knowe þe tymes oþer þe whyles þat þe fadre in Trinite haþ putte in his owne power  
 to schewe certeynly þe day, 3er, oþer þour of þis dom siþ þis knowleche was hid  
 fro þe priue aposteles of Crist, and also fro Cristis manhod as to schewe it to vs.  
 535 Naþeles we moweþ by auctorite of Holy Writ wip resounes and exposiciones of seyn-  
 tis wel and openly schewe þat þis day of wreche is nyze. But zit lest any man seye in  
 his herte, as it is writ of folye baileues : þat þey schal seye, "My lord þat is tariet  
 to come to þe dom". and vpon hope herof he take to smyte seruantis and hynen of  
 God, ette and drynge and make hym drunke. I schal schewe þat þis day is at þe  
 540 hond. How nyze neþeles can I not seye ne wole. For 3if Poule seyde now for a  
 þousand 3eer and þre hundryd and mo passid / we ben pilke into whom þe ende <s>  
 of þe world beþ come, moche rapere mowe we seye þe same þat beþ so moche nerre  
 þe ende þan he was. Also Seynt Johan Crisostom seiþ : þou seest oueral derkenesses,  
 and þou dougtist þat þe day is go ? First on þe valeyes is derkenessis, whan þe day  
 545 drawip donward. Whan þerfore þou seest þe valeis is derkid, why doutist þou wheþer  
 it be neiz euen ? But 3if þou see þe sunne so lowe þat derkenesse is vpon þe hillis þou  
 wolt seye douteles þat it is nyzt. Ryzt so 3if þou see first þe seculeres and lewede  
 Cristene men bygynne dirkenessis of synnes to haue þe maystrie, it is tokene þat  
 þis world endip. But whan þou seest prestes þat beþ put on þe hize coppe of spiritual  
 550 dignites, þat schulde be as hilles aboue þe comune peple in parfit lyuynge, þat dirke-  
 nesse of synnes haþ take hem : who douteþ þat þe world nis at þe ende ? Also Abot  
 Joachym in exposicion of Jeremye seiþ : Fro þe 3eer of oure Lord a þousand and two  
 hundred alle tymes beþ suspecte to me. And we be passid on þis suspect tyme neiz  
 two hundrid 3eer. Also Mayde Hildegare in þe book of hyre prophecie, þe þridde  
 555 partye, þe eleuene visioun, þe seuene chapitre, meueþ þis resoun : Ryzt (*fol.*  
 279b) as on þe seuene day God maad þe world, so in þe seuene þousand 3eer þe

519-20 for he ... world, *Matthew* 24:3.

520 *Matthew* 24:12.

520-1 þerfore ... encresse. See *I John* 5:19.

523-8 Wite ... þerof, *II Timothy* 3:1-5.

531-3 But ... dom, *Acts* 1:7.

537-9 My ... drunke, *Luke* 12:45.

540-2 now for ... come, *I Corinthians* 10:11.

543-51 Chrysostomus, "Opus Imperfectum [spurious]," *Homilia XXXIV*, PG, 56, 818.

552-3 Fro ... me. Perhaps the passage comes from Joachim of Flora, *Diuiniuatis Abbatis Joachim liber cocordia* ... (Venetijs, 1519), f. 58(4).

555-61 Ryzt ... sowle, Hildegardis, "Scivias," III, xi, PL, 197, 714-6.

world schal passe ; and ryzt as in þe sixte day man was maad and formed, ryzt  
 so in þe sixe þousand of ȝeris he was bout aȝen and reformed ; and as in þe seuene  
 day þe world was ful maad and God rested of his worchyng, ryzt so in þe seuene  
 560 þousand of ȝeris þe noumbre of hem þat shullen be sauēd schal be fulfillid, and reste  
 schal be to seyntis, ful in body and in sowle. ȝif þan it be so, as it semeþ to folewe  
 of þis maidenes wordis, þat seuene þousand of ȝeris in passyng of þe world acordiþ  
 to seuene dayes makynge, lat see what lackiþ þat þis seuene þousand ȝeris ne be  
 fulfillid. For ȝif we eke þe noumbre of ȝeris fro þe natyuite of Crist to þe ȝeris fro  
 565 þe bygynny[n]g of þe world to Crist, and þou wolt folewe Austyn, Bede, and Orosye,  
 and most probabyle doctoures trefyng of þis matere, passiþ now almost sexe þou-  
 sand and sexe hundred. As it is open in a book þat is clepid *Speculum Judiciale*, for  
 it sweþ þat þis last day is more þan half ago, ȝif we schulde ȝeue credence to þis may-  
 denes / resoun. But ȝif wee schul leue to þe gospel þanne we schal fynde in þe  
 570 gospel of Matheu þat þe disciplis axeden of Crist þre questiouns : first, what tyme þe  
 cite of Jerusalem shulde be destroyed ; þe secunde, what tokene were of his comy[n]ge  
 to þe dom ; and þe þridde, what signe were of þe ende of þe world. And Crist ȝaf  
 hem no certeyn tyme of þes þyngis whan þey schulle falle, but he ȝaf hem tokenes by  
 whyche þey myȝte wite whan þey drowen nyȝ. And so as to þe firste question, of  
 575 destruccion of Jerusalem, he seyde : Whan þat Romaynes come to bysege þat citee  
 þan sone aftir sche schulde be destroyed. And to þe secunde and to þe þridde, he  
 ȝaf hem many tokenes, þat is to seye, þat rewme schulde ryse aȝens rewme, and peple  
 aȝens peple, and pestilences and erþe schakynges, þe whiche we haue seye in oure  
 dayes. But þe laste tokene þat he ȝaf was þis : whan ȝe seen þe abhominacion of þe  
 580 elengenesse seyd of Danyel þe prophete, stondynge on þe seyntuarie, þanne whoso  
 rede, vnderstonde. Vpon whiche tixte þus argueþ a doctour in a book þat he makip  
 (*fol.* 280a) of þe ende of þe world. ȝif þe wordes of Danyel han auctorite as God  
 seyþ þat þey haueþ it sufficit of [þe] nou[m]bre of ȝeris of þe ende of þe world. Take  
 þat Danyel haþ writen now. Daniel in þe twelþe chapitre spekyng of þis abhomi-  
 585 cion puttip bytwene þe sesyng of þe bysy sacrifice of Jewis, þe whiche felle whan  
 <by> Titus and Vaspacian Jerusalem was distroied and þe puple of Jewes dispar-  
 pullid into al þe world. And þis abhominacion þat doctour seiþ schal be þe grete  
 Antecrist dayes, þousund two hundrid and nynty. Now preueþ þis doctour þat a day  
 mot be take here for a ȝeer, boþe by auctorite of Holy Writ in þe same place and on  
 590 opre, and also by resoun, so it semeþ to þis clerk, þat þe grete Antecrist schulde come

564-7 For ... hundred: Augustinus, "De Civitate Dei," XVIII, xl, *PL*, 41, 600; Bedae, "De Temporibus Liber," ch. xvi-xxii, *PL*, 90, 288-90; Orosius, "Historiarum," I, i, *PL*, 31, 669-70.

567 *Speculum Judiciale* could not be located.

570-2 þat þe ... world, *Matthew* 24:3 and *Luke* 21:20.

575-6 Whan ... destroyed, *Luke* 21:20.

577-8 þat rewme ... schakynges, *Matthew* 24:7 and *Luke* 21:10-11.

579-80 whan ... seyntuarie, *Matthew* 24:15.

581-2 þus ... world, Joachim of Flora, *Diuiniuatis Abbatis Joachim*...

583 *om.* MS, *from* HN, HT.

584-5 Daniel ... Jewis, *Daniel* 12:11.

587-8 And ... nynty, Joachim of Flora, MS Vatican, *Lat.* 3822. While Joachim gives the date 1290, subsequent scribes switch the date to suit their own times.

588-9 þat ... ȝeer, Joachim of Flora, *Diuiniuatis Abbatis Joachim*, f. 12v.

in þe fourteenþe hundred zeer fro þe birþe of Crist, þe whiche nombere of zeeris is now fullillid not fully twelue zeer and an half lackynge. þis resoun put I not as to schewe any certeyn tyme of his comynge, siþ I haue not þat knowlechyng, but to schewe þat he is nyȝ, but how nyȝ I wote neuere. But take we hede to þe / ferþ party  
 595 of þe secunde vision of Jon put in þe Book of Pryuetes, in þe whiche vndir openynge of seuen sealis is declarid þe staat of holychirche fro þe tyme of Crist into þe ende of þe world. þe openynge of þe foure first sealis schewep þe staat of þe chirche fro tyme of Crist into þe tyme of Antecrist and his forgoeris, þe whiche is schewid by þe openynge  
 600 of þe opre þre sealis. þe openynge of þe first seal telleþ þe staat of þe chirche in tyme of þe prechyng of Crist and of his apostles. For þan þe first beest, þat is þe lioun, ȝaf his vois þat tokeneþ þe prechoures of Cristis resurreccion and his assencion. For þan ȝede out a whiȝt hors, and he þat sat vpon hym had a bowe in his hond, and he ȝede ouercomynge to ouercome. By þis whiȝt hors we vndirstondeþ þe clene lyf and conuersacion þat þes prechoures hadde, and by þe bowe, here trewe techynge, pri-  
 605 ckyng sorwe in mennes hertis for here synnes wiþoute flaterynge. And þey wenten out of Jeuerie þat þey comen, ouercomynge summe of þe Jues and make to leue þe trust þat þey hadden in þe Olde Lawe and bileue in Ihesu Crist and sue his techynge. And þey wenten out to ouercome (*fol.* 280b) þe paynemes, schewynge to hem þat here ymagis were none Goddis but mannes werkes, vnmȝyȝty to saue hemself or ony  
 610 opere, drawynge hem to þe bileue of Ihesu Crist, God and man. In þe openynge of þe secunde seal þer criede þe secunde beest þat is a calf þat was a beest was woned to be slayn and offrid to God in þe Olde Lawe. þis schewiþ þe staat of þe chirche in tyme of martiris, þat for stedefast prechyng of trewþe and trewe Goddis lawe schedde here blod. þat is signified by þe rede hors þat wente out at þis seal openynge. And  
 615 þis staat bygan in þe tyme of Nero þe cursed Emperour and durede in[to] þe tyme of Constantyne þe Grete þat enduede þe chirche. For [in] his tyme, namely of Cristis seruau[n]tis and namely þe lederes of Goddis folk were slayn, for of two and twenty bischopes of Rome þat weren bytween Petir and Siluestre þe Firste, I rede but of foure þat ne weren martiris for þe lawe of Crist. And also in þe tyme of Dioclician þe Em-  
 620 perour, þe persecucioun vpon Cristen men was so gret þat wiþinne þretty dayes þer were two and twenty þousand men and wymmen slayn by diuerse cōuntries / for Goddis sake. þe openy[n]ge of þe þridde seal telleþ þe staat of þe chirche in tyme of here- tikes, þat beþ fygured by þe blake hors for fals vndirstondynge of Holy Writ. For þan criede þe þridde best þat is a man, for at þat tyme was it nede to preche þe  
 625 misterie of Cristis incarnacion and his passioun toȝens þese heretikis þat felede mys of þes poyntes ; how Crist toke verey mannes kynde of oure Lady, hym beyng God as he was byfore, and his Modre beyng Maide byfore and aftir. þe openynge of þe ferþe seal telliþ þe staat of þe chirche in tyme of ypocritis, þat, ben signified by þe pale hors, þat beþ sygnes of penaunse wiþoute forþ to blynde þe puple. And he þat sat  
 630 vpon þis hors, his name was deef. For þey schulle sle gostly hem þat þey leden and techiþ to trist vpon opre þyng þan God. And Helle folewiþ hym, for Helle resceyueþ pilke þat þese disceyueþ. At þat time schal it nede þat þe firþe best, þat is þe egle,

595-7 vndir ... world, *Apocalypse* 5:1.

597-652 The references to the Seven Seals and the Four Beasts are taken from *Apocalypse* 4:7 6:1-12, 7:1, 8:1.

615 in, MS, from HN, HT.

616 om. MS, from HN, HT.

make his cry, þat fleþ hyzest of foules to rere vp Goddis gospel and to preyse þat lawe aboute opere, laste mannes wit and here tradicions ouergoo and trede down  
 635 (*fol.* 281a) þe lawe of God by enformynge of þes ypocrites. And þis is þe laste staat þat is or schal be in þe chirche byfore þe comynge of grete Antecrist. þe openynge of þe fiftte seal telliþ þe stat of þe chirche þat þan schal folewe, and þe desir þat louteris of Goddis Lawe schulleþ haue after þe ende of þis world to be delyuered of þis woo. þe openynge of þe sixte seal telleþ þe staat of þe chirche in tyme of Antecristis lymes, þe  
 640 whiche staat 3e mowe knowe to be in þe chirche whan 3e seþ fulfillid þat Seynt Jon prophecieþ to falle on þe openynge of þis where he seiþ þus: After þis I seye foure aungelis stondynge vpon foure corneris of þe erþe holdynge þe foure wyndes of þe erþe þat þey blowe nouzt vpon þe erþe, ne vpon þe see, ne vpon any tree. þese foure aungelis beþ þe nou[m]bre of alle þe dewellis mynistris, þat in þat tyme schulleþ  
 645 in plesaunce of here lord Antecrist stoppe þe foure wyndes, þat beþ þe foure gospellis to be prechid. And so lette þe breþ of þe grace of þe Holy Gost to falle vpon men mornynge for synne and castynge hem to amendement, and ouþer vpon hem þat wolde encesse in vertues, ouþer vpon parfyte men. What is þer after þis to falle, but [ þat þe mysterie of þe seuente seal be schewid. þat he come into his owne per-  
 650 sone, þat Ihesu Crist shal slee wiþ [þe] spirit of his mouþ whan þe fend schal schewe þe vttermest persecucion þat he and his seruautis may do to Cristes lymes. And þat schal be þe pridde warnyng þat þe world schal haue to come to þis dredful dom. In al þis mater haue I nouzt seid of myself but of opere doctoures þat beþ præued.

## [CONCLUSION]

I sayde also in my secunde principal þat it were to wite tofore what iuge we schulde  
 655 rekene. Werfore we schulle wite þat God hymself schal heren þis rekenynge, he þat seþ alle oure dedes and alle oure pouztis fro þe bygynnyng of oure lyf to þe ende. And he schal schewe þere þe hidde þyngis of oure herte, openynge to al þe world þe ryztfulnesse of his dom, so þat wiþ þe myzt of God euery mannys dedis to al þe world schal be schewid. And so it semeth by þe wordis of Seynt Jon in þe Book of Priueytes.  
 660 þer he seiþ þus: I seye dede men littul and grete stondynge in þe syzt of þe trone, and bookes weren opened, [ and anoþer book was opened ] þat was of lyf, and dede men weren iuged after þe þyngis þat weren writen in þe bookis after here wer- (*fol.* 281b) chynge. þese bokes beþ mennis conciensis þat now beþ closed, but þan þey schulleþ ben opened to al þe world to rede þerinne boþe dedis and þoutis. But þe  
 665 book of lif is Cristis lyuyng and doctrine þat is now hid to men þat shulleþ be dampned þouȝ here owne malice þat demeth men to swe þe world rapere þan God. In þe first bok schal be writen al þat we haue do. In þe toþer book schal be write þat we schulde haue do. And þan shulle dede men be demed of pilke þyngis þat beþ writen in þe bookis. For ȝif þo dedis þat we haueþ do, þe whiche beþ writen in þe bokis of oure  
 670 conscience, be acordynge to þe book of Cristis techynge and his lyuyng, þe whiche is þe bok of lyf, we schulleþ be sauēd, and ellis we schulleþ be dampned, for þe dom

650 Ihesu ... mouþ; *II Thessalonians* 2:8.650 *om.* MS, *from* HN, HT, H2.660-3 I ... werchynges, *Apocalypse* 20: 11-12.661 *om.* MS, *from* HN, HT, H2.

schal be zoue after oure werkis. Loke perfore now what þyng is writen in þe bok of [þi] conscience whyle þou art here, and ȝif þou fyndest out contrarie to Cristis lif oþer to his techyng, wiþ þe knyf of penaunce and repentaunce scrape it away and  
 675 write it betere, euermore hertily þynkyng þat þou schalt ȝelde rekenyng of þy baylie.

Also I seyde principaly þat it were to wite what reward schal be zouen in þat / dom to wyse seruantis and goode, and what [to] false seruantis and wicked. For þe whiche it is to wite þat oure Lord Ihesu Crist schal come to þe dom here in þis  
 680 world in þe same body þat he tok of oure Lady hauyng þerinne þe woundes þat he suffrede for oure aȝenbyggyng and al þat euere schul be sauēd, takyng aȝen here bodies, clyuyng to here [hed], Crist, schulle be rauyssched metyng hym in þe aiere, as Poul seyþ. þey þat schulle be dampned lyuyng vpon þe erbe, as in a tounne of wyn dregges dwelliþ byneþe, and þe clere wyn houuereþ aboue, þanne schal Crist axke  
 685 rekenyng of þe dedis of mercy, reprouyng fals Cristene men for þe leuyng of hem, rehersyng þe dedis of þe same and oþre trewþis by þe whiche his trewe seruantis haue folewede hym. þanne schulle þilke false seruantis goo wiþ þe deuēl whom þey haue serued, þe erbe hem swelwyng into þe endeles fier. And ryȝtful men schullen go into euereclastyng lyf. þan schal be fulfillid þat is writen in þe Bok of Pryueytes :  
 690 Woo ! Woo ! (*fol.* 282a) Wo ! to hem þat dwelleþ in þe erbe. Wo to þe paynyme þat ȝaf þat worchipe to dede ymagis wrouȝt of mennes hondis and to oþer creatures þat he schulde haue zoue to God þat hym wrouȝte. Wo to þe Jewe þat trusted so moche in þe Olde Lawe ; þan schal he see Marie sone demyng þe world whom he despised and sette on þe cros. Wo to þe false Cristene man þat knewe þe wille of his  
 695 Lord and fulfillid it not. Also wo for synne of þynkyng. To þe þat hast schit out þe mayne of God, þat is mynde of his passioun, holy contemplacion of his godnesse and memorie of his benfetis, fro þe chaumbre of þyn herte and hast maad it an hous of swyn and a den of þeues by vnclene þouȝtes and delitis ; as þou here hast spered God out of þyn hert so he schal spere þe out of Heuene. þou hast herberwed  
 700 þe meyne of þe fend, and wyþ hem in Helle þou schalt euere abyde. Wo also for synne of speche, for þou myȝt not opene þilke foule and stynkyng mouþ wiþ þe whiche þou schalt speke vnhoneste cursyng, fraude, disceyt, lesynges, forsweryng, scornynge, / and bacbityng to plesse God in þe felaschipe of seyntis. For louyng is not comenliche in mowþis of synneris. For in þe whiche ȝif þou haddist kep þy mouþe  
 705 clene schuldest haue songe in Heuene in felachipe of angelis þys blissed song : SANCTUS ! SANCTUS ! SANCTUS ! DOMINUS DEUS OMNIPOTENS ! Holy ! Holy ! Holy ! Lord God Almyȝty ! þan ȝellyng and wepyng, þou schalt crye in cumpanye of deuēles : VE ! VE ! VE ! QUANTE SUNT TENEBRE ! , Wo ! Wo ! Wo ! How grete beþ þes derkeness ! Wo also for synne of dede. þat þou has  
 710 <be> proud ; þy pride schal be drawe to Helle, as Ysaye seyþ. Or þou hast be

673 *om.* MS, from HN, HT, H2.

678 *om.* MS, from HN, HT, H2.

682 *I Thessalonians* 4:17.

682 *om.* MS, from HN, HT, H2.

690 Woo ... erbe, *Apocalypse* 8:13.

695-709 To þe ... derkeness. This passage is attributed to Chrysostomus in *Jacob's Well*, ed. Arthur Brandeis (London, 1900), EETS, o.s., 115, pp. 228-9, but I could not locate it.

705-7 SANCTUS ... Almyȝty, *Apocalypse* 4:8.

710 *Isaias* 14:11.

brent wiþ enuye ; þouȝ enuye of þe deuel, enuye entrid into þe world, and þey schulleþ  
 folwe hym þat beþ on his syde, as Salamon seyþ. Or þou hast be styred wiþ wrabe,  
 and eueryche man þat beryþ wrappe to his broþer is gilty in dom, as Crist seyþ in  
 þe gospel of Matheu. Or þou hast be slow to goode dedis ; myssayse schal come to  
 715 þe as a weyferynge man and þy pouert as a man armed, as þe Book of Prouerbis seiþ.  
 Or þou hast haunted lecherye, glotonye, oþer coueytise, þat for (*fol.* 282b) soþe  
 wite ȝe þat eueriche auoutir oþer vncleue man þat is gloton oþer chynche schal  
 neuere haue heritage in þe rewme of Crist and of God, as Poul seyþ. But fier, brym-  
 720 ston, and þe spirit of tempestis, þat is þe fend of Helle schulleþ be a party of here  
 peyne, as it is write in þe Sautere. Whan þese dampned men beþ in þis woo þey schul-  
 leþ synge þis rewful song þat is writen in þe Book of Mornyng :

þe ioie of oure herte is ago ;  
 Oure wele is turned into woo.  
 þe coroune of oure heued is falle vs fro.  
 725 Alas, for synne þat we doo.

But ioie, and ioie, and ioie to hem þat beþ saued ! ioie in God ! ioie in himself !  
 ioie in oþre þat beþ saued ! also ioie for her trauayle is brouȝt to so gracious an  
 ende ! ioie for þey beþ scaped peyne of Helle ! ioie for þe endeles blisse þat þey haue  
 in syȝt of God !

## [BENEDICTION]

CUI SIT HONOR ET GLORIA IN SECU LA SECULORUM. Amen.

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711-2 þouȝ ... syde, *Wisdom* 2:24.

713 *Matthew* 5:22.

715 þy ... armed, *Proverbs* 6:11.

717-8 eueriche ... God, *Ephesians* 5:5.

718-9 fier ... tempestis, *Psalms* 10:6.

722-5 *Lamentations* 5:15-16. This quatrain appears in other sermons of the period. See Carleton Brown and Rossell Hope Robbins, *The Index of Middle English Verse* (New York, 1934), pp. 527(3311), 541(3398).

# The 'De rithmis' of Alberic of Monte Cassino: A Critical Edition

HUGH H. DAVIS

## INTRODUCTION

UNTIL the appearance in 1956 of Blum's exhaustive study entitled 'Alberic of Monte Cassino and the Hymns and Rhythms Attributed to Saint Peter Damian,'<sup>1</sup> the text of the treatise *De rithmis* from Alberic's *Breviarium de dictamine* had never been published.<sup>2</sup> Rockinger had omitted it altogether from his edition of extracts from

<sup>1</sup> O. J. Blum, in *Traditio* 12 (1956) 87-148 (124-127, Appendix A, with the text of the *De rithmis*).

<sup>2</sup> For the most nearly complete bibliography of Alberic and his works, see Blum 87 n. 1; almost equally good, and with more detail about his own important publications, is the somewhat earlier bibliography of A. Lentini, 'Alberico di Montecassino nel quadro della riforma gregoriana,' *Studi Gregoriani* 4 (1952) 55-56 n. 4. See also a brief later notice about Alberic with a short bibliography in H. M. Schaller, 'Der Kanzlei Kaiser Friedrichs II.: Ihr Personal und ihr Sprachstil, Teil II.,' *Archiv für Diplomatik* 4 (1958) 267 nn. 9 and 10; the first of these notes cites an important critical study, not mentioned elsewhere, by H. Hagendahl, 'Le manuel rhétorique d'Albericus Casinensis,' *Classica et mediaevalia* 17 (1956) 63-70, treating the Inguauez-Willard edition of Albericus, *Flores Rhetorici* (see below n. 11). Most recently there has appeared the significant discussion of Alberic and his relation to the *ars dictaminis* (which would deny him the honor of being its founder) presented by F. J. Schmale, *Adalbertus Samaritanus: Praecepta Dictaminum* (MGH, Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 3 (1961) 1-4, with a select bibliography on Alberic, p. 1 n. 2. (Unfortunately, neither Schaller nor Schmale includes Blum's comprehensive study in his bibliography.) For Vecchi's edition of the *De rithmis*, see the present article, especially n. 5.

A Freiburg doctoral dissertation on Alberic's *Breviarium de dictamine*, by Peter Groll, was announced for early publication (see H. Plechl, 'Die Tegernseer Handschrift Clm 19411: Beschreibung und Inhalt,' *Deutsches Archiv* 18 (1962) 478 n. 366, 479 n. 372). I have not yet seen a notice of its actual appearance.

the *Breviarium*,<sup>3</sup> and there was a tendency to doubt that it belonged to the materials of the famous compendium despite Haskins' assurances.<sup>4</sup> The doubt stemmed chiefly from the monotonous style of the *De rithmis*, lacking, it was held, the élan of the earlier part of the *Breviarium*, but also from the fact that it was found in only one of the two then known manuscripts of the work, viz., Munich lat. 14784. From that codex Blum copied the text and added a few footnotes by way of an apparatus criticus.

Four years later, in 1960, Vecchi, evidently unaware of Blum's edition, once more produced the text of the Munich codex, using it as a document for the study of medieval Latin rhythms and their classification.<sup>5</sup> His apparatus criticus is somewhat more generous than what Blum's spare notes supply, but neither editor does justice to the text in Clm 14784. Vecchi incorporated in his edition not a few undeclared emendations, many of which are unwarranted.<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, too, his pages are marred by many errors, whether of copyist, or of the press.<sup>7</sup> Finally, despite his efforts at emendation,

<sup>3</sup> L. Rockinger, *Briefsteller und Formelbücher des elften bis vierzehnten Jahrhunderts I* (Quellen und Erörterungen zur bayerischen und deutschen Geschichte 9.1; Munich 1863) 29-46. Based on Clm 19411 and 14784.

<sup>4</sup> C. H. Haskins, 'Albericus Casinensis,' *Casinensia* (Montecassino 1929) I. 118; *Studies in Mediaeval Culture* (Oxford 1929) 173. Cf. Blum 124, Vecchi (cited below, n. 5) 305 n. 12.

<sup>5</sup> G. Vecchi, 'Sulla teoria dei ritmi mediolatini: Problemi di classificazione,' *Studi mediolatini e volgari* 8 (1960) 301-324. The author's remarks and partial paraphrase, pp. 304-307, precede the Latin text of the *De rithmis*, pp. 321-324.

<sup>6</sup> The following list of Vecchi's alterations of M's text, not reported in his apparatus criticus or elsewhere, is so arranged that the first numbers refer to section and line of the present edition, the numbers in parentheses, to pages and sections in Vecchi. M's readings are given in each case, but not L's, since unknown to Vecchi. (The more noteworthy, seemingly intentional, changes have been included below in the apparatus.) The list is as follows: 4.8 (322.3) Unde (Inde M) 4.18 (322.5) producent (dicunt M) recte 6.9 (322.9) sillaba (-us pro -is M) 6.12 (323.11) et (ca M) 6.15 (323.12) cetus noster (cetus M) 6.20 (323.13) nominant (-atur M) recte 7.23 (323.21) huiusmodi (eius-M), est (M) om. 8.15 (324.29) consuerunt (-evit M) 8.20 (324.31) aliquo (-a M) recte 8.22 (324.31) per cantum (precantum M) 9.2 (324.32) consuerunt (-evit M).

<sup>7</sup> Such are the following: 321 note on caption for first division of the work, ergo (ego recte) 3.4 (321.3 App. Crit.) manosillabis (mona-M) 5.1 (322.6 App. Crit.) bisillab (bissillabus M) 6.4 (322.7) certiminis (certaminis M) 6.13 (323.11) considetione (consideratione M) 6.17 (323.13 in note, App. Crit.) supraser. (-scr. recte) 7.1 (323.15 App. Crit.) "Duodecassillibus] Siadecassillabus M" (recte "-abus] -asillabus M") 7.9 (323.20) cardinens (-es M) 7.15 (323.20) iubilet (-at M) 7.27 (323.23. cf. 307) admirabile (-is M) 8.4 (324.26) setiones pro sect- (secciones M) 8.17 (324.29) decasillabis pro -bi?, (App. Crit.) decasillabis

Vecchi, like Blum, either did not notice certain real difficulties in the text that call for at least an annotation, or purposely passed over them in silence in order to devote himself to matters of more general humanistic interest. Such, then, to the present time, is the status of the published unilateral text of the *De rithmis*.

Now, however, not only a textual tradition in common with the other parts of the *Breviarium*, but also an important subsidium for the text of the treatise itself is revealed by the discovery of the *Breviarium*, and with it the *De rithmis*, in a manuscript of the Public Library of Leningrad. Passed over by Staerk in his study of the earlier manuscripts of the then Imperial Library,<sup>8</sup> and also by Alberic scholars, the book received what seems to have been its first printed notice from Professor Paul Oskar Kristeller, of Columbia University, whose report (1959) of Renaissance manuscripts in Eastern Europe, studied in the late summer of 1958, referred simply to his having found 'an early copy of a rare grammatical work by Alberic.'<sup>9</sup> After the notice appeared, it was possible for me, availing myself of a microfilm of the codex, to identify without any doubt both the *Breviarium* and the *De rithmis*. Accordingly, while essaying a critical edition of the entire *Breviarium*, I have thought it expedient and in conformity with the many-sided character of the work, to offer separately this new edition of the *De rithmis* which is called the second part of a handbook, that dealing with medieval rhythms or hymns ('Explicit prima pars euchiridii (*sic*) de prosis cum speris suis. Incipit secunda de rithmis').

Codex O. v. XVI 3 of the Publichnaja Biblioteka, made up of 16 vellum folia, consists entirely of the *Breviarium de dictamine* of Albericus Casinensis, and perhaps a few other pieces, which, if not an integral part of the work, are certainly kindred to it, and with it have a common textual tradition. All the folia are more or less seriously damaged as if by a rodent gnawing from the upper margin down into the text. The text is arranged in two columns, each averaging 37 lines. The Caroline script appears to be work of the twelfth century,

(decass- M) 9.1 (324.32) membri (-is M) 10.1 (324.34 App. Crit.) Ex decasillabo (Exdecasillabus M).

<sup>8</sup> A. Staerk, *Les manuscrits latins du V<sup>e</sup> au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle conservés à la Bibliothèque impériale de Saint-Petersbourg* (St. Petersburg 1910).

<sup>9</sup> P. O. Kristeller, 'Renaissance Manuscripts in Eastern Europe,' *Renaissance News* 12 (1959) 89. Professor Kristeller generously communicated to me the shelf-mark of the Leningrad manuscript, together with a complete microfilm reproduction, graciously furnished him by O. Golubeva, Director of the Public Library.

probably from north Italy,<sup>10</sup> and to be older than that of Clm 14784.<sup>11</sup> The text of the Leningrad manuscript begins as follows: 'Albericus karissim(us)<sup>12</sup> in Christo fratribus Gw. et Go.<sup>13</sup> benivolentie magistralis amorem...; it ends as follows: '... Que autem sunt enclitice (*sic*) postponuntur. Explicit.'<sup>14</sup> The *De rithmis* appears on fols. 13<sup>v</sup>-14<sup>v</sup>. Very frequent on the first folium, but occurring less and less on subsequent folia, are marginalia and interlinear notes. These are the

<sup>10</sup> On the flyleaf, an eighteenth-century hand has added a notice that contains much misinformation:

MSS autographe d'un auteur du tems de l'Empereur Henri 2<sup>d</sup>. dit le Saint, qui monta sur le trône de l'Empire de Germanie le 6 juin 1002. Il se qualifia souvent Roi des Romains, avant même son couronnement, titre que ses successeurs changèrent en celui de Roi d'Italie. L'auteur se nomme Albericus.

The codex, quite clearly, does not offer us an autograph of Alberic's, and does not come from the time of Henry II. As often elsewhere, so here too a model letter has misled the zealous librarian; the model in question, appearing on fol. 8<sup>r</sup>, purports to be a letter of an emperor, Henry by name, and is dated as follows: 'Anno dominice incarnationis M. inditione tertia anno vero henrici serenissimi imperatoris regnantis duodecimo imperii vero eius anno primo.'

<sup>11</sup> Briefly noted as follows in the Halm-Meyer catalogue of the Latin manuscripts of the Munich Staatsbibliothek (42 [1876] 233; the remarks added in square brackets are my own): '14784 ([Sankt] Em[meram] c. 6) membr. in 8<sup>o</sup>. s. XII. 104 fol. Alberici Cassinensis rationis dictandi [the text of only the first book is in Rockinger. 9-28; with good reason no longer attributed to Alberic, see F. Novati, *Le origini* (Milan 1900) 418]; f. 44 Rethorici flores [sec M. Inguañez-H. Willard, *Alberici Casinensis flores rhetorici* (Miscellanea Cassinese 14; Montecassino 1938), also Hagendahl, *cit. supra* n. 2]; f. 67 Breviarium de dictamine [the *De rithmis* is found on folia 92<sup>v</sup>-94<sup>v</sup>]; cf. Rockinger, *Quellen und Erörterungen* IX, 1, p. 1-46'. As far as my knowledge goes, no published description of this important codex is in any sense adequate.

<sup>12</sup> The final syllable may be a faulty *-mus*, being represented by an *m* topped by a slightly curving stroke.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Rockinger I 29, where the names of the addressees, taken from Clm 19411, are written in full and in the reverse order.

<sup>14</sup> The material published from M by Rockinger, *op. cit.*, does not include the text that closes the Leningrad manuscript, although found in the Munich codex. After the word *Explicit* in L, there follows in the remaining space of the column (fol. 16<sup>v</sup>) a table of the Greek alphabet with the corresponding Roman letters, and the numerical values of Greek letters equated to Roman numerals. (This is simply a neater, more schematic form of the same table that occurs in the treatise *Formate epistolæ* on fol. 6<sup>v</sup>.) In view of the definite *explicit* of this codex devoted solely to the *Breviarium* and, on the other hand, of the miscellany-like character of Clm 14784, I am disinclined in the present state of our research to hold that the matter following the treatise *De epistolaribus modis* in the Munich codex on fols. 98<sup>v</sup>-104<sup>v</sup> is the work of Alberic or forms part of the *Breviarium*-corpus.

work of a hand different from that of the original scribe, but evidently of about the same epoch. In general they are ordinary glosses on the words where they are placed. One entry, however, in the upper right margin of fol. 1<sup>r</sup>, where regrettably the vellum has been extensively damaged, is of some length and very intriguing. Although a complete restoration is impossible, enough of the text remains, especially the quite legible 'et rithmi', and 'Intentio est docere vos', to make it evident in such a context that the medieval annotator is pointing out the utility of the codex not only for teaching prose dictamen, but also, rhythmic. It is significant for the present study that the treatise *De rithmis* is thus announced and anticipated by an early marginal note on the first folium of the Leningrad *Breviarium*.

The *De rithmis* occurs in perhaps the most mutilated part of the newly-found codex, but its text as exhibited there is in toto about three fourths of the treatise as presented by Clm 14784, supplemented by portions of text unknown to the Munich codex. Even when intact the treatise as contained in the new codex probably did not much exceed a thousand words. Despite its present mutilated condition the Leningrad manuscript furnishes abundant proof, soon to be noted, of belonging to the tradition of the 'codices integri,' while the Munich codex, because of its truncation of the *rithmi* and of the end of the treatise, not to mention shorter omissions, may be said to belong to the 'mutili.' Although both manuscripts appear to descend from a common archetype later than the author's fair copy,<sup>15</sup> the Leningrad exemplar mirrors the pristine condition of the text much better than the other.

Evidence for this is strikingly presented in the *exempla* or extracts from hymns given as illustrations of the different categories of *rithmi*. Whereas in the Munich manuscript these extracts have been reduced to a single initial verse or, at most, two verses per hymn,<sup>16</sup> the Leningrad codex has in each case retained the entire stanza, thereby making the author's technical discussion of the *rithmi* much clearer, when, e.g.,

<sup>15</sup> The following common errors and peculiarities are sufficient, I believe, to show without any reasonable doubt that M and L descend from a common minuscule archetype later than the fair copy of the author. The essential error has sometimes progressed a little further in M, the later codex, than in L. They are: 2.1 phaleuticus (-euncus M) for Phaleucius; 7.1, 23 diadecasillabus for duodecasillabus; 10.3 prior for priori. Cf. also 1.6 regulam, 4.8 Inde, and 8.3 breviatur, where significant abbreviations appear to have stood in the archetype. For all these instances see the Commentary at the appropriate place.

<sup>16</sup> Five instances out of seventeen: 4.4-5, 12-13; 5.4-5; 7.27-28; 9.4-5.

he says, as is his constant practice, that a certain *rithmus* is employed in a strophe of so many *membra* (verses).<sup>17</sup> Once when the number of *membra* is at issue, he sets out only the first and fifth of a strophe, knowing that the reader, since the strophe has just been quoted in full, is aware that three *membra* intervene.<sup>18</sup> Again, once he treats of the suppression of a syllable, the reason for which is understood only in the light of the *membra* following the initial verse of a strophe.<sup>19</sup>

Not only has the line of the textual tradition represented by the actual codex Clm 14784 (my M) been truncated, but it has also suffered at the hand of the emender. Several instances show how an egregious error has later been reconciled by 'emendation,' to the progressive deterioration of the text.<sup>20</sup> In other places there exists the possibility that a genuine difficulty, as a peculiar idiomatic usage, in the archetype has been obscured by oversimplification.

The Leningrad codex (my L), apparently carelessly copied from its parent manuscript, has many errors, but these seem for the most part due to the inadvertence of the scribe of L, and not inherent in the tradition. In more than twenty-five places I have preferred the readings of M to those of L. However, in some fifty-seven instances, including the additions of genuine text mentioned above, L's readings are better than M's and reflect a more correct tradition. These statistics become more impressive when we remember that about a fourth of L's text is missing, and for the lacunas due to destroyed vellum we are solely dependent on M. All of these matters have been noted in the apparatus criticus, and many of them are treated in the Commentary.

In addition to L's great significance for establishing the text of the *De rithmis*, I wish to stress also its importance for hymnody. Two cycles of hymns are now discernible, the second almost completely new to the present editor,<sup>21</sup> and outside of both cycles a new *planctus* of unknown origin.<sup>22</sup> The Leningrad codex affords us seven new strophes,

<sup>17</sup> Cf. 2.5-8 and Commentary, 26-28.

<sup>18</sup> See 4.19-20 and Commentary, 58x.

<sup>19</sup> See 8.20-25 and Commentary, 166.

<sup>20</sup> See 8.6, 10.1 and Commentary on both places, 136-137, 176.

<sup>21</sup> See 8.7-11 and Commentary, 140.

<sup>22</sup> See 4.12-16 and Commentary, 54. There appears not to be any systematic bibliography on the genus. However, Caroline Cohen, 'Les éléments constitutifs de quelques planctus des x<sup>e</sup> et xi<sup>e</sup> siècles,' *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale* 1 (1958) 83-86, gives a schema for the *planctus* as a literary genre, and promises a study illustrating it, which to my knowledge has not been published. Very helpful orientation to the *planctus*, in my opinion, is offered by Ph. A. Becker, 'Vom Kurzlied zum Epos,' *Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und*

either entire or almost entire, of *rithmi* identified or identifiable by reason of the lately recovered text. Through its use the theme and subject matter of a given hymn have often become apparent even though the author remained unknown, and hymnologists may now exploit the material alone or together with such other data as they have for hymns not incorporated in the monumental *Analecta hymnica*.

What are the antecedents of the *De rithmis*? The beginning of the work appears to owe something in two important respects to the treatise *De arte metrica* of Bede. The discussion about the distinction between *rithmus* and *metrum* in the *De rithmis* (sect. 1) suggests in tone, and even to a limited extent in vocabulary as well, the chapter 'De rythmo' near the end of Bede's widely diffused schoolbook.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, although the intricacies of quantitative meter are thrown out altogether in the present opusculum, the incorrect naming of the Sapphic strophe as *rithmus phaleuticus* (sect. 2) may derive from Bede's juxtaposition of the chapters 'De metro phalecio' (17) and 'De metro sapphico' (18) near the beginning of his canon of meters, only the 'metrum heroicum' with a long separate treatment preceding these.<sup>24</sup> Conceivably, further study of the second cycle of *rithmi*, seemingly office hymns, may reveal whether the *De rithmis* is Benedictine in origin, as the first *rithmus* it offers us rather suggests.

Blum's general observations on the authorship of the *De rithmis* are good, but his argument for Alberician origin on the basis of consistency in prose quotations from St. Peter Damian before and after our treatise within the compass of the entire *Breviarium*,<sup>25</sup> requires considerable qualification. The second quotation from the *Contra clericorum intemperantiam* does not occur in the division of the *Breviarium* to which he assigns it (he says 'De mutatione verborum' by mistaking a rubric in M for the name of the untitled, unascribed rhetorical treatise which should be identified simply from its incipit, 'Orationes dupliciter'), but is actually beyond even the following treatise, *De epistolaribus modis*, the final one in L, and thus altogether outside of the *Breviarium*, as

*Literatur* 63 (1939-1940) 299-341 (part 1), especially 311-337; 385-444 (part 2), especially 402-422. Less erudite but still substantial, and withal very readable because of its charming style, is U. Sesini, *Poesia e musica nella latinità cristiana dal III al X secolo* (a cura di G. Vecchi; Turin 1949) 167-181. The point of view here, as the title suggests, is that of music.

<sup>23</sup> H. Keil, *Grammatici latini* 7 (Leipzig 1878-1880) 258-259.

<sup>24</sup> Keil, *ibid.* 254-255.

<sup>25</sup> Blum 124; cf. Vecchi 305 n. 12.

constituted by L's text. In M the quotation is a gratuitous entity, a kind of *flos* that might have occurred to the scribe after he had finished copying the *De epistolaribus modis*, and before he started on M's next piece (see Note 14 *in fine*).

A quotation from another prose work of Damian appears in the *Breviarium* in a treatise on synonyms and variety of expression ('Miramur ultra quam... facie vultuque sereno'), which immediately precedes the *De rithmis*.<sup>26</sup> Formerly, as with the *De rithmis*, the tradition of the 'Miramur' could have been impugned because the work was found only in the one Munich codex. Now, however, the Leningrad manuscript vindicates it for the Alberician corpus of opuscula comprising the *Breviarium*. Not only is its juxtaposition<sup>27</sup> with the *De rithmis* significant, but also its content, which is peculiarly Benedictine and Casinese. Among its copious unattributed literary and rhetorical materials I have traced long quotations to various works of Alberic's learned contemporaries at Monte Cassino, Alfano, eventually archbishop of Salerno, and Guaiferius of Salerno,<sup>28</sup> *loci* in both verse and prose to supplement the passage from St. Peter Damian which Blum had recognized.

Evidence for the age of the composition of the *De rithmis* is seen in the fact that the new strophic material in L contains in no instance genuine rhyme. This circumstance in all probability points to a time not later than the eleventh century, that of Alberic, and of St. Peter Damian, whose verse is represented in two of the *rithmi*.

<sup>26</sup> L fol. 11<sup>r</sup>-13<sup>v</sup>, M fol. 86<sup>r</sup>-92<sup>r</sup>. For Damian therein, see Blum 116 n. 113 *in fine*.

<sup>27</sup> The juxtaposition of the *opuscula* shows only one irregularity, this pertaining to an element found in full in M (fol. 92<sup>r</sup>) and represented in L (fol. 13<sup>v</sup> marg.) only by its titlature. The *De rithmis* in both L and M is followed immediately by a grammatical opusculum, beginning 'Orationes dupliciter fieri.'

<sup>28</sup> Alfano, *Vita metrica sanctorum duodecim fratrum* (B[ibliotheca] H[agiographica] L[atina] 2299; AS, Sept. I 148-151) M[onacensis 14784] fol. 92<sup>r</sup>, L[eninopolitanus] fol. 13<sup>v</sup>; also, *Oratio seu confessio metrica* (PL 147.1255-56) M fols. 91<sup>v</sup>-92<sup>r</sup>, L fol. 13<sup>v</sup>. Guaiferius, *Vita sancti Lucii* (BHL 5022; AS, Mar. I 302) M fols. 91<sup>r</sup>-91<sup>v</sup>, L fols. 13<sup>r</sup>-13<sup>v</sup>; also, *Historia inventionis corporis sancti Secundini* (BHL 7556; AS, Feb. II 532) M fol. 92<sup>r</sup>, L fol. 13<sup>v</sup>.

All this hagiographical material carried by the two codices, that of Munich and (with some lacunas) that of Leningrad, is significant for the textual study of the above cited works, heretofore known only from Codex Casinensis 280 and a codex at Veroli (has Alfano, *Vita* ... .. *duodecim fratrum* only; see Mazzatinti 34.5), and the several editions printed therefrom. How our text of this hagiographical lore is related to those in the codices just mentioned, and what criteria the author of the treatise 'Miramur' used in his selection of extracts, amounting at times to suppression of matter with political overtones in the papal biography (*Vita S. Lucii*)—these and other questions must be reserved for a later study of mine.

Alberician authorship should not be rejected on stylistic grounds alone, a not entirely reliable criterion. The work, for instance, might have been a youthful performance, based, perhaps, on notes from reading, and never brought to a point of stylistic finish. Be that as it may, it can now be said with a high degree of confidence, in light of the new corroborating evidence that L constitutes, that it was Alberic himself who included the *De rithmis* in his *Breviarium*. But there is no good reason why the compiler of a many-sided manual in that day should not have appropriated an already existing treatise on the desired subject if it was available and suited. The common textual tradition, then, of the *Breviarium* and the *De rithmis* appears to be not a matter of the subsequent fate of the *Breviarium*, but to have begun with Alberic himself.

With the publication of the new improved text of the *De rithmis* it is hoped that future theorists on medieval verse will have recourse to this important document whose influence must have been coextensive with Alberic's prose dictamen. In the matter of syllabism combined with what may be called the penultima principle of terminal cadence, the two essentials of the medieval *rithmus*, even the excellent recent works of Beare<sup>29</sup> and Norberg<sup>30</sup> were handicapped by the lack of such a published authoritative primary source as the *De rithmis* represents. The little work serves, moreover, to vindicate Wilhelm Meyer, who although apparently unacquainted with any text of the *De rithmis*, insisted that medieval rhythmic verse consists simply in matched syllable count and terminal cadence of word accent in successive verses.<sup>31</sup>

There remain a few remarks on the externals of the present edition of the *De rithmis*. The symbol for the Leningrad codex (cod. lat. Bibl. Pub. Leninopol. O. v. XVI. 3, saec. XII, foll. 13<sup>v</sup>-14<sup>v</sup>) is L; that for the Munich codex (cod. lat. Monac. 14784, saec. XII, foll. 92<sup>v</sup>-94<sup>v</sup>) is M. To avoid crowding and obscuring the Apparatus Criticus with L's numerous lacunae, where our text must rest almost solely on M, a special report of these is given in the footnotes.<sup>32</sup> In the few instances

<sup>29</sup> W. Beare, *Latin Verse and European Song: A Study in Accent and Rhythm* (London 1957).

<sup>30</sup> D. Norberg, *Introduction à l'étude de la versification latine médiévale*, 'Studia Latina Stockholmensia' 5; Stockholm 1958).

<sup>31</sup> W. Meyer, 'Spanisches zur Geschichte der ältesten mittellateinischen Rythmik', *Nachrichten Gesellschaft der Wiss. Göttingen* (1913) 165. Cf. G. Lote, *Histoire du vers français* I (Paris 1949) 23, 27, and *passim*, and referred to by Beare (see n. 29) 101.

<sup>32</sup> (Reference by chapters and lines thereof.) 4.2 -us octonario, 2 -ithmi exem-, 3 -bus—istud, 4 Ma-, 5 -id—pro-, 6 nobilis see *App. Crit.* ¶ 43, 8 Inde huius-, vere qua-

that L's lacunae cannot be filled by M, the words proposed on the basis of an established literary source, as a well known hymn, or through conjecture from the context, are italicized in the text, and appropriate rubrics are usually entered in the Apparatus.

The numbering of the entries in the Commentary corresponds to that of the Apparatus Criticus. In the text, however, superscript numbers followed immediately by *x* indicate material in the Commentary not referred to in the Apparatus. The bracketed Arabic numbers in the text represent my own division of the treatise into logical, convenient sections or chapters to serve as one basic system of reference in the Introduction and its footnotes, and to a lesser degree within the articles of the Commentary. In any given reference, therefore, the number before the period stands for the section; the number after, the line of that section.

The schematization of the *rithmi* is not found in the codices, but is presented here for the reader's convenience, in accordance with the rules, as I understand them, for each of the *rithmi* described in the treatise. The medieval orthography of the codices is preserved, e.g., in the use of *e* for the diphthong *ae*, and in the omission of initial *h* in Greek derivatives. I have followed the modern practice, however, in distinguishing between vocalic and consonantal *u* by the use of *u* and *v*, respectively.

.9 -iuscuiusque, -atur, .10 -i rith-, -ia ut, .10 laba, .11 first *u* in producat; 6.7-21 uniuscuiusque—eptasillabum (*fragments, however, of text remain near the end of the lacuna*: .18 ex, .19 Et *u*-, sed, .20 ex *v*... (*Roman numeral*), -re exstimant, .21 sed—epda-; 7.13 deputavit principes *see App. Crit. ¶ 113*, .14-28 alius—sidera, .29 *fragments of uncertain words, see App. Crit. ¶ 125*; 8.1 De-, ex—rithmus, .2 mem-, .19 the rest of the verse after tibi men-, .20 Solet interdum, -liquo membro *see App. Crit. ¶ 158*, .21 pati ver-, .22 precantum, .23-25, some syllables of verse, *see App. Crit. ¶ 162*; 9.1 rithmus est, .2 quinis silla-, .3 consuevi, sono pro-, .4 tensor, .6 -tor, .9 terr- *see App. Crit. ¶ 171*.

## Text

DE RITHMIS<sup>1</sup>

[1] [fol. 13<sup>v</sup> L, 92<sup>v</sup> M] Rithmorum alii sunt in quibus consideratur mensura<sup>2</sup> tantum sillabarum sine omni longitudinis et brevitatis consideratione.<sup>3</sup> Alii sunt in quibus cum certo et determinato numero sillabarum etiam<sup>4</sup> longitudo et brevitatis est prospecta.<sup>5</sup> Quod est<sup>6</sup> apertius<sup>7</sup> dicere: rithmi<sup>8</sup> pariter<sup>9</sup> sunt<sup>10</sup> et metra. Sunt autem aliqui<sup>11</sup> rithmorum de quibus edisserere<sup>12</sup> decrevi per regulam.<sup>13</sup>

[2] Rithmus phaleuticus,<sup>14</sup> qui<sup>15</sup> ab auctore<sup>16</sup> tale est adeptus<sup>17</sup> vocabulum, constat ex tribus endecasillabis<sup>18</sup> et uno pentasillabo.<sup>19</sup> Unumquodque endecasillabum<sup>20</sup> habet in<sup>21</sup> prima portione<sup>22</sup> pentasillabum,<sup>23</sup> in secunda exasillabum.<sup>24</sup> Huius exemplum hoc<sup>25</sup> est:

Christe, sanctorum decus atque vita,<sup>26</sup>  
virtus<sup>27</sup> et forma, lux salusque tuis,  
supplicum vota pariterque himnum  
suscipe clemens.<sup>28</sup>

[3] Rithmus exasillabus<sup>29</sup> quaternarius constat ex quattuor membris quorum unumquodque conficitur sex sillabis et tribus articulis, ita videlicet, quatenus unoquoque articulo<sup>30</sup> dictio terminetur eo scilicet ordine ut unusquisque<sup>31</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Titulum a praescriptione in M 'Incipit secunda (sc. pars) de rithmis' duxi (de 'prima parte' et omnibus quae in codicibus ante hoc opusculum exscripta sunt, alias, in toto Breviario edendo, edisseram; v. Blum 124). Titulum vel potius annotationem in marg. M 'Consideratio rithmorum' (cf. 1.1-2 consideratur... consideratione) repudio. Verba ordiendi huius opusculi non exhibet L.

<sup>2</sup> mensura consideratur L.

<sup>3</sup> consideratione M.

<sup>4</sup> etiam L, et M.

<sup>5</sup> prospeta M.

<sup>6</sup> Quod est) Quidem L.

<sup>7</sup> apercius M.

<sup>8</sup> Rithmorum alii ante rithmi add. M.

<sup>9</sup> pariter om. M.

<sup>10</sup> sunt om. L.

<sup>11</sup> aliqui L, diversa genera post rithmorum exh. M.

<sup>12</sup> edisserere L.

<sup>13</sup> regulam L, singula M.

<sup>14</sup> phaleuncus M.

<sup>15</sup> est ante qui add. L.

<sup>16</sup> auctoritate M.

<sup>17</sup> adeptus est M.

<sup>18</sup> endecasilla sic L.

<sup>19</sup> pentassillabo M.

<sup>20</sup> endecassillabum M.

<sup>21</sup> in om. M.

<sup>22</sup> porcione M.

<sup>23</sup> pentassillabum M.

<sup>24</sup> in secunda exasillabum om. M.

<sup>25</sup> hoc om. L.

<sup>26</sup> vita L, virtus M.

<sup>27</sup> virtus—clemens om. M.

<sup>28</sup> AH 14.63, U. Chevalier, *Repertorium hymnologicum* 3007. Vide Commentarium.

<sup>29</sup> exasillabis M, -bs sic L.

<sup>30</sup> unoquoque articulo L, queque M.

<sup>31</sup> unusquisque) quisque M.

articulus vel ex dissillaba dictione constet vel ex<sup>32</sup> duobus monosyllabis.<sup>33</sup>  
Huius exemplum hoc est:

Solve vincla reis,<sup>34</sup>  
profer<sup>35</sup> lumen cecis,  
mala nostra pelle,  
bona cuncta posce.<sup>36</sup>

[4] Rithmus<sup>37</sup> octosyllabus<sup>38</sup> vocatur qui constat [14<sup>r</sup> L] ex membris [93<sup>r</sup> M]  
constantibus octonario<sup>39</sup> numero sillabarum.<sup>40</sup> Huius rithmi exempla innumera-  
bilia<sup>41</sup> sunt, de quibus est istud:

Maria virgo regia,  
David stirpe progenita,  
non<sup>42</sup> tam paterna *nobilis*<sup>43</sup>  
quam dignitate sobolis.<sup>44</sup>

Inde<sup>45</sup> huiusmodi autem consueverunt cavere quatenus penultima sillaba<sup>46</sup>  
uniuscuiusque membri accentu corripiatur. Fiunt tamen quidam octosyllabi  
rithmi in quibus res cavetur contraria, ut videlicet penultima sillaba<sup>47</sup> unius-  
cuiusque<sup>48</sup> membri accentu<sup>49</sup> producat, ut est:

Luget<sup>50</sup> mundus, plorat terra  
desolata et<sup>51</sup> misella,<sup>52</sup>  
cuncta<sup>53</sup> deflent elementa  
funere Leonis mesta:  
quies sibi sit eterna.<sup>54</sup>

Habent huiusmodi<sup>55</sup> rithmi plerumque membra quattuor, ut patet in supradicto  
exemplo;<sup>55x</sup> interdum etiam<sup>56</sup> quinque sed<sup>57</sup> precipue illi qui producant<sup>58</sup>  
penultimam accentu, verbi gratia: 'Luget mundus'<sup>58x</sup> et cetera usque 'quies<sup>59</sup> ei<sup>60</sup>  
sit eterna.'

32 ex ante duobus *om.* M.

33 monasillabis *sic* M.

34 regis L.

35 profer (profert L)—posce (posse L)  
*om.* M.

36 AH 51.140, Chevalier 1889.

37 ante Rithmus *titulum sive annotationem*

Quod sillabis constet Rithmis *exh.* M.

38 octosyllabis *ut vid.* M, ostosyllabus *sic* L.

39 octonario *scripti*, octogenario M.

40 syllabarum L.

41 numerabilia L.

42 non—sobolis *om.* M.

43 nobilis *deest in L, e scriptis Damiani*  
*supplevi.*

44 Attribuitur s. Petro Damiano: PL  
145.987, AH 48.37, Chevalier 11146.

45 Inde M, Inter Blum, Unde Vecchi.

46 sillab. L.

47 sillaba *om.* M.

48 cuiusque M.

49 accentu *om.* M.

50 leget (u *supra priorem* e) L.

51 et) est L.

52 misella M.

53 cuncta—eterna *om.* M.

54 v. Comment.

55 huiusmodis *ut vid.* L.

55x V. Comment.

56 etiam) eiciam *sic* M, et L.

57 et *post* sed *add.* M.

58 producant L, dicunt M.

58x V. Comment.

59 quies *om.* L.

60 eius M.

[5] Epdasillabus<sup>61</sup> rithmus<sup>62</sup> est qui constat ex membris constantibus septenis sillabis, et huiusmodi<sup>63</sup> plerumque constant<sup>64</sup> ex membris quattuor et penultima accentu producit<sup>65</sup> ut hoc est:

O genitrix<sup>66</sup> eterni  
virgo maria<sup>67</sup> verbi,  
que vox<sup>68</sup> que lingua carnis  
par erit<sup>69</sup> tue laudis? <sup>70</sup>

[6] Decapentacus<sup>71</sup> rithmus est qui constat ex membris constantibus ex quindecim sillabis, qui<sup>72</sup> plerumque ex tribus membris confici<sup>73</sup> consuevit,<sup>74</sup> ut hoc<sup>75</sup> est:

Pange lingua gloriosi prelium certaminis,  
et super<sup>76</sup> crucis tropheum dic triumphum nobile  
qualiter redemptor orbis immolatus vicerit.<sup>77</sup>

In huiusmodi rithmis<sup>78</sup> prior<sup>79</sup> portio<sup>80</sup> membri uniuscuiusque ex octo sillabis constat, dictione<sup>81</sup> terminata et producta penultima accentu.<sup>82</sup> Posterior vero portio ex septenis permanet sillabis, penultima accentu correpta, ut hoc est:

Quando venit ergo sacri/plenitudo temporis.<sup>83</sup> / Ecce posterior<sup>84</sup> portio membri constans ex [93<sup>v</sup> M] septenis sillabis, penultima accentu correpta.<sup>84x</sup> Fiunt tamen nonnulli rithmi decapente sillaba ea consideratione ut prior pars membri et posterior accentu corripitur, et hi. qui eiusmodi sunt. duobus constare artubus consueverunt,<sup>85</sup> ut hoc:

Quando surrexit dominus./ cetus<sup>86</sup> iubilat<sup>87</sup>  
... .. / ... ..<sup>88</sup>

Quidam tamen hunc rithmum ex quattuor membris constare autumant. Et unumquodque membrum non ex quindecim<sup>89</sup> sillabis. sed unum ex octo.<sup>90</sup> et alterum ex septem constare existimant.<sup>91</sup> non eum decapentasilabum sed octo-<sup>92</sup>

<sup>61</sup> Epdasillabus (*pro* 'hepta-') L. bissilla-  
bus M.

<sup>62</sup> rithmus *om.* M.

<sup>63</sup> huiusmodi rithmus M.

<sup>64</sup> constat M.

<sup>65</sup> producta M.

<sup>66</sup> genitrix *ut vid.* L.

<sup>67</sup> maria virgo L.

<sup>68</sup> que vox—laudis *om.* M.

<sup>69</sup> par erit) paraerit *ut vid.* L.

<sup>70</sup> PL 145.937-938, AH 48.52, Chevalier  
13024. Solet attribui s. Petro Damiano.

<sup>71</sup> Decapentecus M.

<sup>72</sup> qui M, hoc L.

<sup>73</sup> perfici M.

<sup>74</sup> consueverunt L.

<sup>75</sup> hoc *om.* L.

<sup>76</sup> et super—vicerit *om.* M.

<sup>77</sup> AH 50.71, Chevalier 14481. Hymnus  
Venantii Fortunati.

<sup>78</sup> rithmo L.

<sup>79</sup> prima L.

<sup>80</sup> portio M.

<sup>81</sup> dictione M.

<sup>82</sup> accentum M. *cui suprascr. ante alt. man.*  
*praepos., accentu scripsi.*

<sup>83</sup> v. et notam 77 et Comment.

<sup>84</sup> posterior *sic* M.

<sup>84x</sup> V. Comment.

<sup>85</sup> consueverunt *Blum*, consuevit (-it in  
*compend.*) M.

<sup>86</sup> noster *post cetus miro modo suppl. Vecchi.*

<sup>87</sup> v. Comment.

<sup>88</sup> *Linea interrupta versus alterius syllabas in*  
*L. olim manifestas notat.*

<sup>89</sup> xv *recte* *Blum*, xx M.

<sup>90</sup> viii *recte* *Blum*, viiii M.

<sup>91</sup> existimant *sic* L. autumant (-tu- *suprascr.*)  
M.

<sup>92</sup> ogdo L.

et eptasillabum<sup>93</sup> nominant;<sup>94</sup> quorum opinioni nostra quoque<sup>95</sup> accedit<sup>96</sup> opinio. [7] Diadecasillabus<sup>97</sup> rithmus est<sup>98</sup> qui ex membris constantibus ex duodecim sillabis constat. Rithmus iste dupliciter habet rationem compositionis.<sup>99</sup> Nam interdum ita ponitur ut prior pars uniuscuiusque membri ex quinque sillabis constet,<sup>100</sup> penultima<sup>101</sup> accentu producta;<sup>102</sup> pars vero posterior conficiatur<sup>103</sup> ex septem sillabis penultima accentu<sup>104</sup> correpta.<sup>105</sup> Constat autem rithmus huiusmodi<sup>106</sup> ex membris plerumque quinque, aliquando<sup>107</sup> tamen<sup>108</sup> ex quattuor, nonnumquam ex tribus. Poterunt autem omnium que de<sup>109</sup> rithmo hoc dicta sunt, tria<sup>110</sup> hec largiri exempla:<sup>111</sup>

Felix per omnes festum mundi cardines  
apostolorum<sup>112</sup> prepollet alacriter  
petri beati. pauli sacratissimi,  
quos Christus almo consecravit sanguine,  
ecclesiarum *deputavit*<sup>113</sup> *principes*.<sup>114</sup>

Alius:

Hodie cetus iubilat angelicus.<sup>115</sup>  
... ..<sup>116</sup>  
... ..  
... ..

Alius:

Dies inluxit sollemnis et annuus.<sup>117</sup>  
... ..  
... ..

Invenitur rithmus diadecasillabus<sup>118</sup> eiusmodi esse<sup>119</sup> cuius unumquodque membrum habet porciones constantes ex senis sillabis, penultima [94<sup>r</sup> M]

<sup>93</sup> epda- L.

<sup>94</sup> nominant *Vecchi*, nominat L, nominatur M.

<sup>95</sup> nostra quoque ML, nostraque *perperam Blum*.

<sup>96</sup> accedit M.

<sup>97</sup> Diadecasillabus (Sia-M) ML.

<sup>98</sup> est rithmus M.

<sup>99</sup> rationem compositionis L, compositiones M, -m *Blum*, *Vecchi*.

<sup>100</sup> constat L.

<sup>101</sup> penultima) .pñ. sic usque ad textus finem L.

<sup>102</sup> accentu. pro. sic L, producta accentu M.

<sup>103</sup> conficiatur L, constat M.

<sup>104</sup> accentu) ace *err.*, ut *vid.*, pro acc (cf.

131) L.

<sup>105</sup> correpta M, corripitur L.

<sup>106</sup> huiusmodi *om.* L.

<sup>107</sup> aliquando L, nonnumquam M.

<sup>108</sup> tamen *om.* L.

<sup>109</sup> de) d sic L.

<sup>110</sup> tria *om.* M.

<sup>111</sup> exempli L.

<sup>112</sup> apostolorum—principes *om.* M.

<sup>113</sup> *Quod deest, e textu hymni vulgari supplevi.*

<sup>114</sup> AH 50.141, Chevalier 6060. Hymnus Paulini Aquileiensis in honorem ss. Petri et Pauli.

<sup>115</sup> v. Comment.

<sup>116</sup> *Lineae interrup. versus syllabas, quarum numerus secundum regulam supradic. rithmi est ex ratione lacunarum libri Leninopol., aestimatus, notant.*

<sup>117</sup> v. Comment.

<sup>118</sup> diadecasillabus) -us ex -is M.

<sup>119</sup> esse scripsi, est (sig. *insulare*) M, *om. Vecchi*.

prolatione et accentu<sup>120</sup> correpta,<sup>121</sup> et in prima porcione et in secunda;<sup>121x</sup> huiusmodi ex senis constare artubus.<sup>122</sup> Huius igitur exemplum hoc est:

O admirabilis/ presens sollemnitas  
in qua sanctissima/ conscendit<sup>123</sup> sidera.<sup>124</sup>  
[14<sup>r</sup> L.] ... quod[?]/ ... -ocum/ ... -itio/ ...<sup>125</sup>

[8] Decasillabus<sup>126</sup> ex denis sillabis rithmus nuncupatur, qui constat ex membris constantibus ex denis sillabis. Huius igitur rithmi ea<sup>127</sup> lex erit<sup>128</sup> quatenus penultima sillaba uniuscuiusque<sup>129</sup> membri breviatur<sup>130</sup> accentu.<sup>131</sup> Habet iste rithmus<sup>132</sup> certas et determinatas sectiones<sup>133</sup> membrorum<sup>134</sup> quemadmodum plerique rithmorum.<sup>135</sup> Solet autem rithmus iste ex quinque artubus constare. Hec itaque universa<sup>136</sup> hoc unum poterit dilucidare<sup>137</sup> exemplum:

O crucifer bone, lucissator,<sup>138</sup>  
omniparens,<sup>139</sup> pie, verbigena,  
edite corpore virgineo:  
sed prius in genitore potens,  
astra, solum, mare quam fierent.<sup>140</sup>

Fiunt<sup>141</sup> autem<sup>142</sup> rithmi decasyllabi<sup>143</sup> interdum ita quatenus ea ratio<sup>144</sup> adtendatur<sup>145</sup> ut penultima sillaba uniuscuiusque membri accentu et sola prolatione<sup>146</sup> levetur.<sup>147</sup> Et huiusmodi decasillabus<sup>148</sup> ex quattuor membris consuevit constare.<sup>149</sup> Huius exemplum tale<sup>150</sup> est:

Deus ardui<sup>151</sup> celi conditor,<sup>152</sup>  
te<sup>153</sup> quesumus<sup>154</sup> carmina nostra que<sup>155</sup>

120 accentu (*altera c. suprascr.*) M.

121 correpto M.

121x V. Comment.

122 artubus (*r. suprascr.*) M.

123 conscendit *sic* M.

124 v. Comment.

125 *Verborum fragmenta in fine trium ex ordine rigarum scripturae ad ult., ut vid., partem huius rithmi spectantia exh.* L (*lineolae transversae marginem scr. indic.*)

126 Dedecasillabus M, decasillabos L.

127 ea *om.* M.

128 est M.

129 cuiusque M.

130 breviatur M, bñ L.

131 accentu) acñ *sic usq. ad text. fin.* L.

132 iste rithmus *om.* L.

133 sectiones M.

134 verborum L, membrorum M.

135 rithmorum L, rithmi M.

136 Hec itaque universa *om.* M.

137 per unum dilucidari poterit M.

138 lucissatorum M.

139 omniparens (*omnipares sic* L)—fierent *om.* M.

140 Prudentius, *Cath.* 3.1: CSEL 61.13, PL 59.796-797, AH 50.37, Chevalier 12838. v. Comment.

141 Fiant L.

142 autem M, quidam L.

143 decasyllabi (*y ex v*) M.

144 racio M.

145 tendatur M.

146 prolatione M.

147 levetur) locetur L.

148 decasyllabis (*primam s. alt. man. add.*) M.

149 constare) stare M.

150 tale exemplum M.

151 arduum M.

152 conditor celi M.

153 te—tibi mem- *om.* M.

154 quesumus) qñ L.

155 nostra que) nrāq; L.

in gloria nominis tui canimus<sup>155\*</sup>  
tibi mem-<sup>156</sup> ... ..<sup>157</sup>

Solet interdum rithmus huiusmodi in membro<sup>158</sup> aliquo<sup>159</sup> unius sillabe eclipsim<sup>160</sup> pati, verbi gratia:

Tu suscipe verba precantum<sup>161</sup>  
—<sup>162</sup> qui<sup>163</sup> totius mundi habenas  
*moderans celum*<sup>164</sup> sidere pingis  
vario— —rale [?] <sup>165</sup> ornaris.<sup>166</sup>

[9] Pentasillabus<sup>167</sup> rithmus est qui conficitur ex membris confectis quinis sillabis, qui<sup>168</sup> undecim membris constare consuevit, penultima uniuscuiusque accentu et sono producta. Huius<sup>169</sup> exemplum hoc est:

Extensor celi,	fecisti quoque
fundator terre,	simile tibi
creator <sup>170</sup> maris,	omnium <sup>172</sup> genus:
omniumque que	suscipe preces
insunt in celis	populi tui. <sup>173</sup>
<i>terra</i> <sup>171</sup> et mari,	

[10] Endecasillabus<sup>174</sup> rithmus est<sup>175</sup> qui ex partibus<sup>176</sup> constantibus sillabis<sup>177</sup> undecim<sup>178</sup> conficitur ita videlicet ut unumquodque membrum constet porcionibus duabus, priori<sup>179</sup> scilicet<sup>180</sup> tetrasillaba penultima producta [94<sup>v</sup> M], posteriori<sup>181</sup> vero eptasillaba<sup>182</sup> penultima<sup>183</sup> correpta. Constat autem partibus quinque, ut hoc dilucidatur<sup>184</sup> exemplo:

Audi deus pietate solita<sup>185</sup>  
preces<sup>186</sup> nostras, himnos atque cantica,  
que nos tui nominis ad laudem

<sup>155\*</sup> V. Comment.

<sup>156</sup> mem-) m̄ L.

<sup>157</sup> v. Comment.

<sup>158</sup> in aliquo membro (relicta a verborum ord. docet) L.

<sup>159</sup> aliqua M.

<sup>160</sup> eclipsim scripsi, edipsin (d in ras.) M, eclisim (-im dub.) L.

<sup>161</sup> precantum) per · cantum *perperam* Vecchi.

<sup>162</sup> *Lineae interrup. versus syllabas quae desunt in L (cf. 116), indic., coniecturis meis passim inductis.*

<sup>163</sup> — qui—ornaris om. M.

<sup>164</sup> Moderans c(elum) *tentavi.*

<sup>165</sup> —rale in dubio L.

<sup>166</sup> v. Comment.

<sup>167</sup> Pentasillabus L, Pentaticus sic M.

<sup>168</sup> qui om. L.

<sup>169</sup> Huius om. M.

<sup>170</sup> creator—tui om. M.

<sup>171</sup> terr- e contextu *supplevi.*

<sup>172</sup> v. Comment.

<sup>173</sup> v. Comment.

<sup>174</sup> endecasillabus sic L, Exdecasillabus sic M.

<sup>175</sup> est rithmus M.

<sup>176</sup> paribus M.

<sup>177</sup> sillabis constantibus M.

<sup>178</sup> membris *post undecim add.* M.

<sup>179</sup> priori ex prior M, prior L.

<sup>180</sup> videlicet L.

<sup>181</sup> posterior L.

<sup>182</sup> eptasillaba M.

<sup>183</sup> penultima om. M.

<sup>184</sup> elucidabitur M.

<sup>185</sup> solita (i ex a) L.

<sup>186</sup> preces—domini om. M.

decantamus tui pro victoria  
huius nati resurgentis domini.<sup>187</sup>

Fit rithmus endecasillabus<sup>188</sup> interdum ita ut solerter<sup>189</sup> caveatur quatenus penultima sillaba uniuscuiusque membri<sup>190</sup> pronuntiatione<sup>191</sup> et sono producat<sup>192</sup>. Huius exemplum istiusmodi<sup>193</sup> est:

Gloria sit perenni trinitati:  
patri, nato, et<sup>194</sup> spiritui sancto  
qui<sup>195</sup> succurrit orbi periclitanti,  
per secula cuncta regnans<sup>196</sup> in celis.<sup>197</sup>

His ita finitis sit vobis vita perennis!<sup>198</sup>

## COMMENTARY

[1] 4 *etiam* L, *et* M

The preferred reading is *etiam* since the emphasis is not on the separate ideas of length and shortness of syllables, but on the joint idea of quantity (in the technical sense of ancient classical verse) which is contrasted with the mere counting of syllables (*cum ... sillabarum*). *Etiam ... prospecta* is a unity in the same way as the *sine ... consideratione* of the preceding sentence.

6 *Quod est* M, *Quidem* L

L's erroneous compendium, *q(ui)de(m)*, differing only slightly from the symbolization of *quod est*, is a common error in the Caroline minuscule.

8-10 *Rithmi pariter et metra* L, *Rithmorum alii rithmi sunt et metra* M

The transitional clause *Quod est apertius dicere* indicates that the author is restating succinctly his preceding sentence by using the generic terms *rithmi* and *metra*, the first denoting verse concerned only with the number of syllables, the second concerned with a metrical pattern involving the quantities of syllables, or verse in the classical sense. Some *rithmi*, says our author, combine the two types of composition. In the light of all this, L's *rithmi pariter et metra*, 'they are

<sup>187</sup> v. Comment.

<sup>188</sup> endecasillabus L, endecassillabus M (cf. 174).

<sup>189</sup> sollerter M.

<sup>190</sup> membri *om.* M.

<sup>191</sup> pronunciacione M.

<sup>192</sup> producitur L.

<sup>193</sup> huiusmodo *sic* M.

<sup>194</sup> *et om.* L.

<sup>195</sup> qui—celis *om.* M.

<sup>196</sup> regnans *scripsi*, regnis L.

<sup>197</sup> v. Comment.

<sup>198</sup> His—perennis *om.* M.

at once both *rithmi* and metrical verse,' is simpler, clearer, and more cogent than M's longer and ambiguous phraseology. The crucial word here is *pariter*. At some time in the transmission of M's text it has fallen out, and M's present reading looks like a clumsy effort to obviate the difficulty. This is the first of several places where after a palpable error or omission in the text M later emended with disastrous results. Although it is not indispensable for the meaning, I admit to borrowing M's *sunt* for our text. Especially if symbolized in such a way as *s* or *st*, it may have been easily overlooked by L by reason of the proximity of the same word, placed after *metra*, at the beginning of the following sentence.

13 *regulam* L, *singula* M

Both readings are due, I believe, to the expansion of the same compendium, probably found in the archetype common to L and M, if not in the author's fair copy itself. Was the compendium that for *regulam* (r[e]g[u]l[a]m), or *singula* (si[n]g[u]l[a])? If one accepts *singula*, it is obvious that he must also accept M's *diversa genera*, which precedes. The author has decided to set forth or explain several kinds of *rithmi*, one by one, as is borne out by the categories that follow: *rithmus phaleuticus* etc.

The reading of L, *per regulam*, on the other hand, can be called the *lectio difficilior*. Unlike *per singula* it has no such close reference to an element earlier in the sentence, but its meaning must be considered primarily in itself. A good case, however, can be made for it. The emphasis here is not on a series of *rithmi*, one after another—that goes without saying—but rather on the technical lore to be communicated with each *rithmus* named in the treatise. *Regula* conveys the idea not only of the prescriptions or rules for a given *rithmus* (cf. 8.2 'ea lex erit,' 8.12 'ea ratio adtendatur,' 10.11 'solertur caveatur' etc.), but also, perhaps more important, of a model or pattern for guiding the learner. (See Forcellini, s.v. *regula*.) Are not the specimen strophes of *rithmi* in our treatise, usually introduced by the word *exemplum*, a very important aspect of the *regula* for a particular *rithmus*?

Before choosing between the two readings it is well to recognize the important constants in the situation. They are: the form *rithmorum*, the *per* phrase at the end of the sentence, and its object, a word that embraces the two syllables *-gula-*. A close relationship, as we have seen, exists between M's *per singula* and *diversa genera*. But there is no real evidence that *diversa genera* stood in the archetype because it does not show up in L. Therefore in the light of M's errors and emendations

elsewhere in our text, may we not posit the theory that after finding and incorrectly expanding as *singula* the compendium at the end of the sentence, only then did the ancestor of M substitute *diversa genera* for *aliqui* since it was necessary to limit and qualify *rithmorum* and at the same time provide a grammatically correct antecedent and better antithesis to *singula*? (The changed word order of M, *sc.* the element *diversa genera* following *rithmorum* instead of preceding as *aliqui* does in L, together with the rather vague character of the latter pronoun, suggests to me from my experience with other medieval codices that *rithmorum* may represent an independent use of the partitive genitive, analogous to the vernacular in 'ce ne sono dei ritmi' and 'il y a des rythmes,' and the readings of both L and M may be attempts to reconcile to orthodox Latin syntax the presence of the independent genitive. In that event M's reading would not constitute a substitution for a previously existing *aliqui*. However, M's choice of *diversa genera* as a necessary reference for the genitive *rithmorum* remains for the reasons that I have adduced before this parenthesis.)

[2] 14 *phaleuticus* L, *phaleuncus* M

L's reading is preferred because it is more nearly like the recognized word *Phaleucius* (see Lewis and Short, also Keil, *GL* 6.590.21 App. Crit., 7.254. 10, 13 App.). Most probably *phaleuticus* stood in the archetype, but the syllable *-ti-* was misread in the line of M, a common mistake in the transmission of minuscule texts. Here, then, is good evidence that L and M derive from a common archetype because *phaleuticus* is a palpable error for *Phaleucius*.

With the pentasyllable at the close, the strophe is properly called Sapphic. (Cf. above, Intr., at n. 24.)

26-28 *Christe—clemens*

In view of the fact that the rithmus has just been described as composed of three hendecasyllables and one pentasyllable, an example that shows this four-verse composition is appropriate. L's strophe, therefore, is plainly preferable to M's mere initial verse. The argument is reinforced by similar divergences between M and L throughout the treatise.

The text of the entire strophe as provided by L makes it clear that the first rithmus, appropriately for a treatise incorporated in Benedictine Alberic's work, is a hymn in honor of St. Benedict. From M's reading alone, Blum was unable to determine the fact, and Vecchi erroneously attributed the initial verse to a hymn with a similar beginning in honor of St. Stephen.

*Virtus* (see AH 14.63) is usually at the end of the first verse, and *vita* the first word of the second, in the several exemplars of the text of the rithmus. Since, however, a hymn for St. Scholastica (Chevalier 24448) begins with exactly the same verse as in L, but continues in a different manner from that of the present hymn for St. Benedict, the variant in L's version is probably not peculiar to the scribe, but represents an authentic reading in the text of the hymn, which in the second verse differs still more from the vulgate. That verse in AH 14.63 is *Vita et forma via lux et auctor*, but Chevalier (3007) recognizes here the variant termination *salusque* (i.e., in place of *et auctor*). With L's use of *lux* after the caesura, instead of *via*, the cogency of L's reading *Virtus* is enhanced, especially in view of the series of *u*'s in the second half of the verse.

[3] 33 *vel ... vel ... monosyllabis*

The given strophe of the 'Ave Maris Stella' is well chosen to illustrate the particular *regula* in question. But what of the tetrasyllables in other strophes, e.g., *Gabrielis* in the second, and *singularis* in the fourth, not to mention several trisyllables scattered throughout the hymn?

[4] 37 [Quod sillabis constet Rithmus] M

Blum (125) suggested that perhaps *quot*, instead of *quod*, would be more in context, but in my opinion the latter word is satisfactory enough. I reject, however, the entire phrase because of its strange position, the hand different from the scribe of M, and its absence in L. The rubric, added as an afterthought in a few spaces not filled by the last line of writing in the previous section, is out of place at this point where the *rithmus octosyllabus* is to be considered. Illustrations of the fact that a rithmus consists of syllables have already been given, i.e., the *phaleuticus* and the *exasillabus*. This annotation is by the same hand that gave M its title, *Consideratio rithmorum*, and is in the category of rubrics superimposed on the completed text of the treatise.

39 *octogenario* M, lacuna in L, *octonario* scripsi

The reading of M is probably an inadvertent error. The context requires *octonario*, and since all the elements of the correct word are in the erroneous form, my emendation is accomplished by simply omitting the syllable *-ge*. The psychology of the error may perhaps be seen in the scribe's having written correctly the combination *numerus octogenarium* twice and *octogenarium* alone once, all in the treatise *Formate epistole*, a few folia before the present work (cf. Intr. n. 14).

45 *Inde* (*In*) M, lac. in L, *Unde* Vecchi, *Inter* Blum

This is one of the cruces in our text. M's compendium is not acknowledged to represent *inde* in the period in question (Cappelli does, however, list such a form for the middle of the thirteenth century), even though an analogous one is common enough for *unde*. To judge by the extent of the damage in L, the missing form appears to have been a very short one, probably no more than two letters, followed by the *huius*- that is also missing before the extant *-modi* at the beginning of the following line. The two codices concur in *-modi* and a plural verb, *consueverunt*. Most probably *huiusmodi* is used substantively as the subject of the verb (as at 5.2 below), a usage well vouched for (see TLL 6.2744).

In the light of the context I believe that the unfamiliar contraction should be construed as *inde*, although admitting that Vecchi's undeclared emendation to the relative adverb *unde* makes for a more conventional introductory word of transition. Several initial occurrences of the compendium *Un(de)* in other treatises in codex L, made with an exaggerated, elongated *V*, verging on a cursive capital *i*, suggest a possible source of error in transmission which resulted in M's *In(de)*. (Blum is certainly wrong in equating the compendium to *inter*.) My explanation of the passage is as follows: In his opening statement about the *octosyllabus* our author says nothing about the terminal cadence of such a rithmus. From the example, however, of the strophe presented, it becomes apparent that the cadence is proparoxytone, that is, with the stress on the antepenultimate syllable of each verse. The author then states his rule by saying in effect: 'From the example (*Inde*) it is clear that rithmi of this sort (*huiusmodi*) are usually composed in such a way that the penultimate syllable of each verse does not receive the stress, but the antepenultimate does.'

With the octosyllabics the principle of terminal cadence, the second pole of medieval rhythmic verse—the first being syllable count—is introduced into the treatise, to be met with, from this point on, in the discussion of every rhythm.

53-54 *cuncta—eterna* L, om. M.

These verses of an unknown rithmus are one of the chief textual contributions of L for the treatise. In contrast to the truly ecclesiastical character of the other rithmi used as *exempla*, the 'Luget mundus' belongs to a decidedly different genre of composition, namely, the *planctus*, a dirge for a great man whose death is generally seen against the background of a prominent historical event. The genus is well represented by the anonymous 'Planctus de obitu Karoli,' for Charle-

magne, and the 'Versus de bella (*sic*) quae acta fuit Fontaneto' (MGH, Poetae 2.138-9), i.e., a battle fought among the sons of Louis the Pious on June 25, 841. Amid hyperbolic expressions of universal grief the poet does not forget to pray for the soul of the departed, as in strophe 7 of the 'Planctus' (MGH, Poetae 1.435): 'Christe, caelorum qui gubernas agmina, tuo in regno da requiem Karolo,' and similar pious ejaculations later in the same text.

The occasion for the present rithmus is indicated in the fourth verse, namely, the death of one Leo. The motif of universal grief here, if pressed closely, seems to require a worthy no less important than a pope or emperor. No western emperor of that name being available, the numerous Leos holding the papacy from the time of Charlemagne to the century of Alberic come up for scrutiny. Of these only three appear to be at all likely subjects for popular poetry: Leo III, the great contemporary of the overshadowing emperor Charlemagne; Leo IV, the builder of the fortress Leonine City; and the German pilgrim-pope, Bruno of Egisheim, who took the name of Leo IX. All three were early canonized. It is the German, however, who seems to have more quickly captured the popular imagination by his humility, sanctity, and splendid *res gestae* in peace and in war. His reign of five years was the shortest of the three pontificates. He died at the early age of fifty-two, his death probably hastened by his later life, made strenuous by journeys and military campaigns. The *Vita* (BHL 4818) written by Wibertus, the pope's contemporary, quotes an elegiac distich to illustrate the sorrow of Rome at his passing: 'Victrix Roma dolet non viduata Leone,/ Ex multis talem non habitura Patrem' (2.14; PL 143.504). However, more significant for our present rithmus is a sentence from the anonymous *Historia mortis et miracula S. Leonis IX* (BHL 4819) 7: 'Tanta itaque fuit quietudo in ejus obitu per totam urbem Romanam, ut nec arborum frondes aura modicum agitaret' (PL 143.531). One thinks immediately of the hyperbole and pathetic fallacy in our exemplum: 'cuncta deflent elementa/ funere Leonis mesta.'

If the obsequies of Leo IX are referred to in a contemporary rithmus, we have an important date, 1054, for the composition of the strophe extant in L, and a terminus post quem for the writing of the treatise *De rithmis*.

Peter Damian, to whom the preceding eight-syllable rithmus, 'Maria virgo,' is attributed, should not be excluded as a possible composer of the verses for his contemporary, Leo IX, nor should Alberic himself, also a contemporary. Such luminaries are hardly needed, however, to

fashion verse of this caliber, and the true author of the planctus may be simply one of the *profanum vulgus*.

55x *supradicto exemplo*

*Supradicto* refers not to the last, but the next to the last rithmus, i.e., 'Maria virgo,' which, as is evident from L, is composed of four verses (*membra*). The last example in the section illustrates a five-verse stanza, in which the penultimate syllable in each verse is accented. Our author makes the point abundantly clear by quoting from the beginning and end of the 'Luget mundus.'

58x '*Luget—eterna*'

Here is excellent evidence that the original text of the *De rithmis* contained the entire strophe, and that, in consequence, L's format with full strophes supplied throughout the treatise, is to be preferred to that of M with initial verses only. The author has already illustrated the two main points of his description of the rithmus by having quoted a complete stanza, thus showing clearly that (1) it is composed of five verses—not four—and (2) the penultimate syllable of each verse is accented. Here then he needs only refer to the incipit and the last verse of the strophe already quoted.

60 *ei* L, *eius* M

Twice L has employed the dative, *sibi* in the strophe itself, and here *ei*, the correct pronoun according to classical norms, in such a context. Certainly, too, the use of the same pronoun by M, even in a different case, gives weight to *ei*, which being dissyllabic fits the pattern of the strophe satisfactorily. And yet I hesitate to alter the strophe as given in L. Poetry in all ages has tolerated a certain freedom, and medieval usage, in both prose and verse, the third person reflexive in place of the normal pronoun. The theorist, moreover, may be speaking here in *ei*, as he describes the meter, but does not quote the verse quite verbatim. To choose, however, between L and M in the description here of the rithmus is easy. The dative *ei* is corroborated by the dative *sibi* in the strophe. Thus, the genitive *eius* of M is rejected.

[5] 62-24:1 *rithmus* L, om. M 2 *rithmus* M, om. L 3 *constant* L, *constat* M

In these three related places I have deferred to L's authority in view of the presence of *huiusmodi* in line 2, and my remarks on 4.8 (including 9), paragraph 1, in 45 above.

[6] 82 *producta penultima ante accentum* M, lac. in L, *producta penultima accentu* scripsi

The formula throughout the treatise is *producta penultima accentu* (the word order is sometimes changed, and a finite verb used instead of the participle)—'the penult held by reason of the word accent'—and the meaning in this passage is the same, namely, that the next-to-the-last syllable in the first half of the verse, that part composed of eight syllables, receives the stress because it is long, or, more precisely from the point of view of medieval rhythemics, it receives the word accent. The element *dictione terminata* does not in my opinion alter the situation. It is analogous to 3.3 'quatenus unoquoque articulo dictio terminetur,' and means that the final word within the first part (*prior portio*) of the *decapentacus* is never divided, and a part given to the second section of the verse (*posterior portio*).

*Ante* written later above the line before the final word, was occasioned evidently by the *m* by suspension over *u* in *accentu* ( $\bar{v}$ ). The *m* may be an inadvertent error of M, but the second hand of M tried to reconcile it by inserting the preposition to govern the accusative.

### 83 *Quando—temporis*

The author skips to the beginning of the fourth strophe of the 'Pange lingua' to illustrate his point, a gratuitous procedure since he has already quoted all of the first strophe.

### 84x *Ecce posterior—correpta*

Certainly a tedious statement, since the writer has said the same thing before the last example. And why so much laboring of the point about only the latter part of the verse, as evidenced in this 'eccolo' from a well-satisfied teacher?

### 87 *Quando—iubilat*

The verse quoted of this unknown hymn lacks two of having the necessary fifteen syllables. Nothing daunted, Vecchi cavalierly supplies the dissyllable *noster* after *cetus* in the second part of the verse without reporting his emendation, or a possible source for the word.

L would appear to have carried before its mutilation two fifteen-syllable verses of the hymn, i.e., one more than the extant verse that M exhibits.

94 *nominant* Vecchi, *nominat* L, *nominatur* M

The context requires an active third plural, coordinate with *existimant*. The emendation is slight; very probably the bar for the *n* by suspension was omitted inadvertently in L, and misplaced and corrupted into *-ur* in M.

[7] 97 *Diadecasillabus* (*Sia-*, sed *dia-* in 23 M)

Not finding *diadeca-* elsewhere as a medieval variant for *duodeca-*, *dodeca-*, and not being able to attribute the error to the author, who writes a few words later *ex duodecim sillabis*, I am reduced to considering the form an error in the common archetype of L and M. Although I have found no evidence suggesting medieval confusion between the Greek combining forms *duo-* and *dia-*, still, on the basis of ML's agreement and my desire to reproduce their archetype, I retain the incorrect nomenclature.

107-108 *plerumque ... aliquando tamen ... nonnumquam*

In the diminution of the series, L's *aliquando* seems stronger than M's *nonnumquam*, thus fitting better in second place, and providing variation with the third member, *nonnumquam*, in which L and M conspire. M's *tamen* enhances the force of the second member in the series, and at the same time links it to the first.

115-117 *Alius ... Alius ...*

The extent of the lacunae in L makes it clear that, in accordance with the prescription for the rithmus, two strophes of four and three verses, respectively, must have been quoted, whereas M contains only the initial verse of each one. For the subject matter of these hymns, see below at 125.

119 *est* insular sign ÷) M, om. Vecchi, *esse* scripsi

By assigning the meaning *esse* to the sole occurrence in M of the insular sign usually equated to *est*, I have made the construction following *Invenitur* possible.

121x *correpta, et in prima porcione et in secunda;*

Despite the punctuation of M, a faint period after *correpta*, and a kind of majuscule *e* in the first *et*, I am of the opinion that the correlative phrases *et ... et ...* should be taken closely with the preceding prescription about terminal cadence. This is always made very specific, especially in the long verses which can be broken up into two parts (*portiones*), as e.g. the *decapentacus rithmus* (cf. 6.13). The fact that the cadence is exactly the same for both isosyllabic *portiones* does not

deter the author, characterized by redundancy, from expressing himself here in this lengthy way.

122 *huiusmodi ex senis constare artubus*

Putting a full stop after *secunda*, we come to the only matter not treated before in the discussion of this species of dodecasyllabics: the number of verses in a strophe. *Artus*, like *membrum*, indicates a verse (cf. 6.15, 8.5). From the extent of the lacunae it appears that L contained all six twelve-syllable verses. In this instance, even M contains two complete such verses. (From the standpoint of syntax, *huiusmodi* may be considered a substantive (cf. 4.8, 5.2), equivalent to *huiusmodi rithmus*, subject of the clause, whether *constare* is controlled by *Invenitur*, or by the formulary 'consuevit' or 'solet' in ellipsis here, but certainly well known to the reader of the *De rithmis*.)

125 *O admirabilis— itio ...*

The subject of this unidentified hymn would appear to be the Virgin's Assumption. Note the epithet *sanctissima*, often applied to her, and (scandere) *sidera*, a commonplace in the hymns of the feast. The first verse suggests that there may be a close tie with the previous dodecasyllables whose incipit (7.20) 'Dies inluxit sollemnis et annuus,' may also refer to the annual recurrence of the oldest Marian feast, the Dormitio or the Assumption. Likewise the other incipit of an unidentified rithmus in the dodecasyllabic category, 'Hodie cetus iubilat angelicus' (7.15), seems to belong to the cycle of Assumption hymns, and to refer to the Virgin's reception into Heaven. I suggest that if Alberic is the author of the *De rithmis*, these three hymns may be those which Peter the Deacon, *De viris illustribus* 21 (PL 173.1033), assigns to Alberic under the rubric 'In assumptione sanctae Mariae hymni tres' in his canon of our author's works.

[8] 127-128 *ea lex erit L, lex est M*

L's longer phrase with the demonstrative pronoun is preferable. Cf. 6.14 'ea consideratione ut,' 8.12 'ea ratio adtendatur ut.'

130 *breviatur M, b̄r L*

In a context of abbreviations (*p̄n* for *penultima*, *ācc* for *accentu*) L employs what was apparently a standard one—at least *b̄r* served as a compendium for *breviatum* in the thirteenth century (Cappelli). M's indicative form instead of the correct subjunctive, *brevietur*, may derive from the expansion of the above abbreviation in the archetype. Since medieval syntax is very elastic, I retain M's *breviatur*.

133 *sectiones*

The word here means simply sections or divisions, as in modern English usage, and *membrorum*, composed of verses. The rithmus, we are told, like most rithmi, is composed of fixed and definite groups of verses (*certas ... sectiones membrorum*), i.e., strophes. This is the only place where our author employs a periphrasis for the idea of a strophe or stanza. Elsewhere the word *rithmus* itself is used indifferently for strophe, as in line 5. The present sentence (lines 4-5), which is quite superfluous, becomes clear in the light of the sentence that follows, where the number of verses in a strophe of decasyllabics is given.

136-137 *Hec itaque universa hoc unum poterit dilucidare exemplum* L  
*hoc per unum dilucidari poterit exemplum* M

In the light of the context, the reading of L is eminently better than M's. We need not point out the many rather obvious reasons. On the other hand, it is well to note the progressive deterioration of M's text. By reason of the similarity in the pronouns *hec* and *hoc* the scribe of an ancestor of the actual codex M, in copying his text, skipped from *constare* (the word preceding *hec*) to *hoc*, thereby omitting inadvertently *Hec itaque universa*. Later, another scribe, finding the resultant *hoc unum poterit dilucidare exemplum* ambiguous, to say the least, if not impossible, emended the text by inserting *per* before *unum*, and changing the infinitive to the passive form, *dilucidari*, and perhaps at the same time upsetting the position of *poterit*. If the minor change in word order came later, it would represent a still further step in deterioration, granted, of course, that L's word order in respect of *poterit* represents the genuine.

140 *O crucifer—fierent*

Up to this point all the *exempla*, barring the planctus for Leo, have been taken from the feasts of the Christian year. (I have included under Marian feasts the 'Ave Maris Stella' (3.6-9 and 'Maria virgo regia' (4.4-7), even though sung more often.) Now the author turns to the hymns of the Christian day, or of the canonical hours. His first example is a very literary hymn to be sung before meat (*ante cibum*), and comes from Prudentius' *Cathemerinon*, or book of lyric poems for the Christian's day.

148 *decasyllabus* L, *decasyllabis* M

L's reading is correct. The adjective in the nominative is called for, with *rithmus* understood, and the singular predicate *consuevit*, which is written in full in L. Thus, Blum's emendation of M to *decasyllabi*

falls, and with it his and Vecchi's expansion of the compendium for *consuevit* (*consuev*) to *consueverunt* (-*suer*- Vecchi).

152 *celi conditor* L, *conditor celi* M

The scheme of the rithmus requires that the penultimate syllable of the verse be short. Hence L's reading must be chosen over M's.

155x *in—canimus*

According to our schematization of the rithmus, the third verse is hypermetric by two syllables—only by one if *in* is bound over in pronunciation to the final word (*que*) of the preceding verse.

157 *Deus—tibi mem-* (or *men-*)

The feeling here is of an office hymn for a ferial hour, possibly lauds.

160 *eclipsim pati*

This is a typical Latin medievalism, noted by K. Strecker (tr. R. B. Palmer) *Introduction to Medieval Latin* (Berlin 1957) 50. The meaning here is to be reduced by a syllable.

166 *tu—ornaris*

From schematizing what remains of the stanza, I conclude that this ten-syllable rithmus accented the penultimate syllable of each verse, unlike the preceding decasyllabic 'Deus ardui.' Through the new evidence for the strophe found in L, M's *precantum* is in effect confirmed and the reason for the syncopated form of the genitive made clear in the light of the paroxytone endings for the other verses, and the rule (lines 20-21), now fully understood.

The lyric beauty of the imagery in the rithmus is apparent from the fragments, and suggests somewhat the spirit of Prudentius.

[9] 167 *Pentasillabus* L, *Pentaticus* M

L's reading is preferred because it is the normal adjectival form of a like noun twice already employed by the author (2.2, 3). M's *Pentaticus* does not exist elsewhere as a word, and must be considered a corruption, due perhaps to an abbreviation for *-sillabus*.

172 *omnium*

The reading may be a corruption of *hominum*, which with *genus* constitutes a commonplace phrase, and one that fits the context here very well. And yet I hesitate to emend. *Omnium* may conceivably have a kind of partitive force here, equivalent to *ex omnibus*, or *inter omnia genera creaturarum*.

173 *Extensor—tui*

With these *quinarii* and their thought cf. the true glyconics of Walafrid Strabo in strophes 7 and 8, *Versus in Aquisgrani palatio editi de ymno Trium Puerorum anno XVI Ludovici Imperatoris* (MGH, *Poetae* 2.394-395). The Three Children in the Fiery Furnace (v. *Daniel* 3.52-90) sing:

6. Omnia viva,  
quae vehit aequor,  
quae vehit aer,  
terraque nutrit.

7. Cuncta hominum gens,  
Israel ipse  
christicolaque  
servuli quique.

[10] 176 *partibus* L, *paribus* M

The correct reading of L, *partibus*, which is a synonym for the usual *membris*, is confirmed in line 4, where *quinque* follows it, and by L's five-verse specimen strophe. M's addition of *membris* after *undecim* is obviously incorrect, together with the reversal of the preceding word order to *syllabis constantibus*, but represents an attempt to make a readable text some time after the earlier error of *paribus*, and most probably after the detruncation of the *exemplum* showing five verses. This is another instance of progressive deterioration in M's text: first a bad error, and later an attempt at emendation resulting in a worse condition of the text than before (cf. on 8.6, in 136-137).

179 *priori* ex *prior* M, *prior* L

Evidently the archetype contained the ungrammatical *prior*: only a second hand has inserted in M a suprascript *i* over the final *r*, resulting in *priori*, in agreement with *porcionibus* and remedying the bad syntax of the nominative *prior*, in which L and M originally conspired.

187 *Audi—domini*

Rather than an Easter hymn, this may be intended for the Sunday office. Verse 3 (line 8) lacks one syllable of being hendecasyllabic.

194 *et* M, om. L

The meter requires *et* to fill out the hendecasyllabic verse.

196 *regnans* scripsi, *regnis* L

Undoubtedly *regnis* is a corruption of *regnans*, the *n* written by suspension (*regnas*). Later *-as* became assimilated to the *-is* in *celis*.

197-198 *His—perennis*

Although the doxology, 'Gloria—celis' (14-17), would have been an

appropriate conclusion to a school manual in the Ages of Faith, our author also graciously remembers his readers with a pious good wish. It seems perhaps inspired by the *Gloria*, especially by *perenni*.

The tag is proof positive that the end of our text has been reached. By the truncation of the doxology strophe M has lost the explicit of the work, probably taken as part of the rithmus. Whimsically enough, our author, completing a treatise on rithmus, bows out with a perfectly metrical dactylic hexameter which conveys a neat, characteristically mediæval antithesis.

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# St. Anselm and the Argument of the "Proslogion"

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## I

THE historians of St. Anselm have found it easier to interpret *Proslogion* cc. 2-4 in isolation from the work as a whole than to see how the argument for the existence of God is part of St. Anselm's larger purpose in writing the *Proslogion*. Having thus detached these chapters, the historians have then attached them to later centuries and later intellectual climates, with the result that it has proved almost impossible to see the argument of cc. 2-4 apart from the circumstances of another age. The theologians of the thirteenth century, who were the first to give to the Anselmian proof serious consideration, interpreted the argument in function of the critical problem that their age posed for them, namely, the meeting between the Augustinian and the Aristotelian world views. As a result, we cannot see the Anselm of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas except in relation to the different attitudes they had toward the place and the value of Aristotelianism within Christian thought. An Anselm caught in such a situation can easily become a participant in a problem that he never knew. But can we make the effort to interpret the *Proslogion* before it became a part of the thirteenth-century Aristotelian world? The purpose of the present study is to reach such a pre-Aristotelian interpretation.

In explaining the origin of the *Proslogion* St. Anselm said that, after writing the *Monologion*, he was looking for a single and self-sufficient argument to prove that God truly existed and that He was the highest good and whatever else we believed of the divine substance.<sup>1</sup> That self-sufficient argument is contained in *Proslogion* c. 2, although St. Anselm did not answer the fool of the *Psalms* until c. 4. It seems quite possible to think that the main point in the *Proslogion*, as far

<sup>1</sup> *Proslogion*, Prooemium; in *S. Anselmi Opera Omnia*, ed. F. S. Schmitt, Vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1946), 93. All page references to St. Anselm (and Gaunilo) will be to this volume.

as the existence of God is concerned, is set forth in cc. 2-4 and that what St. Anselm went on to say in cc. 5-26 was part of the religious meditation that c. 1 had opened and that the proof of God had then kept on its uninterrupted course. This overall appreciation of the *Proslogion* would explain why a recent interpreter, in writing a summary commentary on the text, has devoted some thirty pages to the prologue and the first four chapters of the work and less than four pages to the remaining twenty-two chapters.<sup>2</sup>

But there are puzzles in the *Proslogion* that such a procedure, however traditional, leaves untouched. According to c. 1, the *Proslogion* is a work of prayer aiming to reach an unapproachable God. St. Anselm began by recognizing with St. Paul that God dwells in an inaccessible light (*I Tim.* 6. 16). But if in c. 1 St. Anselm believed that God was unapproachable, how could he go on in c. 2 to frame a notion of God that was intended to act as the sole and self-sufficient ground for proving His existence? *Et quidem credimus te esse*, he wrote in c. 2, *aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari possit*.<sup>3</sup> Was this formula a notion of God? If so, the argumentation of cc. 5-15 must have led the author to a rude discovery; for in c. 15 St. Anselm recognized, in the light of the intervening development, that God was something greater than can be thought. Did c. 15 nullify c. 2? This was clearly not St. Anselm's own position since for him the discovery of c. 15 was a continuation of what he had proved in c. 2. *Ergo, domine*, he acknowledged in c. 15, *non solum es quo maius cogitari nequit sed es quiddam maius quam cogitari possit*.<sup>4</sup> In short, cc. 2 and 15 are both true; c. 15 is a complementary addition to c. 2. We are thus obliged to ask what notion St. Anselm

<sup>2</sup> *St. Anselm's Proslogion, with a Reply in Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo and the Author's Reply to Gaunilo*, Translated with an Introduction and Philosophical Commentary by M. J. Charlesworth (Oxford, 1965), 49-78 (Preface and cc. 1-4), pp. 78-82 (cc. 5-26).

The history of the so-called ontological argument lies beyond the purpose of this article. For an introduction to recent American and English discussions, involving the whole question of natural theology, see: A. Plantinga (editor), *The Ontological Argument from St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers* (New York, 1965), 71-180; J. Hick (editor), *The Existence of God* (New York, 1964); A. Flew and A. MacIntyre (editors), *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* (London, 1963). Two interesting but widely conflicting books on the existence of God are: J. C. Murray, *The Problem of God* (New Haven, 1964) and W. T. Matson, *The Existence of God* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1965). Attention should also be drawn to a very fruitful symposium on the existence of God, conducted by a remarkable group of theologians: *L'Existence de Dieu* (Cahiers de l'actualité religieuse, vol. 16, Tournai, 1961).

<sup>3</sup> *Proslogion*, c. 2, p. 101.

<sup>4</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 15, p. 112.

had of that than which a greater cannot be thought if what he was venturing to think of was greater than can be thought.

How is *Proslogion* c. 2 to be interpreted if it is located between the inaccessible divine light affirmed in c. 1 and reaffirmed in c. 16?<sup>5</sup> *Proslogion* c. 16, in fact, quotes St. Paul after c. 15 had reached the conclusion that God was greater than can be thought. In *Proslogion* c. 1 St. Anselm believed in the divine inaccessibility, but in c. 16 he both believed and understood it, having proved by c. 15 that God was *quiddam maius quam cogitari possit*. The question is: how, in the light of cc. 15-16, do we interpret c. 2? What is the basis of the Anselmian argument in this chapter? What notion of God does Anselm have if God is for him both that than which a greater cannot be thought and also greater than can be thought? For if, according to c. 15, God is greater than can be thought, what is in Anselm's mind in c. 2 that requires him to affirm that God exists? What does the notion of God in c. 2 contain that can satisfy St. Anselm's purpose if God radically eludes the limits of human thought?

The point of these and similar questions is not the questions themselves, nor is it their answers; it is the questioner. It is the questioner who, in undertaking to answer them, invests them with the meaning that they have in the process of doing so. To understand what St. Anselm thought he was doing in writing the *Proslogion*, and especially how he located the argument of c. 2 between the inaccessibility affirmed in c. 1 and both affirmed and understood in c. 16, we must avoid loading our questions with Aristotelian presuppositions. Otherwise we shall not know what St. Anselm thought on his own ground. We shall know, for example, what St. Thomas thought about the Anselmian argument, both as to its meaning and as to its validity; but we shall not be able to read the *Proslogion* apart from the Thomistic perspective. And the Thomistic interpretation of *Proslogion* c. 2 is a crucial one because, more than any other thinker, St. Thomas has created the opinion that the Anselmian argument is an illegitimate inference from the notion of God to His existence. Now, on Aristotelian grounds it is. Only, what were St. Anselm's grounds?

## II

To understand the true force of this question, we need to examine the Thomistic interpretation of the argument of the *Proslogion*. At the

<sup>5</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 16, pp. 112-113.

center of this interpretation lies an astonishing idea. St. Thomas approached the whole question of the existence of God by asking *utrum deum esse sit per se notum*,<sup>6</sup> and he pointed to three principal sources of the view that the existence of God was self-evident. Those sources were St. Augustine, St. John Damascene and St. Anselm.<sup>7</sup> Now St. Thomas was not the first theologian to bring these three thinkers together as somehow contributing to a common teaching. But he was the first to diagnose their views under the rubric that the existence of God was self-evident. So far as the texts permit us to say, he seems to have been the inventor of the formula and the question is to know, not the doctrinal function of the rubric within the overall architecture of the problem *utrum deus sit*, but its historical relevance within the world of the thirteenth century. It has not proved difficult for historians to discover that neither St. Thomas' predecessors nor his contemporaries held that the existence of God was self-evident. Hence the question: what was St. Thomas doing in diagnosing the contemporary views under a heading that seemingly did not apply to any theologian? The answer to this question, while involving us in a thirteenth-century problem, will also help to bring us nearer to St. Anselm's *Proslogion*.

From one point of view, the question *utrum deum esse sit per se notum* was a perfectly understandable one for St. Thomas to raise. It was understandable as an introduction to the larger question *utrum deus sit*. To prove that God exists as the culminating moment of this larger inquiry one would have had to show that such a proof was both necessary and humanly possible. But to prove that God exists was neither a necessary nor a possible undertaking for man if the existence of God was for him a self-evident proposition: self-evident propositions cannot be proved and do not need to be proved. Moreover, the propo-

<sup>6</sup> The four main Thomistic texts that ask this question are: *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2 (ed. P. Mandonnet, Paris, 1929), 93-95; *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 12; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, cc. 10-11; *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 2, a. 1. The Anselmian argument is mentioned by name in *In Boethii de Trinitate*, q. 1, a. 3, obj. 6 and ad 6 (ed. B. Decker, Leiden, 1955, pp. 70, 73-74); and *deum esse* is examined as a *per se notum* in *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 2, obj. 11 and ad 11.

For a new examination of the Thomistic natural theology, of which these texts form a necessary part, see: E. Gilson, "Trois leçons sur le problème de l'existence de dieu" (*Divinitas*, I, 23-87); by the same author: "Prolegomènes à la *Prima Via*" (*Archives d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du moyen âge*, 30, 1963, 53-70).

<sup>7</sup> See *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 1-3. For St. John Damascene, the well-known text is *De Fide Orthodoxa*, I, c. 1; PG 94, 789B.

sition *deum esse* could not be proved if this was the proper conclusion to be drawn from the weakness of so many human efforts to do so. St. Thomas' general procedure, therefore, first sketched in *De Veritate* q. 10, a. 12, would be methodologically understandable if we supposed that, before proving that God existed, he opened the way to this end by showing that the existence of God was neither self-evident nor indemonstrable; it needed demonstration and it could be demonstrated. Such is the fully articulated organization of the question *utrum deus sit* in *SCG* I, cc. 10-13 and in *ST* I, q. 2. The doorway to this effort, from a structural point of view, was the clarification that *deum esse* was not an indemonstrable principle. Hence the rubric *utrum deum esse sit per se notum*.

But St. Thomas went farther than the organization of a structure. Into it he fitted the views of others, so that his procedure has a historical dimension and purpose. Indeed, he seems to have intended *utrum deum esse sit per se notum* as a principle by which to diagnose opinions current among his predecessors and contemporaries. Who had said that the existence of God was self-evident and who was repeating it in the thirteenth century? And if it is true that no one had said it, what was St. Thomas doing in thus involving his predecessors and contemporaries—let us say specifically, St. Augustine, St. Anselm and St. Bonaventure—in a dialectical construction that they had not helped to build? This question is as appropriate as the possibility of asking it. Did St. Thomas begin his investigation of *utrum deus sit* with an issue (*utrum deum esse sit per se notum*) that either did not represent or was unconnected with the views of those whom he was interpreting? It is much easier to discover that St. Thomas' diagnosis did not exactly represent the views of others than to see how, nevertheless, it was not unconnected with them.

Without saying so in so many words, St. Thomas has managed to give the impression that there were contemporaries who held that the existence of God was self-evident. The effort to prove the existence of God, he writes in the opening paragraph of *SCG* I, c. 10, "will perhaps seem superfluous to some who assert that the existence of God is self-evident"; and, after listing the arguments of these thinkers, St. Thomas concludes the chapter by saying that "from these and similar arguments, then, some people believe that the existence of God is so self-evident that the contrary cannot be thought by the mind".<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> *SCG*, I, c. 10, §§ 1 and 7.

In *De Veritate* q. 10, a. 12, St. Thomas presents the third of three opinions on the question at issue as follows: "Others, for example, Anselm, think that the existence of God is self-evident; so much so that no one can think within himself that God does not exist, even though he can express this externally and think interiorly of the words by which he expresses it." It cannot be argued that the SCG reference is more contemporary than the reference to Anselm, so that we cannot always be sure who a contemporary was in St. Thomas' mind. But we can be sure about the doctrine at issue, and it clearly goes much farther than the simple assertion that *deum esse est per se notum*. The *De Veritate* text says that the existence of God is so self-evident that no one can think within himself that God does not exist. And the SCG text (I, c. 10, § 1), after noting the view of those who will think the effort to prove the existence of God superfluous, adds that for them the existence of God is self-evident "in such wise that its contrary cannot be thought and thus that God exists cannot be demonstrated."

The position that St. Thomas is here recording for refutation says (a) that *deum esse* is a *per se notum*, (b) so much so that the contrary cannot be thought, (c) and thus that the proposition is an indemonstrable truth. Naturally, if *deum esse* is a *per se notum*, it is indemonstrable and its opposite is unthinkable. But who, other than St. Thomas, made these inferences? As we shall see, St. Anselm did say that God cannot be thought not to be, and St. Bonaventure added that *deum esse est verum indubitabile*.<sup>9</sup> But they did not base their views on the ground supplied by St. Thomas; they said that the divine non-existence was unthinkable, they did not say that this was true because *deum esse* was a *per se notum*. It is legitimate to ask what other grounding, if any, was possible, and we shall ask it. For the moment let us notice simply that St. Thomas, in his presentation, has inferred the unthinkable of the divine non-existence from the self-evidence of *deum esse*. How important to St. Thomas was this formulation of the problem, and especially this order of ideas?

All the essential elements, though not all the details, of the Thomistic position on whether the existence of God is a *per se notum*

<sup>9</sup> St. Bonaventure, *De Mystério Trinitatis*, q. 1, a. 1; in *S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia*, ed. Quaracchi, 5, 1891, 45-51. — The Bonaventuran natural theology is not under discussion here. An examination of the problems involved will be found in E. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure* (2nd ed., Paris, 1943), 101-118; L. Veuthey, *S. Bonaventurae Philosophia Christiana* (Rome, 1943), 107-113; by the same author: "Le problème de l'existence de dieu chez S. Bonaventure" (*Antonianum*, 28, 1953, 19-38).

are already contained in the Commentary on the *Sentences*. St. John Damascene and St. Anselm are witnesses for the affirmative, and the contrary view is taken from the famous fool of the *Psalms* and Aristotle. It is argued that that is self-evident whose knowledge is naturally implanted in us, e.g. that every whole is greater than its part. But according to Damascene the knowledge that God exists has been naturally implanted in us by God Himself. Hence, the existence of God is a self-evident truth. Similarly, that is said to be self-evident which cannot be thought not to be. But God cannot be thought not to be; hence His existence is self-evident. Anselm proves that God cannot be thought not to be, for according to him God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. And since that which cannot be thought not to be is greater than that which can, God cannot be thought not to be.<sup>10</sup>

The case against this view is simply stated. The non-existence of God is thinkable: the fool did it. Moreover, the conclusion of a demonstration is not a self-evident proposition. Now the philosophers — and chiefly Aristotle in *Physics* VIII and *Metaphysics* XII — have proved that God exists. Hence, since the existence of God is a truth that it is possible to deny and to prove, it is not a *per se notum*. St. Thomas' own position is clear and to the point. That God exists, considered in God, is a self-evident truth. In relation to us, the proposition *God exists* has a twofold status. We can speak of God according to His likeness and participation, that is, according to His presence in things by likeness and participation. In this sense, that God exists is self-evident because nothing is known except by its truth, which is derived from God, and the existence of truth is self-evident. Or we can speak of God in Himself, as He is in His own nature. In this sense, that God exists is not self-evident. Indeed there are many who have denied it, e.g. all those philosophers who did not posit an efficient cause (*causam agentem*). The reason for this situation is that the things that are self-evident to us are made known immediately by the sense, as when, on seeing a whole and a part, we know immediately and without inquiry that every whole is greater than its part. That is why Aristotle says that we know principles in knowing their terms. But on seeing sensible things we reach God only by proceeding to Him. For example, we argue that sensible things are caused, that every caused thing is from some agent, that the first cause cannot be a body;

<sup>10</sup> In *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 2 and 4.

we thus reach God only by reasoning our way to Him. As Avicenna knew, knowledge of this sort is not self-evident.<sup>11</sup>

This argumentation involves three propositions. (a) The existence of God is self-evident when we consider it in God. (b) In relation to us, God's existence is self-evident in general in the likeness that His effects have of Him: their truth comes from God and by as much as the existence of truth is self-evident, by so much the existence of God is self-evident. This means: that truth, which is in fact the likeness of God, exists, is self-evident; that the first truth, which is God Himself, exists, is not self-evident. (c) This is why we must reach God *procedendo* and *arguendo*, as Avicenna said. On this basis we can easily deal with Damascene and Anselm.

Damascene's argument, based on a knowledge of God naturally implanted in us, must be understood as a knowledge existing according to a likeness of God and not God Himself. This likeness can lead to God, but the point is that the further procedure of reason is needed to reach God. The argument of Anselm must be understood as follows. After we grasp what God is, we cannot hold that He exists and also hold that He can not-be. But if it should happen that a person does not think that there exists any such reality as that than which a greater cannot be thought, then he can deny that God exists or think that He does not. Anselm's argument, therefore, proceeds on the assumption that that than which a greater cannot be thought exists.<sup>12</sup>

The more elaborate text of the *De Veritate* (q. 10, a. 12) does not modify this result. On the question whether God exists St. Thomas recognizes three different views. (a) Some, as reported by Maimonides, said that the existence of God was neither self-evident nor demonstrable, but rather held by faith alone.<sup>13</sup> They were led to this conclusion by the weakness of the arguments advanced by many to prove the existence of God. (b) Others, such as Avicenna, said that *deum esse* was not self-evident but known through demonstration. (c) Still others, such as Anselm, think that *deum esse* is self-evident; so much so that no one can think in his heart that God does not exist, though he may say so in words and think in his heart the words by which he has expressed it. St. Thomas thinks that the first opinion is clearly false. Though silly arguments have been used to prove God's existence, it

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, *Sed Contra* and *Respondeo*. — For Avicenna, see *Metaphysics*, Tr. 1, c. 1; ed. Venice, 1508, fol. 70r ab.

<sup>12</sup> *In I Sent.*, *ibid.*, ad 2 and 4.

<sup>13</sup> Moses Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed*, I, c. 75; tr. S. Pines (Chicago, 1963), 226.

remains that there are irrefutable arguments upholding it. There is something true, as St. Thomas adds, in the views of both Avicenna and Anselm, as the sequel will show. There now follows an exposition of the main object of the whole article, namely, the two ways in which something can be a *per se notum*, their differences, and the import of these differences for our knowledge of the existence of God.

*De Veritate* q. 10, a. 12 may be schematized as follows. Something is said to be self-evident in itself or in relation to us. That God exists is in itself self-evident. It is not self-evident to us, and that is why we must have demonstrations taken from God's effects to show that He exists. This point appears from examining a self-evident proposition. It is one in which the predicate belongs to the nature of the subject; for in that case the subject cannot be thought without the predicate appearing as present within it. Now that something be self-evident (to us) we must know the nature of the subject in which the predicate is present. That is why some self-evident propositions are known to all, namely, whenever the subjects are known to all, e.g. that every whole is greater than its part. On the other hand, some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who know the meaning of their terms, while people in general do not. In the case of creatures, it cannot be said that for them to be is self-evident. But in the case of God, the act of being is included in His quiddity, since in God what He is and His being (*quid esse* and *esse*) are the same. However, the quiddity of God is not here and now known to us, and therefore for us the existence of God is not self-evident but needs a demonstration. In the beatific vision, when we shall see God's essence, His "existence will be much more evident to us than that affirmation and negation are not simultaneously true is self-evident to us now."

The line of the argument is beyond question and we can follow St. Thomas as he answers objections. Is the knowledge that God exists naturally implanted in us? The reply to Damascene is that it is, but the Thomistic reason is "that there is naturally present in all that from which it is possible to know that God exists".<sup>14</sup> If God is truth and truth cannot be thought not to be, does it not follow that God cannot be thought not to be? Truth, replies St. Thomas, is founded on being and just as it is in a general way evident that being exists (*ens esse*: there exists something, which we call "a being"), so in a similar way it is evident that truth exists. But it is not self-evident to

<sup>14</sup> *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 12, ad 1.

us that there exists a first being, cause of every other being, until faith accepts the proposition or demonstration proves it. Neither, then, is it self-evident that the truth of all things is from the first truth. Hence it does not follow that the existence of God is self-evident.<sup>15</sup>

SCG I, c. 10 lists five arguments in favor of the view that *deum esse* is *per se notum*. They are not unknown to us at this point. The first argument comes from *Proslogion* c. 2. The second is likewise Anselmian, arguing that the maximum thinkable object cannot be thought not to be. The third contends that, since in God His essence is His existence, the proposition *God exists* is self-evident. God is naturally known, runs the fourth argument, because He is naturally desired, and what we know naturally we know without inquiry. Finally it is argued that, as light makes all visible things visible, so the divine light makes all knowable things knowable, so that this light, which is God Himself, is known to exist self-evidently.

SCG I, c. 11 contains the answers to these arguments. *Deum esse* is not self-evident to us. We have no such notion for *deus* as Anselm presupposes. Assuming that we constructed one from things, it would not contain the necessity that Anselm attributes to it and it would prove only that we formed such a notion in our intellects. The notion does not control what exists in reality, so that we are able to deny that *deus est*. The only control that Anselm could have would exist if we were to grant to him that that than which a greater cannot be thought exists in reality. In that event, Anselm could reason from his notion because he would already have received it from reality. The other arguments have already been answered, except the fifth. All things are known by us by means of the divine light, not in the sense that they are not known unless God is known, which is what happens with self-evident principles (that is, unless they are known, conclusions are not known), but in the sense that all knowledge is caused in us by the divine influence.

The *Summa Theologiae* reduces to three classic arguments the defense for the view that *deum esse est per se notum*. There is the argument of Damascene that we know God naturally and hence in the same way that we know first principles; there is the argument of Anselm in *Proslogion* c. 2; finally, there is the Augustinian argument from truth, which exists self-evidently and which is God Himself. We meet Aristotle and the fool of the *Psalms* once more in the *Sed contra*, as we did in the Commentary on the *Sentences*. The *Respondeo* is compact and

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 3.

to the point. There is the distinction between the *per se notum secundum se* and the *per se notum quoad nos*. There is the explanation of a *per se nota* proposition that we have seen, namely, that in which the predicate is included in the notion of the subject. When all know the meaning of the predicate and the subject, the proposition is *per se nota* to all. Such is the case with the first principles of demonstration, whose terms are certain common notions that no one is ignorant of, e.g. "being," "non-being," "whole," "part" and the like. On the other hand, there are the propositions that are *per se notae* but only to the wise who know their terms and their meaning. As for *deus est*, the situation is clear enough. In itself, the proposition is self-evident because the predicate is identical with the subject; for God, as St. Thomas will prove in the next question<sup>16</sup> is His own *esse*. But since we do not know what God is, *deus est* is not self-evident to us: it needs to be demonstrated from God's effects.<sup>17</sup>

St. Thomas admits, in reply to the argument from Damascene, that to know God in something common and in a confused way is naturally implanted in us. This is the case so far as God is man's beatitude. Man naturally desires beatitude and what he naturally desires he naturally knows. But this is not to know unqualifiedly that God exists: *sed hoc non est simpliciter cognoscere deum esse*; just as to know that someone is coming is not to know that it is Peter, though in fact Peter is the one who is coming. So, too, many want beatitude but are mistaken as to what it is.<sup>18</sup>

As for St. Anselm, the text of St. Thomas needs no commentary. "Perhaps he who hears this name *God* does not understand that what is signified is something than which a greater cannot be thought. After all, some have believed that God is a body. Granted, moreover, that any person understand that by this name *God* is signified that which it is claimed, namely, that than which a greater cannot be thought, from this it follows, not that he understands that what is signified by the name exists in reality, but only that it exists in the apprehension of the intellect. Nor can it be granted that it exists in reality, unless it were granted that there exists in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought; which is not granted by those who hold the view that God does not exist".<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 3, a. 4.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, I, q. 2, a. 1.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 1.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 2.

With the objection based on truth St. Thomas deals in a summary way. "That truth exists in a general way, this is a self-evident proposition; but that the first truth exists, this is not self-evident to us".<sup>20</sup>

It is easier to understand what St. Thomas means to say in these texts from the *Sentences* to the *Summa Theologiae* than to see why he says it. Seen in Aristotelian terms, the existence of God is a truth of demonstration; it is not a self-evident truth. If we say that the existence of God is known by man naturally because God has implanted a knowledge of Himself in man, St. Thomas does not disagree; he merely points out that such a natural knowledge of God is confused, it is not a knowledge of God in Himself, it is compatible with denying that God exists, and the demonstration that He exists is still a necessity. As an effort to organize the whole question *utrum deus sit*, the procedure of St. Thomas is perfectly understandable; it is particularly understandable in the Aristotelian aim and spirit that it has as an exposition of Christian doctrine. What is not clear is its historical role in the thirteenth century.

Here let us ask a provisional question. The core of St. Thomas' argumentation is its empiricism. Our intellectual knowledge, including the knowledge of principles, comes from the physical universe around us; our notions do not transcend that universe, so that, before and after the proof of His existence, our notion of God has no more necessity and no more uniqueness than the physical universe will allow. Necessity in relation to God is a matter of proof, not of notions, and proof proceeds from the physical existents in the universe to the existence of their cause. The proof of God is not a deduction from notions or essences, and it is a necessity of thought only on the condition of being a necessity found in the world of existence. Hence our question. Granted that St. Anselm did not know the deep Aristotelianism involved in such a Thomistic view, what did he do in his proof that made it vulnerable to the empirical and existential thrust of St. Thomas' argumentation?

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 3. — The examination of the notion of the *per se notum* in St. Thomas, including its Aristotelian (and, in a secondary way, Boethian) origins, is beyond our present purpose. The most difficult aspect of the problem is the nature and range of *natural knowledge*. See, in general, the following Thomistic texts: *In Metaph.*, IV, lect. 5, no. 595; XI, lect. 4, nos. 2207-2210; *In Post Anal.*, I, lect. 5-6, nos. 52-81; lect. 18-20, nos. 149-172; *In Post Anal.*, II, lect. 20, nos. 582-596; *In Boethii de Hebdomadibus*, lect. 1, nos. 13-18.

## III

Since the appearance in 1931 of Karl Barth's now famous book on the *Proslogion*, the historians of St. Anselm have been faced by a dilemma.<sup>21</sup> If the *Proslogion* is theology, in what sense, if at all, is it philosophy? To emphasize the difficulty, Gilson contended in 1934 that the *Proslogion* was neither theology nor philosophy.<sup>22</sup> Now if we take St. Anselm's title of the work at face value, we must say that the theme *fides quaerens intellectum* is a theological one. Moreover if we accept St. Anselm's own reflections on what he had accomplished in *Proslogion* cc. 2-4, we must say that these three chapters effected a progress from *fides* to *intellectus*, the progress was an illumination, but an illumination that somehow produced an extraordinary result. The concluding sentence of c. 4, which is itself an Anselmian monument, reads: *gratias tibi, bone domine, gratias tibi, quia quod prius credidi te donante, iam sic intelligo te illuminante, ut si te esse nolim credere, non possim non intelligere.*<sup>23</sup> Here is the whole transition from the beginning of c. 2 to the end of the argument. But it is a transition from *fides* to *intellectus*, which is precisely what Anselm had prayed for in the opening sentence of c. 2: *ergo, domine, qui das fidei intellectum, da mihi, ut quantum scis expedire intelligam, quia es, sicut credimus et hoc es quod credimus.* Anselm thus prays that he may understand what he believes. What does he believe? *Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit.*<sup>24</sup> By the end of c. 4 he also understands what he here believes. Had Anselm characterized this advance only in religious terms, the result would have been easier to grasp. It would have been a progress from what he believed by the faith that God had given him (*quod prius credidi te donante*) to the understanding that he now has as an illumination from God (*iam sic intelligo te illuminante*). Here is certainly religious growth, since this illumination is a second divine gift added to the gift of faith. But there is more. Under God's illumination,

<sup>21</sup> K. Barth, *Fides Quaerens Intellectum. Anselms Beweis der Existenz Gottes* (Munich, 1931); English translation by I. W. Robinson (New York, 1962). — For a summary of the interpretations of Anselm's argument in the early thirties, which is at the same time an original position on the problem, see M. Cappuyns, O.S.B., "L'argument de saint Anselme" (*Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 6, 1934, 313-330).

<sup>22</sup> E. Gilson, "Sens et nature de l'argument de saint Anselme" (*Archives d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du moyen âge*, 9, 1934, 5-51).

<sup>23</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 4, p. 104.

<sup>24</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 2, p. 101.

Anselm so understands that God exists that, should he refuse to believe it, he still could not not understand it. No doubt, Anselm does not refuse, so that an understanding whose intellectual necessity Anselm cannot deny is for him also a gift of illumination. Thus, at the end of c. 4, Anselm has reached an *intellectus* that is at once an illumination and an undeniable work of understanding. This understanding that God exists does not replace faith, it is added to faith and added even within faith, but as understanding it has an internal rational character that Anselm cannot repudiate.

This result in the Anselmian argument has been emphasized with particular effectiveness by Henri Bouillard.<sup>25</sup> Agreeing with Barth that the argument of the *Proslogion* is a theological one, he also agrees with Gilson that the argument of c. 2 is a rational one. From this point of view, Anselm was doing as a theologian what, under other conditions, Bonaventure, Aquinas and Scotus were to do after him, namely, employing rational truths within faith and in its service. Father Bouillard insists that *Proslogion* cc. 2-4 does have philosophically recognizable marks in its argumentation even if philosophy itself was not present to Anselm's mind. The rational reality was there, and we can see it. Will it be replied that this is a rationality that lives within and on faith, and does not descend to the level of purely human reason? Even so, the rationality of the argument in c. 2 is at one and the same time — and this in Anselm's intention — both believing and visible in its rational structure to the unbeliever. The rationality of c. 2, therefore, is for Father Bouillard intelligible as such to the unbeliever, so that the argument in its rationality is "identical in the believer who speaks and the unbeliever who is listening".<sup>26</sup>

One of the permanent problems in the interpretation of the *Proslogion* lies in this conclusion. According to c. 1 the *Proslogion* is a contemplative elevation of the mind to God, a religious search after what it believes. According to c. 2 it is a rational argument, by a believer, no doubt, but still a rational argument. Can it be both?

<sup>25</sup> Henri Bouillard, S. J., "La preuve de dieu dans le 'Proslogion' et son interprétation par Karl Barth" (*Spicilegium Beccense*, I. Congrès international du IX<sup>e</sup> centenaire de l'arrivée d'Anselme au Bec [Paris, 1959], 191-207). See also the complementary paper of Father Bouillard in *L'Existence de Dieu*, 95-108: "Le refus de la théologie naturelle dans la théologie protestante contemporaine" (reprinted by the author, with additions, in his more recent *Logique de la foi* [Paris, 1964], 97-121). At the source of these developments is Bouillard's remarkable three-volume work, *Karl Barth* (Paris, 1957). On the whole question of Barth and natural theology, see vol. 3, pp. 63-207, especially pp. 143-170, on St. Anselm.

<sup>26</sup> H. Bouillard, "La preuve de dieu," 199-200.

According to Father Bouillard, it can. Seeking to raise himself to God in contemplative prayer, Anselm meets the denial of God by the fool the moment after asserting his own faith that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. The fool intervenes, so to speak, between the faith of the believer and its religious search for understanding. At this point Anselm asks what is in fact a purely philosophical question. Does God exist, or does He exist only in my mind? Does God truly exist in reality? We know Anselm's answer. That than which a greater cannot be thought must exist in the mind *and* in reality. Thus, Anselm incorporates within his contemplative effort a rational proof with a recognizable method and purpose (to remove the denial of God) and an equally recognizable religious intention (to continue his rise to God).<sup>27</sup> Though addressed to his monks, the argument of *Proslogion* c. 2 intends to be logically rigorous and valid for an unbeliever, be it only a hypothetical one. In short, as an *intellectus fidei* the argument of c. 2 is also a genuine proof of God. And should it be argued, as indeed Gaunilo will argue, that the unbeliever cannot begin where Anselm begins, namely with *credimus te esse...*, Anselm will reply that the unbeliever can acquire such a notion from the things of this world.<sup>28</sup> This means that the unbeliever can reach the same notion of God that Anselm in fact has from his faith. As an *intellectus fidei*, therefore, *Proslogion* c. 2 is both an illumination and a rationally visible argument; and though for Anselm himself it is a divine gift added to the gift of faith, it is no less open to the understanding of the unbeliever.<sup>29</sup>

The dual character of the Anselmian *intellectus*, however, which Father Bouillard has disengaged so forcefully, raises a textual and literary question about the *Proslogion* as a whole. St. Anselm parts company with the fool in c. 4. Does the rational effort of cc. 2-4 likewise come to an end at this moment, so that the proof of God, once completed, yields to the religious purpose inaugurated in c. 1? In that event the proof would be an external aid to faith, essential to the very possibility of Anselm's religious purpose, but outside its direct and internal development. In reality such a view is as groundless as the common practice of treating the argument of cc. 2-4 in isolation from the rest of the *Proslogion*. Had there been no fool, and Anselm's monks had not asked him for a logically rigorous proof of God, perhaps

<sup>27</sup> H. Bouillard, "La preuve de dieu," 201.

<sup>28</sup> St. Anselm, *Responsio*, § 8, 137-138.

<sup>29</sup> H. Bouillard, "La preuve de dieu," 202-203.

*Proslogion* cc. 2-4 would not have been written. But Anselm did not need the fool to write the first two sentences of c. 2, and in writing them he posed the unifying theme of the *Proslogion* as well as its basic problem. For, even before meeting the fool, Anselm had said that "we believe You to be that than which a greater cannot be thought," and, while this belief was in fact the ground on which the evidence of God was located, it was also the first step in the paramount aim of the *Proslogion*, namely to locate the *intellectus* of faith in the presence of the divine transcendence. Chapters 2-4 of the *Proslogion* are an integral part of this effort, both influenced by it and also influencing its unfolding. In *Proslogion* c. 1 St. Anselm believed with St. Paul that God dwelt in an inaccessible light and was unapproachable. But when St. Anselm again cites *I Tim.* 6. 16 in cc. 9 and 16, something has intervened: now he both believes that God is unapproachable and he understands why this is so. He understands because he has spent cc. 5-16 probing the meaning of what he had proved in cc. 2-4, namely, that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. Understanding now, at c. 16, how totally God transcends his mind, St. Anselm undertakes, in the next and concluding chapters of the *Proslogion*, to locate himself before such a God. Chapters 2-4 belong in this line of development.

The origins of the *Proslogion* are not our immediate concern. Having finished the *Monologion*, a work that he had written at the request of his monks, Anselm thought that its argumentation was made up of a great many interconnected arguments. Therefore, "I began to ask myself whether it might not be possible to find a single argument that needed only itself for its own proof and would alone suffice to prove that God truly exists, that He is the highest good, needing nothing else, but which all other things need for their being and well-being, and whatever we believe concerning the divine substance".<sup>30</sup> The new proof continued to elude Anselm for a long time, and he even made up his mind to give it up as impossible. But when he tried to turn away from it as a distraction, the proof began forcing itself upon him in spite of his resistance. One day the proof came to him with such force that he embraced the notion that he had been so strenuously turning away from. This is the origin of the *Proslogion*. "Thinking therefore that what gave me so much joy to have discovered would be pleasing to a reader if it were written down, I have written the accompanying short work from the point of view of one trying to raise

<sup>30</sup> *Prosl.*, *Prooem.*, p. 93.

his mind to the contemplation of God and seeking to understand what he believes about this problem and certain other ones".<sup>31</sup>

As distinguished from the *Monologion*, the *Proslogion* is not a treatise but a prayer addressed to God. It begins with an exhortation of Anselm to himself to seek an understanding of his faith and thus to be rejoined to a God Who was ever-present to him but from Whom he nevertheless felt estranged and removed. Now St. Poul had said that God dwelt in an inaccessible light (*I Tim.* 6. 16). But where was this unapproachable light and how did one approach it? Who will lead Anselm to see God and by what signs will Anselm, never having seen God, recognize Him? Anselm therefore stands baffled before the divine unapproachability. "Lord, You are my God, and You are my Lord, and I have never seen You. You have made me and You have remade me, and whatever I possess You have given me — and I have still to see You. Shall I add that I have been made to see You, and I have still to do that for which I was made" ?<sup>32</sup>

This conclusion leads Anselm to three distinct reflections that are the immediate setting of his proof. Having set out to find and even to see God, Anselm discovers the miseries that Adam has brought on his children: he is one of the wretched sons of Eve far away from his God. He therefore wants God to hear him, to give him light, and not to send him away in hunger or in despair. What he asks for from God constitutes the second moment of Anselm's impasioned search. "Teach me to seek You, and reveal Yourself to me in my search; because neither can I seek You unless You teach me, nor can I find You unless You reveal Yourself to me. Let me seek You with desire, let me desire You in my seeking. Let me find You in loving You, let me love You in finding You".<sup>33</sup> The sin of Adam has separated Anselm from God, therefore, and he prays for the only conditions that can make his restoration possible, namely, that God teach him and give him His guiding light. At this point Anselm recognizes the ground of his confidence and the limits of his petition. We are now at the third moment in Anselm's prayer. Why, indeed, should this exile still be seeking God unless he still remembers God even in exile? And he does. Made in the image of God, which original sin and other sins have worn away but not erased, Anselm is still aware of God. He can still remember God, think of Him, love Him. Though the divine image

<sup>31</sup> *Prosl.*, Prooem., pp. 93-94.

<sup>32</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 1, p. 98.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

within him needs renewal and reform, still it is there to remind Anselm of the God Whose transcendence he cannot encompass or forget.<sup>34</sup> Out of this experience, which is somehow an awareness of God within him, is born the Anselmian argument for the existence of God. It is born in a prayer and in an effort to return to a present but hidden God. Anselm is seeking God as one who is already aware of His presence. Hence, in considering the proof, we must ask ourselves exactly what it is that Anselm is undertaking to do.

What does Anselm want? Apparently, two things, judging by the opening of *Proslogion* c. 2. "Therefore, Lord, You Who give understanding to faith, grant that I may come to understand (as much as You think best) that You are as we believe and that You are what we believe You to be".<sup>35</sup> Anselm wants assurance from God on two points of faith, namely, that God exists and that He is what we believe Him to be. But these two questions are so one in Anselm's mind that he even asks the second one first and frames the first question in the light of the second. We believe God to be a being than which nothing greater can be thought. Or (and here, seeking God, Anselm encounters the fool) is it the case that such a nature does not exist because "the fool has said in his heart: there is no God" (*Ps.* 13. 1)? Let us answer the empty-hearted fool. He must admit perforce that when Anselm speaks of a being than which a greater cannot be thought, he hears and understands what Anselm is talking about, though he may not understand such a being to exist. Anselm will therefore argue that that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist solely in the intellect. For did it exist in the intellect alone, it could be thought to exist in reality as well, which is greater. The Anselmian triumph now follows in a few words. "If, then, that than which a greater cannot be thought is in the intellect alone, then that than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But, clearly, this is not possible. Without any doubt, then, there exists, both in the intellect and in reality, a being than which a greater cannot be thought".<sup>36</sup>

The question that St. Anselm has been asking is not: does God exist? To be sure, this question is contained in the one that in fact St. Anselm has asked. But when he opened his argument what he wanted to know was: does that than which a greater cannot be thought exist? Why

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 2, p. 101.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

should it occur to St. Anselm to ask a question in terms of "that than which a greater cannot be thought"? Why did he frame the question of the existence of God in terms of the highest or maximum object of the human intellect? The point does not concern the historical origins of St. Anselm's question, since they really accentuate it.<sup>37</sup> What is the fundamental issue at stake in *Proslogion* c. 2? When St. Anselm proved the existence of God as that than which a greater cannot be thought, to what necessity was his proof a response? Did he intend to argue that existence in reality was greater than existence in the intellect, or did he intend to say that he would fall short of affirming the highest object of the human intellect in all its uniqueness if he did not affirm it as existing? In short, is there behind the Anselmian mechanism of the "greater" a more enduring problem than the mechanism itself, a problem of which the mechanism is, not the substance, but the vehicle? The sequel to *Proslogion* c. 2 proves that there is. St. Anselm meant to prove nothing less than a most remarkable proposition: if God is thinkable, He exists.

The proof for the existence of God is completed in *Proslogion* c. 2, but the true Anselmian problem begins after this moment. Anselm now knows that there indubitably exists something than which a greater cannot be thought, and it exists both in the intellect and in reality. Indeed, Anselm's reflections continue, this being exists so truly that it cannot be thought not to be. Why not? Because we can think of something that cannot be thought not to be, and this is greater than what can be thought not to be. We must therefore conclude that, as that than which a greater cannot be thought, this being cannot be thought not to be. And this is God. You so truly are, Lord, St. Anselm adds, that You cannot be thought not to be. And indeed, only God cannot be thought not to be because, of all things, He alone has being most truly and therefore in the highest degree: everything else is less truly and hence in a lesser way. We are now nearer to St. Anselm's true question. For, if all this is so, "why did the fool say in his heart that there is no God when it is so evident to the reasoning mind that You of all things exist in the highest degree"?<sup>38</sup> After all, what the fool could not possibly think he could

<sup>37</sup> The ultimate sources of the argument and the *quo maius* formula in *Proslogion* c. 2 are not in any doubt. See, in particular, St. Augustine, *Confessions*, VII, 4.6 (PL 32, 735-736); *De Doctrina Christiana*, I, 7.7-8.8 (PL 34, 22-23); also Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*, III, Prosa 10 (PL 63, 763 ff., especially, 765-766).

<sup>38</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 3, pp. 102-103.

not very well have said in his heart, since to think and to say in one's heart are the same thing. Anselm knows that he cannot convince the fool, though his argument should. For, if we are really thinking of a reality and not simply of the meaning of words, then we cannot think God not to be. He who understands that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought, likewise understands that God so is that even thought cannot make Him out not to be. God so exists that He cannot be thought not to be. Anselm now sees this point so clearly that, were he to refuse to believe it, he could not not understand that God existed.<sup>39</sup>

But what is God in being that than which a greater cannot be thought? He is the highest being of all, alone existing through Himself, maker of all other things. What is less than the highest is not God. He is therefore whatever it is better to be than not to be — e.g., true, blessed, a spirit, omnipotent, merciful, supremely just.<sup>40</sup> And whatever God is He is through Himself. He is the life by which He lives, the wisdom by which He is wise, the goodness by which He is good to the good and to the wicked. He alone, finally, is eternal and omnipresent.<sup>41</sup> Anselm can therefore now ask his soul whether it has found what it is seeking. Seeking God, Anselm has found Him to be the highest being, that than which a greater cannot be thought. This being, in turn, he has found to be life itself, light, wisdom, goodness, eternal beatitude and a blessed eternity, existing always and everywhere. In finding such a being, Anselm cannot say that he has not found God. God is such a being and Anselm has truly found Him. Only, why does he not perceive what he has found? Finding God to be light and truth, which can only be by seeing light and truth, Anselm must argue that, in seeing light and truth, he is seeing God. Otherwise, he is not seeing light and truth. Or, he adds with evident perplexity and wonderment, "is it the case that it is truth and light that [my soul] has seen, but still it has not yet seen You because it has seen You somewhat though it has not seen You as You are"?<sup>42</sup> Here at last begins the true Anselmian problem, namely, the presence of God to Anselm's mind and yet His very inaccessibility in that presence.

Naturally enough, wishing to see God as He is, Anselm prays that

<sup>39</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 4, pp. 103-104.

<sup>40</sup> *Prosl.*, cc. 5, 6-9, pp. 104-108.

<sup>41</sup> *Prosl.*, cc. 12-13, pp. 110-111.

<sup>42</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 14, p. 111.

God will tell him what He is that is other than what Anselm sees, so that Anselm may see God in a pure and unalloyed way. All that Anselm sees is shadows, and there are no shadows in God; but he sees that, because of his own shadows, he cannot see any more. Is it that his eye is clouded in its vision by its own weakness, or that his eye is blinded by the divine brilliance? Both reasons are true, Anselm acknowledges. The eye of his mind is limited by its own narrowness, and it is overcome by the divine immensity. For consider how great is that light from which every truth shines upon the mind of man. In its amplitude it contains all truth, it is the source of all truth, in one glance it sees all things whatever it has made, and Anselm can only conclude that the divine truth has a purity, a simplicity, a certitude and a brightness that are greater than a creature can understand.<sup>43</sup>

This conclusion has two results, both of which affect the argument of *Proslogion* c. 2. Anselm now knows not only that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought, but also that God is so great that He is greater than can be thought. Anselm likewise knows that this absolute divine transcendence is, to repeat the language of St. Paul, the inaccessible light in which God dwells. It is an impenetrable light, and though Anselm sees through it, in seeing the truth, he does not see it. His intellect is not equal to this seeing, and the eye of his mind cannot bear for too long to strain toward that brilliant light. "O supreme and inaccessible light," Anselm concludes, "O perfect and blessed truth, how far You are from me, and how near I am to You! How removed You are from my sight, when I am so present to Your sight! You are wholly present everywhere, and I do not see You. In You I move and have my being, and I cannot approach You; You are within me and around me, and I do not perceive You".<sup>44</sup>

There now follows the final movement of the *Proslogion*, based on the conclusion reached in cc. 15 and 16. God is not only *quo maius cogitari nequit*, He is *quiddam maius quam cogitari possit*.<sup>45</sup> And because God is this *quiddam maius* than can be thought, Anselm now knows why it is that God lives in an impenetrable light: God is greater than can be thought. God surrounds Anselm and even enfolds him and Anselm does not perceive God. We are therefore past the argument of *Proslogion* cc. 2-4. God is greater than Anselm can think and he must

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112.

<sup>44</sup> *Prosl.*, cc. 15-16, pp. 112-113.

<sup>45</sup> *Prosl.*, 6. 15, p. 112.

now stop to consider, if not a new setback in his original search for God, a new awareness of an old bafflement. "You are still hiding from my soul, Lord, in Your light and beatitude, and so it is still going round and round in its darkness and misery. It looks around and it does not see Your beauty. It listens, and it does not hear Your harmony. It smells, and it does not perceive Your odor. It tastes, and it does not recognize Your flavor. It feels, and it does not perceive Your softness. These things You have in You in Your own ineffable way, Lord God, Who have given them to Your creatures in a perceptible way. But the senses of my soul have become burdened and overwhelmed and blocked by the ancient weakness of sin".<sup>46</sup> And so Anselm prays that God undo the effects of original sin, that He cleanse and illumine and sharpen the eye of Anselm's mind so that it might see God, and that the powers of his soul be rejuvenated and he might strive once more toward God. Only, Anselm's problem is not merely to undo the consequences of original sin. Even after God restores the divine image in his soul, Anselm realizes that he has another question before him — the question that he now sees in all its force. For he is, at this point, face to face with an unapproachable and ineffable God understood in the fulness of His inaccessibility. Anselm had begun by believing that God was a being than which a greater cannot be thought. He now knows that this being is greater than can be thought. What to do at this point except to ask, as St. Anselm indeed does: "What are You, Lord, what are You? What shall my heart think You to be"?<sup>47</sup> And now, finally, Anselm is in pursuit of God in all His transcendence and with a realization of what this means.

God is many things — life, wisdom, truth, goodness, beauty, eternity, and every true good. Anselm's limited intellect (*angustus intellectus*) cannot see so many things together in order to enjoy them all together. How is God all these things? He is not a whole of which these are parts, for each of them is the whole of what He is. God is an indivisible and homogeneous unity and each of His attributes is wholly what He is and wholly what the other attributes are. God has no parts and neither does the eternity that He is; there is no place or time in which there is a part of God or of His eternity. He is wholly every where and His whole eternity is ever and always.<sup>48</sup> God's eternity

<sup>46</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 17, p. 113.

<sup>47</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 18, p. 114.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

has no past, it has no future still to come. Yesterday, today and tomorrow are in time, and though nothing can be without God, God is not in any place or time; nothing contains Him, He rather contains all things.<sup>49</sup>

This is to say that God is before and beyond all things. Before all things were made, God is. Moreover, while things can in no way be without God, He would in no way be diminished if things were reduced to nothing. God is also beyond things because they can be thought to have an end, whereas He cannot. That which in no way can have an end is beyond that which is in some way ended. And God likewise transcends things because His eternity (including the eternity of things) is wholly present to Him, although things do not yet have the future part of their eternity nor any longer still have what is past. God is always beyond things, then, because He is always present where He is, without the future that has still to come to things.<sup>50</sup>

Once more, what is God? "You alone, Lord," writes Anselm, "are what You are (*es quod es*) and are Who You are (*et tu es qui es*)." What is other in the whole and in its parts, or is mutable in some respect, is not entirely what it is. Similarly, what began from non-being and can be thought not to be, and returns to non-being unless it subsists through another; and that which has a past that is not now and a future that is not yet, such a thing is not properly and absolutely: *id non est proprie et absolute*. "But You are what You are, because that which You ever or in any way are, this You are as a whole and always: *hoc totus et semper es*." Moreover, God is properly and absolutely He Who He is, since He has no past nor future, but only a present, and cannot be thought ever not to be. Yes, and God is life and light and wisdom and beatitude and eternity and many such goods, but still He is only the one and supreme good, self-sufficient and independent, and needed by all things for their being and well-being.<sup>51</sup>

Consider, then, what and how great is this good that God is. This is Anselm's exhortation to his own soul. If each good thing is enjoyable, consider well how enjoyable is that good that contains the joy that comes from all goods, and contains these goods with all the difference that there is between the creator and His creature. If a created life is good, how good is the creating life of God? If created things contain many and great delights, what and how great is the

<sup>49</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 19, p. 115.

<sup>50</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 20, pp. 115-116.

<sup>51</sup> *Prosl.*, cc. 22-23, pp. 116-117.

delight that is in Him Who made all delightful things?<sup>52</sup> Why, then, little man — Anselm pursues himself unmercifully — do you wander over the goods of the earth? Love one good, containing all goods, and this is enough. What do you want, Anselm asks his soul and his body. Whatever you love and desire is there in the supreme and simple good — strength, abundance, harmony, pleasure, wisdom, friendship, peace, security and other goods. Can Anselm's heart grasp the joy that it will have from the beatitude of God?<sup>53</sup>

And now Anselm turns to God. Tell me, Lord, he says, whether this good that You are is the good that was promised to the elect, the good that eye has not seen or ear heard or the heart of man entertained. In that event, Anselm has not yet put into words or thought of how much joy the blessed will have. We do not know the blessedness that God is and that He will give to His elect. And since Anselm's words and thoughts fail him, he can only pray. He prays that his hope will be realized and that his love will be fulfilled. Meantime, he prays that his mind think of God and his tongue speak of Him. He wants his whole substance, soul and body, to thirst after God until he enters into the joy of the Lord.<sup>54</sup>

So ends St. Anselm's prayer, an intense and singleminded pursuit of God. The reader who has followed this prayer that the *Proslogion* is through to the end, and has asked himself what St. Anselm has been doing and how he has done it, is aware of several conclusions affecting the argument for the existence of God.

In the first place, the *Proslogion* is certainly a work of *fides quaerens intellectum*, and the *intellectus* is throughout a religious reality. Even when, at the end of c. 4, St. Anselm says that with God's illumination (*te illuminante*) he now so understands that God exists that, were he not to believe it, he could not not understand it, the point is not that he understands without believing it; the point is that he really does understand that God exists, and the fool could understand it if he really thought about God as he should. Anselm really understands it, therefore, and he understands it within the belief that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought and in the *intellectus* which, through the divine illumination, is generated within faith. The *intellectus* of the *Proslogion* stands, in the very visibility of its rational evidence, as a religious reality; so that, as faith seeking understanding,

<sup>52</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 24, pp. 117-118.

<sup>53</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 25, pp. 118-120.

<sup>54</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 26, pp. 120-122.

the *Proslogion* is a work of theology in the very rooting of *intellectus* within faith. This conclusion, of course, leaves untouched the further point that, as such a religious reality, the *intellectus* of the *Proslogion* contains rational and humanly communicable evidence in its structure.

But, in the second place, what is no less significant in the *Proslogion* is what happens to the notion of God that St. Anselm takes from his faith as the starting point of the proof, namely, *credimus te esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit*.<sup>55</sup> At the end of c. 4 Anselm knows, against the pretensions of the fool, that God so is that He cannot be thought not to be. But when Anselm asks himself what he knows, and what this God is, we realize that the presumed notion of God that he took from faith was not exactly a notion, although it was a starting point. It was not a notion of God Himself because, from c. 5 to c. 14, Anselm went on to prove the totally transcendent perfection of God, and to recognize in c. 15 that, instead of being the highest object of the human intellect, God transcended the intellect and whatever it could think. In short, even as that than which a greater cannot be thought, God was infinitely greater than can be thought. What happens, then, to the notion of God in c. 2 and to the argument for God in cc. 2-4?

In c. 15, St. Anselm recognizes the infinite transcendence of God and thereafter, to the end of the *Proslogion*, he tries to locate himself in the presence of a God Who is totally beyond time but Who is also Anselm's promised beatitude. He cannot speak or think of this God properly; he can only, with infinite inadequacy, locate himself by faith, hope and love within the promise that God has made. This is the outcome that Anselm himself intends for the *Proslogion* as a whole and it is within this outcome that the proof of cc. 2-4 must be located. These chapters really begin the recognition of the divine transcendence that understanding adds to Anselm's faith. As so located, the argument of cc. 2-4 receives two modifications that affect it in a profound way and indeed give it its true significance. The first modification is reached in the progress made from c. 5 to c. 14 and culminating in c. 15. St. Anselm cannot have a "notion" of a transcendent God — an infinitely transcendent God. Moreover, in the course of cc. 16-25 St. Anselm learns why he cannot have a notion of such a God. The infinity of this God as the *summum bonum* is, in the unity and totality of its perfection, uniquely and wholly beyond Anselm's grasp. He now

<sup>55</sup> *Prosl.*, c. 2, p. 101.

sees fully what he had said with St. Paul in c. 1, that God lives in an inaccessible light. How could St. Anselm have a "notion" of such a transcendent and unapproachable God? He cannot and he does not, and he therefore prays, in the presence of this God, that his knowledge and love will grow until his *hope* is fulfilled.

Transformed by the divine transcendence, the notion of God in c. 2 is surely a perplexing reality. On the one hand, after c. 15 it becomes explicitly the notion of that which is beyond thought. Is it still a *notion* of God? On the other hand, there is no doubt that, however we answer this question, Anselm is in the presence of God as in a wholly unique situation: God alone is truly, God alone is eternal, God alone cannot not be or be thought not to be. This is a unique situation for the human mind, and Anselm entered it in c. 2 by means of what he believed God to be. Yet if God is transcendent, how could Anselm have had a unique and appropriate notion of Him? Clearly his argument would not work unless its basis was unique and appropriate. Only, if Anselm himself proved to his own satisfaction in the course of cc. 5-15 that God was beyond his grasp, what was he grasping in c. 2? If he did not have a unique notion of a unique being, what did he have that made his argument possible?

This is not an easy question to answer, and it may be that in asking it I am betraying Anselm at least in the form of the question. He does not say in c. 2 that he has a concept of God or that he has grasped the divine quiddity. What, then, does the *quo maius* of c. 2 mean? What does Anselm have in mind that makes the non-existence of God unthinkable? This question directs us towards the passage-at-arms between Gaunilo and Anselm and especially toward the concluding sections of Anselm's *Responsio*. By instructing Gaunilo on how the "notion" of the *quo maius* can be formed, these sections enable us to look back to the *Monologion* for the full interpretation of the argument in *Proslogion* c. 2.

#### IV

The most relevant aspect of Gaunilo's surprising and vigorous *Pro Insipiente* is that it contests to St. Anselm the very ground of his argument and consequently its possibility. Gaunilo has no notion of God such as Anselm visualizes by his *quo maius* formula. In other words, he has no unique notion of God. Moreover, he cannot construct any notion of God because what he can think of is unlike God and consequently no basis for a notion of Him. When Gaunilo hears

Anselm's expression, he cannot think of anything. But if there is no unique notion of God, then there is no unique inference such as that which Anselm undertook in *Proslogion* c. 2. Gaunilo rather wishes to proceed from the existence of God to His perfection than from His perfection to His existence.<sup>56</sup> We can sympathize with the hard-headedness of Gaunilo's rejoinder. He has no notion of God that does not come to him from things, and this is infinitely inadequate to represent God, just as it is inadequate as a basis for a unique argument. It would therefore be easy to agree with the old sentiment of Hauréau that "nous sommes du parti de Gaunilon".<sup>57</sup> The only question is whether in thus agreeing with the empiricism of Gaunilo we have successfully eliminated St. Anselm's argumentation. Certainly St. Anselm was forced by Gaunilo to explain and defend himself on the ultimate ground of his position, namely, the uniqueness of the "notion" from which he proved the existence of a unique being in a unique way. This outcome is all the more important because, as we have seen, St. Anselm himself insisted on the very same divine transcendence which made a "notion" of God impossible. And yet, when St. Anselm came to answer Gaunilo, his *Responsio* not only took the criticisms of the *Pro Insipiente* into account, it also asserted once more the very same position that Gaunilo had found objectionable in the *Proslogion*. After Gaunilo, St. Anselm can say with renewed emphasis that if God can be thought to be, He necessarily exists: *si ergo cogitari potest esse, ex necessitate est*;<sup>58</sup> and, having said it, he can go on to show that God is thinkable and that, in spite of Gaunilo, the argument of the *Proslogion* is valid.

It cannot be said that Anselm's reply to Gaunilo is not to the point. He sets out to defend the proposition that, if God can be thought to exist, He necessarily exists. No one who denies or doubts that the *quo maius* exists, denies or doubts that, if it did exist, then neither in actuality nor in the intellect could it not-be. Otherwise, it would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought. On the other hand, were that which can be thought but is not to exist, it could either in actuality or in the intellect not-be. Hence the main point: if the *quo maius* can so much as be thought, it cannot not-be. Posit it as non-exists, provided it can be thought, and you will discover what Anselm felt he had discovered: the only way of thinking of the *quo*

<sup>56</sup> Gaunilo, *Pro Insipiente*, §§ 1, 3-5, pp. 125, 126-128.

<sup>57</sup> B. Hauréau, *Singularités historiques et littéraires* (Paris, 1894), 202.

<sup>58</sup> St. Anselm, *Responsio*, § 1, pp. 130-131.

*maius*, provided the thing can be done and at the same time avoid absurdities, is to say that it can be thought *and* that it exists. Hence Anselm's conclusion: "It is false, therefore, that there is not something than which a greater cannot be thought, provided that it can be thought".<sup>59</sup> St. Anselm is clearly striking at the main issue. If God, as that than which a greater cannot be thought, can be thought, He necessarily exists. The rest of the *Responsio* is devoted to further proving, first, the legitimacy of the inference (God necessarily exists) and, second, the soundness of the condition (that the *quo maius* can be thought).

The *quo maius* is in the intellect and it cannot be understood except as existing. Gaunilo's island does not interest Anselm; indeed it seems to have annoyed him as an absurd distraction. He was thinking of that than which a greater cannot be thought, and to him it was clear that, in this unique and therefore incomparable case, what he was thinking of could not be thought not to be. If someone replied to him that he was thinking that this being did not exist, Anselm would rejoin: when you are thinking this, either you are thinking of something than which a greater cannot be thought or you are not. If not, then you are not thinking the non-existence of what you are not thinking at all. If so, then you are thinking of something which cannot be thought not to be. For if it could be thought not to be, it could be thought to have a beginning and an end. But this is not admissible. "He therefore who is thinking of that being is thinking of something that cannot even be thought not to be; and he who thinks of such a thing is not thinking that this thing does not exist. Or otherwise he is thinking what cannot be thought. Hence, that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought not to be".<sup>60</sup> In other words, either you are not thinking of God, or, if you are, you must think of Him as existing.

Anselm proceeds to enforce the uniqueness of the present situation against Gaunilo. Gaunilo can *think* of himself (and other things) as non-existing while he *knows* that he exists. True enough, if he exists he cannot think otherwise. But this is not the point. "For although none of the things that are can be understood not to be, they can be thought not to be — except that which supremely is." All the things that have a beginning and an end or a composition of parts can be thought not to be, "but that alone cannot be thought not to be in

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>60</sup> *Responsio*, § 3, p. 133.

which there is neither beginning nor end nor a joining of parts, as well as that which all thought finds everywhere and always only as a whole".<sup>61</sup> It is true but not relevant that Gaunilo can know that he exists and think of himself as non-existing; God, as that than which a greater cannot be thought, cannot be thought not to exist. It is just as irrelevant that things known to exist cannot at the same time be thought not to exist. That is why, after removing both of Gaunilo's irrelevancies, we can see with Anselm how it is that *proprium est deo non posse cogitari non esse*.<sup>62</sup>

The ultimate problem between Anselm and Gaunilo is, obviously, the former's contention that he can think of God *somewhat* in the sense of thinking of that than which a greater cannot be thought. Gaunilo had said that he could deny the existence of such a being just as he could deny the existence of God.<sup>63</sup> Anselm thinks that this is very bad argumentation since the cases are not the same. When you hear "God," perhaps you have nothing in mind and can say that such a being does not exist. When you hear "that than which a greater cannot be thought," you do have something in mind. If you hear the latter, you cannot deny that such a being exists and use as a ground for your denial that you do not understand it. You understand it somewhat, and you cannot argue about it in the way that you would argue about something totally unknown.<sup>64</sup>

We are now in the presence of Anselm's ultimate contention against Gaunilo's central point, namely, that he has nothing in mind when he hears Anselm's formula. He cannot compare Anselm's *quo maius* with the reality itself nor conjecture what it is by comparing it with anything like it. He therefore cannot think of it. The truth is otherwise, Anselm replies. The answer needs to be read carefully. "Every lesser good is like a greater good so far as it is good. Since this is so, any reasonable person can see that, by climbing from lesser to greater goods, we can figure out (*conicere*) from the goods than which a greater can be thought that good than which a greater cannot be thought. For example, who cannot think of the following even though he may not believe that what he is thinking of exists in reality? If there is a good that has a beginning and an end, then the good that has a beginning but no end is better than it; and just as the latter is better

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, § 4, pp. 133-134.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> Gaunilo, *Pro Insipiente*, § 4, pp. 126-127.

<sup>64</sup> St. Anselm, *Responsio*, § 7, pp. 136-137.

than the former, so better than the latter good is the good that has neither end nor beginning, even though it should be forever passing from the past through the present into the future. Moreover, whether such a good exists in reality or not, much greater than it is the good that in no way needs or is forced to be changed or moved. Can this not be thought? Or can a greater than this be thought? Or is it not possible to figure out, from the things than which a greater can be thought, that than which a greater cannot be thought? There exists, then, the source from which (*unde*) that than which a greater cannot be thought can be figured out. Thus, the fool who does not accept sacred authority can be easily refuted if he denies that that than which a greater cannot be thought can be figured out from other things. And if a Catholic should deny this," let him remember the admonition of St. Paul in *Rom.* 1. 20! <sup>65</sup>

Concede to Anselm, therefore, that in some way an ineffable God can be grasped as that than which a greater cannot be thought and he thinks that thereafter his argument is impregnable against denial. "Whoever denies that there is something than which a greater cannot be thought understands and is thinking of his denial. Now he cannot understand or think of this denial without its parts, and that than which a greater cannot be thought is a part of it. So whoever denies this, understands and is thinking of that than which a greater cannot be thought. Clearly, then, that than which a greater cannot be thought can both be thought and understood. Now he who is thinking of this is thinking of something greater than is the man who is thinking of that which can not-be. Hence, *while* that than which a greater cannot be thought is being thought, and *if* what can not-be is being thought, then that than which a greater cannot be thought is not being thought. But the same thing cannot at the same time be thought and not thought. Hence, he who is thinking of that than which a greater cannot be thought is thinking, not of what can not-be, but of what cannot not be. Therefore, what he is thinking of must be, since whatever can not-be is not what he is thinking of". <sup>66</sup>

The central piece in Anselm's argumentation is the very existence of the notion of that than which a greater cannot be thought. If this notion does not exist at all, all of Gaunilo's arguments follow. If it does, however inadequate it may be, Anselm's unique reasoning in a unique situation follows. Does it exist? *Responsio* § 8 proves that it

<sup>65</sup> *Responsio*, § 8, pp. 137-138.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, § 9, p. 138.

does, and at the same time enables us to see that the notion is itself a construction, in the manner of the *Monologion*,<sup>67</sup> based on the hierarchy of perfection leading to a highest as the necessary measure and norm of perfection itself. A whole dialectic of participation and hierarchy in perfection precedes and grounds the construction of the notion of God as that than which a greater cannot be thought. In the name of this precedent grounding Anselm can argue that we have such a notion, however inadequate it may be, we can think and speak in its name, and when we do we can only say in its name that the divine substance must exist. No denial is possible in the situation. The original conditional proposition (if God is thinkable, he exists), therefore, is found to be valid in its consequence by force of the truth of its antecedent.

An important exegetical point is worth noting in St. Anselm's procedure. As we have seen, in the Prooemium of the *Proslogion* he had said that, having written the *Monologion*, he was looking for "a

<sup>67</sup> In the light of the position adopted by *Responsio* §§8-9, including the meaning of the *quo maius* formula, the following points of doctrine and procedure in the *Monologion* are particularly relevant.

(a) *Monologion* c. 2 contains not only a proof of the *summum bonum* but also, in the process, a trial run of the method to be used in proving the existence of God. The method is participation, involving the notion of hierarchy and leading to a transcendent prime cause, the *summum bonum*, which is the *summum omnium quae sunt* (c. 2, pp. 13-15). The method is then put to work in cc. 3 and 4 (pp. 15-18), and leads to the conclusion that things exist *through* the sustaining causality and presence of God (c. 14, p. 27).

(b) Being not only supreme but also *one* in the totality of its perfections, the divine essence is transcendent, omnipresent and eternal. God is therefore totally unlike creatures and Anselm wants to know how he can possibly think or reason about a God Who is so infinitely different from what he says (c. 65, p. 76). Anselm's answer is that he can point to the divine essence not through itself but through something else. The supreme nature "is never thought to be expressed through a property of its essence, but rather *somewhat designated* (*utcumque ... designata*) through something else" (*ibid.*, italics added).

(c) By a much longer route the *Monologion* has arrived in c. 65 at the same conclusion that the *Proslogion* will arrive at in cc. 2 and 15. When Anselm said to Gaunilo that we can reach God *somewhat*, the modesty of the achievement concerned the fact that, though we reached Him, God was not present in our notion of Him. This is already the conclusion of *Monologion* c. 65. Participation leads to the notion of a greater that has no greater, that is, to that than which a greater cannot be thought. The community of being, as contained by God, is the source of that notion in the *Monologion*, the *Proslogion* and the *Responsio*.

For a general interpretation of the *Monologion* as a whole see P. Vignaux, "Structure et sens du *Monologion*" (*Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 31, 1947, 192-212).

single argument that did not need anything other than itself for proof and that alone established that God truly existed".<sup>68</sup> In the light of his *Responsio* we can now see what Anselm had in mind. The formula "that than which a greater cannot be thought" originates in the effort to find a single self-sufficient argument and answers to that argument. It contains precisely the two elements that are necessary and necessary *together* as a minimum basis for a successful argument. God is the highest being which the dialectic of the hierarchy posits and the highest thinkable being which the argument as an intellectual effort requires. The dialectic makes the construction of the notion possible for the intellect and when the intellect grounds itself in such a notion it cannot not think that God exists: the peak of the dialectic on which the intellect is resting assures it that it is thinking truly and not fabricating; the intellect has then only to remain faithful to itself under these conditions in order to affirm, by the necessity of the dialectic and with the necessity that the dialectic imposes, that God exists.

Seen in the light of *Responsio* § 8, the argument of the *Proslogion* is no mere inference from thought to existence or from essence to existence. It is an inference from that experience of being that leads to the peak of the dialectic as the point of departure for what the intellect *must* do in *its* name. Both the existential and the empirical character of the Anselmian argument, which have been contested, are in the balance in this procedure. We now can see how St. Anselm has telescoped into a single self-sufficient argument the arguments for God that he had set forth in the *Monologion*. The *Proslogion* works successfully to the extent that it translates the necessity of the dialectic of being set forth in the *Monologion* into a structure that is internal to thought and is at the source of the necessities of thought. The mechanism of the *greater* in the *Proslogion*, therefore, must be seen, not as an effort to go from thought to existence, but, *within existence*, as a maximum effort to remain faithful to a maximum object. The issue in Anselm's mind was not whether God existed in the mind alone or also in reality. The true issue was that, when you considered God in the mind and really considered the reality itself, you could not think of Him as non-existing. But if you were to ask Anselm why we think of God at all, his answer would be the answer of the *Responsio* and the *Monologion*: the community of being is itself unthinkable without God; and, by so much, in the presence of the community of being, as the

<sup>68</sup> *Prosl.*, Prooem., p. 93.

maximum condition of its existence, namely, as that than which a greater cannot be thought, God cannot but be thought to exist.

God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. The possibility of the notion rests on what it presupposes. As a notion, which however is *not* a notion of God in Himself, it is a possible one if we assume that Anselm is seeing other things in such a way that the notion emerges from them. In what way does this seeing take place? It consists in seeing other things absolutely, that is, not in the way they are in themselves, but in what they are when compared in terms of existence, origin and end, time and motion. To see things in this way is to see both that they are not the source of what they are and that this source is a unique and eternal being. This being is for the mind that than which a greater cannot be thought. To think of such a being is already to have reached it from and within other things seen in this absolute way. God is in His uniqueness what other things are not, and this is known from what things are taken according to a radical view of their being: things are, but with an origin, and things perish; things change and they are in time. Is not this the situation which, far from being self-explaining, raises for the mind both the direction and the meaning of the explanation? There is a way to God in things themselves, and Anselm saw it, and, having seen it, he went from what he saw to the assertion that it existed.

Thus, the inference in the *Proslogion* is from what Anselm saw to what Anselm asserted. He somehow saw God, the infinitely transcendent God, somehow present to him. If God was somehow present to Anselm, then his inference was from God's presence to God's existence: thought simply acknowledged the presence and then asserted the existence of God. The incomprehensible God in Whom Anselm believed, and Whom he pursued with such insistence, somehow did enter Anselm's mind and Anselm would not deny it even when he knew that God was infinitely beyond his reach.

Should it, once more, be asked whether God is present in things and to Anselm's mind, the answer must remain the same. He is present because the community of things is intelligible only in terms of participation, involving the notions of unity, origin and hierarchy in perfection. Such is the Anselmian thinking. God is present in the community of things as the transcendent source of the perfection they have and cannot explain except by reduction to Him. Given the universe of things such as they are, God is the highest thinkable reality in the sense that He is that absolute and maximum source of being without which things would not be intelligible. Anselm did not

artificially make up such a maximum object of thought: the universe and its perfections required it, since it was the condition of their existence. Present in the world, visible to thought because thought could see being in terms of unity and origin, the transcendent God stood before thought, through the creation, as that than which a greater cannot be thought. This was God's name when thought looked upon the being of things in a maximum way and with an absolute reduction to their source.

## V

With this conclusion we return to our original question, namely, the appropriateness of St. Thomas' rubric in the interpretation of St. Anselm. If we could agree with Father Chatillon that St. Thomas misinterpreted St. Anselm because he ignored the *credimus* on which the argument of *Proslogion* c. 2 hangs, our situation would be simpler than it is.<sup>69</sup> But this would be to simplify the Anselmian position out of existence since it would mean that *Proslogion* c. 2 was not for its author a rational argument. Yet, as *Responsio* § 8 proves, it was, and by so much St. Thomas could examine it on its merits as an argument for the existence of God. If he really misinterpreted St. Anselm, it was not by forgetting or ignoring the *credimus*; it was on the ground of the argument itself. Did St. Thomas misinterpret c. 2 by subsuming the meaning of the text under the rubric *utrum deum esse sit per se notum*? To be vulnerable to the Thomistic criticism, *Proslogion* c. 2 would first have to be open to the Thomistic interpretation. If we allow St. Thomas his interpretation, we must allow him his criticism. But is his interpretation appropriate or even relevant to the text such as we have found it to be on its own ground and in its author's intention?

A first answer to this question would be to say that St. Thomas' interpretation is in fact a total misinterpretation. If the preceding analysis of St. Anselm is in the right direction, then we must say that neither in its premises nor in its conclusion is the Anselmian argument faithfully presented by St. Thomas. And if we ask why this is so, one answer covers the situation as a whole. St. Thomas interpreted and criticized the argument on Aristotelian grounds, and there are no Aristotelian grounds in the *Proslogion* or the *Monologion*. There is not a word in either of these works on the notion of a *per se notum*, no

<sup>69</sup> Jean Chatillon, "De Guillaume d'Auxerre à saint Thomas d'Aquin" (*Spicilegium Beccense*, 1), 228, 230-231.

effort to derive the divine existence from an inspection of the divine essence, no effort to go from thought as such to existence. The true Anselmian position, formulated by its author at least three times for the benefit of Gaunilo, is this: if God as the *quo maius* can be thought to be, He necessarily is: *si ergo cogitari potest esse, ex necessitate est*.<sup>70</sup> Now He *can* be thought to be, not indeed in Himself since He is incomprehensible and ineffable, but in His likenesses; and he can be thought when these likenesses are seen in a state of absolute reduction to their source and therefore in the state of designating that source. God can be thought because other things can designate Him both uniquely and necessarily. Far from arguing from thought to existence, therefore, St. Anselm was arguing *from presence to existence* — from the designated presence of God in things to His existence in Himself. St. Thomas' interpretation and criticism have nothing to do with this argument and the question is to know from what point of view, if from any, what he has said about *Proslogion* c. 2 is understandable as exegesis and as commentary.

It is natural to look in the thirteenth century for an answer, and historians have done so.<sup>71</sup> There is, for example, the imposing edifice of the Bonaventuran theology within which St. Anselm and his argument always had an honored place. When St. Thomas argued against the view that the non-existence of God was unthinkable, was he referring to St. Bonaventure? As we have seen, perhaps it would be dangerous to press the notion of "contemporary" in *SCG* I, c. 10. The *standing positions* in a problem can easily sound like contemporary views, and sometimes at least they can be. In this instance, we know that in *SCG* I, c. 10 St. Thomas thought, not that if the proposition *deum esse* is self-evident its demonstration is superfluous and indeed impossible, but that some people were asserting it; so much so, that the contrary of *deum esse* could not be thought and therefore that *deum esse* could not be demonstrated.<sup>72</sup> *Asserunt*, says St. Thomas, and the question is to know what he intends. St. Bonaventure had certainly said that *deum esse est verum indubitabile*, but he had not said this on the ground that *deum esse* was a *per se notum*. His reasons for saying it were Augustinian in origin and deeply Platonic in metaphysical temper. *Divinam veritatem esse*, St. Bonaventure proclaimed from the very beginning of his career, *probat et concludit omnis veritas et natura*;

<sup>70</sup> St. Anselm, *Responsio*, § 1, p. 131.

<sup>71</sup> See the discussion of E. Gilson, *Le thomisme* 6th ed., (Paris, 1965), 51-60; and J. Chatillon, "De Guillaume d'Auxerre à saint Thomas d'Aquin," 211-227.

<sup>72</sup> St. Thomas, *SCG*, I, c. 10, §§ 1 and 7.

but the grounding of this truth is the purest Bonaventure and perhaps we should not neglect it at this moment. The sentence continues: *quia si est ens per participationem est ens per essentiam et non ab alio*.<sup>73</sup> Participation was the Bonaventurian ground of the indubitability of the divine existence, so that, right or wrong, it was St. Thomas and not St. Bonaventure who thought that only the notion that *deum esse* was a *per se notum* could justify the view that God could not be thought not to be and therefore that His existence was an indubitable truth. It is this equivalence that must be questioned. St. Thomas made it, St. Bonaventure did not, and the problem for the historian is not to interpret St. Bonaventure as though he were St. Thomas. What stands between them is the Aristotelianism that St. Thomas accepted and that St. Bonaventure did not.

At least twice in his career St. Thomas had the opportunity to speak of the *moderni*, to distinguish them from older thinkers and to comment on the point of the distinction. In the Commentary on the *Sentences*, he took the position that the Platonic view of soul and body allowed them to be related to one another as *ens completum enti completo*. Such a view could justify the position of Hugh of St. Victor and Peter Lombard on the personality of the separated soul. St. Thomas' disagreement with this position is here not as important as his reason for it. We must join soul and body to one another, not as two complete beings, but as part and part. And precisely there is a second opinion that makes this possible. It is the opinion of Aristotle, according to which the soul is related to the body as form to matter. Of this opinion St. Thomas says, surprisingly enough, that all the moderns followed it: *quam omnes moderni sequuntur*.<sup>74</sup> Again, in his introduction to the Commentary on the *De Divinis Nominibus* of the Pseudo-Dionysius, St. Thomas explains in some detail the difficulty involved in reading this author. It was due in part to the style and manner of speaking that he had generally adopted. It was a Platonic style and manner, and St. Thomas surprises us a second time by adding that this was not in vogue among the moderns: *plerumque utitur stilo et modo loquendi quo utebantur Platonici, qui apud modernos est inconsuetus*.<sup>75</sup>

These indications suggest, not a conclusion, but a direction in which to look for the origin of St. Thomas' historical position. He cannot mean that all his contemporaries were following the teaching of

<sup>73</sup> St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2; *S. Bonaventurae Opera Theologica Selecta*, I (Quaracchi, 1934), 120.

<sup>74</sup> St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, d. 5, q. 3, a. 2; ed. M. F. Moos (Paris, 1933), 206-207.

<sup>75</sup> *In Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus*, Prooemium; ed. C. Pera (Rome, 1950), 1.

Aristotle or that the Platonic mode of speaking had gone out of fashion in his day. He cannot mean this if only because he was in a better position than we are to know that it is not true. What does he mean to say? Perhaps the following remarks, which are merely a historical construction, can help to locate the problem. Aristotelianism was a new and difficult master in the thirteenth century. It was new in its intellectual pressure on a Christianity that for centuries had little or no experience of Greek metaphysical speculation; and Aristotelianism was difficult because its own metaphysics, physics and ethics contained theoretical positions and perspectives that were not reconcilable with Christianity. St. Thomas was not unaware of the Aristotelian dangers, but he found his own way of overcoming them while still profiting from the truths that Aristotle taught. St. Thomas was no simple disciple of Aristotle, he was a theologian who defined for himself the conditions of his acceptance of Aristotelianism. He was a master tactician who created a Christian intellectual climate within which a revolutionized but still recognizable Aristotelianism could become — and in his theology became — the philosophy natural to the mind of the Christian man. The coming of Aristotle into the world of the thirteenth century is one event, but his coming into the mind of St. Thomas is a second one, as real as it is personal to the St. Thomas in whom it took place. After the coming of Aristotle, as St. Thomas saw things, Christian thought could not remain the same. The natural order received a new depth, creation received a new meaning within the world of salvation, and human intelligence received a new understanding of its mysteries as a creature. A pagan Aristotle, who knew only the structure and dynamism of eternal substances, taught a theologian who was ready to listen the wholeness and dynamism of creatures, including especially intellectual creatures. In the history of Christian thought, the thirteenth century begins the era *after* Aristotle. This is the era of the *moderni*, St. Thomas' contemporaries as seen by him, who could no more return to the world of the historical Augustine than they could undo the new world of Aristotle in their midst.

We must come so far if we are to understand the situation in which St. Thomas ventured to say that the language of Plato was outmoded because his contemporaries were following an Aristotelian intellectual fashion. St. Thomas' judgment is historical only in the sense that his own vision of Aristotle was history in its ultimate intellectual roots. St. Thomas' Aristotle was what a Christian Aristotle should have been in the thirteenth century, namely, a philosopher speaking for nature on its way to grace, and therefore a philosopher chosen by grace to

speak for nature. As St. Thomas saw it, such an Aristotle spoke better than Plato about creation, about the world of time and nature, and about intelligence and truth. What was true in St. Augustine could not but be more adequately said via Aristotle than it had been said via Plato and Plotinus; and what was true of St. Augustine was no less true of Christian thinkers from Boethius to St. Anselm and from Hugh of St. Victor to St. Bonaventure. In short, there is every reason to believe that, according to the deepest convictions of St. Thomas, the main business of the thirteenth century was to *translate* Augustinianism into Aristotelian terms on all those points of doctrine on which the historical Aristotle had decisively corrected his master Plato. St. Thomas' relations to St. Anselm and St. Bonaventure are a case in point. His issue with them is not the particular Augustinian theses that, in different ways, they both espoused. Did they believe, in the name of St. Augustine, that God was present in a special way to the intellectual creature? So did St. Thomas.<sup>76</sup> For St. Thomas as well as for St. Bonaventure God was the unique teacher of the human intellect, and without God there would be no intellectual life, no intellectual truth and no intellectual knowledge.<sup>77</sup> But without in any way denying this divine uniqueness, St. Thomas refuses to locate God in His uniqueness within creation or within its structure. He refused because he thought that a Platonic explanation of the divine uniqueness within creation was metaphysically untenable. Moreover, he thought so for Aristotelian reasons.

Is the existence of God self-evident? No, it is not, and no one known to St. Thomas said that it was. Why, then, the Thomistic weapon *utrum deum esse sit per se notum*? Because there was a task of translation from Platonism to Aristotelianism facing the world of St. Thomas. From the time of St. Augustine, nature, intelligence and creation had been explained by Christian thinkers in Platonic terms, and the point of that explanation was the unique presence of an absolute and immutable God within the created universe, indeed within the truth that was visible in the world of time. Participation was the Platonic cornerstone of that explanation, and all the notions that St. Thomas thought to reduce to his rubric were built on it; or, rather, there was a Platonic way of saying that the existence of God was undeniable and that His non-existence was unthinkable. By removing this Platonic cornerstone for reasons that he learned from Aristotle St. Thomas had also to remove what was built on it. The

<sup>76</sup> St. Thomas, SCG, III, c. 47.

<sup>77</sup> *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 11; q. 11, a. 1.

Platonic dialectic leads hierarchically and inevitably toward a transcendent prime term. The lesser cannot be understood except in relation to a maximum. In such a view, the maximum is somehow visible within the order that leads to it. The order of being points to God with inexorable logic for the mind. This is the logic of reality, which is no more than a rational discourse, as Plato long ago determined in the *Sophist*. But there was also an Aristotelian way of looking at the order of being, and St. Thomas preferred to follow it in his own effort to reach God; and this is true even when it is also true that St. Thomas recognized Platonism as a possible way to God. It was the order that was visible in the world of time and motion, of bodies and physical causes, and of a world of nature that was striving to achieve its own inherent purposes. God was present in such an order, but as the transcendent source and term of nature. He was present, as intelligence is present within the world of nature, which has to be read in its intelligibility before intelligence can be seen. St. Thomas' Aristotelian road to God was from the physical universe seen as a nature, a nature that revealed God on the condition that intelligence and nature were kin and that in the name of intelligence man could go from nature as the work of intelligence to intelligence in itself.

St. Anselm is not directly involved in the thirteenth-century conflict between the Platonic and the Aristotelian roads to God. Is the non-existence of God unthinkable, so that His existence is an indubitable truth? The Platonic answer to this question is, *yes*; the Aristotelian answer is, *no*. The reason for the Platonic answer is the dialectic of participation, while the reason for the Aristotelian answer is the structure of nature: nature can lead to God, but its economy must be discovered before it does. In neither the Platonic nor the Aristotelian view is the existence of God self-evident; in both views it must be demonstrated. But there is a difference. In the Aristotelian view, the empirical data of nature are as such the necessary starting point of the search for God; in the Platonic view of St. Augustine, St. Anselm and St. Bonaventure, the empirical data, while necessary as a starting point, are no more than the ground on which the dialectic of participation leads to God along the highways of immutability and truth. Both views begin within, and proceed from, experience; but they proceed along diverse ways. Neither view proceeds from thought to existence or from essence to existence; both proceed from the experience of being, but they understand it differently and they rise within it by diverse means.

St. Thomas preferred the Aristotelian way and the Aristotelian means. From such a point of view, there were no experimental data

leading to God that were not physical, there were no notions in the human intellect that were not grounded in physical experience, and the necessity of reaching God was a matter of argument similarly grounded in experience and not a matter of any privileged notion or notions. The existence of God was therefore a truth of demonstration, deniable short of proof; it was not a truth evident in itself to the human intellect. The necessity of *deum esse* came to man from the experience of nature, not from the truth itself. That there is a general order within being was a matter of experience, whether that order be expressed in terms of being or truth or even nature.<sup>78</sup> But the principle and source of the order had to be reached by proof if it was to be known in itself. Such a philosophical preference on the part of St. Thomas involved a whole reconstruction of Platonism, and especially that of St. Augustine. The Platonic view of experience and knowledge, and of being and becoming, was replaced by Aristotelian teaching. The Aristotelian causal appreciation of reality replaced Platonic participation. Committed to this transformation of traditional Christian thought, St. Thomas had no hesitation in measuring even the meaning of his predecessors and contemporaries by the paramount need to make doctrinal sense in an Aristotelian age.

St. Anselm himself stands outside this purely thirteenth-century phenomenon — indeed this purely Thomistic view of the Aristotelian situation of the thirteenth century. If we do not inflict on the *Proslogion* St. Thomas' convictions and purposes; if we do not uproot *Proslogion* cc. 2-4 from the religious texture and aim of the whole work, but rather allow these chapters to be what St. Anselm intended, namely, a first step in the proper appreciation of the divine transcendence; if, finally, we make some effort to unravel the meaning of the *quo maius* formula from the *Responsio* and the *Monologion*, and see it as the peak moment within thought of the dialectic of participation, then the Anselmian argument will appear in all its simplicity and even in all its ingenuousness. It is an argument proceeding from the hidden presence of God within the mind of Anselm to the necessary assertion of His transcendent and ineffable existence. It is an argument that moves from an absolute moment in things caught absolutely by the mind of Anselm and leading to an absolute God.

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<sup>78</sup> On the existence of nature as a *per se notum*, see St. Thomas, *In Phys.*, II, lect. 1, no. 148; ed. M. Maggìolo (Rome, 1954), 75.

# Cajetan's Notion of Being in his Commentary on the "Sentences"

ARMAND MAURER, C.S.B.

IN the spring of 1491 Thomas de Vio, better known as Cajetan, was sent by the Master General of the Dominican Order to the University of Padua to complete his studies begun at Naples and Bologna. He was then in his twenty-second year, having just been ordained a priest. On January 21, 1493 he was named "ad legendas Sententias pro gradu et forma Magistri pro tertio anno Paduae."<sup>1</sup> A record of the Paduan lectures on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard is preserved in an unedited manuscript of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, *latin* 3076.<sup>2</sup> Bound in two bulky volumes, the manuscript is not an autograph but a copy of Cajetan's lecture notes or more likely of a student's report on his lectures. The latter hypothesis would explain the many lacunae and the numerous mistakes in the manuscript.

Despite the poor condition of the manuscript, it sheds precious light on Cajetan's earliest theological and philosophical views. The few passages that have been edited reveal that the young Dominican teacher defended, chiefly against the Scotists, the theses of the Thomistic school of the fifteenth century without questioning whether they were held in the same sense by St. Thomas himself.<sup>3</sup> An examination of several articles touching on the nature of being, especially the central one on the real distinction between essence and existence, shows that from the beginning of his teaching career he held the metaphysical views he was later to expound at much greater length in his Commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia* and *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas. These articles are here edited for the first

<sup>1</sup> Cf. M. J. Congar, "Bio-bibliographie de Cajétan," *Revue thomiste*, 17 (1934-35), 5.

<sup>2</sup> For the description of the MS cf. G. Frénaud, "Les inédits de Cajétan," *Revue thomiste*, 19 (1936), 333-337.

<sup>3</sup> To my knowledge two articles of Cajetan's *Sentences* have been edited, one on sacramental causality by M. H. Laurent, "La causalité sacramentaire d'après le commentaire de Cajétan sur les Sentences," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 20 (1931), 77-82; the other on the accidents of the Eucharist by L. B. Gillon, "La condition des accidents eucharistiques selon Cajétan," *Revue thomiste*, 17 (1934-35), 319-342.

time. It goes without saying that the conclusions we have drawn from them are tentative. We shall have to wait for the complete edition of the manuscript before attempting a definitive statement of Cajetan's earliest teaching on the notion of being.

The title of Cajetan's article on the distinction between essence and existence is remarkable, for it is identical with that of Capreolus in his Commentary on the *Sentences*: *Utrum aliqua creatura subsistens sit suum esse existentiae*.<sup>4</sup> We are alerted to the possibility that Cajetan wrote his article in close dependence on that of his illustrious Thomistic predecessor. This is borne out by an examination of the contents of the two articles.

Cajetan begins by making a threefold distinction in the meaning of the word *esse*. The word, he says, means essence, or the being of existence (*esse existentiae*), or the truth of a proposition (I, 1).<sup>5</sup> This threefold meaning of *esse* is based on a passage in St. Thomas' Commentary on the *Sentences* that Cajetan could conveniently read in Capreolus:

Sed sciendum, quod esse dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo dicitur esse ipsa quidditas vel natura rei, sicut dicitur quod definitio est oratio significans quid est esse; definitio enim quidditatem rei significat. Alio modo dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae; sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est animae actus; non actus secundus, qui est operatio, sed actus primus. Tertio modo dicitur esse quod significat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod "est" dicitur copula: et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente et dividente quantum ad sui complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei, quod est actus essentiae, sicut supra de veritate dictum est.<sup>6</sup>

The use of the term *esse* to mean the essence or quiddity of a thing had a long tradition in the Middle Ages,<sup>7</sup> which St. Thomas took account of several times in his writings, but when speaking in his own name he used the term *esse* to signify the act of being (*actus essendi*), namely the act whereby a being exists.<sup>8</sup> Because in mediaeval tradition *esse* was linked with essence, the term *esse essentiae* was conveniently

<sup>4</sup> Joannis Capreoli, *Defensiones Theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis*, I, 8, 1; ed. Paban-Pègues (Turin, 1900), I, 301b.

<sup>5</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, references to Cajetan are to the Texts edited below. I, 1 refers to Text I, paragraph 1.

<sup>6</sup> St. Thomas, *Sent.*, I, 33, 1, 1, ad 1m; ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), I, 766. Cf. Capreolus, *ibid.*, 314b.

<sup>7</sup> For the history of *esse* as form or essence, cf. E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955), 105, 143, 252; E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, 6th ed. (Paris, 1965), 53-60.

<sup>8</sup> *De Potentia*, VII, 2, ad 9m. Cf. E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, 169-189.

used by scholastics of the late Middle Ages, such as Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, to mean the being proper to an essence, in distinction to the being of existence, which they called *esse existentiae*. Although this twofold distinction of being into essential and existential was decidedly unthomistic, it was generally adopted by the Thomistic school, the chief of whom were Capreolus and Cajetan.<sup>9</sup>

After introducing his students to the threefold meaning of the term *esse*, Cajetan gives three reasons for the real distinction between *esse* in the first and second senses, in short between essence and existence (I, 1). These reasons summarize briefly the first three of the seven arguments for the real distinction in the parallel article of Capreolus.<sup>10</sup> The three arguments reappear in a more expanded form and in a different order in Cajetan's Commentary on St. Thomas' *De Ente et Essentia*.<sup>11</sup>

The first argument briefly states that essence is really distinct from existence because existence has a cause whereas essence does not. Cajetan's lecture notes do not specify in what sense the essence of a creature is uncaused, but in Capreolus' parallel text and in Cajetan's Commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia* it is said to lack an efficient cause. In both of the latter works the existence of a created being is said to have an efficient cause, but its essence is said to lack any efficient cause. Thus, according to Capreolus, the quiddity of a rose does not belong to the rose through an extrinsic agent, though its existence does. In other words, there is no efficient cause that a rose is a rose and that it has certain essential properties; these belong to it of itself and eternally, whether any rose exists or not. An efficient cause, however, is needed to explain the actual existence of a rose.<sup>12</sup> Following Capreolus, Cajetan argues in his Commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia* that essential properties belong to a thing apart from any efficient cause, whereas existence belong to the thing only through an efficient agent. Consequently, the essential predicates and the existence of the thing are really distinct.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. J. Hegyi, *Die Bedeutung des Seins bei den klassischen Kommentatoren des heiligen Thomas von Aquin; Capreolus, Silvester von Ferrara, Cajetan* (Munich, 1959). For Capreolus' doctrine of the real distinction cf. N. J. Wells, "Capreolus on Essence and Existence," *The Modern Schoolman*, 38 (1960), 1-24. For Cajetan's notion of being, cf. E. Gilson, "Cajetan et l'existence," *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*, 15 (1953), 267-286.

<sup>10</sup> Capreolus, *ibid.*, pp. 301-307.

<sup>11</sup> Cajetan, *In De Ente et Essentia*, V; ed. M. H. Laurent (Turin, 1934), 156-157.

<sup>12</sup> Capreolus, *ibid.*, 303a.

Id quod convenit naturae specificae absque omni causa effectiva distinguitur realiter ab eo quod convenit illi non nisi per aliquam causam effectivam; sed praedicata quiditativa conveniunt rei absque omni causa effectiva, existentia autem non convenit rei nisi per aliquod efficiens; ergo praedicata quiditativa et existentia rei distinguuntur realiter.<sup>13</sup>

This is the position suggested by the brief statement in Cajetan's lecture notes that essence is really distinct from existence because existence has a cause whereas essence does not. His source is the first argument for the real distinction in Capreolus' *Sentences*, where it is presented as that of St. Thomas in his *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 52, § 6, as interpreted with the help of St. Albert.<sup>14</sup> Capreolus hesitated to ascribe the notion of an uncaused essence in creatures to St. Thomas, for he realized that the Angelic Doctor explicitly taught that God created not only the *esse* of a creature but also its essence. Capreolus thought this the safer position, though he did not consider erroneous the position that the essence of a creature is uncreated.<sup>15</sup> Cajetan, for his part, expresses no doubt about the Thomistic character of this doctrine, and he accepted it as his own as early as his lectures on the *Sentences*.

Cajetan's notes follow Capreolus in attributing to a created essence an actuality of its own, in the essential order, distinct from the actuality in the order of existence that it must receive from an extrinsic agent in order to exist. Thus a created essence by itself and formally is outside nothingness, if by this is meant the nothingness opposed to essential being. But by itself it is not outside nothingness, as this term is opposed to existential being. A created essence is potential to this sort of being and receives it from another being (I, 4).<sup>16</sup>

The second reason for the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures given in Cajetan's lecture notes is that if existence were not really distinct from essence it would be self-subsistent

<sup>13</sup> Cajetan, *ibid.*, 157.

<sup>14</sup> Capreolus, *ibid.*, 301b-302a.

<sup>15</sup> Capreolus, *op. cit.*, II, 1, 2; III, p. 76. Cf. St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, III, 5, ad 2m.

<sup>16</sup> Dico quod ens sumptum ab esse existentiae, opponitur contradictorie nihilo existentiae; et ens sumptum ab esse essentiae, opponitur nihilo essentiae. Dico igitur quod essentia, quae est ens secundo modo, potest reduci in nihil sibi non oppositum; licet ens existentiae non potest reduci in nihil existentiae, nisi per accidens, ratione substrati, scilicet essentiae, quae, sive habeat actum essendi vel existendi, sive non, semper tamen remanet ens, prout ens sumitur ab esse essentiae, et significat essentiam reponibilem in praedicamento. Capreolus, *Sent.* II, 1, 2; III, p. 72b. Cf. I, 8, 1; I, pp. 328b-329b. The twofold meaning of nothing is found in Cajetan's Commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia*, V, pp. 158-159.

and infinite. Consequently, it would be one, for it would be entirely unlimited, admitting of no formal division and being unreceived in anything (I, 1). This corresponds to the second argument for the real distinction in Capreolus' *Sentences*. Capreolus gives as its source St. Thomas' *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 52 § 4.<sup>17</sup> It is also Cajetan's second argument for the real distinction in his Commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia*, which begins:

Omne esse irreceptum est infinitum simpliciter; nullum esse creaturae est infinitum simpliciter: ergo nullum esse creaturae est esse irreceptum: ergo distinguitur ab essentia...<sup>18</sup>

The third reason for the real distinction between essence and existence given in Cajetan's notes is that, if they were not distinct, existence (*esse*) would be self-subsistent and pure, without anything added to it. For *esse* is the very essence of being; by itself alone and totally it is being. But dependence on another does not belong to being as such; it is an addition to being, accruing to it by reason of an imperfection. The unstated conclusion is that since a caused being is dependent, its being cannot be pure and unmixed; it must have an addition that is really distinct from its existence, and this is essence (I, 1).

This is a summary of Capreolus' third argument for the real distinction in his *Sentences*, where its source is given as St. Thomas' *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 52, § 5.<sup>19</sup> Cajetan's rendering of the argument stays close to the following text of Capreolus:

Cum igitur esse sit tale abstractum, immo abstractissimum inter omnia, ipsum dicit praecisum formale entis in quantum ens, scilicet illud quo solo formaliter et quo toto est; haec enim duo dicit omne abstractum. Tali autem formali, separato ab omni susceptivo, cum nihil sibi accideret (nec enim ipsum accideret alteri, nec subjiceretur alicui accidenti, nec ipsum cum alio esset in aliquo tertio), nullo modo posset aliquid dici de illo nisi quod esset entis in quantum ens, scilicet quod pertinet ad perfectionem essendi. Et sic, cum dependere ab alio non sit entis in quantum huiusmodi, immo potius dicit imperfectionem essendi, sequitur quod tale esse non esset ab alio, et per consequens non esset esse creatum.<sup>20</sup>

The same argument for the real distinction appears, in a somewhat different form and less closely dependent on Capreolus, in Cajetan's Commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia*.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Capreolus, *Sent.* I, 8, 1; I, p. 305b.

<sup>18</sup> Cajetan, *ibid.*, 156.

<sup>19</sup> Capreolus, *ibid.*, 306a.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 306b.

<sup>21</sup> Cajetan, *ibid.*, 156

After proposing these three reasons for the real distinction between existence and essence in creatures, Cajetan's lecture notes continue with a description of *esse*, in the sense of actual existence. All the terms of this description are taken from the four conclusions of Capreolus that follow his arguments for the real distinction.<sup>22</sup>

Existence, Cajetan says, is the actuality of a thing impressed on it by the primary agent (God): *Est autem esse hoc: actualitas omnis rei impressa a primo agente* (I, 2). This statement is found in Capreolus, who attributes it to Giles of Rome: *Tale autem esse, secundo modo dictum, ut ponit Aegidius, primo Quolibeto, q. 7, nihil aliud est quam quaedam actualitas impressa omnibus entibus a primo ente.*<sup>23</sup> Existence, Cajetan continues in his paraphrase of Capreolus, is not the creator nor is it properly speaking a creature; rather it is something concreated, and it is the reason for creation on the side of the creature (I, 2). It is not an accident in the general sense of the term. That is to say, it is not an accidental form, for this comes to a subject already constituted in existence. Neither is existence a substantial form, for unlike a substantial form it is not part of a creature's essence. Moreover, existence comes to a complete specific essence, or more exactly to a supposit, for the supposit is ultimately that which exists and is in no sense a principle by which a thing exists. Further, unlike substantial form and matter, the composition of existence and essence does not result in a third entity that is one *per se* and essentially. Again, unlike a substantial form, existence does not constitute an essence, but it is that by which something exists. Hence it is not the terminus *quo* of generation but that under which something ultimately exists. Indeed, existence is ultimate in the order of primary acts; unlike a form, it does not constitute something that is potential to further act (I, 2). Existence is not an essence or quiddity, but it is that whereby something formally exists. It is the actuality of essence or quiddity. Properly speaking it is not a being or thing; it can be called a being only in the sense that by it something exists. A created essence and existence are not strictly two beings but only one (I, 3; cf. I, 8). This is an important precision; in his Commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia* Cajetan describes the composition of existence and essence as a composition between two things (*res*).<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Capreolus, *ibid.*, 312a-314a.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 315a. *Esse ergo nihil est aliud quam quaedam actualitas impressa omnibus entibus ab ipso Deo, vel a primo ente.* Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* I, q. 7 (Louvain, 1646), 16.

<sup>24</sup> *Dicimus igitur in proposito intelligentias cum subsistant habere in se quidditatem et existentiam adunatas, ut potentiam et actum, et sic compositas esse ex duabus rebus realiter distinctis.* Cajetan, *ibid.*, 161.

Cajetan's notes sometimes follow literally the text of Capreolus. For example, when Cajetan wrote: *esse causatur a forma per modum sequelae* (I, 2), he clearly had in front of him the statement of Capreolus: *Ad sextum dicitur quod esse quod est a forma, fluit a forma, non per modum effecti ab ea, sed per modum sequelae*.<sup>25</sup>

Cajetan's notes on essence and existence conclude with a list of authorities on the subject, including Aristotle, Boethius, Robert Grosseteste, St. Albert, Giles of Rome, St. Thomas, Alfarabi, Algazel, and Avicenna (I, 9). All of these feature prominently in Capreolus' article on the same subject, and most of them reappear in Cajetan's Commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia*.<sup>26</sup>

Among the important notions that Cajetan took from Capreolus is that existence (*esse*) is the ultimate act whereby a thing exists: *esse non est terminus generationis quo, sed sub quo ultimate aliquid est* (I, 2).<sup>27</sup> Existence is the ultimate complement of the subject of existence: *ultimum complementum proprii susceptibilis ipsius esse* (II, 3). This notion also appears in Cajetan's Commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia*, in which existence is described as the *ultima actualitas rei* and the *principium ultimum ipsius substantiae*.<sup>28</sup> Bañez criticized Cajetan for teaching as authentically Thomistic the notion that *esse* is not the primary but the ultimate act of a thing.<sup>29</sup> It is significant that in his lecture notes on the *Sentences*, Cajetan places *esse* among the primary acts but as the last of them: *esse est ultimum in genere actuum primorum, non constituens aliquid potentiale, sicut forma facit* (I, 2). The text of Capreolus that Cajetan had before him when he wrote this sentence is the following: *esse autem, quia est actualissimum in genere actus primi, non constituit aliquid potentiale, sicut forma faciebat*.<sup>30</sup> Elsewhere, however, Capreolus calls *esse* the ultimate act of a thing; and Cajetan, for his part, describes *esse* as the supreme actuality (*actualissimum*).<sup>31</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Capreolus, *ibid.*, 326a.

<sup>26</sup> Cajetan, *ibid.*, 157.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Capreolus, *ibid.*, 313a. In his Commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia* Cajetan says that form is the primary and existence the secondary terminus of generation. *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>28</sup> Cajetan, *ibid.*, 159.

<sup>29</sup> Deinde quod Cajet. dicit. D. Tho. intelligendum esse de actu ultimato, cum inquit, quod bonitas vel humanitas non significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam esse, non videtur proprie dictum: quoniam *esse* potius est primus actus cujuslibet rei, quam ultimus. D. Bañez, *Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Summae Theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis*; ed. L. Urbano (Madrid-Valencia, 1934), q. 3, a. 4, p. 141.

<sup>30</sup> Capreolus, *ibid.*, 322b-323a.

<sup>31</sup> Unde cum *esse* sit actualissimum, quanto magis acceditur ad ipsum, tanto minus possibile. MS Bibl. Nat. lat. 3076, fol. 47v. Cf. Capreolus, *ibid.*, 313a.

Though existence is the supreme actuality, according to Cajetan, it is not the highest perfection. When discussing in his lecture notes the possibility of a plurality of existences in Christ, he ascribes to Him all perfections of human nature but not of the human supposit or person. Since existence belongs to the latter category, as that whereby the supposit exists, the humanity in Christ does not have its own existence but exists by the divine existence. This does not derogate from the perfection of Christ, however, since existence is not the highest perfection, though it is the first: *licet etiam esse non sit summa perfectio sed prima*. The supreme perfection, according to Cajetan, is the activity that renders a man absolutely good and unites him to his final end.<sup>32</sup> Cajetan's denial that *esse* is the supreme perfection is in contrast to the view of St. Thomas that, since *esse* is the supreme actuality, it is the highest perfection.<sup>33</sup>

The purpose of this paper is not to evaluate the thought of Cajetan but rather to point out the significance of his lecture notes on the *Sentences* for the genesis of his metaphysics. There can be no doubt that he had Capreolus' article on the real distinction in front of him when he composed his own notes on the subject. Faced with the formidable assignment to teach this difficult matter for the first time, he acted as most young teachers would do: he looked about for the best text book to help him prepare his lecture. Who could be a better guide than Capreolus, the acknowledged Prince of the Thomists? His impressive Commentary on the *Sentences* was at hand, and Cajetan used it for the statement of the problem of essence and existence, for his understanding of the terms of the problem, and for its solution. Thus from the beginning of his teaching career Cajetan was indebted to Capreolus for his notion of being. When he commented on St. Thomas' *De Ente et Essentia* a few years later (1494-95), his basic metaphysical ideas had already been shaped by his reading of Capreolus, and they naturally passed into his famous commentary.

<sup>32</sup> Humanitas ergo in Christo, sicut nec proprium suppositum, ita nec proprium esse habet, cum sit perfectio suppositalis. Ex quibus paret quod omnia quae in natura plantavit in omnibus perfectionibus, et nihil habet aliquis homo quod Christus non habeat quoad naturalia, non suppositalia; licet etiam esse non sit summa perfectio sed prima. Summa enim qua aliquid dicitur bonum simpliciter est operatio, ultimo fini conjungens. Fol. 415r-v.

<sup>33</sup> Hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum... Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum. St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, VII, 2, ad 9m.

## TEXTS

## I

UTRUM ALIQUA CREATURA SUBSISTENS SIT SUUM ESSE  
EXISTENTIAE

<1> Esse tripliciter dicitur: quandoque essentiam significat, quandoque esse existentiae, quandoque veritatem propositionis. Esse secundum distinguitur realiter a primo quia secundum habet causam, primum non. Secundo quia esset per se subsistens et infinitum <44v>, et sic unum, cum nullo modo contrahibile, cum divisionem formalem non habeat nec receptivum per positum. Tertio quia esse per se subsistens separatum non habet additum, cum dicat praecisam essentiam essendi, id est se solo et toto. Dependencia autem est additum, et convenit rei ratione alicujus imperfectionis in quantum deficit ab ente, non entis in quantum... unum per se.

<2> Est autem esse hoc: actualitas omnis rei impressa a primo agente. Non creator, non creatura proprie sed concreatum, et ratio creationis ex parte creati. Non accidens universaliter, sed reductive ad genus cuius est, sicut actualitas ejus. Non pars essentiae, sed extra eam, et sic accidens principaliter. Non forma accidentalis, quia haec advenit subjecto in esse constituto. Non forma partis substantialis. Primo quia esse non est pars essentiae. Secundo quia esse advenit essentiae <45r> specificae completae, et supposito verius, cum sit ultimum in genere quod, nullo modo quo. Tertio quia ex esse et essentia non resultat tertia res per se una essentialiter. Quarto quia esse non constituit essentiam,<sup>1</sup> sed est ipsum quo. Quinto quia esse non est terminus generationis quo, sed sub quo ultimate <aliquid est>. Sexto quia esse est ultimum in genere actuum primorum, non constituens aliquid potentiale, sicut forma facit. Septimo quia esse causatur a forma per modum sequelae. Est enim forma principium essendi formale composito, scilicet in quantum est complementum essentiale essentiae, quae est primum subjectum esse, sicut diaphanum in aere...

<3> Non est etiam ens proprie aut res, sed quo est natura actualitas in genere existentium; id est quo formaliter existit. Unde proprie loquendo essentia creata et esse<sup>2</sup> non sunt duo entia sed unum, sicut albedo et album. Esse enim non est alio modo ens nisi quia ipso aliquid est. Si enim accipiaturs ens adjective seu <45v> participialiter, sequatur<sup>3</sup> quod non sunt duo quia unum suppositum; si substantive et nominaliter, proprie etiam unum ens sunt, cum unica sit forma significata, scilicet esse. Essentia vero quae significatur non tenet in locum formae sed potentiae.

<4> Abusive tamen concessio: scias quod essentia creata seipsa formaliter est extra nihil oppositum enti praedicamentali, et est actualitas in genere essentiarum, nisi materia quae <est> potentia. Non est seipsa extra nihil

<sup>1</sup> MS esse.

<sup>2</sup> MS essentia.

<sup>3</sup> MS sed.

oppositum enti actualiter existenti, sed per esse formaliter non est actualitas in genere existentiae sed potentia, quia ab alio habet esse. Comparatur universaliter esse ad essentiam <sicut> actus ad potentiam. Distinguitur autem nihil sicut non ens, non ex se sed ratione oppositi, scilicet entis, primo *Topicorum*: "Quoties dicitur unum oppositorum, toties et reliquum."<sup>4</sup>

<5> Nota quod aliquid esse in potentia dupliciter: primo ad formam rei et existere, sicut materia prima ad formam rosae; et tale non est rosa. Secundo modo ad existere tantum, sicut ipsa essentia rosae; et tale est rosa.

<6> Advertas quod ens <46r> nominaliter est transcendens essentiale, et actu quo ens participialiter, non in potentia; universaliter ideo quia in pluribus praedicamentis invenitur, licet improprie dicatur albedo est. Esse enim etiam in accidentibus <distin>guitur realiter. Esse autem potest esse abstractum entis nominaliter et participialiter.

<7> Adverte tamen: substantia est ens participialiter per se, id est non quod subjective quae eadem genere est generantis. Idem quae sunt, quod non quaestio patet de parte. Cum dicitur nulla creatura est suum esse, intelligitur de essentiis in praedicamentis repositis.

<8> Nota quod existere non est indifferens<sup>5</sup> ad esse et non esse, cum ad se nihil sit indifferenter ad se, licet sit et non sit. Quia tamen quo, et actualitas in omni genere, et nullo modo potentiale, quaestio an est non ponit in nihilum. Sicut dictum est quod esse <et> essentia non sunt duo entia. Esse enim non est aliqua quidditas, sed actualitas omnis quidditatis.

<9> Boethius,<sup>6</sup> hebdomade secunda:<sup>7</sup> "Quod est participare aliquo potest, sed ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo participat" <46v>; prima: "Quod est, accepta forma essendi, est atque consistit"; tertia: "Illud quod est habere aliquid praeterquam ipsum quod est potest; ipsum vero esse nihil praeter se habet admixtum"; quinta: "Omne quod est participat eo quod est esse ut sit"; secunda: "Fit autem participatio cum aliquid jam est. Est autem aliquid cum jam esse suscepit." Hebdomade prima: "Diversum est esse et id quod est." Secundo *Posteriorum*, c. 2.... Linconiensis,<sup>8</sup> Alfarabus, Algazelis, Avicenna, Averroes, Linconiensis, Albertus *De Causis*, c. 8,<sup>9</sup> in *Postpraedicamentis*, c. 9,<sup>10</sup> Thomas, Aegidius. Aristoteles septimo *Metaphysicae*:<sup>11</sup> Esse debetur supposito contra Platonem. Averroes e folio 4. Esse omne inest non sicut forma, sed sicut actus primae potentiae. Ideo non sequitur: sicut ad formam esse, ita ad esse esse aliud. Et prima forma omnis complet subjectum, ut supra. Esse actuat ultimos; quare non simile.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, *Topics*, I, 15, 106b14-15.

<sup>5</sup> MS corrupt.

<sup>6</sup> MS add. 15.

<sup>7</sup> Boethius, *De Hebdomadibus*; PL 64, 1311.

<sup>8</sup> Robert Grosseteste, *In Libros Posteriorum*, II, c. 2, t.c. 35 (Venice, 1537), fol. 31v.

<sup>9</sup> St. Albert, *De Causis et Processu Universitatis*, I, 1, 8; ed. Borgnet (Paris, 1891), 10, 377.

<sup>10</sup> St. Albert, *Liber de Praedicamentis*, tract. 7, c. 9; ed. Borgnet (Paris, 1890), 1, 289-290.

<sup>11</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII, 8, 1033a23-1034a7.

## II

UTRUM FORMA SUBSTANTIALIS SIT ENTITAS REALITER  
A MATERIA PRIMA DISTINCTA

<1> Materia prima est entitas absoluta in suo esse essenziale <265v> distincta a forma, ita quod non habet illud a forma, quia praesupponitur et recipit, et prius natura et tempore est qualibet forma. Quomodo autem materia dependens a forma est sic videndum.

<2> Esse est duplex: essenziale et actualis existentiae. Primum esse forma dat composito sicut pars et causa formalis suo toti. Et dat materiae primae non simpliciter quia non dat ei essentiam, sed informando et actuando ipsam ut forma tantum, trahit eam ad hoc quod sit pars hujus naturae specificae, et constituit eam modo praedicto indeterminata specie suo modo, scilicet partialiter, quae de se ad nullius essentiae specificae constitutionem determinata est. Tale esse essentiae habet a forma sola actuazione.

<3> Secundum vero esse, scilicet actualis existentiae, forma dat composito sicut natura antecedens et ultimum complementum proprii susceptibilis ipsius esse, et sicut ratio essendi hoc modo, scilicet quia ratio quod compositum generetur; et sic est forma et dat etiam materiae. <266r> Non quod det suscepi illud in materia, sed per hoc compositum illud suscipit; et illo est materia informata quae est pars per idem esse existit. Nec potest fieri esse absque forma; posterius non potest sine priori necessario praecedente sicut complemento susceptivi. Eadem primo necessitate requiritur forma qua requiritur receptivum; sine receptivo<sup>12</sup> autem fieri implicat, quia subsistens; licet e converso essentia possit occupari, ut patet in essentia partis ligni, aquae, seu praeveniri ut in Christo, et hoc quia prius.

<4> Omnes auctoritates Aristotelis, Commentatoris, quod forma et materia non sint multa seu sint unum, intelliguntur de unitate et indivisione existentiae. Multitudo enim istarum impedit compositionem per se, et fieri unum per se. Idem enim esse existere materiae, formae et compositi; non sic substantiae et accidentis.

<5> Additur secundo quod materia<sup>13</sup> et forma non sunt entia et multa completa in specie, sed partes unius in specie completi, et sic agens non... in duo, nec legitur multitudinem <266v> quoad existentiam et nisi duo nec multitudo complexorum in specie. Unde subditur: hoc enim est unum in actu. Cum vero dicitur materia et forma sunt duo actu distincta, non notatur dualitas seu distinctio actualitatum, sed actualitas dualitatis seu distinctionis. Si admittatur forma est esse mere, non intelligatur intransitive, id est forma est esse, quod materia, quia falsa est. Sed construat transitive, id est formalis actuatio et perfectio materiae, non sicut esse existentiae sed ut forma. Cum septimo *Metaphysicae*:<sup>14</sup> una per se quidditas non potest fieri ex his quae habent proprias rationes, scilicet completas in specie, quales non materia et forma, sed substantia et accidens. Nec proprie fit naturaliter cujus pars non praexistit. Quare forma non fit. Ideo non sequi creari sed compositum per se, forma non. Ideo non sequitur creatio.

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<sup>12</sup> MS receptio.

<sup>13</sup> MS natura.

<sup>14</sup> Aristotle, *ibid.*

# A Provisional Bibliography of Oresme's Writings

ALBERT D. MENUT

## FOREWORD

THIS bibliographic inventory of the writings of Nicole Oresme, the versatile fourteenth-century French scholar-cleric, is an outgrowth of research pursued in the preparation of a new critical edition with parallel English translation of Oresme's *Livre du Ciel et du monde*. The editio princeps of this work was published in three consecutive annual issues of *Mediaeval Studies* (vols. 3, 4 and 5, 1941-43), edited by A. D. Menut and Rev. A. J. Denomy. The new edition, sponsored by the National Science Foundation, now in press, will appear in the Publications in Medieval Science Series, issued by the University of Wisconsin Press.

The present bibliography is offered with the hope that it may serve as a useful tool in the hands of future investigators of Oresme's voluminous writings. General in scope, it is published in *Mediaeval Studies* to make it generally available to medievalists of whatever special interest. That it can be only a "provisional bibliography" is emphasized by the experience of the past quarter-century, during which time several items previously merely adumbrated or wholly unknown or wrongly attributed have been recovered and restored to their rightful authorship. Probably, the most striking example is the case of Oresme's *Quaestiones super septem libros Physicorum*, reported lost for the past four centuries and only recently (1962) discovered at the Biblioteca Colombina in Seville. Doubtless, other Oresmiana will come to light. Almost certainly, additional manuscript copies of works presently known will be discovered, and surely, several more critical editions will appear—indeed, several are presently announced or already in press. Thus the Provisional Bibliography published herewith contains several items absent from the critical edition of Oresme's *Livre de Ethiques d'Aristote*, published in 1940. Already in 1943, several corrections and additions were required under the caption "Scientific Writings" in the editio princeps of *Le Livre du Ciel et du monde*, edited in felicitous collaboration with the late Father Denomy, C.S.B., for *Mediaeval Studies* (vol. V, pp. 245-49). Comparison of this special

listing of scientific items with the present inventory of the same classification reveals the notable addition of recently discovered items and the remarkable increase of critical editions, especially in this category.

For it appears that the publication in *Mediaeval Studies* (1941-43) of the editio princeps of Oresme's commented French version of Aristotle's *De Caelo* catapulted Nicole Oresme to a place of eminence among the natural philosophers of the fourteenth century. It stimulated historians of science to study intensively *Du Ciel* and also Oresme's numerous original tracts on several scientific subjects. It revealed the intellectual temper of Scholasticism at its most highly developed stage in its major task of accomodating Aristotelian natural science with the faith of the Fathers.

It is especially fitting and proper to publish in the pages of *Mediaeval Studies* this present tabulation of Oresme's writings, bringing up to date the inventory of a quarter-century ago. We would dedicate this contribution to the grateful memory of Father Denomy (1904-1957), distinguished medievalist, accomplished scholar and our esteemed collaborator in the editio princeps of *Du Ciel et du monde*.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY<sup>1</sup>

### A. — ORIGINAL WORKS IN LATIN

#### a. Pertaining to Science.

#### MATHEMATICS.

##### 1. — *Algorismus proportionum*.

Incipit: "Presul Meldensis Philippe quem ... Algorismus proportionum ..." (prologue); "Una media debet sic scribi" or "Una medietas scribitur sic ..." (text). Published, ed. M. Curtze, Berlin, 1868, 30 pp., from a ms. in the Gymnasium at Thorn (modern Torun, Poland); critical edition of the first of three parts,<sup>2</sup> ed. Edward Grant, together

<sup>1</sup> The classification of Oresme's writings presented here is ordered according to subject matter only; no chronological sequence is to be inferred from this arrangement.

<sup>2</sup> Part 2 of the *Algorismus proportionum* has been mistakenly catalogued in some instances as a separate treatise, entitled *Utilitates algorismi proportionum*. The error arose apparently from the presence in Florence, Laurenziana, Ashburnham 136, ff. 173-177<sup>v</sup> and in Arsenal,

with Oresme's *De Proportionibus proportionum*, q.v. infra; English translation of Part I, E. Grant, *Isis* 56 (1965), 327-341, with bibliographical and critical annotation; Grant lists, *loc. cit.*, 13 mss., stating that he knows of 25 extant. We have examined the following: Florence, Laurenziana, Ashburnham 210, ff. 172-177<sup>v</sup>; Bruges, ms. 530, ff. 25-30<sup>v</sup>; Brussels, Bibl. Royale, ms. 1043, ff. 217-222<sup>v</sup>; Utrecht, Universiteitsbibliotheek, ms. 165-171; Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 7197, ff. 74-79<sup>v</sup>. Grant, *loc. cit.*, p. 327, states: "Thus far the *Algorism of Ratios* stands as the first known systematic attempt to present operational rules for multiplication and division (called addition and subtraction by Oresme) of ratios involving integral and fractional exponents." Grant sets date of composition "sometime between 1351-61."

2. — *De Proportionibus proportionum*.

Incipit: "Omnis rationalis opinio de velocitate ..." (prologue); "Omnes proportiones equalitatis sunt ..." (text). Published Venice, 1505; critical edition by Edward Grant, dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1957, three of six chapters only, on film together with the text of the first of three parts of *Algorismus proportionum*, with English translation, q.v. supra, both to be published fall of 1966, together with *De Motibus sphaerarum* (otherwise called *Ad pauca respicientes*), q.v. infra, in the Publications in Medieval Science Series, issued by the University of Wisconsin Press; the *De Proportionibus* text will appear in full. Manuscripts: Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 7371, ff. 268-278<sup>v</sup> and ms. lat. 16621, ff. 94-110; Venice, Marciana, cod. 10, a.347, l. 237, L. VI 133, ff. 50-62<sup>v</sup>; Erfurt, Stadtbücherei, Amplonianus Q. 385, ff. 67-82<sup>v</sup> and Q. 352, ff. 134-148<sup>v</sup>; Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, lat. ms. 1480, ff. 135-153; Dresden, Königliche Öffentliche Bibliothek, ms. C 80, ff. 234-244; Seville, Biblioteca Colombina, ms. 7-7-13, ff. 114-122<sup>v</sup>; Cambridge, Peterhouse, ms. 277, ff. 93<sup>v</sup>-110<sup>v</sup>; Vatican, lat. 4275, ff. 102-127.

3. — *Quaestiones super geometriam Euclidis*.

Incipit: "Circa librum Euclidis queritur primo circa quoddam dicta Campani ..." Explicit: "Explicuit questiones super geometriam Euclidis magister Nicolai Oresme." Published, ed. H. L. L. Busard, *Nicole Oresme: Quaestiones super geometriam Euclidis*, Leiden, 1961, xiv+179 pp.

ms. 522, ff. 122<sup>v</sup>-126, between Parts 1 and 2 of the *Algorismus*, of a rubric "Utilitates, etc.," which is immediately followed by the text of Part 2 of the *Algorismus*: "Est autem istarum regularum ..." Cf. the passage in Curtze's edition, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

Twenty-one questions from Vatican, Chisianus F. IV. 66, ff. 22<sup>v</sup>-40, collated with Vatican, lat. 2225, ff. 90-98<sup>v</sup>, containing seventeen questions; original Latin text with English paraphrase. Busard did not know of ms. 7-7-30 at the Bibl. Colombina, Seville; this has been studied critically by John E. Murdoch in his severe criticism of Busard's edition, *Scripta Mathematica* 37 (1964), 67-91; the Colombina ms. is undoubtedly greatly superior to the two Vatican mss. utilized by Busard. Questions 10-17 deal with the configuration problem, the subject of Oresme's *De Configurationibus*, q.v. infra; M. Clagett will re-edit these several questions in Appendix I of his promised edition of the latter work in its entirety, to be published in 1966. Clagett thinks the *Questiones super geometriam* were written earlier than the *De Configurationibus* (see his statement in "Nicole Oresme and Medieval Scientific Thought," *Proceedings of the Am. Philosophical Society*, 108, no. 4, August, 1964, p. 304).

4. — *De Commensurabilitate motuum celi.*

Incipit: "Zenonem et Crisippum maiora egisse ..." Unpublished; critical edition in preparation by Edward Grant. Manuscripts: Arsenal ms. 522, ff. 110-122; Vatican, lat. 4082, ff. 97<sup>v</sup>-108<sup>v</sup> and lat. 4275, ff. 96-101, pt. 3 only; Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 7281, ff. 259-273; Florence, Laurenziana, Ashburnham 210, ff. 159-171<sup>v</sup>; Cambridge, Peterhouse, Pepysiana, ms. 2329, ff. 111<sup>v</sup>-128; Utrecht, Universitätsbibliotheek, ms. 725, ff. 172-193. See Edw. Grant, "N. O. and the commensurability and incommensurability of the celestial motions," *Archive for History of Exact Sciences* I (1961), 420-458; also A. Maier, *Metaphysische Hintergründe*, 28-32.

5. — *De Configurationibus qualitatum* or *De Uniformitate et difformitate intensionum.*

Incipit: "Cum imaginationem meam de uniformitate et difformitate ordinare cepissem ..." (prologue); "Omnis res mensurabilis extra numeros ymaginatur ad modum quantitatis continue ..." (text). Unpublished in full. Manuscripts: Florence, Laurenziana, Ashburnham, ms. 210, ff. 101<sup>v</sup>-129<sup>v</sup>; Arsenal, ms. 522, ff. 1-29; Vatican, lat. 3097, ff. 1-22; Bruges, ms. 486, ff. 159-173; Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 7371, ff. 214-266, ms. lat. 14579, ff. 18-40<sup>v</sup>, and ms. lat. 14580, ff. 37-60<sup>v</sup>; Erfurt, Stadtbücherei, Amplon. Q. 750, ff. 1-14, (incomplete), and Q. 298, fragment, ff. 63-64; Groningen, Universitätsbibliotheek, ms. 103, ff. 68-95<sup>v</sup>, and ff. 119-123<sup>v</sup> (fragment); British Museum, Sloane 2156, ff. 159-193<sup>v</sup>;

Vatican, Chisianus E. IV. 109, ff. 97-159; Basel, ms. F. III. 31, ff. 1-28; Florence, Bibl. Nazionale, Con. soppressi, J. IX. 26, ff. 13-35. Portions of this important work have been published by Duhem, Wieleitner, Borchert, Maier, Clagett and others; a Russian version of large segments of the three parts of the text has been published with scholarly annotation by Vasili Pavlovitch Zubov, "Traktat Nikolaia Orema 'O konfiguratsii kachestv,'" *Istoriko-matematicheskiye Issledovaniya*, II (1958), 601-731; a critical edition by Marshall Clagett is nearing completion; see his excerpts in *Science and Mechanics in the Middle Ages* (Madison, 1961), 331-381. See also A. Maier, *An der Grenze, etc.*, 289-353 and "La Doctrine de Nicole Oresme sur les configurations intensum," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 32 (1948), 51-67.

6. — *Quaestiones de sphaera.*

Incipit: "Utrum terra quiescat naturaliter in centro mundi ..." Unpublished; Garrett Droppers is preparing a critical edition for the Publications in Medieval Science Series. Manuscripts: Florence, Riccardiana, ms. 117, ff. 126-134; Erfurt, Stadtbücherei. Amplon. Q. 299, ff. 113-126; Vatican, lat. 2185, ff. 71-79<sup>r</sup>; recently discovered, Seville, Bibl. Colombina, ms. 7-7-13, ff. 95-102. A. Maier<sup>3</sup> considers this treatise to be a commentary upon Sacrobosco's *De Sphaera* and possibly Oresme's earliest extant work; it should be compared with the much later French *Traictié de l'espere*, q.v. infra. The impetus theory is mentioned casually in Questio 4 (Vatican, lat. ms. 2185, fol. 73a), in connection with the stone-dropping theme—will the stone dropped to the center of the earth stop there quietly, or will it, and why will it move up and down several times before coming to rest? Impetus is one of the answers given. Cf. in *Du Ciel et du monde*,<sup>4</sup> fol. 30ab, a similar example.

7. — *De Motibus sphaerarum* or *Ad pauca respicientes.*

Incipit: "Ad pauca respicientes de facili ..." Unpublished; critical edition with English translation will be included together with Edward Grant's projected edition of *De Proportionibus proportionum* and *Algorismus proportionum*, q.v. supra. Grant will publish it under the title *Ad pauca respicientes*, since the traditional title is irrelevant to the

<sup>3</sup> See Anneliese Maier, *Zwischen Philosophie, etc.*, 208-211, and also *Metaphysische Hintergründe, etc.*, 254, n. 31.

<sup>4</sup> Ed. Menut and Denomy, *Mediaeval Studies* 3 (1941), Livre I, ch. 18, pp. 230-31.

contents of the treatise. Manuscripts: British Museum, Sloane 2542, ff. 55<sup>v</sup>-59; Erfurt, Stadtbücherei, Amplon. Q. 385, ff. 155-158; Vatican, Palatine Latin, ms. 1354, ff. 233<sup>v</sup>-237<sup>v</sup>; Venice, Marciana, cod. 10, a.347, l. 237, L. VI, 133, ff. 62<sup>v</sup>-65; Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 7378A, ff. 14<sup>v</sup>-17<sup>v</sup> and ms. lat. 16621, ff. 110<sup>v</sup>-114. Other mss. will be listed in Grant's edition.

8. — *Quaestiones super septem libros Physicorum Aristotelis.*

Incipit: "Circa librum Physicorum queritur primo utrum cognitio unius rei faciat ad cognitionem alterius." Explicit: "Et potest dici quod sic intelligebat Aristoteles ... quod est vitium in translatione. Deo gracias. Expliciunt questiones septimi Phisicorum." Unpublished, unique manuscript, Biblioteca Colombina (Seville), 7-6-30, ff. 2a-79d, on paper; fol. 1<sup>r</sup> bears title at top; center, "El autor es Nicolas Oremsis. Véase el final del primer libro de los Physicos;" lower center, shelf number, 7-6-30. Fol. 1<sup>v</sup>, in modern letterpress, stamped upon center of page: "Don Fernando Colón, hijo de Don Cristóbal Colón, primer Almirante que descubrió las Indias, dejó este libro per uso e provecho de todos sus próximos; rogad a Dios por él. (In italics) Clausula 49 de Testamento del mismo Don Fernando, cumplida por el Cabildo Metropolitano de Sevilla."

The 107 questions, are written in double columns averaging 59 lines in length, in a careless hand, often illegible, in the Italian cursive humanistic style of the middle and late 15th century, heavily abbreviated. Identification of the author appears at the end of Book I, fol. 17c: "Et sic finiuntur questiones primi libri physicorum, Amen, Deo gracias Amen, compillatas per reverendissimum doctorem Nicolaum Orem et parisiis disputate. (In different hand) Summa omnium questionum primi libri, 22." This manuscript was discovered in 1962 by M. Guy Beaujouan, while preparing a catalogue of the famous Biblioteca Colombina, established at Seville by the second son of Christopher Columbus, Don Fernán Colón, who lavished his wealth upon his great collection of books, purchased in large part in the course of two journeys — 1529 and 1531 — to Italy. The *Quaestiones in septem libros Physicorum* is listed in the Inventory of purchases made at Pavia in 1531. Reported lost for the past four centuries, its recovery makes available for study what may prove to be one of the more significant of Oresme's *ex professo* treatises in the field of science.

9. — *Quaestiones super libros De Caelo et mundo.*

Incipit: "Utrum ens mobile localiter ..." Unpublished; critical edition with English translation to be published 1966 in Publications

in Medieval Science Series, dissertation by Claudia Kren, University of Wisconsin, 1964, basic text Erfurt, Stadtbücherei, Amplon. Q. 299, ff. 1-50, collated with Amplon. Q. 325, ff. 57-90<sup>v</sup>. This *ex professo* treatise anticipates many of the items discussed less formally in *Le Livre du Ciel et du monde*, q.v. infra; see A. Maier, *Zwei Grundprobleme, etc.*, 236-249, where extensive passages are cited from both works; cf. also A. Maier, *Metaphysische Hintergründe etc.*, 31-38, also *An der Grenze, etc.*, 204-207.

10. — *Quaestiones super librum De Generatione et corruptione.*

Incipit: "Primo queritur utrum de ente mobile ad formam sit haec scientia tamquam de subjecto." Explicit: "Expliciunt quaestiones primi et secundi de generatione et corruptione. Deo gratias." Unpublished. Manuscripts: Vatican, lat. 2185, ff. 40<sup>v</sup>-61<sup>v</sup>, and also lat. 3097, ff. 103-146; Florence, Bibl. Nazionale, Con. sop. H. IX. 1628, ff. 1-76<sup>v</sup>. See A. Maier's discussion of her attribution to Oresme and extensive passages cited, *Metaphysische Hintergründe*, 218-220 and her *An der Grenze*, 129-132. Cf. Oresme's reference to this work, *Du Ciel*, fol. 168b.

11. — *Questiones super libros Metheorum.*

Incipit: "Utrum de impressionibus meteoricis sit scientia ..." Unpublished. Manuscripts: Codex Sangallensis 839, ff. 1-54; Erfurt, Stadtbücherei, Amplon. Q. 299, ff. 51-103; Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, lat. F 631, ff. 2-50; Breslau, Stadtsbibliothek, ms. Wratislav IV. Q. 27, ff. 44-96; Cracow, Bibliothek Jagellon, ms. CC VIII 12, ff. 59<sup>v</sup>-108, and ms. CC VIII 31, ff. 1-53. Heinrich Suter announced his discovery of this work, "Eine bis jetzt unbekannte Schrift des Nicole Oresmes," *Zeitschrift für Mathematik und Physik* (historische und literarische Abteilung) 27 (1882), 121-125, in the Saint Gall ms. Duhem, *Système du monde* IX, 326, cites Questio 4, Bk. III, to show Oresme's early objections against the theory of the earth's rotation, in contrast to his strong arguments for it — but ultimate rejection — in the much later *Du Ciel* (ff. 138b-144c). Oresme refers to the *Metheores*, Questio 1, Bk. III, on fol. 202c of *Du Ciel*. A. Maier, *An der Grenze*, 132, n. 96, cites Questio 2, Bk. II, from the Berlin ms., ff. 106-107. See also the following: L. Thorndike, "Oresme and 14th century commentaries on the *Meteorologica*," *Isis* 45 (1954), 145-152; idem, "More questions on the *Meteorologica*," *Isis* 46 (1955), 357-360; E. Borchert, *Die Lehre von der Bewegung*, p. 71 and *passim*. Columbia University Library Film F-1257 contains this treatise.

12. — *Inter omnes impressiones.*

Incipit: "Utrum omnes impressiones que sunt in parte superioris aeris regionis sint eiusdem species vel ad invicem different?" Published, ed. René Mathieu, "L'Inter omnes impressiones de Nicole Oresme," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 35 (1960), 277-294, from Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 4082, ff. 82d-85c. This work deals principally with comets. Title mentioned in *Du Ciel*, fol. 202c, along with *Questiones in Metheorum libros*. Mathieu notes several similarities between the works, citing in particular Questio 20, Bk. III of the *Metheores* from Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 299, fol. 96: "Utrum omni hora dici yris possit apparere?"

13. — *Expositio et Questiones super librum De anima.*

Incipit of Expositio: "Bonorum honorabilium. Iste liber de Anima totalis dividitur ..." Explicit: "Et hoc poterit videri in una questione facta in secundo huius, et sic est finis tocius." This Expositio is apparently found only in Bruges, ms. 477, ff. 238<sup>r</sup>-263<sup>v</sup>, where it precedes the *Questiones*, ff. 264-298<sup>v</sup>. The *Questiones* are found also, in slightly varying versions, in Bruges, ms. 514, ff. 71-111 and in Munich, Clm. 761, ff. 1-40<sup>v</sup>. The incipit of the *Questiones* in all three manuscripts reads: "Circa librum de Anima primo queritur utrum scientia istius primum libri sit de anima." The explicit, mutilated in Bruges 477, reads as follows in the Munich ms.: "Expliciunt Questiones super librum de Anima parisiis disputate per venerabilem doctorem dominum Nicolaum de Horem." In Bruges, ms. 514, fol. 97<sup>r</sup>, end of *Questiones* on Book II, the author is identified thus: "Expliciunt questiones super 2<sup>um</sup> librum de Anima data a Magistro Nicolao Oresme." Concerning Bruges, ms. 477 René Mathieu writes: "Bruges 477 may well be the prototype of the other two manuscripts. Thanks to it, we believe we are in possession of the complete commentary on the *De Anima*, *expositio* and *questiones*, from the pen of one of the most representative among the philosophers who prepared the transition between scholarly thinking derived from Aristotle and the rise of modern concepts based upon the results of the most rigorous scientific experimentation." R. Mathieu, "A la recherche du De Anima de N. O.," in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 31 (1956), 255. See also A. Maier, *Metaphysische Hintergründe*, 33-37; C. Michalski, "La Physique nouvelle et les différents courants philosophiques au xiv<sup>e</sup> siècle," *Bull. International de l'Académie polonaise*, Cracow, 1927, 139; also E. Borchert, *Die Lehre von der Bewegung*, 18.

14. — *Questiones de sensu et sensato.*

Unpublished. Manuscript: Erfurt, Stadtbücherei, Amplon. Q. 299, ff. 128-157. Attributed to Oresme in manuscript.

15. — *Questiones parvorum naturalium.*

Unpublished. Manuscript: Erfurt, Stadtbücherei, Amplon. Q. 299, ff. 104-109; a fragment is found in Munich, Clm. 761, fol. 41.

16. — *De Perfectionibus rerum or specierum.*

Incipit: "Consequenter queritur an universaliter entium alterius rationis alterum in infinitum sit perfectius et nobilius essentialiter altero." Explicit: "Et sic patet de ista materia totali quid sentiendum sit, etc." Unpublished. Manuscript: Vatican, lat. 986, ff. 125-133. Nine geometrical questions on the continuum, formerly thought to be a fragment of Oresme's lost questions on the *Sentences*. A. Maier believes they are part of the work mentioned in *Configuratio qualitatum* under the title *De perfectione figurarum*; see *An der Grenze*, 305 and 374, n. 24; also *Die Vorläufer Galileis*, 190, n. 69.

17. — *Quodlibeta annexa questioni premissae.*

Incipit: "Ut autem aequaliter pacificentur animi ..." Unpublished. Manuscripts: Florence, Laurenziana, Ashburnham 210, ff. 21-70<sup>v</sup>; Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 15126, ff. 39-85 and 15173, ff. 96-161 (incomplete). In B. N. 15126, the three separate sections are indicated: "Rationes et cause plurium mirabilium in natura," "Quodlibeta et diverse questiones," and "Solutiones predictorum problematum." Thorndike discussed this work in detail: *Hist. of Magic* III, 440-471, and also in "Coelestinus' Summary of Nicole Oresme on Marvels," *Osiris* I (1936), 629-635. In both manuscripts the Quodlibeta follow upon Oresme's *Contra divinatores horoscopios*, with which their content has only a superficial relationship. A. Maier, *Zwei Grundprobleme*, 249-251, considers it an early work, possibly antecedent to *De Caelo*; she believes the date 1370 at the end of *Contra divinatores horoscopios* does not apply to these Quodlibeta.

18. — *Questio utrum dyiameter alicuius quadrata sit commensurabilis costae eiusdem.*

Published, ed. Heinrich Suter, "Die Questio De Proportionem diametri quadrati ad costam ejusdem des Albertus de Saxonia," *Zeitschrift für*

*Mathematik und Physik*, 32 (1887), 43-54; see earlier description of manuscript, Berne, Stadtbibliothek, A, 50, *ibidem*, 29 (1884), 84-85. Duhem proved effectively that the attribution to Albert of Saxony contradicted this savant's theories expressed in several other works; see his *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci* 1<sup>re</sup> série (Paris, 1955, reprint), 341-344. V. P. Zubov shows convincingly, on the basis of affiliation of ideas with Oresme's *De Proportionibus proportionum* and *Du Ciel et du monde* (Bk. 1, chs. 11, 13, 29 and 33), that there can be little doubt of Oresme's authorship; see "Observations sur l'auteur du Traité anonyme *Utrum dyameter alicuius quadrati sit commensurabilis costae ejusdem*," *Isis*, 50 (1959), 130-134.

## b. — Oresme on Astrology in Latin.

### 1. — *Contra judiciarios astronomos et principes in talibus se occupantes*.

Incipit: "Multi principes et magnates noxia curiositate ..." Published, ed. H. Pruckner, *Sudien zu den astrologischen Schriften des Heinrich von Langenstein*, Leipzig, 1933, 227-245, from Erfurt, Stadtbücherei, Amplon. Q. 125, ff. 142-149<sup>v</sup>; ed. G. W. Coopland, *Nicole Oresme and the astrologers*, Cambridge, Mass., 1952, 123-148, from Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 10709, ff. 52-61. Other manuscripts: Erfurt, Stadtbücherei, Amplon. Q. 205, ff. 54-60<sup>v</sup>; Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, ms. 4613, ff. 147-151<sup>v</sup> and ms. 4948, ff. 162-168; Vatican, lat. ms. 4275, ff. 35-40; Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 14580, ff. 100-104; Florence, Laurenziana, Ashburnham 210, ff. 84<sup>v</sup>-89. This was apparently Oresme's first tract against astrology and seems to have established his reputation through several generations as an early antagonist and unrelenting enemy of this great delusion. Thorndike thinks this an exaggerated estimate of Oresme's intentions, and points out the limited scope of his arguments against astrology; see *Hist. of Magic* III, 398-423. In *Le Livre de Ethiques* IV, c. 24, Oresme refers to astrologers: "Et est fort de prouver les mensonges des devineurs... si comme je ay autrefois déclaré en un traictié contre telz genz." Probably written about 1360, at the time when Charles V was sponsoring several French translations of Latin versions of Arabic tracts on judicial astrology.

### 2. — *De Divinationibus*.

Incipit: "Plures artes seu scientie sunt per quas scitur de futuris seu occultis ..." A literal Latin translation of Oresme's *Livre de divinations* (q.v. infra) by someone other than Oresme. Unpublished. Manuscripts:

Bodleian, Canon. misc. 248, ff. 28-33<sup>v</sup>; Basel, ms. F.V. 6, ff. 48-53<sup>v</sup>. The explicit in the Basel manuscript reads: "Liber magistri Nicholai Oresme de divinacionibus translatus in latinum quia ipsius (*sic*) composuit in gallico scriptus anno Domini .mcccxvj. Sed hic scriptus anno 1411<sup>o</sup> ipso die beati Remigii." Assuming that .mcccxvj. represents a scribal error for .mccclxvj. (1366), it has been assumed that the *Livre de divinacions* was written in 1366 — a plausible but unconfirmed deduction. Thorndike felt that this "is easily the clearest, most concise and coherent, most readable and best presented of Oresme's works against astrology." (*History of Magic, etc.*, III, 401.)

### 3. — *Contra divinatores horoscopios.*

Incipit: "Utrum res future per astrologiam (astrologos) possint presciri..." Unpublished. Manuscripts: Florence, Laurenziana, Ashburnham 210, ff. 3-21; Biblt. Nat., ms. lat. 15126, ff. 1-39. The explicit gives the date: "Et sic finitur questio contra divinatores, facta anno 1370..." Can we be sure, however, that *facta* here means "compiled" rather than "written" or "copied?" If the former, then this is the only certain dating found in connection with any of Oresme's Latin writings. Thorndike called this work the "most penetrating as well as the most elaborate of Oresme's several onslaughts upon astrology." (*History of Magic, etc.* III, 402-404).

## c. — Oresme on the Function of Money.

### 1. — *De Mutationibus monetarum.*

Emile Bridrey, *Nicole Oresme: Etude d'histoire des doctrines et des faits économiques. La Théorie de la monnaie au xiv<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1906), 23-31, lists 18 printed editions and 9 manuscript copies of this celebrated treatise; E. Borchert, *Die Lehre von der Bewegung* (Münster, 1934), 13, adds Utrecht, Universitätsbibliotheek, ms. lat. 318. Bridrey holds that Oresme wrote this work about 1356 at the command of Jean II that he investigate the much abused royal prerogative of debasing the coinage, a practice traditional with rulers since early times. Oresme's reply ignores the basic fact that bad money drives good money out of circulation, according to Gresham's law. Recent editions: Louis Wolowski, *De mutationibus monetarum*, Paris, 1864, lxxxvii-cxxxix; Wolowski includes Oresme's French version, the *Traictié de la monnoie*, i-lxxxvi, and also Copernicus's short treatise on money, 48-79, with parallel translation in French; Charles Johnson, *The De Moneta of Nicholas*

*Oresme and English Mint Documents*, London, 1956; W. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, London, 1890, contains the *De Moneta*, Appendix. E. Bridrey, *op. cit.* 45-49, shows conclusively that Oresme made two redactions of this tract; internal evidence points to a first version made perhaps in 1355, but certainly before Jean's exile after his defeat at Poitiers (September 13, 1356) with several additions made the following year when the dauphin Charles, acting as lieutenant for his father imprisoned in London, was attempting to raise money to pay his father's ransom to Edward III.

## B. — ORIGINAL WORKS IN FRENCH

### 1. — *Le Livre de divinacions.*

Incipit: "Mon entencion a l'aide de Dieu ..." (prologue); "Pluseurs ars ou sciences sont ..." (text). Published: ed. G. W. Coopland, *Nicole Oresme and the astrologers, a study of his Livre de divinacions* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952, 50-121) with parallel English translation, from Bibl. Nat., ms. franç. 1350, ff. 39-61<sup>v</sup>. See *idem*, 123-141, Latin text of *Contra judiciarios astronomos* of which *Le Livre de divinacions* is a considerably expanded version — not a translation but rather an original work on an identical subject. Other manuscripts: Bibl. Nat., ms. franç. 19951, ff. 1-31; Berne, ms. 476, ff. 25-42. This French work was turned into Latin under the title *De Divinationibus*, q.v. *supra*. Oresme's apology for his "rude" French, in which tongue he says he has not previously undertaken to write (cf. Coopland, *op. cit.*, 50), has been held to mean that this is Oresme's first work in French, without clear confirming evidence. He cites his *Configuratio qualitatum* twice (Coopland, 60 and 92) and the *Commensurabilitas*, etc., *ibid.*, 54. These citations are lacking in the Latin text. Regarding the title, Oresme states: Tully (Cicero) wrote a book on divinacions ... and following his example, I have been pleased to name this treatise "On Divination." (Coopland, *op. cit.*, 92-93).

### 2. — *Traictié des monnoies.*

Incipit: "Cy commence ung petit Traictié de la premiere Invention des monnoies et des causes et manières d'Icelles." Published Bruges, Colard Mansion, ca. 1477, only known copy in Bibl. Nat.; edited by L. Wolowski, together with Latin original, q.v. *supra*, Paris, 1864, i-lxxxvi; ed. J. E. Parker, unpublished dissertation, Syracuse University, 1952, 65+77 typed pages, from Bibl. Nat., ms. franç. 5913, ff. 1-49<sup>v</sup>.

Other mss.: Bibl. Nat., ms. franç. 23927, ff. 2-65<sup>v</sup> and ms. franç. 23926, ff. 2-47<sup>v</sup>, also ms. franç. 25153, ff. 1-33<sup>v</sup>; Arsenal, ms. 4594, ff. 19-64. Bridrey, *op. cit.*, p. 46, inclines to fix the date of this vernacular version, generally quite literal, of the *De Mutationibus monetarum* between 1358-60. The following passage from the last chapter, the twenty-sixth, not found in the Latin original: "Car tele fraude, et se je ose dire larrechin, ne se porroit conseillier de hommes qui en leurs pensees ne feussent corrompus et pretz a toute fraude et perversité tyrannique conseillier ou il verroyent le prince ployer et encliner, comme depuis pou de temps en ça avons asséz veu par deffaulte de chief," has been taken to indicate that Oresme was writing this treatise in French while King Jean was still absent in exile, leaving the dauphin in nominal regency but unable to control the plethora of rebellious elements. Mentions of a *Traité de mutations des monnoies* are found in the *Livre de Ethiques* V, 11 and in *Le Livre de Politiques* I, 10 and 12, whether to the Latin or the French version is problematical.

### 3. — *Traictié de l'espere.*

Incipit: "La figure et la disposicion du monde ..." Published Paris, 1508 and *ibid.*, without date; unpublished critical editions: J. V. Myers, *Le Traité de la Sphère* (from Bibl. Nat., ms. franç. 1350, ff. 1-38<sup>v</sup>), Syracuse University, 1940, xlviii+87 pp.; ed. Lillian McCarthy, thesis, University of Toronto, 1942. Manuscripts: Bibl. Nat., ms. franç. 1350, 1-38<sup>v</sup>; Bibl. Nat., ms. franç. 565, ff. 1-22; 1083, ff. 126-146; Bibl. Nat., nouv. aquis. 10045, ff. 1-39; Berne, ms. 310 begins with ch. 13; Bibl. Nat., ms. franç. 7487 ends with ch. 17 out of fifty chapters. This treatise on the sphere in the vernacular is wholly unrelated to Oresme's *ex professo Questiones de Sphaera*, q.v. supra. In ch. 50 he states: "My purpose was not to enter deeper into such subtleties nor to treat astrology in French, but merely to set forth in general terms what is proper and fitting that all men should know about the natural arrangement of the sphere of the world;" if astrology is the end in view, then let those so inclined beware the dangers which "I have more fully described and proved in a little book in French, bearing upon this subject." The "little book" is surely the *Livre de divinations*, which indicates that the *Traictié de la Sphère* stands chronologically between the French treatise against astrology, tentatively dated above as of 1366, and the *Du Ciel et du monde*, where Oresme suggests (fol. 157a) that the *Traictié* be considered as an introduction to *Du Ciel* and put into a volume together with it. This suggestion was carried out in connection with four of the six extant mss. of *Du Ciel*, q.v. infra.

# C. — COMMENTED TRANSLATIONS FROM THE ARISTOTELIAN CORPUS

## 1. — *Le Livre de Ethiques d'Aristote.*

Incipit: "En la confiance de l'aide de Nostre Seigneur Jhesu Crist... je propose translater de latin en françoys aucuns livres lesquelx fist Aristote ..." (proemium); "Tout art et toute doctrine " (text). Published, Vérard, Paris, 1488; critical edition, A. D. Menut, New York, 1940, from Brussels, Bibl. Royale, ms. 2902, 91+456 pp. This manuscript was written in 1372; 17 other manuscripts are extant, some containing minor revisions. Sixteen copies of the Vérard edition are preserved in European libraries.

## 2. — *Le Livre de Politiques d'Aristote.*

Incipit: "A tres souverain et tres excellent prince Charles, quint de ce nom... Nicole Oresme, doyen de vostre eglise de Rouen, vostre humble chapellain ..." (proemium); "Nous voyons que toute cité est une communauté ..." (text). Published, Vérard, Paris, 1489. Critical edition in preparation by A. D. Menut, based on Avranches, ms. 223, ff. 3c-328d, unique final redaction. 17 other ms. copies and 22 copies of the Vérard edition are extant; of the latter, four are in American libraries — one, Morgan Library; one, Washington, Library of Congress; one, Walters Art Gallery, Baltimore; one, Henry Huntington Memorial Library, San Merino, California. Three redactions are represented in the 17 manuscript copies, in addition to the unique redaction of Avranches, ms. 223. The date of the oldest known manuscript is 1374.

## 3. — *Le Livre de Yconomique d'Aristote.*

Incipit: "Cy commence le livre appelé Yconomique, lequel composa Aristote ..." (proemium); "Yconomique et politique ne different pas seulement tant comme different maison et cité ..." (text). Published, Vérard, Paris, 1489, together with the *Livre de Politiques*; critical edition by A. D. Menut, *Maistre Nicole Oresme: Le Livre de Yconomique d'Aristote*, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 47, pt. 5, 1957, pp. 783-853, from Avranches, ms. 223, ff. 329a-348c, with parallel English translation and the Latin original. This treatise in two short Books, which follow the *Politics* in the Aristotelian corpus, was considered an authentic Aristotelian work until the 16th century.

It is in fact spurious, although it contains passages paraphrased from the *Politics*. Oresme's late 13th century Latin original consisted of the first and third Books; no Greek original of Book III has been recovered. Besides the Avranches manuscript, nine other ms. copies are known, all following after the *Livre de Politiques*, and this arrangement is employed in the Vérard edition. The date 1374 established for the third redaction of the *Politiques* probably applies also to the second redaction of the *Yconomique*.

4. — *Le Livre du Ciel et du monde*.

Incipit: "Ou nom de Dieu, ci commence le livre d'Aristote..." (proemium); "La science naturelle presque toute est des corps et des magnitudes qui sont." (texte). Published, critical edition based upon Bibl. Nat., ms. franç. 1082, ff. 1a-209c; by A. D. Menut and the late A. J. Denomy, *Mediaeval Studies* 3 (1941), 185-280; 4 (1942), 159-297; 5 (1943), 167-333. Issued also in one volume bound together, 1946. Other manuscripts: Bibl. Nat., ms. franç. 565, ff. 23a-171d, ms. franç. 1083, ff. 1a-125b and ms. franç. 24278, ff. 1a-146a; Bern, Bibl. Bongarsiana, ms. 310, ff. 28a-152d; Bibl. de la Sorbonne, ms. 571, 1a-234d. A new edition with parallel English translation by A. D. Menut is in press for the Publications in Medieval Science Series of the University of Wisconsin Press. The *Du Ciel* was completed in 1377; almost certainly it was Oresme's last work in French. Clagett has called it "his brilliant, final translation of, and commentary on, Aristotle's *De Caelo*." (See M. Clagett, "Nicole Oresme and Medieval Scientific Thought," *Proceedings of the Am. Philosophical Society*, 108, no. 4, 1964, p. 300). For a thorough analysis of the work see O. Pedersen, *Nicole Oresme og hans naturfilosofiske system, etc.*, Copenhagen, 1956, 290 pp.

D. — THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS

1. — *Sermo coram papa Urbano V<sup>o</sup> et cardinalibus habitus anno 1363*.

Incipit: "Juxta est salus mea, ut veniat..." (Isaiah 56: 1). Published in Flaccus Illyricus, *Catalogus testium veritatis* (Basel, 1556 and Lyons, 1597); in F. Wolf, *Lectio-num memorabilium et reconditarum centenarii XVI* (Lauingen, 1600); in *Appendix ad Fasciculum rerum expetendarum et fugiendarum* (Cologne, 1535); in *Tomus secundus scriptorum veterum... qui Ecclesia Romae Errores et Abusus detegunt et damnant, necessitatemque Reformationis urgent* (London, Chiswell, 1690). Manuscripts: see E. Borchert, *Die Lehre von der Bewegung*, p. 12, where six mss. are listed. Oresme

gave this admonitory sermon before the papal court at Avignon on Christmas eve, 1363. As a stirring plea for internal reforms in the Church, this sermon was greatly esteemed and often published in the Protestant countries, where Oresme's arguments were utilized in the 16th and 17th centuries in support of the Reformation.

2. — *De Communicatione idiomatum in Christo*. (On the interrelation of the human and the divine in the person of Christ).

Incipit: "De communicatione idiomatum quedam aliis dixi in tertio *Sententiarum*, que nunc Deo dante, propono diffusius et ordinacius pertractare ..." Published by E. Borchert, *Der Einfluss des Nominalismus auf die Christologie der Spätscholastik*, 1940, 5-41, from Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 14579, ff. 41-47<sup>v</sup>. Borchert lists 27 manuscript copies of this work commenting upon a topic favored as a subject for disputation by doctoral candidates in Sacred Theology at the University of Paris, found in Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (Bk. III). Indeed, Oresme begins with a reference to his own *Questiones* on the *Sentences*, now lost, to which he again refers in *Du Ciel*, fol. 72d. This tract is probably a product of Oresme's years as grand master of Navarre, 1356-1362.

3. — *Sacrae conciones*.

Unpublished. Manuscript: Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 16893, containing 115 brief sermons for Sundays and feast days. Doubtless prepared for such occasions by Oresme while dean at Rouen Cathedral (1364-1377), possibly in part while bishop of Lisieux (1377-1382). See Féret, *La Faculté de Théologie de Paris, moyen âge 3* (Paris, 1896), 289-304.

4. — *Expositio cuiusdam legis*.

Unpublished. Manuscript: Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 14580. Discussion of a point of canon law; dates from the years at Navarre.

5. — *Determinatio facta in resumpta in domo Navarrae*.

Unpublished. Manuscript: Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 16535. On the ceremonial address called *resumptio*, see Rashdall's *Medieval Universities I*, 486.

6. — *Ars sermonicinandi*, or *De arte predicandi*.

Unpublished. Manuscript: Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 7371, ff. 227-233. This work follows Oresme's *Configuratio qualitatum* in this codex. An *ex professo* exposition of the art of preaching.

7. — *De Malis venturis super Ecclesiam.*

Unpublished. Manuscript: Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 14533. Presents in briefer form the arguments developed in the *Sermo coram papa Urbano V<sup>o</sup>*, q.v. *supra*.

E. — WORKS OF UNCERTAIN ATTRIBUTION<sup>5</sup>1. — *Decisio an in omni causa oporteat iudicem judicare secundum allegata et probata.*

Unpublished. Manuscript: Brussels, Bibl. Royale, ms. 1695; probably identical with item noted in J. Launoy, *Regii Navarrae Gymnasii Historia*, I (Paris, 1677), p. 455. This *Decisio* is an anonymous Latin version of five extensive glosses found in *Le Livre de Ethiques* (V, c. 19, no. 14; VI, c. 17, no. 6; IX, c. 3, no. 8 as far as the *Question*; IX, c. 11, nos. 13 and 17). These same five glosses in French follow after the *Livre de Politiques et Yconomique* in Avranches 223, ff. 350a-360a, in a different hand. Whether the Latin compilation was made by Oresme or by someone else, and whether the French version antedates the Latin—although the latter seems likely—these unanswered doubts are sufficient justification to question the attribution of this Latin work to Oresme.

2. — *Contra mendicationem.*

Unpublished. Manuscripts: Borchert, *op. cit.*, p. 12, lists three manuscript copies of this tract, as follows: Munich, Clm. 14, 265; Kiel, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 127; Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, lat. 11799 and also lat. 4923, a fragment. A copy is noted in J. Launoy, *ibidem*. This is a Latin version of Oresme's attack upon the mendicant friars found in French in the long gloss in *Le Livre de Politiques* II, 6; whether written by Oresme is doubtful.

3. — *Quaestiones super perspectiva.*

Incipit: "Utrum lux multipliciter per radios ..." Published, Valence, 1503, and attributed to Henry of Hesse in title; ascribed to Oresme in

<sup>5</sup> The titles of several Latin tracts attributed to Oresme appear in the inventory (dated 1410-12) of the library of Amplonius Ratynk, preserved in the Erfurt Stadtbücherei; this inventory is reproduced in Paul Lehmann, *Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz* (Munich, 1928), 2, 468. Otherwise unknown are: *Questiones super speram bonam*; *Commentum super Physionomium*; *Questiones super De secretis mulierum*; *De terminis confudentibus*.

an inventory (1412) of the library of Amplonius Ratynk — "Optime questiones Orem super perspectiva," cited by Paul Lehmann, *Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz* 2 (Munich, 1928), 468. Manuscript: Erfurt, Stadtbücherei, Amplon, F. 380, ff. 29-40<sup>v</sup>. Highly rated by Thorndike, *History of Magic, etc.*, III, 509-10; its author was almost certainly Henry of Hesse.

4. — *Liber de reprobatione judiciarum astrologie.*

Incipit: "Distinctio prima de reprobatione judiciarum astrologie ..." Unpublished. Manuscript: Vatican, lat. 3097, ff. 23-50, incomplete text of a work ascribed variously to Oresme, Henry of Hesse or Bernard de Verdun. See Thorndike, "A hitherto unnoticed Criticism of Astrology," *Isis* 31 (1939), 68-78.

5. — *De Visione stellarum.*

Unpublished fragment, found in Florence, Bibl. Nazionale, Con. sop. J. X. 19, fol. 43<sup>v</sup>. The fragment consists of an astronomical diagram and the concluding lines of text: "... earundum qui etiam stella super cenith comprehenditur proprie in suo loco, non est autem idem de magnitudine, sed cum hac stella non videtur inter illas inter quas existit et in eadem constellatione vel congregacione celi in qua est, et hoc sufficit, nec (?) concedamus ipsius (?) repugnatur."

## F. — FALSE ATTRIBUTIONS

1. — *De Instantibus.*

Incipit: "Circa tractatum de instantibus intendo primo per ordinem ponere quasdam regulas." Unpublished. Manuscript: Arsenal, ms. 522, ff. 169-187. V. P. Zoubov has shown this work to be identical with John of Holland's *De Instanti* in Bodleian, Canon. misc. 177, ff. 48<sup>v</sup>-61<sup>v</sup> (dated 1369) and in Venice, San Marco, lat. VI. 155, ff. 43-64<sup>v</sup>; see Zoubov, "Une fausse attribution: le De Instantibus attribué à Nicole Oresme," *Archives internationales de l'histoire des sciences*, 11 (1958), 377-378.

2. — *De Proportionibus velocitatum in motibus.*

Incipit: Ut circa ardua asperaque fantasmata ex difformibus..." Unpublished. Critical edition by James F. McCue, dissertation, University of Wisconsin; typed; presents convincing evidence that this work

was composed by one Symon de Castello, whose authorship is indicated on the last page, fol. 168<sup>v</sup>. Manuscript: Arsenal, ms. 522, ff. 126-168<sup>v</sup>. Cf. Marshall Clagett, *Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages* (Madison, 1961), p. 339, n. 11.

3. — *Tractatus de latitudinibus formarum*.

Incipit: "Quia formarum (formarum quia) latitudines multipliciter variantur ..." Published, Padua, 1482 and 1486; Venice, 1505; Vienna, 1515; many modern printings in full or in part; the number of manuscript copies is at least a full score (see list in M. Clagett, *Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages*, pp. 397-98). In the early printed editions Oresme's authorship is indicated; however, the synoptic character of this work, derived from the first section of *De Configuratione qualitatum*, led Duhem to the suspicion, later shared by Wieleitner, that the attribution to Oresme is implausible and erroneous. This has since been confirmed by the discovery of several manuscript copies identifying the author of the compendium as Jacobus de San Martino (or de Napoles), a practical teacher of mathematics active in the latter half of the 14th century in southern Italy. This text-book-like synopsis of Oresme's most significant single contribution to science was the only representative example of his scientific thinking to enjoy wide distribution and lasting influence in succeeding centuries. The solution of the long-standing problem of authorship of this work was due to the indefatigable efforts of Anneliese Maier, whose account of her search and discovery is found in *An der Grenze* (2nd ed., Rome, 1952), 369-375, and in *Metaphysische Hintergründe*, 346-347; see also M. Clagett, *The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages*, selected passages with English translation, 392-401.

4. — *Le Quadripertit Ptholomee*.

Incipit: "Anciennement le commun language du peuple romain estoit latin" (proemium); "Misori, c'est à dire, 'Oïés, monsignour" (text). Ed. by J. W. Gossner, unpublished dissertation, Syracuse University, 1951, 265 pp. typed, from Bibl. Nat., ms. franç. 1348, ff. 1-223. Other manuscripts: Bibl. Nat., ms. franç. 1349, ff. 1-214, followed by an anonymous French translation of Ptolemy's *Centiloquium* (attributed); Bibl. Nat., ms. lat. 7321 A, ff. 53-171<sup>v</sup>, incomplete. This French translation of the Latin version of Ptolemy's four Books on astrology with the accompanying commentary from the Arabic of Haly ibn-Ridwan is prefaced by a proemium in which the following statement appears: "Et quant a present et son commandement, par

moy, G. Oresme, sera translaté ... le Quadriperti de Ptholomee avecques le comment de Haly ..." This same statement appears in the other two extant manuscripts; at the end of ms. 1348, in a much later hand, "Ce livre fu translaté par Guillaume Oresme pour Charles V." Guillaume Oresme was one of the twenty students enrolled at Navarre along with Nicole Oresme in 1348; their names appear together again in the Register for 1352-53. It has been speculated that these two Oresmes were brothers; there is no documentary evidence for or against this possibility. Guillaume Oresme was canon of Bayeux in 1376 (Reg. Greg. XI, n° 288, ff. 183b). Probably the earliest assimilation of Guillaume to Nicole Oresme occurs in the article by E. de Fréville, "Le Traité de la Sphère de Nicole Oresme et les découvertes maritimes des Normands," *Revue des Sociétés savantes*, 1 (1859), p. 712. This identification of Guillaume with Nicole was accepted by Féret, *op. cit.*, III, 293 and by Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V*, II, 367, note 1. Following the example of these generally reliable scholars, the first edition of *Du Ciel et du monde* listed *Le Quadripartit de Ptholomee* as an authentic translation by Nicole Oresme, arguing from the inferiority of the style that it must be his first work in French.<sup>6</sup> On careful reconsideration, this judgment now appears to run counter to the evidence at hand. There can be no doubt that there was a Guillaume Oresme contemporary with Nicole Oresme, nor is there any reason to believe him incapable of the task of translating the *Quadripartit* from Latin to French. Moreover, two substantial reasons can be adduced for denying the translatorship to Nicole; in the first place, Nicole never once cites the *Quadripartit* as his own work, although it is mentioned as "Ptholemy's treatise" or "Haly says ..." more than thirty times in Nicole's authentic works; when referring to his own writings, Nicole usually states, "si comme je ay monstré jadis ..." or some equivalent expression. Secondly: the style of this French translation is patently inferior to that of Nicole's authentic French writings, less rhythmically balanced in sentence structure, unclear syntactical errors, numerous dubious passages of doubtful meaning. From the evidence at hand there is not sufficient reason to warrant denying the authorship to Guillaume Oresme.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Mediaeval Studies* 5 (1943), 241, 244, 247. The present judgment contradicts that expressed in Menut's edition of *Le Livre de Ethiques* (New York, 1940), 26-28.

G. — WORKS AUTHORED BY ORESME, OF WHICH NO  
COPY HAS BEEN RECOVERED1. — *De Concepçione B. Mariae Virginis.*

In his *De communicatione idiomatum in Christo* Oresme mentions this work as his own; mentioned by J. Launoy, *Regii Navarrae Gymnasii Historia* I (Paris, 1677), p. 236; also by Abbé Huet, *Les Origines de la Ville de Caen* (Rouen, 1706), p. 332.

2. — *Commentum in libris Sententiarum.*

Oresme refers to this work at the beginning of his *De communicatione idiomatum in Christo*, q.v. supra, p. 294, item 2; another reference appears in *Du Ciel et du monde*, fol. 72d: "si comme je monstrai pieça en *Sentences*."

3. — *De Perfectione figurarum.*

See above, p. 287, item 16.

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# The Twelfth Century Theological "Questiones" of Carpentras Ms 110

JOHN R. WILLIAMS

IN the teaching of Christian theology the twelfth century was an age of innovation and experimentation. In the schools of Laon and Paris especially, many masters were exploring and exploiting new approaches to the mysteries of *Sacra pagina*. One of the most fruitful of these was the question (*quaestio*) and discussion (*disputatio*). While retaining the traditional scriptural exegesis, *lectio*, as the basic instrument of instruction, masters in theology were allowing their students to analyze the content of the *lectio* by means of question and answer. This device, to be sure, was not entirely novel.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, there is evidence that it had been used as early as the ninth century.<sup>2</sup> Only in the twelfth, however, did it become an almost universal feature of training in theology, and in other fields as well.<sup>3</sup> No doubt the great popularity of dialectic, which followed the recovery of the entire Aristotelian *Organon*, proved a powerful stimulus to this development.

Abelard's difficulties with William of Champeaux imply that the *quaestio* was already established in the schools of the early twelfth century.<sup>4</sup> We hear, too, of the failure of Alberic of Rheims in the 1120's to answer the questions of his disciple, Walter of Mortagne.<sup>5</sup> Somewhat later, John of Salisbury gives us an interesting analysis of the merits and defects in discussion of two of his Paris masters.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On the history of the *quaestio*, see G. Paré, A. Brunet, and P. Tremblay, *La Renaissance du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle: les Ecoles et l'Enseignement* (Paris and Ottawa, 1933), 125-131; A. G. Little and F. Pelster, *Oxford Theology and Theologians* (Oxford, 1934), 29-33; A. M. Landgraf, *Einführung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Frühscholastik* (Regensburg, 1948), 40-42; B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (2nd ed., Oxford, 1952), 66-82; M.-D. Chenu, *La Théologie au douzième siècle* (Paris, 1957), 337-343.

<sup>2</sup> Landgraf, *Einführung* 40.

<sup>3</sup> It was used even in grammar. See R. W. Hunt, "Studies on Priscian in the Twelfth Century," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 2 (1950), 19; 55-56.

<sup>4</sup> *Historia Calamitatum*, c. 2, J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Latina* (hereafter PL) 178, 115-123; ed. J. T. Muckle, *Mediaeval Studies* (hereafter MedSt) 12 (1950), 177-179.

<sup>5</sup> *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France* 14, 398-401.

<sup>6</sup> *Metalogicon* L. 2, c. 10 (ed. C. C. I. Webb, Oxford, 1929), 78-79.

Despite these indications of increasing use of the *quaestio*, however, our knowledge of actual procedures in the schools remains slight. Originally, it would appear, the *quaestio* was used during the period of the *lectio* itself. Later it became a separate exercise. Artur Landgraf produced evidence to show that in the twelfth century it was being used both with the *lectio* and apart from it.<sup>7</sup> Questions were asked by the masters to be answered by the students, and *vice versa*. In the thirteenth century the master usually left the *pro* and *contra* of controversial questions to the students.<sup>8</sup>

While the *quaestio* was thus establishing itself in the schools, it was also becoming a recognized form of theological literature. As the twelfth century advanced, scriptural commentators increasingly interspersed their written exegesis with real questions from the schools or hypothetical ones of their own invention. Thus Robert of Melun, between 1145 and 1155, commenting on St. Paul devotes more space to questions than to commentary.<sup>9</sup> From here it was but a short step to the work devoted exclusively to questions and their solution. Such a work is the *Quaestiones Magistri Odonis Suessionensis*, our earliest considerable example of *quaestio* and *disputatio* as they were evolving in the twelfth century classroom.<sup>10</sup> Odo of Soissons, or Ourscamp, who died in 1178, had taught theology at Paris in the 1150's and 1160's. Despite the unsystematic and heterogeneous character of the *Quaestiones* one is conscious of a technique in the process of development. In the *Disputationes* of Odo's disciple, Simon of Tournai, who died in 1201, one finds this technique polished and perfected.<sup>11</sup> With the thirteenth century *quaestio* and *disputatio* reach full maturity, both as an instrument of theological training in the new universities and as a *genre* of theological literature.

An interesting series of questions and answers from a twelfth century classroom has been preserved in the present Carpentras MS 110. This

<sup>7</sup> Landgraf, "Quelques Collections de « Questiones » de la seconde moitié du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 7 (1935), 124-126. Hereafter this periodical will be cited as *RTAM*.

<sup>8</sup> Little and Pelster 31-32.

<sup>9</sup> Smalley 73-75.

<sup>10</sup> Ed. J. B. Pitra, *Analecta novissima Spicilegii Solesmensis* (Paris, 1888), 2. On the nature and significance of these questions, see M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (Freiburg i. B., 1909-1911), 2, 25-27; Landgraf, *Einführung* 41, and "Quelques Collections de « Questiones »", 121.

<sup>11</sup> J. Warichez, *Les DISPUTATIONES de Simon de Tournai — Texte inédit* (*Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense* 12, Louvain, 1932) XLIII-LII.

manuscript was first described (as number 126) by C.-G.-A. Lambert in editing the catalogue of the Carpentras library published in 1862.<sup>12</sup> A revised description and analysis was given in 1901 by Auguste Molinier in the *Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France*.<sup>13</sup> In this 126 was renumbered 110. Lambert assigned the manuscript to the fourteenth century; Molinier to the fifteenth. These catalogues provide a satisfactory description of the external features of the codex, its dimensions (240 by 150 millimeters), its 72 folios (the numbering is modern) with two columns of text on recto and verso, its red morocco binding. As a guide to the contents of this theological compendium, however, they are completely inadequate. In all fairness to Lambert and Molinier it should be added that at the time their analyses were made it was probably impossible to identify the component elements of the collection. Fortunately this is no longer the case.

After careful examination of Carpentras 110, I am now able to identify most of its components.<sup>14</sup> Not only should they prove of interest to students of twelfth century theology, but they also have some bearing on the dating of the questions and answers which constitute the main topic of this article. I shall, therefore, summarize my findings below:

- (1) Fol. 1r.-50r.: the *Summa sententiarum*, written c. 1140, and frequently ascribed to Hugh of St. Victor. The version presented here concludes with Walter of Mortagne's treatise on marriage.<sup>15</sup>
- (2) Fol. 50r.-53r.: a second treatise on marriage, beginning "Coniugium est, ut ait isidorus." It follows without break the last line of the first treatise. In the right margin appears the notation "Magistri Galterii." The treatise proves to be that published in 1931 by F. Bliemetzrieder as an epitome of the marriage doctrine of the school of Anselm of Laon.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Catalogue descriptif et raisonné des manuscrits de la bibliothèque de Carpentras* 1 (Carpentras, 1862), 59.

<sup>13</sup> Vol. 34 (Paris, 1901), 57-58.

<sup>14</sup> I wish here to express my sincere gratitude to the Staff and Administration of the Bibliothèque Inguimbertaine at Carpentras. Not only did they make it possible for me to obtain microfilm of MS 110, but when I arrived at the library on a day on which it is ordinarily closed, they very courteously admitted me and allowed me to examine the manuscript.

<sup>15</sup> Published in PL 176, 41-174. As to MSS and versions of the treatise, see R. Baron, "L'Enigmatique « Summa sententiarum », " *RTAM* 25 (1958), 33 ff.

<sup>16</sup> "Théologie et théologiens de l'école épiscopale de Paris avant Pierre Lombard," *ibid.* 3 (1931), 273-287.

- (3) Fol. 53r.-54r.: a discussion of simony, beginning, "In peccato Simonis a quo symonia denominatur ...." This is identical with *Section IX* of the *Sententie Anselmi* published by Bliemetzrieder in 1919.<sup>17</sup>
- (4) Fol. 54r.: a brief commentary on alms-giving, "Nota quia in helemosina facienda ...." This was published in 1930 by Bliemetzrieder from the *Liber Pancrisis* (Troyes MS 425) as a *sententia* of Anselm of Laon.<sup>18</sup>

These 54 folios are all in the same hand. Molinier judged the script to be of the fifteenth century. I think, however, that it could well be earlier, perhaps as early as the late thirteenth century.<sup>19</sup> Originally these folios were not bound together with those which follow, but constituted a separate volume or part of some other codex.<sup>20</sup> Surprisingly, they have much in common with two twelfth century manuscripts now in the Würzburg University Library, Mp. th. q. 36 and Mp. th. q. 62.<sup>21</sup> Both of these contain the *Summa sententiarum* and the three brief treatises noted above. The Carpentras MS is, however, more closely related to Mp. th. q. 62 than to Mp. th. q. 36. The sequence of the four treatises is the same in the two manuscripts. Moreover, the scribe in Mp. th. q. 62 made an obvious blunder in attributing "Conjugium est ut ait isidorus" to a Magister Galterius.<sup>22</sup> The identical blunder occurs in the Carpentras manuscript. This can not be mere

<sup>17</sup> *Anselms von Laon systematische Sentenzen* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 18, 2-3, Münster i. W., 1919), 125-129.

<sup>18</sup> "Trente-trois pièces inédites de l'œuvre théologique d'Anselme de Laon," *RTAM* 2 (1930), 73-74. The text in the Carpentras MS varies somewhat from that of *Liber Pancrisis*.

<sup>19</sup> The script is large and clear. The letters are fairly round and they are not crowded together. There are only 33 lines to a column, compared with 45 to 49 in later folios. There is a suggestion of "Gothic" here, but it is not very pronounced.

<sup>20</sup> Not only are more lines crowded into a column after folio 54, but it is obvious that the tops of some of the later folios (55, 60, 67, 69) have been trimmed to make them match the size of folios 1-54.

<sup>21</sup> See H. Weisweiler, *Das Schrifttum der Schule Anselms von Laon und Wilhelm von Champeaux in Deutschen Bibliotheken* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 33, 1-2, Münster i. W., 1936), 134-138. (Hereafter this series will be cited as *BGPTM*). See also Fr. Gillmann, "Bischof Otto von Lucca der Verfasser der *Summa Sententiarum*?" *Der Katholik*, Vierte Folge, 19-20 (1917) 214-216. Unlike the two Würzburg MSS, the Carpentras MS makes no reference to the authorship of the *Summa sententiarum*.

<sup>22</sup> Weisweiler comments, 134-135: "An diesen ersten Ehetraktat schliesst sich dann unter der Überschrift, die wohl ursprünglich die Nachschrift zum vorgehenden Traktat war: De conjugio secundum magistrum galterium...."

coincidence. There must be a relationship, direct or indirect, between these two manuscripts.

The remaining folios, which must at some time have been appended to those described above, contain the following works:

- (1) Fol. 55r.-65r.: the *Epitome theologiae Christianae*, or, as it is usually cited today, *Sententie Hermannii*, by a disciple of Abelard.<sup>23</sup> This was identified and used by Ostlender, who judged the script to be that of the thirteenth century.<sup>24</sup>
- (2) Fol. 66r.: contains nothing but an acrostic, a large cross formed by letters of the alphabet.<sup>25</sup> The verso contains a series of quotations from works of Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome. The script could well be that of the twelfth century.<sup>26</sup>
- (3) Fol. 67r.-69r.: *De Sancta Trinitate Magistri Gualterii*. This is the well-known treatise on the Trinity of Walter of Mortagne published in the *Patrologia Latina*.<sup>27</sup> The script appears to be later than that of the *Sententie Hermannii*, probably fourteenth century.<sup>28</sup>
- (4) Fol. 69v.-70r.: more excerpts from Augustine and other Fathers, copied apparently by the same scribe who copied those on fol. 66v.<sup>29</sup> One of these is of very great interest, an excerpt of 95 lines which is attributed to "Basilius" (fol. 69v., col. 2-70r., col. 2). It begins, "Missus est angelus domini ad Mariam virginem..." Actually the excerpt comes from no work of Basil but from John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* III, 2-3. Taken probably from some *florilegium*, its text derives in part from the Latin translation from the Greek of Cerbanus (1134-1138), in part from that of Burgundio of Pisa (1153-1154). On

<sup>23</sup> Published in PL 178, 1695-1758.

<sup>24</sup> "Die Sentenzenbücher der Schule Abaelards," *Theologische Quartalschrift* 117 (1936) 210. To my knowledge, Ostlender is the only scholar to have noticed Carpentras 110.

<sup>25</sup> Starting with the letter C, at the very center of the cross, the acrostic reads: straight up, *crux michi certa salus*; straight down, *crux est quam semper adoro*; to the right, *crux domini mecum*; to the left, *crux pia refugium*.

<sup>26</sup> The letters are large and round. I think I detect a cedilla under the e in *nature*.

<sup>27</sup> PL 209, 575-590. The text in the MS continues for 68 lines beyond the end of the published text.

<sup>28</sup> The script has a more pronounced "Gothic" appearance than that of any of the preceding works. The treatise was probably copied in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century.

<sup>29</sup> A twelfth century hand is suggested here by the use in two places of *natur* (for *nature*), and once of *compositē* (for *composite*).

some occasions, however, the wording differs from both of these translations.<sup>30</sup>

- (5) Fol. 70v.-72r.: the theological questions and answers which follow below and which are the main concern of this article.
- (6) Fol. 72r.-72v.: Another series of excerpts from the Fathers, *De corpore Christi*.

The first interchange of question and answer takes place between an anonymous student and Master Arnaldus Lugdunensis. There is no indication of *lectio* here. Apparently this is a period in the school routine devoted exclusively to *quaestio* and *responsio*. The student quizzes his master on the mystery of the hypostatic union, on the omnipotence of God, and on original sin. The master contradicts many of the views of the student and tries to substitute for them interpretations of his own. Then, end of fol. 70v., the place of Magister Arnaldus is taken by a certain Magister Vualterius. Starting all over, the student questions the new *respondens* on the same topics raised with Arnaldus, but adding to them questions on the nature of sin itself and the eucharist. The dialogue comes to an abrupt end in the middle of column 2, fol. 72r.

The script of the folios which contain these questions and answers appears to me to be that of the late twelfth century.<sup>31</sup> Yet even if I am mistaken as to this point of paleography, there can be no doubt as to the stage in theological evolution which the dialogues represent. The specific problems with which they deal, the views of the participants on these problems, the sources on which they draw, the reliance on the syllogism, all point to the last two-thirds of the twelfth century. It is to be kept in mind, too, that all the other treatises and parts of treatises preceding our questions originated in that period.

<sup>30</sup> For comparison with Cerbanus and Burgundio I have used E. M. Buytaert, ed., *Saint John Damascene De Fide Orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus* (Franciscan Institute Publications 8, St. Bonaventure, 1955), 170-177, 391-394. Thinking that the excerpt might possibly have been taken from Robert Grosseteste's thirteenth century translation of *De fide orthodoxa*, I have compared it with corresponding passages in that work by means of photostats of Pembroke College MS 20, fol. 13r.-13v. I find nothing to suggest a relationship between the Grosseteste version and that in Carpentras 110.

<sup>31</sup> There is a tendency towards "pointing" in certain letters, such as *m* and *n*. On the other hand, straight *d* is used more frequently than round *d*. What seems to me the decisive point is the frequent use of *ſ* for *ae*. This usage, we are told, was abandoned at the end of the twelfth century. See M. Prou, *Manuel de paléographie latine et française* (Paris, 1924) 154, and F. Steffens, *Lateinische Paläographie*, 2nd ed. (Trier, 1909) XXII. On occasion, however, the cedilla appears in Humanistic script.

Unfortunately the folios of the Carpentras MS provide no direct evidence of its place of origin. There is, however, circumstantial evidence that it came from Southern Germany or Austria. Its affinities with Würzburg University Library MSS Mp. th. q. 36 and Mp. th. q. 62 (which seems to have formerly been at Bamberg) have already been noted. To this may be added a clue provided by the long excerpt attributed to "Basilius" (fols. 69v.-70r.) but which in reality is taken from a Latin translation of John of Damascus' *De fide orthodoxa*. As noted, the Latin translation most used by the scribe was that of Cerbanus. Only two manuscripts of this translation have come down to us, one from the monastery of Admont the other from that of Reun. Both are in modern Austria. But the really significant point is that Gerhoch of Reichersberg (modern Austria) in a letter to Bishop Eberhard of Bamberg written ca. 1143 quotes from the Cerbanus translation believing he is citing Basil!<sup>32</sup> In other words the Cerbanus translation was circulating in Austria in the 1140's under the name of Basil. As a final point we may note that the form Vualterius, rather than Gualterius, suggests a German rather than a French or Italian scribe. From Southern Germany the manuscript could easily have migrated to Northern Italy. There, probably, it was among the 4000 volumes collected by Malachie d'Inguimbert, who in 1735 became bishop of his native Carpentras and is now honored as the real founder of its library.<sup>33</sup>

In publishing these questions and answers, I shall use modern capitalization and punctuation. Although the scribe has usually marked the beginning of an answer by R (for *Responsio*), he has not done so very consistently. Hence in the interest of clarity I shall take the liberty of inserting an *R* of my own when the end of a question and beginning of an answer is not obvious.

<sup>32</sup> PL 194, 1067. For other citations of Damascene by Gerhoch, see Buytaert, XLIX-LI.

<sup>33</sup> On D'Inguimbert and the history of the Carpentras library, see L.-H. Labande's introduction to *Cat. Gén.* 34.

Fol. 70v., col. 1

*DE HOMINE ASSUMPTO MAGISTRI  
ARNALDI LUGDUNENSIS RESPONSIO*<sup>34</sup>

Queritur utrum hac locutione, scilicet, homo est deus, dicatur aliquid esse deus? Non. Quid, ergo, hac locutione cum vera sit, dicatur? Quod humana natura personaliter deo unita est.<sup>35</sup> Non, ergo, videtur propria esse locutio! R. Propria diversis modis accipitur. Propria enim potest dici, id est, usitata catholica receptibilis, impropria etiam secundum significationes proprias dictionum ad quas<sup>35a</sup> sunt institute. Item, hac locutione, homo ille est deus, queritur an aliquid dicatur esse deus? R. Homo ille! Hec locutio quandoque denotat humanam naturam iam deo unitam, et apponitur ille per excellentiam ad expressionem; quandoque significat personam ex duobus naturis compositam. Si, ergo, de naturis loqueris nichil dicitur esse deus; si de persona aliquid. Set numquid de illo composito dicitur quod sit deus? R. De illo quidem toto sonat locutio, set pro parte totius vera est. Quandoque enim totalis locutio, id est, in qua est totale nomen, pro toto vera est, quandoque pro parte, quandoque pro parte partis.<sup>36</sup> Item, an homo ille ab eterno fuerit? Non, quia neque de natura, neque de persona illa coniuncta potest dici.<sup>37</sup> Oporteret enim unionem ab eterno fuisse. Si tamen auctoritas usquam hoc dicit, pro parte verum est, ut ego sum "principium qui et loquor vobis," "ego sum principium et finis," et "antequam Abraham fieret ego sum", pro parte vera sunt.<sup>38</sup> Item, cuius rei nomen sit Christus? R. Illius per-

<sup>34</sup> A great deal has been written in recent years about the controversy over *homo assumptus* which raged in the schools from the 1140's to about 1180. Of especial importance are the articles of Father Nicholas Haring: "The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154)," *MedSt* 13 (1951) 26-39, "The *Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam Tertium* of John of Cornwall," *ibid.*, 253-300, and "The 'Tractatus de Assumpto Homine' by Magister Vacarius," *ibid.*, 21 (1959), 147-175. See also A. M. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* 1/2 (Regensburg, 1953), 116-149, and R. F. Studený, *John of Cornwall an opponent of Nihilianism* (dissertation, Vienna, 1939).

<sup>35</sup> The classic description of the three positions taken by mid-twelfth century theologians as to *homo assumptus* is that of Peter Lombard, *Libri IV Sententiarum* III, 6, 1-4; ed. Quaracchi (1916), 573-579. Arnold seems to accept the second position, that Christ consisted of three substances (divinity, soul, and body), or of two natures (divine and human). The anonymous author of the *Quaestiones in Epistolas Pauli*, PL 175, 433D, is undoubtedly referring to Arnold's position when he writes: "Alii dicunt quod cum dicitur: homo est deus, non praedicatur hoc quod significatur hoc nomine Deus, sed esse unitum Deo personaliter."

<sup>35a</sup> The MS has *quam*.

<sup>36</sup> This distinction occurs frequently in the theological literature of the period. For example, *Sententie Divine Pagine* (ed. Bliemetzrieder, *BGPTM* 18) 40; Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* II, Pars I, c. 11 (PL 176, 402A ff.); *Sententie Hermannii* c. XXIV (PL 178, 1733C-D).

<sup>37</sup> This view seems to stem from Abelard's teaching. See Haring, "Case of Gilbert de la Porrée," 31-32.

<sup>38</sup> The three scriptural passages are, *John* VIII, 25, *Apocalypse* I, 8, and *John* VIII, 58. The MS has in the first "e.l.v.e." for "et loquor vobis." The second *e* is perhaps a mistake for *et*. In the third quotation, the MS has "e.s." for "ego sum."

sone composite. Quomodo, ergo, vere dicitur Christus est ab eterno? Pro parte. Item, an illa<sup>38a</sup> persona composita sit tertia in trinitate? Non. Alia? Non.<sup>39</sup> Quod in multis est, ut anima alicuius hominis nec ipse est, nec aliud. Set auctoritas dicit, idem est filius dei et filius hominis.<sup>40</sup> Videtur, ergo, quod eadem sit persona filius hominis et filius dei. Non. Auctoritas enim sic intelligitur: "idem est" et cetera, id est,<sup>40a</sup> filius dei ita humanam naturam assumpsit quod persona que prius erat eadem et immutata permansit.<sup>41</sup> Unde, manens quod erat, assumpsit quod non erat.<sup>42</sup> Item, an illa sunt partes huius persone que in hac persona simul sunt unita? Ita.<sup>43</sup> Unde humana natura et verbum simul sunt unita? R. Sic. Igitur sunt partes eius, ergo verbum est pars huius persone, igitur pars persone est persona.<sup>44</sup> R. Verbum non est pars huius persone. Verbum enim nomen est persone, non nature, non partis. Cum vero dido illa ex quibus constat esse partes huius persone, de humana et divina loquor natura, que sunt partes huius persone. Hec enim nomina partes distinguunt. Verbum autem, etsi sit divina natura que est pars, non tamen potest dici pars, nec bene dicitur hec persona constare ex homine et verbo, set ex homine et deo, licet verbum sit deus ut in hoc simili: hec statua est hoc es, et hoc es est creatura,<sup>45</sup> non sequitur ergo, hec statua est creatura. Item, cum deus hominem assumpserit, an aliquem? R. Non. Ergo nullum hominem sibi univit. R. Sic. Set nichil est modo deo unitum; neque sibi univit vel assumpsit ergo, cum nullum hominem sibi univerit et nullus ei est

<sup>38a</sup> The MS has *illam*.

<sup>39</sup> Fourth on the list of charges against Abelard at the Council of Sens was: "Quod neque deus et homo neque hec persona, que Christus est, sit tertia persona in trinitate." See P. Ruf and M. Grabmann, "Ein neu aufgefundenes Bruchstück der Apologia Abaelards," *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-Hist. Abt., Munich, 1930, Heft 5, p. 10.

<sup>40</sup> The MS has *idem et filius dei et filius hominis*. The authority appealed to is presumably a letter attributed in the Middle Ages to St. Jerome. In this occurs the statement (PL 30, 140A): "... sed unus idemque Christus Filius Dei atque hominis filius." The passage is also cited (as Jerome's) by Abelard, *Sic et Non*, PL 178, 1449D.

<sup>40a</sup> The MS has *idem*.

<sup>41</sup> Lombard has almost identical words in *Collectanea in Epistolas D. Pauli*, PL 191, 1312C: "... ita Deus suscepit hominem quod eadem persona quae prius erat, immutata permansit." Also *Sent.* III, 6, 4; 579: "... non est divisa vel mutata, sed una eademque immutata permansit."

<sup>42</sup> The anonymous *Sententiae Divinitatis* (ed. B. Geyer, *BGPTM* 7, Heft 2-3, Münster i. W., 1909) 65\* also uses similar words: "Manens quod erat, factus est quod non erat."

<sup>43</sup> The view that there were "parts" in Christ is attributed to Abelard and his "school." It is stated explicitly by his disciple in the *Sententie Hermanni* XXIV (PL 178, 1733C-D). According to Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte* 2/1, 74 ff., this view was accepted by the authors of the *Sententie Parisienses* and *Sententie Florianenses*, by Omnibene and others.

<sup>44</sup> The objection that a person cannot be part of a person is raised also by the author of the *Sententie Hermanni*, *loc. cit.*, and in the *Sententie Parisienses* (ed. Landgraf, *Écrits théologiques de l'école d'Abélard: Spicilegium Sacrum Loveniense*, Fasc. 14, Louvain, 1934), 30.

<sup>45</sup> The MS has *hoc es*, which I took to be the garbled form of some proper name. I am deeply indebted to Father Nicholas Haring for suggesting to me that it probably is *hoc es* (*hoc aes*).

unitus. R. Sic, quia nulla persona, cum enim dicimus nullus homo vel aliquis, personam aliquam intelligimus. Set numquid homo assumptus non est unitus deo? Est. Ac homo assumptus est aliquis homo. Non. Homo assumptus est homo, ergo est aliquis homo non sequitur, quia cum enim dicimus homo assumptus est homo, id est, humana natura, ut cum dicimus deus assumpsit hominem, id est, humanam naturam. Assumpsit enim illa quæ sunt coniuncta in aliis sunt persona, non tamen personam.<sup>46</sup>

### DE POTENTIA DEI EIUSDEM

Queritur utrum deus possit aliquid facere quod non faciat? R. Potest ad diversa [refertur?],<sup>47</sup> quandoque ad naturam dei, et non potest deus aliquid facere qu[od] non conveniat, set non potest maior] esse potentia dei quam sit qu[od] ipse deus quibusdam [affectibus respondet]. Tamen con [fol. 70v., col. 2] ceditur multa potest facere que non facit, id est, multa possunt evenire per eius potentiam quæ non eveniunt. Probo quod non! Deus non potest facere alia evenire per suam potentiam quam eveniunt. R. Utrum? Penes eum ratio est quare hec facit evenire et non alia. R. Ita. Set hanc rationem non potest non observare. R. Ita. Ergo non potest facere alia evenire quam ratio illa suadet, quia, si alia faceret evenire et non ista, illam rationem non observaret.<sup>48</sup> R. Immo, si hec pretermitteret et alia evenire faceret, tamen hanc rationem non destrueret, quia non contra hanc male vel minus bene ageret, set alia ratione eque bona que penes eum est eque bene faceret.<sup>49</sup> Set, si eque bona ratio penes eum est qua summe bene potest agere, item ratio penes eum est quare potius hanc intentionem quam illam sequitur. R. Sola voluntas! Set quare magis vult hanc sequi quam illam? R. Non capit hominis intelligentia, unde

<sup>46</sup> None of the theories as to *homo assumptus* held that in the incarnation the Word assumed a fully constituted human person. Holders of the first theory, however, held that upon incarnation Christ, as man, was a person, an *aliquid* and *aliquis homo*. Probably Gerhoch of Reichersberg was thinking of Arnold and those like him when he wrote to Alexander III (PL 193, 565): "Sed et alii licentia disputandi de Christo adeo abusi sunt, ut dicere non dubitaverint in hac locutione: *homo est Deus*, nullam rem dici Deum, sed aliquid Deo unitum. Item: *Christus est Deus*, et: *Ego principium*, pro parte totius vera est. Item: Christum, cum sit nomen personae compositae, tertiam in Trinitate personam non esse, eo quod nihil nisi simplex in Trinitate sit."

<sup>47</sup> The parchment at the bottom of fol. 70v., col. 1 has been badly rubbed. Some of the words are illegible. In brackets I have conjectured what they may have been, but I cannot be sure that my conjectures are correct.

<sup>48</sup> The student's argument for the limitation of divine power stems from Abelard, *Theologia Christiana* V (PL 178, 1327A-1328B), and *Theologia scholarium* (*Introductio ad theologiam*) III 5 (*ibid.*, 1095C-1097B). It is also used by Abelard's disciple in *Sententie Hermanni* XX (*ibid.*, 1724D-1726A). At the Council of Sens the sixth charge against Abelard was: "Quod ea solummodo possit deus facere, que facit, vel dimittere, que dimittit, vel eo modo tantum, vel eo tempore et non alio." (Ruf and Grabmann, *loc. cit.*, 10). It is probable, however, that the argument as presented here comes from Lombard, *Sent. I*, 43, 1; 265. Compare the student's "penes eum ratio est quare hec facit" with Lombard's "Ratio enim penes eum est, qua illa facit et illa dimittit...."

<sup>49</sup> Arnold's refutation is substantially Lombard's.

"O altitudo divitiarum" et cetera,<sup>50</sup> vel propter homines quodcumque illis convenientius, ut cum alius modus eque bonus Ade liberationis deo possibilis, hunc tamen facere potius voluit quam alium, quia nobis, etsi non melior, tamen convenientius.<sup>51</sup> Conveniens enim erat, ut homo qui per superbiam ceciderat, per humilitatem surgeret. Item, an deus possit aliquid quod non velit? Non. Set ipse non vult nisi quod facit.<sup>52</sup> R. Si ait de voluntate secundum prescientiam, verum est; si de ea secundum clementiam, falsum est. Vult enim secundum clementiam multa quae non facit, auctoritate enim testante, per clementiam vult omnes homines salvos fieri, etsi secundum iustitiam quosdam reprobet.<sup>53</sup> Set numquid vult clementiam contra iustitiam? Non. Aliud vult per clementiam quam per iustitiam, sed non contra. Contra iustitiam enim velle clementiam, esset per clementiam male velle.

### DE ORIGINALI PECCATO EIUSDEM

Queritur utrum originale peccatum sit peccatum? Ita. Originale peccatum est in pueris, ergo peccatum est in pueris. Ita. Set in pueris nullum peccatum est, quia nec inobedientia, nec superbia, nec concupiscentia, et sic de ceteris. Ergo nullum peccatum. R. Non sequitur. Hec enim actualia sunt, illud non, set originale. Item, si illud originale fuit actuale Ade? Ita. Set actuale actualiter fuit, ut superbia vel inobedientia. Set nullum harum est in puero, quia nec etiam mala cogitat, ergo nullum peccatum quod fuerit in Adam est in hoc puero. R. Non sequitur, cum enim dicimus originale peccatum esse in puero, talis est sensus, id est, effectus peccati primi hominis inest ei. Pro peccato Ade subiacet temporali et eterne penae. Nec originale peccatum proprie peccatum dicitur.<sup>54</sup> Set si originale peccatum proprie non est peccatum, set effectus peccati, quomodo dicit, apostolus, ex uno originali itum est in condemnationem?<sup>55</sup> Per hoc enim videtur quod originale peccatum sit causa dampnationis. R. Sic intelligitur, "ex uno" et cetera, pro peccato Ade ab origine eterne penae subiaceamus.

<sup>50</sup> *Romans XI*, 33.

<sup>51</sup> This may have been suggested by Lombard, *Sent.* III, 20, 1; 640, or directly by Augustine, *De Trinitate XIII*, 10, no. 13 (PL 42, 1024).

<sup>52</sup> Here there is a close verbal parallel to Lombard, *Sent.* I, 43, 1; 267: "Dicit enim Augustinus in libro *De Symbolo*: «Hec solum non potest Deus, quod non vult». Per quod videtur non posse facere aliquid; nisi quod vult, sed non vult nisi quod facit, et ita videtur non posse nisi quod facit." Lombard does not agree with Augustine nor with Arnold.

<sup>53</sup> The auctoritas is I *Timothy*, II, 4.

<sup>54</sup> Arnold is inconsistent. He starts out by acknowledging that original sin is a sin, but ends by conceding that properly speaking it is not a sin. His conclusion is close to the position of Abelard in *Expositio in Epistolas Pauli ad Romanos II*, 5 (PL 178, 863 ff.). Eighth in the charges against Abelard at Sens was: "Quod non contraximus culpam ex Adam, set penam tantum." His view was adopted by the school of Gilbert de la Porrée, although Gilbert himself did not subscribe to it. It was rejected by the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, Hugh of St. Victor, and the Lombard. For discussion, see O. Lottin, "Les Théories du péché originel au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle," *RTAM* 12 (1940), 78 ff.

<sup>55</sup> *Romans V*, 16.

## DE HOMINE ASSUMPTO MAGISTRI VUALTERII RESPENSIO CERTA

Queritur an hac locutione, homo est deus, dicatur aliquid esse deus? Ita.<sup>56</sup> Vel aliquid [fol. 71r., col. 1] quod semper fuit deus, vel quod non semper. R? Quod semper fuit deus. Ergo homo semper fuit deus? Ita. Ergo homo fuit deus antequam esset homo? Ita. Ergo homo fuit deus antequam esset. R. Non sequitur. Talis enim sensus est: homo semper fuit deus, id est, humanatum verbum semper fuit deus; homo fuit deus antequam esset homo, id est, verbum humanatum fuit deus antequam esset humanatum. Ergo, homo fuit antequam esset, non sequitur, quita talis esset sensus, humanatum verbum fuit antequam esset. Item, si hec locutio, homo est deus, propria sit? Ita. Propria est fide catholica et usitata in sacra scriptura; non est propria secundum quod accipitur in philosophicis scripturis. Item, quid dicitur hac locutione, homo ille est deus? R. Illa quod ista: Christus est deus. Quid et ista? R. Verbum incarnatum est deus, Christus enim est nomen verbi incarnati. Item, si vera est hec, homo ille est ab eterno? R. Si de persona ais, ita; si de illa humana natura, non.<sup>57</sup> Ita et vere et sine determinatione dicitur Christus est ab eterno. Item, si partes sunt in Christo, si compositum aliquid esit Christus, si de diversis constet?<sup>58</sup> R. Absit! Hoc enim negat auctoritas. Set quod dicitur Christus constat ex diversis naturis sic intelligi debet, id est, ille due nature ita sunt unite, quod ex illis nulla nova essentia vel persona facta est, set quę prius divina et eterna, scilicet, ex tempore incarnata est. Item Christus erat homo ille qui apostolis loquebatur? Ita. Set homo ille erat quidem homo et verus, ergo Christus erat quidem homo et verus, ergo erat quiddam compositum. R. Non. Talis enim est sensus: Christus erat homo ille qui loquebatur apostolis, qui videbatur, id est, erat illa persona quę per humanam naturam loquebatur quasi per instrumentum et videbatur.<sup>59</sup> Similiter, ille homo erat quidam homo, hoc est, illa persona erat unita cuidam vere humane nature. Unde non sequitur quod Christus esset aliquid compositum, vel Christus erat quidam homo, id est, quedam persona humanata. Item, in illa unione quidam homo factus est? Ita,

<sup>56</sup> Magister Vualterius' answer is the opposite of that given by Magister Arnaldus to this same question. It appaers to place him among the adherents of the first theory as to *homo assumptus* described by Lombard, *Sent.* III, 6, 2; 574-576, the so-called "assumptus theory." As will appear, however, there is considerable inconsistency in his answers to the student's questions.

<sup>57</sup> The anonymous author of the *Quaestiones in Epistolas Pauli*, PL 175, 435, gives an almost identical reply to this question: "An concedendum sit, Homo ille fuit ab aeterno? Solutio. Si per pronomen, ille, demonstretur persona, verum est hominem illum ab aeterno fuisse; si autem natura humana, non est verum. Homo ille fuit ab aeterno."

<sup>58</sup> Abelard and his "school" subscribed to the view that there were "parts" in Christ. See *supra* n. 43.

<sup>59</sup> In regarding the human nature in Christ as an "instrument" Vualterius diverges from the orthodox "assumptus theory." The champion of orthodoxy Gerhoch of Reichersberg was deeply scandalized by such an idea. In his letter to Pope Alexander III (*supra* n. 46) he writes: "Item alii nomen tantum Verbi assumptis Christum dicunt per hominem quasi per instrumentum fuisse locutum."

set non ex diversis naturis, divina scilicet et humana. Ex naturis enim, ut diximus, nichil ibi confectum est, set ex anima et corpore quidam homo, id est, quedam humana natura. Set nonne dicitis animam et corpus esse humanam naturam? Ita. Quomodo ergo quandam humanam naturam ex illis confectam dicitis? R. Humana natura tum dicitur anima et corpus coniuncta, sive disiuncta. Unde dicitur quod deus ex quo fuit unio, est unitus humane nature semper, quia post semper fuit unitus humane anime et carni, sive coniunctis sive seperatis. Set numquid fuit unitus carni, anima seperata? R. Utique! Set auctoritas dicit quod *mediante anima* verbum carni est unitum. Non videtur, ergo, seperata anima a carne verbum carni esse unitum.<sup>60</sup> R. Non sequitur. Quod enim auctoritas dicit mediante et cetera, hoc dicit contra illos [fol. 71r., col. 2] qui animam ibi esse negabant. Tum humana natura dicitur compositum ex anima et corpore, secundum quod dicimus quoddam compositum est unitum deo, id est, quedam humana natura. Quedam, enim, et nulla et aliqua compositum in his locutionibus quid ostendunt. Item, homo ille, ut dicitis, est verbum humanatum cum de persona loquimur. Set verbum incarnatum assumpsit carnem. Ita. Ergo homo ille assumpsit carnem? R. Absurdum quidem videtur hoc concedi, et vere potest negari. De multis enim dicitur hoc est illud, non tamen quicquid dicitur de uno et de altero. Hoc tamen si sensum [attribuimus?] recte potest concedi. Sensus enim hic est: homo ille assumpsit carnem, id est, illa persona humanata assumpsit carnem, ut bene dicitur, hic senex fuit puer. Item, de huiusmodi locutionibus queritur que credende sint vel non: homo ille est deus, homo ille est homo, homo ille est ab eterno, homo ille est ex tempore, homo ille est res incorporea, homo ille est res corporea, homo ille est immortalis, homo ille est mortalis, homo ille invisibilis, homo ille visibilis? Similiter de Christo, et huiusmodi locutiones in sacra scriptura frequenter inveniuntur.<sup>61</sup> R. Quedam illi homini, id est, illi persone humanate, attribuuntur secundum essentiam divinitatis, quedam secundum humanam naturam sibi unitam. Verbi gratia, homo ille est ab eterno, vel est immortalis, hoc dicitur de illa persona humanata secundum se, et sic de huiusmodi. Homo ille, sive Christus, est ex tempore, vel mortalis, hoc de illa persona dicitur secundum aliud, id est, secundum naturam assumptam, et sic de similibus, ut cum auctoritas dicit "Rex glorie crucifixus," et "Deus mortuus est,"<sup>62</sup> hoc de humana natura ei unita intelligi debet. Secundum humanam naturam dicitur quod filius dei ascendit in celum, secundum illud: "Nemo ascendit in celum nisi qui descendit de celo, filius hominis qui est in celo."<sup>63</sup> Ecce ipse in celo erat et in terra loquebatur, set in celo erat secundum se, in terra loquebatur secundum naturam assumptam. Similiter, ipse qui erat in celo secundum se ascendit in celum secundum aliud. Similiter, de Christo dicitur, Christus secundum quod homo est predestinatus ut sit filius dei in virtute,<sup>64</sup> id est, humana natura Christo unita preelecta est ad hoc, ut sit unita

<sup>60</sup> The *auctoritas* is Augustine (Ep. 140, PL 33, 542). The statement, "verbum assumpsit carnem mediante anima," was much discussed by theologians of the twelfth century. See Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte* 2/1 Ch. 8.

<sup>61</sup> There is a fairly close parallel to this discussion in Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sac. L. I*, Part I, c.9, PL 176, 395A-B.

<sup>62</sup> The authority here is undoubtedly I Cor. II, 8, but the passage seems to have been suggested by Hugh of St. Victor, *loc. cit.*

<sup>63</sup> John III, 13. The MS abbreviates "descendit de celo, filius hominis, qui est in celo" by "d. d. c. f. h. qui est in c."

<sup>64</sup> Romans I, 4.

filio dei qui est equalis patri et in eadem potentia, et magnum fuit tanto uniri. Item, si deus assumpsit aliquem hominem? Non.<sup>65</sup> Hominem assumpsit? Ita. Ergo aliquem hominem assumpsit! Non sequitur. Cum enim dico assumpsit hominem, id est, humanam naturam, inde non sequitur, ergo aliquem hominem, quia per aliquem hominem compositum intelligo. Set etsi modo est unitum deo quam sibi univit? Ita. Cum, ergo, aliquem hominem sibi non univerit, nec aliquis homo est ei unitus non sequitur. Quedam enim humana natura deo unita est, quæ dicitur homo assumptus, quæ non est aliud ab eo quod assumpsit, nec tamen illud. Hoc enim compositum quod deo est unitum, et non est aliud a corpore et anima quæ deus assumpsit, et ideo non sequitur quod etsi hoc non unierit et modo est unitum, ergo aliud est unitum quam univit. Item, si hoc compositum constans ex anima et corpore deus sit? R. Non, set tantum deo unitum.<sup>66</sup> Item, si persona sit? R. Non. Probo quod est! Hoc compositum est substantia rationalis individua?<sup>67</sup> Ita. Ergo est persona! R. Non sequitur. In illa enim diffinitione oportet intelligi non coniuncta alii. [fol. 71v., col. 1]. Set iterum, secundum hoc, dicam verbum non esse personam, quia non est substantia rationalis individua non coniuncta alii. R. Hec diffinitio tantum data est de visibilibus personis, non de illis tribus.<sup>68</sup> Set cum illud compositum sit quidam homo, ergo quod removetur ab illo, removetur a quodam homine; set ab illo removetur quod sit persona, ergo et a quodam homine. Ergo quidam homo est qui non est persona? R. Ita. Potest enim bene concedi, vel potest dici quod illud compositum sit persona, nec illa tamen cui est unitum, nec alia. Item, queritur si secundum illam diffinitionem, persona est substantia rationalis individua, possumus dicere quod pater sit alia persona quam filius vel spiritus sanctus? R. Non. Oportet enim quod esset alia substantia rationalis individua. Quomodo, ergo, in-

<sup>65</sup> Vualterius means that in the incarnation the Word did not assume a fully constituted human person, or *aliquis homo*. The *Summa sententiarum* Tr. I, c. 90 (PL 176, 71A-B) states the case very clearly: "Filius Dei hominem assumpsit, sed nullus homo est qui non sit persona. Quod satis concedimus; sed ut diximus, non erat ille homo priusquam assummeretur. Licet enim corpus esset prius, non tamen anima. Itaque non assumpsit hominem qui prius esset, sed assumendo creavit. Tamen non videtur concedendum, assumpsit aliquem hominem, sed simpliciter hominem...." This does not mean, as Vualterius points out, that a *compositum*, or *aliquis homo*, is not united to the Word. Christ as man is *aliquis homo*.

<sup>66</sup> Vualterius' answer here is not consistent with his defence of the "assumptus theory." Exponents of this theory held that in the incarnation "God began to be man and man began to be God." Thus the author of the *Summa sententiarum* Tr. I, c. 15 (PL 176, 72A) states: "De hoc solet quaeri, homo assumptus est Deus, utrum sit concedendum. Sed cum Augustinus dicat, homo assumptus est unigenitus Dei Filius; non video qua fronte negari posset." The author of the *Quæstiones in Epistolas Pauli* (PL 175, 436B) gives a similar answer: "An homo assumptus sit Deus. Solutio. Multi dicunt quod non, quibus auctoritas plane contradicit. Dicit enim Apostolus...."

<sup>67</sup> The much over-worked definition of Boethius (*De Persona et Duabus Naturis*, PL 64, 1343C).

<sup>68</sup> Vualterius is clearly influenced by Lombard, *Sent* III, 10, 1; 594; "Nam et modo anima Christi est substantia rationalis, non tamen persona, quia non est per se sonans immo alii rei coniuncta. Illa tamen personæ descriptio non est data pro tribus illis personis."

telligitur "alia est persona patris, alia filii, alia spiritus sancti?"<sup>69</sup> Cum ad plenum hoc disseri nequeat, hoc tamen catholice possumus dicere: "Alia est persona patris, alia filii, alia spiritus sancti," id est, alius est gignens, alius genitus, alius procedens. Item, cum pater sit sapiens sapientia sua et sapientia eius sit filius, videtur quod pater sapiens sit a filio, vel per filium, cum ipse tamen nichil a filio, set filius omnia habet a patre. R. Licet pater sit sapiens sapientia sua et sapientia patris sit filius, non tamen sequitur quod sit sapiens per filium. Sapientia enim patris dissimiliter accipitur. Accipitur enim tum pro sapientia patris, quæ est ipse pater sapiens, ut cum dicitur pater est sapiens sapientia sua, id est, per se ipsum sapientem, tum in designatione persone, ut cum dicitur sapientia patris filius est, et ideo nichil ibi concluditur, quia dissimiliter accipitur.<sup>70</sup>

### DE POTENTIA DEI SECUNDUM EUNDEM

Queritur utrum deus possit aliqua facere que non facit, aut pretermittere aliqua de his quæ facit? R. Potest. Probo quod non! Quicquid debet facere facit? Ita. Id est, quicquid vult. Aliter enim debet non convenit deo. Item, quicquid pretermittit debet pretermittere? Ita. Id est, quicquid vult pretermittere.<sup>71</sup> Item, ratio est eum facere quæ facit et pretermittere que pretermittit. R. Hic dividendum est. Ratio est eum facere quæ facit et alia pretermittere, id est, non facere. Hoc est, ea quæ facit rationabilia sunt, et nulla facit nisi rationabilia. Hic sensus verus est. Ratio est eum facere quæ facit et non alia, id est, si alia faceret et non ista, non essent rationabilia.<sup>72</sup> Hic sensus falsus est. Similiter, convenit eum facere que facit et non alia duplex est, et eodem modo exponenda. Item, penes eum ratio est et causa quare hec facit et non alia. R. Ita. Set contra illam rationem non potest ipse facere verum est; set contra faceret si non ageret quod ratio suadet falsum est. Contra illam enim rationem agere esset male agere. Set si aliud ageret, non male ageret, ergo non contra illam rationem ageret. Item, non potest deus facere aliud quam prescivit, nec pretermittere quæ prescivit. Ita. Set ea quæ facit prescivit se facturum et non alia? Ita. Ergo, non potest alia facere quam hec! R. Non sequitur. Quod enim dicitur non potest alia facere quam prescivit et illa pretermittere ita intelligitur, id est, non potest utrumque simul esse, scilicet, quod hec prescierit et alia non

<sup>69</sup> The *Athanasian Creed*: P. Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom* (New York, 1905) 2, 66 (Article 5).

<sup>70</sup> The discussion again betrays the influence of Lombard who touches on this question in *Sent.* I, 32, 2-6. Note especially his phraseology (p. 202): "... et ita non videtur esse sapiens a Patre, cum a Patre habeat omnia."

<sup>71</sup> The disciple's argument is given in the *Summa sententiarum* Tr. I, c. 14 (PL 176, 69C), from which Peter Lombard appears to have taken it in *Sent.* I, 43, 1. The disciple was probably taking it from the latter.

<sup>72</sup> As indicated above, n. 48, the argument that God's power is limited by reason derives from Abelard and his "school." There is striking evidence in this discussion of Lombard, *Sent.* I, 43, 1; 265-266. For example: "Si enim, cum dicitur: Non potest facere, nisi quod ratio est eum facere, intelligas, eum non posse facere, nisi ea quæ rationabilia sunt, et ea quæ, si fierent, rationabilia essent, verus est sensus. Si autem intelligas, eum non posse facere alia rationabilia et bona, nisi ea quæ vult et facit, falsus est intellectus." (p. 266).

ista faciat. Iterum secundum hoc opponitur utrumque simul esse non potest, scilicet quod prescierit et non faciat. Ita. Ergo ibi ubi alterum sit, scilicet quod prescierit, nec alterum potest esse, ut non faciat? Ita [fol. 71v., col. 2]. Ergo non potest non facere, non sequitur. Coniunctim enim conceditur, set disiunctim negatur, ut in multis contingit.<sup>73</sup> Item, si deus possit aliud velle quam velit? R. Utique! Ergo potest alia voluntas esse quam sit.<sup>74</sup> R. Hic dividendum est. Alia potest et cetera, id est, aliud potest velle quam velit verum est; alia potest et cetera, id est, alius potest esse deus volens quam sit falsum est. Set probo quod<sup>74a</sup> aliud non potest velle quam vult, quia penes eum ratio est quare illud vult et non aliud. R. Hic dividendum est. Penes eum ratio et cetera, id est, in eo illa rationabilis voluntas est et non alia. Hic sensus verus est; penes eum et cetera, id est, si aliud vellet et non hoc non esset rationabilis voluntas, hic sensus falsus est.

### DE ORIGINALI PECCATO SECUNDUM EUNDEM

Queritur quid sit originale peccatum? R. Reatus. Ille reatus est culpa vel pena? R. Neutrum. Quid ergo? R. Obnoxietas temporalis penę et eterne. Set quare hec obnoxietas originale peccatum dicitur? R. Quia pro peccato primi parentis ab origine et a conceptione<sup>74b</sup> obnoxius est homo temporali et eterne pene.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>73</sup> The similarity to Lombard, *Sent.* I, 38, 2; 244 is striking: "Possunt enim haec coniunctim intelligi, ut conditio sit implicita, et disiunctim. Si enim ita intelligas: Non potest aliter fieri, quam Deus praescivit, id est, non potest utrumque simul esse, scilicet quod Deus praesciverit ita fieri, et aliter fiat; verum intelligis. Si autem per disiunctionem intelligas, ut dicas, hoc aliter non posse evenire, quam evenit, quo modo futurum Deus praescivit; falsum est...; si coniunctim intelligas, verum dicis; si disiunctim falsum." There is a somewhat similar passage in the *Sententiae* of Roland Bandinelli (ed. A. Gietl, *Die Sentenzen Rolands nachmals Papstes Alexander III*, Freiburg i. B., 1895, p. 58).

<sup>74</sup> In Lombard, *Sent.* I, 43, 1; 267, the question is not whether God can will other than he does, but whether he can do only what he wills. Lombard does not accept this limitation on God's power.

<sup>74a</sup> The MS has *quo*.

<sup>74b</sup> The MS has *conceptionem*.

<sup>75</sup> Vualterius' view is that of Abelard, who writes in his *Expositio in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos* II, 5 (PL 178, 871A): "Est ergo originale peccatum, cum quo nascimur, ipsum damnationis debitum quo obligamur, cum obnoxii aeternae poenae efficimur propter culpam nostrae originis, id est, primorum parentorum, a quibus nostra incoepit origo." The eighth of the charges against Abelard at Sens was: "Quod non contraximus culpam ex Adam, sed penam tantum." See Ruf and Grabmann, *loc. cit.*, 10. The author of the *Summa sententiarum* and Lombard, *Sent.* II, 30, 6; 462 reject this theory and accept that of Anselm of Laon that original sin is in nature concupiscence. The Lombard's description of the Abelardian thesis is worthy of especial note here: "Quidam enim putant, originale peccatum esse reatum poenae pro peccato primi hominis, id est debitum vel obnoxietatem, qua obnoxii et addicti sumus poenae temporali et aeternae, pro primi hominis actuali peccato: quia pro illo, ut aiunt, omnibus debetur poena aeterna, nisi per gratiam liberentur. Juxta horum sententiam oportet dici, originale peccatum nec culpam esse, nec poenam." This is exactly Vualterius' "Neutrum." He is one of Lombard's "Quidam."

Set quomodo hec obnoxietas in baptismo remittitur, cum etiam post sit subditus temporali penę? R. Partim remittitur quia non est reus ęternę penę, partim remanet ad cautelam. Item, si originale peccatum est reatus pro peccato Adę, et non culpa, quomodo peccatum dicitur remitti in baptismo?<sup>76</sup> R. Quia reatus peccati remittitur. Set, iterum, quomodo dicit apostolus ex unius quidem delicto, ait expositor "originali et uno quidem itum est in condemnationem,"<sup>77</sup> si originale peccatum non est peccatum, cum non eatur in dampnationem nisi pro culpa? Sic intelligitur: ex peccato unius hominis, id est Adę, uno quidem (licet plura in eo fuerint, unum tamen dicit, inobedientiam, quia maius) peccato inquam originali itum est in condemnationem, *in*, id est, pro peccato Adę, rei sunt dampnationis ęternę.

### QUID SIT PECCATUM SECUNDUM EUNDEM

Queritur quid peccatum sit? R. Mala voluntas et malus actus. Set quomodo dicitur malus actus peccatum, cum peccatum sit culpa in anima? R. Peccatum dicitur culpa, id est, tale quid pro quo auctor culpabilis est. Quod autem dicitur culpa est in anima, id est, ex anima procedit. Ex corde, enim, procedunt quę coinquant hominem. Item, si voluntas mala est peccatum, cum mala voluntas est in homine, peccatum est in eo. Set cum illa<sup>77a</sup> ducit ad effectum, malus actus est in eo, et ille malus actus peccatum est. Quero, ergo, utrum duo sint in eo peccata cum sint in eo [fol. 72r., col. 1] peccatum voluntatis et peccatum operis? R. Duo.<sup>78</sup> Ergo, vel duo criminalia, vel duo venalia, vel unum criminale et alterum veniale? R. Si velit occidere hominem et occidat, duo criminalia sunt, voluntas illa et actus. Ergo tenetur duo criminalibus bene potest concedi. Ergo, si absque penitentia moritur pro duobus dampnatur? Ita. Set si sunt duo peccata, ergo vel duo homicidia vel duo alia peccata. R. Hic dividendum est. Duo homicidia possunt dici, id est, homicidium actus et homicidium voluntatis, set duo homicidia non possunt dici, id

<sup>76</sup> This problem is discussed in *Summa sententiarum* Tr. III, c. 11 (PL 176, 107B), and by Lombard, *Sent.* II, 32, 1; 474. Neither of these accepts Vualterius' concept of original sin, so there is slight similarity in explanation. Lombard agrees that *reatus* is removed by baptism, but it is the *reatus* of concupiscence. Vualterius does not even mention concupiscence in his discussion of original sin.

<sup>77</sup> The reference is to *Romans* V, 16, also cited by the disciple in questioning Arnold. The *Expositor* was undoubtedly Lombard's commentary on Paul (PL 191, 1393B): "... id est quia, unius hominis Adae delicto uno quidem, etsi ipsi plura admiserit, in posteros tamen non nisi unum originale transmisit..." Note also Lombard's use of *itum*. Thus, 1395A: "... itum est ab homine, vel processit sententia Dei in *condemnationem* corporis et animae..." Also 1396B "... itum est in justificationem vitae."

<sup>77a</sup> The MS has *illam*.

<sup>78</sup> The *Summa sententiarum* Tr. III, c. 15 (PL 176, 113B-C) rejects the view that there are two sins. Lombard, *Sent.* II, 42, 1; 527-529 discusses the problem, but fails to reach a conclusion of his own. That some theologians accepted the theory of two sins is indicated by a comment of Hugh of Saint-Cher: "Consequenter querit, cum peccatum sit interior actus et exterior, utrum voluntas et opus exterius sint unum an diversa peccata. Et dicit quidam quod sic, ut Prepositinus; quidam quod non." Cited by Landgraf, "Quelques Collections de « Questiones »", *RTAM* 7 (1935) 119.

est, due male voluntates et duo diversi actus, ut vulgo appellantur.<sup>79</sup> Unde ecclesia non duo nominat set unum, quia alterum ex altero procedit, et quasi de uno penitentiam pro duobus tamen iniungit. Item, si manenti in uno criminali, aliud remittitur?<sup>80</sup> R. Non. Manens in uno sepe de alio dolet et displicet sibi! R. Sit. Ergo de eo penitet. R. Sit. Remittitur, ergo, ei quia peccatum de quo penitet baptismo remittitur ad penitentiam. R. Si vere penitet, utique remittitur; si autem non vere, id est, non perfecte penitet, non remittitur ideo. Perfecte autem penitere dicimus comissa flere et flenda non committere<sup>81</sup>, id est, nolle committere. Taliter autem penitenti omne peccatum dimittitur. Item, si peccatum dimittitur antequam sacerdoti confiteatur? R. Ita, "dixi confitebor et tu remisisti." Quare, ergo, confitetur?<sup>82</sup> Propter humilitatem et quia aliter inputaretur nisi confiteretur, si adsit tempus. Set numquid sub conditione dimittit peccatum? R. Non.<sup>83</sup> Quomodo ergo dicimus quod nisi confiteatur, peccatum remissum ei inputabitur? Numquid peccata redeunt?<sup>84</sup> Satis potest concedi. Quis, igitur, sensus est deus huic dimittit peccata? R. Id est, ita a peccato eum mundat quod si statim moreretur ei ad eternam dampnationem non inputaretur. Set peccatum illud, quomodo redit? R. Quia, si post contempnit satisfacere, iudex imputat, quod in parabola evangelica ostenditur, "serve nequam" et cetera. Quidam aliter dicunt, non pro peccato remisso punitur, sed pro contemptu.<sup>85</sup> Neuter autem preiudico. Item, si peccatum

<sup>79</sup> In remarking "... set duo homicidia non possunt dici ... ut vulgo appellantur" Vualterius probably has in mind the *Summa sententiarum* Tr. III, c. 15 (PL 176, 113C): "... et utrumque appellatur homicidium *consuetudine loquendi* et usu Scripturae, nec duo sunt peccata vel duo homicidia, set unum et idem...." The italics are mine.

<sup>80</sup> This point was discussed by most of the theologians of the time, including the anonymous authors of the *Summa sententiarum* and the *Sententiae Divinitatis*, Abelard and Peter Lombard. All of these give a negative answer to the question.

<sup>81</sup> This definition of perfect repentance is found, with variation in wording, in nearly all works on penance from this period. The source seems to be Gregory the Great, *Homilia in Evangelium* 34, n. 15 (PL 76, 1216).

<sup>82</sup> The question seems to echo the *Summa sententiarum* Tr. VI, c. 11 (PL 176, 147B): "... ad quid ergo confessio oris est utilis?" The *Summa* and Lombard, *Sent.* IV, 17, 1; 845 take the same position as Vualterius. Like him both cite "Dixi, confitebor ...." from Psalm 31.

<sup>83</sup> That some theologians held the opposite opinion is shown by Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte* 4/1, 215, where he cites from Brit. Mus. Harley 325 (beginning of the thirteenth century): "Dicimus quod peccata redeunt. Non enim dimittantur nisi sub conditione."

<sup>84</sup> This question was much discussed in the twelfth century. The conflicting opinions are well described by Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte* 4/1, Ch. IV. In accepting the *reditus peccati* Vualterius ranges himself with the "school" of Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, Gilbert de la Porrée, and the oral teaching of Lombard. The *reditus* was rejected by the authors of the *Summa sententiarum* and the *Ysagoge in theologiam* (ed. Landgraf, *Ecrits théologiques de l'école d'Abélard*, Louvain, 1934).

<sup>85</sup> "Serve nequam ...." (*Matthew* XVIII, 32) is cited in most discussions of the *reditus peccati*. In speaking of contempt, Vualterius may have been prompted by the *Summa sententiarum* Tr. VI, c. 11 (PL 176, 148D): "Hoc ideo dicimus, quia solent quidam dicere cum non pro peccato illo puniendum, sed pro contemptu."

remittitur nisi in caritate? R. Non. Item, si caritas amittatur? R. Est quidam status caritatis qui habitus non amittitur, est alius qui amittitur.<sup>86</sup>

### DE CORPORE CHRISTI SECUNDUM EUNDEM

Si illud corpus Christi quod pendit in cruce [fol. 72r., col. 2] sit super altare? R. Hoc habet sana fides. Ante consecrationem sacerdotis sola substantia panis ibi erat? R. Ita. Post consecrationem est ibi corpus Christi? R. Quidem. Quero ergo an substantia panis que prius ibi erat modo mutata vel versa vel facta sit corpus Christi? R. Auctoritates hoc sonant. In multis enim reperitur quod substantia panis transit et vertitur in corpus Christi et similia. Quid ergo dicemus? Quod cotidie multa fiant corpus Christi que prius non erant? R. Non. Non enim formalem nec substantialem dico ibi esse conversionem, id est, nec formam illam fieri hanc, nec substantiam illam fieri dicimus, nec aliquid unquam factum esse corpus Christi nisi carnem in utero virginis sanctificatam, nec ipsam de nova materia cotidie fieri dicimus.<sup>87</sup> Quod autem auctoritates dicunt sic intelligitur: substantia panis transit vel vertitur et sic de aliis, id est, sub illis accidentibus sub quibus prius erat substantia panis per consecrationem est corpus Christi. Set quid factum est de substantia panis que prius ibi erat? R. In nichilum puto redactam. Qui enim omnia de nichilo fecit, et id quod aliquid est in nichilum redigere potest. Vel si quid aliud inde actum est, deus melius novit!<sup>88</sup> Item, si accidentia illa que sensibus occurrunt ibi remaneant? R. Ita. In quo ergo subiecto fundantur? De hoc magis est opinio quam assertio. Quidam in aere, quidam in illo corpore. Michi tamen videtur quod in ipso corpore Christi sint<sup>89</sup> Set numquid corpus Christi diversas

<sup>86</sup> Vualterius probably means an imperfect *caritas*, which may be lost, and a perfect one which is never lost. Opinion on this problem is summed up by Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte* 1/2, Ch. 6.

<sup>87</sup> It will be noted that the term, *transubstantiation*, is never used by Vualterius or the disciple. The former's position is well described in *Summa sententiarum* Tr. VI, c. 5 (PL 176, 142C): "Alii volunt dicere quod verum corpus Christi sit in altari; sed negant panem in ipsum commutari. Dicunt namque panis substantiam adnihilare et non in aliud transire; et ea substantia adnihilata sub illa specie remanente, corpus Christi esse. Quos supradictae auctoritates confutant." Stephen of Tournai notes that Master Adam du Petit-Pont "neutrum recipiebat scil. id quod fuit panis est corpus Domini, id quod fuit panis non est corpus Domini." (Quoted by Landgraf, "Some Unknown Writings of the Early Scholastic Period," *New Scholasticism* 4, 1930, p. 3). Lombard was troubled by the question. In *Collectanea in Ep. Pauli* (PL 191, 1644B) he remarks: "Utrum vero sit substantialis perspicuum non est." Later, *Sent.* IV, 11, 1; 802, he says: "Si autem quaeritur, qualis sit illa conversio, an formalis, an substantialis, vel alterius generis, definire non sufficio."

<sup>88</sup> Vualterius' words here are very similar to those of Lombard in *Collectanea* (PL 191, 1645C): "Praeterea quaeri solet ... quod de ipsa substantia panis et vini factum sit. Ad quod illi respondent, vel in praeiacentem materiam resolutam, vel in nihilum redactam, quod potest ille facere qui de nihilo cuncta creavit."

<sup>89</sup> The theory that the accidents remained in the air was propagated by Abelard and accepted by many members of his "school." Lombard notes the theory in *Sent.* IV, 12, 3; 810. His own view (p. 808) is "potius videtur mihi fatendum, existere sine subiecto,

habet species? R. Non. Ita enim hec accidentia sunt in illo corpore quod non afficiunt illud, nec enim potest dici sic sapidum vel sic coloratum.<sup>90</sup> Quomodo sunt in eo? R. Modum essendi nescio. Deus scit! Item, si fractio et atricio fiant in ipso corpore? R. Videtur quidem fractio fieri in substantia corporis, nec tamen fit, nec ibi fractio est, set tantum videtur fieri.<sup>91</sup> Si enim frangeretur corpus Christi, et pateretur. Christus autem semel mortuus est,<sup>92</sup> iam non moritur. Mors illi ultra non dominabitur.<sup>93</sup>

### DE CORPORE CHRISTI AUCTORITATES SANCTORUM<sup>94</sup>

Hylarius: Corpus Christi, quod summitur de altari, figura est, dum panis et vinum extra videtur; veritas autem, dum corpus et sanguis in veritate interius creditur.<sup>95</sup>

Ex Simbolo Ephesino: Necessarie igitur et hoc addicimus: incruentam celebramus in ecclesiis sacrificii servitutem et sanctificamur participes sancti corporis et preciosis sanguinis Christi, non ut commu [fol. 72v., col. 1] nem carnem percipientes, nec ut viri sanctificati et verbo coniuncti secundum dignitatis unitatem, set vere vivificatricem et ipsius verbi propriam factam.<sup>96</sup>

quam esse in subiecto." The theory that the accidents remained in the body of Christ is alluded to by nearly all the writers, but, to my knowledge, Vualterius is the only one who accepted it. F. Jansen in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* V (ed. A. Vacant and E. Mangenot, Paris, 1913) 1378 characterizes the theory as "absurde."

<sup>90</sup> This seems to echo a passage in Lombard, *Collectanea* (PL 191, 1644C): "De priori autem substantia quaedam remanent, scilicet color, sapor, forma, pondus, quae prioris substantiae accidentia fuerunt, quae nec ipsum Christi corpus afficiunt, nec in eo fundantur."

<sup>91</sup> Theologians agreed that there was no actual breaking of the body of Christ, but there were different theories as to what did take place. The authors of the *Sententie Hermanni* (PL 178, 1742B) and the *Sententie Divinitalis* (p. 134\*) appear to agree with Vualterius (and Augustine) that there only "seems" to be breaking. In *Collectanea* (PL 191, 1644C-1645C) Lombard explains the different theories, but does not express a preference. In *Sent.* IV, 12, 3; 810, however, he concludes: "... sane dici potest fractio illa et partitio non in substantia corporis, sed in ipsa forma panis sacramentali fieri ...."

<sup>92</sup> I *Peter* III, 18.

<sup>93</sup> *Romans* VI, 9.

<sup>94</sup> The wording and order of the citations from the Fathers which follow make it almost certain that the immediate source was Abelard's *Sic et Non* c. 117 (*De sacramento altaris, quod sit essentialiter ipsa veritas carnis Christi et sanguis, et contra*: PL 178, 1519D ff.). The only other possibility is that Abelard and the compiler of this list were drawing upon the same *florilegium*.

<sup>95</sup> Abelard, *Sic et Non*, c. 117 (PL 178, 1519D) attributes this to Hilary, as do Ivo of Chartres (*Decretum*, Pt. 2, Ch. 7; PL 161, 145B) and Gratian (*Decretum*, Dist. 2, c. 79, *De consec.*; Ed. A. Friedberg, *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, vol. I, Leipzig, 1879, col. 1346). I have not been any more successful than the numerous editors of the latter work in finding the quotation in Hilary or anywhere else.

<sup>96</sup> *Sic et Non* c. 117, 1519D. Abelard's source was probably Ivo of Chartres (*Decretum*,

Hylarius : Non est humano aut sæculi sensu de his rebus loquendum, neque per violentiam atque imprudentem predicationem celestium dictorum sanitati alienę atque inpię intelligentię extorquenda est perversitas. De naturali enim in nobis Christi veritate que dicimus nisi ab eo didicimus, stulte atque inpie dicemus. Ipse enim ait: caro mea est esca, et sanguis meus vere est potus. Qui edet carnem meam et bibet sanguinem meum in me et ego in eo. De veritate carnis et sanguinis non est relictus ambigendi locus. Nunc enim ipsius domini professione et fide nostra vere caro est et vere sanguis est et accepta atque hausta. Efficiunt ut et nos in Christo et Christus in nobis sit.<sup>97</sup>

Ab̄r: Panis iste panis est ante verba sacramentorum. Ubi accessit consecratio de pane fit Christi caro.<sup>98</sup>

Item: Sermo celestis si operatur in aliis rebus, non operatur in sacramentis celestibus? Ergo didicisti quod ex pane fiat corpus Christi et quod vinum cum aqua in calice mittitur, set sit sanguis consecratione verbi celestis.<sup>99</sup>

Item: Qui pridie, inquit, quam pateretur, accepit panem. Antequam consecratur panis est. Ubi autem verba Christi accesserunt, corpus est Christi, et ante verba Christi calix est vini et aque. Ubi verba Christi operata fuerint sanguis efficitur.<sup>100</sup>

Ier: De verbis dei humano sensu argumentari sacrilegium est.<sup>101</sup>

Aug, in libro de moribus ecclesię contra Manicheos: Naturę quidem ordo ita se habet, ut cum aliquid dicimus rationem precedat auctoritas. Nam infirma videri ratio potest, que cum reddita fuerit auctoritatem postea per quam firmetur assumit.<sup>102</sup>

Ab̄r: In illo sacramento Christus est, quia corpus Christi est. Non ergo corporalis esca set spiritualis. Corpus enim Christi corpus est divini spiritus.<sup>103</sup>

Ier, Ad Edibiam: Nec Moyses dedit nobis panem verum [fol. 72v., col. 2] set dominus Iesus, ipsa conviva et convivium; ipse comedens qui et commeditur.<sup>104</sup>

Idem, in libro de membris domini: Sacerdos dei Patris dicitur filius dei secundum humanitatem, in qua se pro nobis acceptabile sacramentum deo optulit, ut ipse esset sacerdos qui et sacrificium.<sup>105</sup>

Aug, De utilitate agendę penitentię: Tunc eis Petrus annuntiavit eum colendum

Pt. I, Ch. 2; PL 161, 61). He has, however modified Ivo's text considerably. Comparison of the wording of the Carpentras MS with both Ivo and Abelard proves beyond a doubt that the latter was the immediate source.

<sup>97</sup> Hilary, *De Trinitate* VIII, 14 (PL 10, 247); *Sic et Non* c. 117, 1518D-1519A. The MS has "Qui ... bibet s.m. in me...."

<sup>98</sup> Ambrose, *De Sacramentis* IV, 4, 14 (PL 16, 439B-440A); *Sic et Non* c. 117, 1520B.

<sup>99</sup> Ambrose, *De Sac.* IV, 4, 19 (PL 16, 442B); *Sic et Non* c. 117, 1520C-D.

<sup>100</sup> Ambrose, *De Sac.* IV, 5, 23 (PL 16, 444A); *Sic et Non* c. 117, 1520D-1521A.

<sup>101</sup> Jerome, *In Hierimiam Prophetam* VI, 31 (PL 24, 915A); *Sic et Non* c. 1, 1351C.

<sup>102</sup> Augustine, *De Moribus Ecclesię Contra Manicheos* I, 3 (PL 32, 1311); *Sic et Non* c. 1, 1350D.

<sup>103</sup> Ambrose, *De Mysteriis* 58 (PL 16, 408); *Sic et Non* c. 117, 1523B.

<sup>104</sup> Jerome, Letter 120 (PL 22, 986); *Sic et Non* c. 117, 1523B.

<sup>105</sup> This work goes under a number of different titles and has been attributed to various authors. It is published as a work of Augustine under the title *De Essentia Divinitatis* in PL 42, 1199-1208. The passage cited here is in col. 1205; *Sic et Non* c. 117, 1523C.

quem crucifixerunt, ut eius sanguinem biberent credentes quem fuderant sevientes.<sup>106</sup>

Idem, in Omelia II, Psalmi XXXIII: Accesserunt Iudei ut Iesum crucifigerent. Nos accedamus ut corpus et sanguinem eius accipiamus.<sup>107</sup>

Est ratio cur pars altaris dextra misse principium finemque tenet, medium sinistra. Cepit ab his, defertur ad hos, refertur ad illos nostra fides et erunt omnes in fine fideles.<sup>108</sup>

The time at which the above dialogues occurred can only be approximated. We have noted the student's persistent defense of the Abelardian thesis that divine power is limited by reason. Both masters are sympathetic to Abelard's view of original sin. Arnaldus, like Abelard, even denies that Christ is the third person in the Trinity. Yet none of the participants betrays awareness that these doctrines were condemned by the Council of Sens.<sup>109</sup> This circumstance might tempt one to assume a date previous to the meeting of that Council in 1140-1141. Such a conclusion is, however, untenable since the participants in the dialogues display extensive familiarity with Peter Lombard's *Sententiarum libri quatuor*.<sup>110</sup> As this work did not appear until 1154-1157,<sup>111</sup> it would be rash to assume a date earlier than 1160 for the dialogues.

As to a terminus *ad quem*, several points are significant. First of all, we may note the great interest of the parties to the discussion in the hypostatic union. Becoming a major concern to the schools in the 1140's,<sup>112</sup> this doctrinal issue soon became a source of active controversy.<sup>113</sup> After the death of Peter Lombard in 1160 the controversy became a tempest centering in the view attributed to the Master of the Sentences that Christ *secundum quod homo non sit aliquid*.<sup>114</sup> A climax

<sup>106</sup> Augustine, *Sermo* 352 (PL 39, 1550); *Sic et Non* c. 117, 1523C.

<sup>107</sup> Augustine, PL 36, 313; *Sic et Non* c. 117, 1523D.

<sup>108</sup> I have been unable to locate the source of this quotation. Examination of the manuscript reveals that it was written in different ink from the citations which precede it and was apparently appended to them at a later time.

<sup>109</sup> These were the 4th, 6th, and 8th charges against Abelard at Sens. See Ruf and Grabmann, *loc. cit.* 10-11, and J. Rivière, "Les «Capitula» d'Abélard condamnés au concile de Sens," *RTAM* 5 (1933) 5-22.

<sup>110</sup> See the notes to the text *passim*.

<sup>111</sup> D. Van Den Eynde, "Essai chronologique sur l'œuvre littéraire de Pierre Lombard," *Miscellanea Lombardiana* (Novara, 1957) 57-58.

<sup>112</sup> P. Glorieux, "L'Orthodoxie de III Sentences (d. 6, 7 et 10)," *ibid.* 140.

<sup>113</sup> See N. M. Haring, "The 'Tractatus de Assumpto Homine' by Magister Vacarius," *MedSt* 21 (1959), 147-175. Haring dates this treatise (by a defender of the first or "assumptus" theory) between 1150 and 1155 (p. 148).

<sup>114</sup> The course of the controversy is well outlined by Haring, "The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée," *MedSt* 13 (1951), 37-38.

was reached in the period 1177-1179. On 18 February of the former year Pope Alexander III officially condemned this proposition.<sup>115</sup> His action was followed by at least two vigorous literary attacks on its defenders, the *Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam Tertium* of John of Cornwall,<sup>116</sup> and the *Contra quatuor labyrinthos Franciae* of Walter of St. Victor.<sup>117</sup> This attack probably failed to stifle all debate, but after 1180 defenders of the proposition that Christ as man is not an *aliquid* were temporarily driven under ground. Towards the end of the century, Stephen Langton states that the opinion of the Lombard as to the hypostatic union "... iam exspiravit, et hoc auctoritate decretalis epistole Alexandri, que precipit dici, quod est aliquid secundum quod homo."<sup>118</sup> Thus the time and space devoted to "homo assumptus" in our dialogues imply the period when the controversy was at its height, that is to say, the years between 1160 and 1180.

This conclusion is strengthened by the specific theological attitudes and technical terminology of the protagonists. Master Arnold does not employ the formula *Christus secundum quod homo non sit aliquid*, but his statement that the expression *homo est deus* does not mean that *deus* is an *aliquid* is tantamount to the same thing. Thus the papal condemnation of 1177 would have applied to him as well as to the Lombard and his disciples.<sup>119</sup> In the light of his disregard for the censures of the Council of Sens, it would probably be hazardous to assume that he would respect the papal letter of 1177. Nevertheless in the light of other evidence it is probable that his words here were spoken before that date.

Some of this other evidence is provided by the dialogue between the student and Master Vualterius "de corpore Christi." Vualterius' views of the eucharist are the old-fashioned ones of the first two-thirds of the twelfth century. They reflect the age of the *Summa sententiarum*, Hugh of St. Victor, Roland Bandinelli, and Peter Lombard.<sup>120</sup> Especially

<sup>115</sup> Alexander's letter to Archbishop William of Rheims condemning the proposition is in H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* 1 (Paris, 1889), n. 9, 8-9.

<sup>116</sup> Published by Haring, *MedSt* 13 (1951), 253-300. Haring (p. 254) dates the *Eulogium* shortly before the Lateran Council of 1179.

<sup>117</sup> Published by Glorieux, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 19 (1952), 187-335.

<sup>118</sup> Landgraf, *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephan Langton* (BGPTM 37, Heft 1, Münster i. W., 1952) 112.

<sup>119</sup> Haring, "The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée," *loc. cit.* 38.

<sup>120</sup> See L. Hodl, "Der Transsubstantiationsbegriff in der scholastischen Theologie des 12. Jahrhunderts," *RTAM* 31 (1964), 235-259. Hödl acknowledges that Bandinelli in his

noteworthy is the absence of the term *transubstantiation*. Yet by the 1160's this term was already being used, and in the sense that later became official, in theological discussion.<sup>121</sup> Vualterius, however, is quite unaware of this development. Would this have been possible, were he discussing the eucharist after 1180?

There is, then, reason to believe that we are dealing with a theological school of the period, 1160-1180. Our source, however, fails to yield a single clue as to the geographical location of this school. On general grounds we may conjecture that it must have been at Paris, which, by the second half of the twelfth century had become the Mecca for ambitious students from all parts of Europe. Unfortunately the identity of the student of the dialogues is nowhere disclosed. If, as has been suggested, the Carpentras MS originated in Southern Germany, he too presumably came from there. Although chronology makes it impossible for him to have studied with Abelard, he betrays an intellectual attachment to that master, championing his view of divine power and appending to his discussion of the eucharist a catena of patristic citations culled from the *Sic et Non*.<sup>122</sup> Beyond this we know nothing about him.

One might anticipate greater success in identifying the two masters, Arnaldus of Lyons and Vualterius. The name Arnaldus, with its variants such as Ernardus, was fairly common in the twelfth century. Yet I have failed to find a master of that name who meets the requirements of time, place, and theological doctrine imposed by the MS. There was to be sure a Master Arnold of Lyons who flourished ca. 1106,<sup>123</sup> but he is obviously too early to be our man. Arnold of Brescia, Abelard's disciple had been executed in 1155.<sup>124</sup> Arnold, the Cistercian Abbot of Bonneval, was living after 1156, but it is difficult

*Sentences* of 1140/1142 uses the term, but argues that he does not give transubstantiation the later meaning.

<sup>121</sup> Hödl, *loc. cit.* 251 finds the term in its later sense used for the first time between 1160 and 1165.

<sup>122</sup> See my notes to the text, nos. 94-108. There is, of course no absolute proof that the patristic citations from *Sic et Non* were the work of the student. Still they are pertinent to the foregoing dialogue, and although copied somewhat carelessly, were apparently written by the same hand that wrote the dialogues.

<sup>123</sup> He attests a charter of Archbishop Hugh of Lyons in that year: A. Bruel, *Recueil des chartes de l'Abbaye de Cluny (Documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, 18)* 5 (Paris, 1894) 119. The same master is probably commemorated in an Obituary of Lyons: G. Guigue and J. Laurent eds., *Obituaires de la Province de Lyons* 1 (Paris, 1933) 76.

<sup>124</sup> G. W. Greenaway, *Arnold of Brescia* (Cambridge, 1931), 158 n. 2, and Appendix III.

to see in this austere friend of St. Bernard the rather radical schoolmaster of the MS.<sup>125</sup> A better possibility is Magister Arnaldus "qui non ridet", the archdeacon of Poitiers who accused his bishop, Gilbert de la Porrée, of heterodoxy<sup>126</sup> and is listed among the masters present at the latter's trial at Rheims in 1148.<sup>127</sup> Moreover there is evidence that he was still active ca. 1160.<sup>128</sup> Yet there is nothing to associate the cheerless archdeacon with Lyons or Paris, and his attitude towards Gilbert does not encourage one to attribute to him the Abelardian sympathies of Arnold of Lyons. Finally we should probably eliminate as a possibility the "Magister Arnaldus" whose opinions are cited in an early thirteenth century MS.<sup>129</sup> As he seems to have been at Paris in the time of Stephen Langton, he would presumably be too late to be the master of the Carpentras MS.

At first I was inclined to believe that Master Vualterius would prove to be Walter of Mortagne, the eminent master of theology who became bishop of Laon in 1155 and died in 1174.<sup>130</sup> This suspicion was founded on the undoubted fact that two of his treatises, one on marriage, the other on the Trinity, are included in our MS. Moreover, a surviving letter of Walter of Mortagne is devoted to "homo assumptus",<sup>131</sup> the topic to which Vualterius and his disciple devote so much time. A comparison of the views expressed in this dialogue with those expressed by Walter of Mortagne in his authentic works finds the two masters agreeing on certain points, but seemingly disagreeing on others.<sup>132</sup> The decisive argument against identification, however, is

<sup>125</sup> J. Balteau, *Dictionnaire de biographie française* 3 (1939), 825-826; J. Leclercq, "Les Méditations d'Arnaud de Bonneval" *RTAM* 13 (1946) 40-56.

<sup>126</sup> John of Salisbury, *Historia pontificalis* (ed. R. L. Poole, Oxford, 1927) 17, and Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici Imperatoris* (*Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, SS. 20) 376.

<sup>127</sup> J. Leclercq, "Textes sur Saint Bernard et Gilbert de la Porrée," *MedSt* 14 (1952), 108-109.

<sup>128</sup> F. Barlow, ed., *The Letters of Arnulf of Lisieux* (*Camden Society*, Series 3, 61, London, 1939), n. 32, 52-53. Father Haring has recently sketched the career of this man in considerable detail, "Zur Geschichte der Schulen von Poitiers im 12. Jahrhundert," *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, 47 (1965), Heft 1, 31-39. Haring suggests that *Qui non ridet* was a family name.

<sup>129</sup> Landgraf, "Sentenzenglossen des Beginnenden 13. Jahrhunderts," *RTAM* 10 (1938) 40.

<sup>130</sup> The best account of the life and works of Walter of Mortagne is that of L. Ott in *Untersuchungen zur theologischen Briefliteratur der Frühscholastik* (*BGPTM* 34, Münster i. W., 1937), 126-145.

<sup>131</sup> Published by L. D'Achéry, *Spicilegium sive collectio veterum aliquot scriptorum* 3 (Paris, 1723), 520-522. The letter is analyzed by Ott, 162-187.

<sup>132</sup> Thus Vualterius when asked, "si hoc compositum constans ex anima et corpore deus sit?" answers, "Non, set tantum deo unitum." Walter of Mortagne declares

chronology. At the time Vualterius and his disciple were delving into the mysteries of the hypostatic union at Paris, Walter of Mortagne was presiding over the diocese of Laon as its bishop.

There are, of course, other possibilities. Walter of St. Victor was a master at Paris in the period of our questions. He was, moreover, highly agitated over the current views as to "homo assumptus."<sup>133</sup> Could the author of the *Contra quatuor labyrinthos Franciae* be our Magister Vualterius? Despite the coincidence of name, time, place, and theological interests it is difficult to believe so. We have seen that Vualterius denies that the man composed of soul and body is God. Walter of St. Victor, on the contrary, declares, "vere dicitur et est Deus homo et homo Deus."<sup>134</sup> There are, however, obstacles of a more general nature to such identification. Walter of St. Victor was a violent and bitter assailant of both Abelard and Peter Lombard. Is it conceivable that he would have defended the former's view of original sin as does Vualterius? Or would he have utilized the ideas of the Lombard on the scale that the latter does? Walter of St. Victor's highly emotional diatribes based on authority<sup>135</sup> stand in sharp contrast to the cool, dialectically reasoned answers of Vualterius.

There remains another possibility. An examination of charters from the period with which we are concerned reveals the presence at Nôtre Dame of Paris of a Master Walter, canon and priest. First attesting a charter in 1142, he appears in subsequent charters down to 1164-1165.<sup>136</sup> Of especial interest is a charter of Bishops Theobald of Paris and Baldwin of Noyon issued at St. Denis on 4 September 1154. Here, in the list of witnesses, immediately following *Magister Petrus Longobar-*

(*Spicilegium*, 521) "Saepe dixi et adhuc dico, et libera voce pronuntio falsum esse quod homo assumptus sit Deus in hoc sensu, assumpta humanitas est assumens Divinitas ...." On the other hand, Vualterius when asked "si caritas amittitur?" replies, "Est quidem status caritatis qui habitus non amittitur; est alius qui amittitur." Walter of Mortagne, however, in a letter to a Master Chrysanthus describes three "status caritatis." See, E. Martène and U. Durand, *Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum amplissima collectio* 1 (Paris, 1724), 843-848.

<sup>133</sup> Actually little is known of the career of Walter of St. Victor. What there is is summarized by Glorieux in his edition of the *Contra quatuor labyrinthos Franciae*, loc. cit., 194-195.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.* I, 7; 208.

<sup>135</sup> For a critical evaluation of Walter of St. Victor and his work, see P. Glorieux, "Mauvaise action et mauvais travail," *RTAM* 21 (1954), 179-193. The title succinctly epitomizes the author's opinion of Walter.

<sup>136</sup> R. de Lasteyrie, *Cartulaire général de Paris* (Paris, 1887). Nos. 290, 313, 368, 413, 451. Lesne, *Prop. ecclés.* 5 (*Les Ecoles*) 222 calls attention to him.

*du* comes our *Magister Galterus canonicus*.<sup>137</sup> This could well be the "Magister G." cited in a tract on original sin preserved in Paris Mazarin MS 1708.<sup>138</sup> He is almost certainly the Master Walter commemorated in an Obituary of Nôtre Dame.<sup>139</sup> Certainly the Master Walter, canon of Nôtre Dame had every opportunity to familiarize himself with the Lombard's classroom *dicta* as well as with his more cautious written opinions. Such familiarity is a prominent feature of the answers which Magister Vualterius gives to his disciple.

Yet certainly Vualterius was no blind and subservient imitator of the Lombard. The two theologians agree on many points, to be sure. For example both deny that God's power is restricted by duty (*debet*), reason, or foreknowledge.<sup>140</sup> On other topics there is more disagreement than agreement. So Vualterius regards "*homo assumptus*" as an *aliquid* and an *aliquis*, while the Lombard was accused by contemporaries of teaching that *Christus secundum quod homo non sit aliquid*.<sup>141</sup> The former accepts Abelard's concept of original sin;<sup>142</sup> the latter regards original sin as an actual sin and sees its essence in concupiscence.<sup>143</sup> Vualterius does not even use the word! He sees two sins, one of will and one of act, in a single sin.<sup>144</sup> Lombard treats this problem, but avoids giving a categorical answer to the question raised.<sup>145</sup> Vualterius, somewhat reluctantly it appears, is obliged by his disciple to concede that perfect repentance for one sin may cancel it out even when the sinner may remain unrepentant for other sins.<sup>146</sup> This the Lombard denies.<sup>147</sup> The two also differ as to the eucharist. Vualterius belongs to a minority group of theologians who could not believe that substance of bread actually becomes substance of Christ's body. In consecration God annihilates substance of bread and miraculously replaces it with substance of body. Nothing is said of the wine and the blood! He

<sup>137</sup> J. Ramackers, *Papsturkunden in Frankreich: Normandie (Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Dritte Folge, Nr. 21, 1937)*. No. 79, 165.

<sup>138</sup> See O. Lottin, "Le Traité sur le péché originel des «*Questiones Prepositini*»," *RTAM* 6 (1934), 417 and n. 6.

<sup>139</sup> A. Molinier ed., *Obituaires de la Province de Sens* 1 (Paris, 1902), 102.

<sup>140</sup> *Supra*, fol. 71v., cols. 1-2, and notes 72-74.

<sup>141</sup> *Supra*, fol. 70v., col. 2-71v., col. 1, and notes 56 and 115 especially.

<sup>142</sup> *Supra*, fol. 71v., col. 2, and note 75.

<sup>143</sup> *Sent.* II, 30, 6 ff.; 462-476. See also, Lottin, "Les Théories du péché originel," *RTAM* 12 (1940), 246-248.

<sup>144</sup> *Supra*, fol. 72r., col. 1.

<sup>145</sup> *Sent.* II, 42, 1; 527-529.

<sup>146</sup> *Supra*, fol. 72r., col. 1.

<sup>147</sup> *Sent.* IV, 15, 1-7; 828-838.

believes that the accidents which remain have as their subject the body of Christ. There only *seems* to be a breaking of the body.<sup>148</sup> The Lombard is cautious and uncertain as to the conversion of substance of bread into substance of body.<sup>149</sup> The accidents after consecration are in no subject;<sup>150</sup> there is a real breaking of the body in the *form* of the sacramental bread.<sup>151</sup> Vualterius is certainly acquainted with the views of Peter Lombard, but obviously he was unconvinced of the truth of many of them. It is tempting to see in him that colleague of Peter Lombard who affixed his name to the charter of 1154. Yet unfortunately, unless new evidence comes to light, the identification must remain in the realm of speculation.<sup>152</sup>

Arnold of Lyons and Vualterius are interesting, if dim figures. Perhaps Arnold, with his Abelardian proclivities, is the more interesting. It is to be regretted that the student spent less time in questioning him than he did the conservative Vualterius, so that we have a more extensive and diversified view of the latter's opinions. Obviously neither of these theologians was a pioneer or revolutionary. Both were what somebody has called "run of the mill" theologians. Yet they well represent the curiosity, ingenuity, and enthusiasm of early Scholasticism. They give substance and reality to the shadowy "alii" whose opinions are so often cited in the *Summa sententiarum* and the *Sententiarum libri quatuor*. As for the disciple, whoever he was, we are very much indebted to him, as we are to the compilers of the *Quaestiones Magistri Odonis Suessionensis*, for a first hand recording of a twelfth century theological discussion.

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<sup>148</sup> *Supra*, fol. 72r., col. 2.

<sup>149</sup> *Supra*, note 87.

<sup>150</sup> *Supra*, note 89.

<sup>151</sup> *Supra*, note 91.

<sup>152</sup> There were, of course, other Master Walters in this period. Father Haring calls my attention to a Master Galterius mentioned by John of Salisbury (Ep. 144; PL 199, 133A), and another mentioned in a letter of Alexander III (Ep. 568; PL 200, 542A). There is, however, no reason to believe that either of these was the Master Vualterius of the Carpentras MS.

# The Gifts of the Shepherds in the Wakefield "Secunda Pastorum": An Iconographical Interpretation

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SINCE the Gospels neither record a specific number of shepherds who visited the crib in Bethlehem nor mention any gifts that they presented to the Child, it is not surprising to find that early nativity plays include as many as eight shepherds and shepherds' assistants, some of whom present such rustic gifts as a spoon and rattle or give none at all. Only the Wakefield *Prima* and *Secunda Pastorum* deviate from this general pattern. In both plays the number of shepherds is reduced to three, and each rustic carries a gift not usually found in other cyclical plays featuring the nativity.<sup>1</sup>

The three adoring shepherds in each of the Towneley plays obviously parallel the Magi, whose gifts of gold, incense, and myrrh represent in all medieval drama Christ's kingship, divinity, and sacrifice. The rustic triads, like their royal prototypes, also suggest the Trinity, and the gifts they present—their gesture no doubt the result of a custom so long established by the tradition of the Wisemen that no offer at all would appear discourteous—bear allegorical significance similar to that of the Epiphany gifts,<sup>2</sup> and contrast the happy and smiling innocence of the Infant with the agony and sorrow of His predestined mission.

<sup>1</sup> The cyclic and non-cyclic plays include a pair of nuts upon a band, a horn spoon, a boxwood rattle, a carved wooden calendar, a hood, a bottle without a stopper, a bell, a nut hook, a shepherd's pipe, a lamb, and a crook. The last two may well refer to Christ's position as the sacrificial Lamb of God and as the Good Shepherd; however, the givers are shepherds who would normally possess such offerings, irrespective of the recipient's future ministry and death, and therefore the appropriateness may be coincidental. The pipe, according to Louis Réau, *Iconographie de l'art chrétien* (Paris, 1955), II, 2, p. 234, symbolizes Christ's role as a new Orpheus leading his disciples. Certainly most of these objects are baby presents, appropriate to the givers' occupations and circumstances.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 241-242, The Trinitarian significance of both sets of gifts is discussed.

In order to instruct the faithful, whose understanding of words was limited, as well as to baffle the pagans who were not supposed to understand certain words at all, the Church from the very beginning evolved a symbolism that linked the visible sign with the invisible truth. Through the Christian centuries this simple symbolism that had accommodated a plain ritual developed into a detailed and minute iconography that dominated the visual and literary arts.<sup>3</sup> By the late Middle Ages, the number, grouping, and attributes of figures derived from Biblical episodes—whether fired in glass, carved in stone, limned on manuscripts, or dramatized on pageants—were as rigidly ordered by churchmen and theologians as dogma, learning, and society. The gifts of the shepherds in the Wakefield plays, particularly those in the *Secunda Pastorum*, belong to this iconographical system.<sup>4</sup>

The opening passages of the Towneley Creation and Noah plays attest to the strong pressure exerted throughout the Middle Ages upon orthodoxy regarding the Trinity. The doctrine was proclaimed and emphasized in all areas of experience in order to combat the Arian heresy, and often its expression included the idea that even at the moment of His birth, Christ embodied all three Persons. Not only the number of shepherds in their two plays belonging to the Towneley cycle alludes to the Trinitarian doctrine but also the words each shepherd speaks in hailing the Infant. In the *Prima Pastorum*, shepherd number one greets the Child as “kyng ... most of myght,” recognizing immediately the sovereignty implicit in the miraculous event; shepherd number two calls Him “rewarder of mede! / Daudid sede!” acknowledging the Son of God as savior; and shepherd number three hails the Infant Babe as “maker of man!” recalling the creative power of the

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 142.

<sup>4</sup> Émile Mâle, *L'art religieux du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle en France* (Paris, 1931), Chs. i, ii. For the iconographical influence of religious drama upon the visual arts, see Émile Mâle's *Religious Art* (New York, 1949), 26-28, 162-162, and L. Réau, *op. cit.*, I, 254-265. Lawrence J. Ross, “Art and the Study of Early English Drama,” *Renaissance Drama: A Report on Research Opportunities*, ed. S. Schoenbaum (Evanston, Illinois, n.d.), 35-46, states that early English Drama should be studied in terms of “visual and related traditions.” For remarks pertinent to the iconographical system that informed the visual arts, see Erwin Panofsky, *Early Netherlandish Painting*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1953). Quoting Abbot Suger and Thomas Aquinas, Panofsky (I, 141-142), discusses the way in which Flemish painting intermingles the worlds of God and of man by means of symbolism, each artist viewing concrete objects as metaphors of spiritual reality. On pp. 1-20, Panofsky shows the interrelations between the Flemish and Italian traditions beginning with the Trecento. Surely the same iconographical system obtained for all art media.

Holy Spirit.<sup>5</sup> The adoring rustics in the *Secunda Pastorum* hail the Child in identical fashion: the first calls Him "maker," referring to the Holy Spirit; the second as "sufferan sauyoure," noting His earthly sacrifice; the third as "derlyng dere, full of Godhede!" recognizing Him as the Heavenly Father.<sup>6</sup> But their gifts—the third element in a triadic structure, parts of which have Trinitarian reference—signify something different in each play.

In the final tableau at the crib, the first shepherd in the *Prima Pastorum* presents the Child with a "spruse cofer."<sup>7</sup> In no other mystery play does such a gift appear. This might well be interpreted as a reference to Christ's death and resurrection—his burial in a coffin made from an evergreen tree—but analysis of the next two gifts suggests another significance.

The second shepherd carries a ball which, like the apple, is omnipresent in Nativity and Holy Family scenes in both the literary and visual arts of the Middle Ages. Its spherical shape denotes the world, royalty, and universal rule; when cast in diminutive form, it becomes a toy, indeed a homely baby gift.<sup>8</sup>

The third shepherd offers the Child a "botell" made from a "gowrde." This gift is intended not so much for the Child as for Joseph, Mary's spouse, who, on the flight into Egypt, will carry it on the end of a stick. Filled with either wine or water, it will provide the elderly man with needed refreshment on the long, hazardous journey.<sup>9</sup>

The latter two gifts therefore suggest the significance of the first.

<sup>5</sup> All quotations are from the edition by A. C. Cawley, *The Wakefield Pageants*, (Manchester, 1958).

<sup>6</sup> Moreover, each salutation includes references to all three persons of the Trinity. L. J. Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 39, comments on the indebtedness of the shepherds' speeches to the *Hail Lyrics*, in which Christ's role, as dramatized by the cycle, is glorified.

<sup>7</sup> L. Réau, *op. cit.*, II, 2, p. 279, states that in Northern European countries spruce wood replaced that of the palm tree in episodes concerning the life of Christ—a geographical modification for the benefit of the local audience—just as oranges replaced dates as the fruit served to the Holy Family on its journey into Egypt. Both substitutions are associated with Christ, specifically with the episode of the Flight.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 1, p. 41, and George Ferguson, *Signs and Symbols in Christian Art* (New York, 1955), 313.

<sup>9</sup> L. Réau, *op. cit.*, II, 2, p. 275; George Ferguson, *op. cit.*, 37-38, relates that both St. James the Great and Christ who, when dressed as a pilgrim as He traveled to Emmaus, carried a gourd-flask. E. Panofsky, *op. cit.*, II, Fig. 191, reproduces a picture that shows Joseph carrying a gourd-flask on his journey. Cf. this with Giotto's fresco *Flight Into Egypt* (Padua, Arena Chapel) in which Joseph carries a wicker-covered bottle.

Since the ball and gourd-flask are pragmatic traveling gifts for the Child and Joseph—a toy to entertain the Baby and a canteen to sustain the strength of the spouse and protector—the spruce coffer is, probably, a gift for Mary, a container for her personal effects, which she will need, particularly during moments of rest. Myth and legend surrounding the Family's journey south—material always attractive and stimulating to writers, painters, sculptors—record such periods of rest, as well as attacks by brigands and repasts of luscious fruits served by angels.<sup>10</sup> Thus the three gifts bear a unified significance in that they are appropriate to the natal occasion and useful for the momentous trip that will save Him to fulfill His divine mission.

The three gifts that appear in the final tableau of the *Secunda Pastorum* are unified not only in significance but also in relation to the number of rustics and their salutations. In other words, the third element in the triadic structure also signifies the Trinity.

Coll is the first shepherd to speak. Responding intuitively to the warmth and innocence of the “yong child,” he offers a “bob of cherys,” a gift that radiates at least three, perhaps even four, associations with the Child.<sup>11</sup> This attribute of Christ is a commonplace in fifteenth-century religious painting of Northern and Southern Europe. For Northern pictorial examples contemporaneous with the Wakefield play, one need cite only the illustrations gathered by Erwin Panofsky in *Early Netherlandish Painting*, particularly Figs. 494, 495, which reproduce two paintings of the Holy Family that hang in New York's Metropolitan Museum. In the former, Joseph pauses in his reading from scripture to watch Mary nurse the Infant; on a table before

<sup>10</sup> L. Réau, *op. cit.*, II, 2, pp. 273-278. The context for the gifts strongly indicates that the “spruce cofer” is a chest or box for Mary's convenience on the Flight; but this does not preclude a secondary significance—an allusion to the Child's eventual death and resurrection. One of the best statements regarding the symbolic interpretation of objects appearing in the visual arts—a method that involves the historical as well as the commonsensical approach—is by E. Panofsky, *op. cit.*, I, 142-143. His statement is relevant to this study, as well.

<sup>11</sup> The association of cherries with Christ is as old, perhaps, as the seventh century A.D. At this time, in the Roman Forum, the supposed Temple of Augustus was converted into the church of *S. Maria Antiqua*, where fresco fragments, dating from the seventh or eighth century, record cherries and spear heads. These motifs, alluding of course to the crucifixion, decorate scenes from the Old and New Testaments, particularly the crucifixion. See Giuseppe Lugli, *The Roman Forum and the Palatine* (Rome, 1964), 50-52. The cherries are a substitute symbol for the grape, the fruit ordinarily associated with Christ's sacrifice. We are indebted to Grace and Earl Bergendahl, who this summer visited the church of *S. Maria Antiqua* to photograph and sketch for us the cherry-spear motifs.

them rests a tray of fruits — apple, pomegranate, grapes, a cherry.<sup>12</sup> In the latter, Joseph reads from the Gospel as Mary suckles the Child, the fingers of her left hand touching a cluster of cherries resting on a table. The Southern European tradition may best be illustrated by such paintings as Niccolo di Giacomo's *Woman Taken in Adultery* (Milan, Ambrosiana Library); Carlo Crivelli's *Madonna and Child* (Washington, D. C., National Gallery of Art); and II Schiavone's two paintings of the *Virgin and Child* (Baltimore, Walters Art Gallery; Turin, Pinacoteca). Niccolo di Giacomo places a cherry tree near Christ, and Crivelli and Schiavone juxtapose an apple and a pear with the cherry, the apple indicating the burden of man's sin and the pear Christ's love for mankind.<sup>13</sup>

In literary art, the strongest evidence for a link between the bob of cherries and the Christ Child is the "Cherry Tree Carol," which records an English version of the story in pseudo-Matthew concerning a palm tree that bowed down in tribute to Christ's divinity on the flight into Egypt.<sup>14</sup> The author of the carol locates the event in the pre-natal period, when Joseph is grieved to find his bride pregnant. Mary suddenly craves cherries and Joseph suggests, "Let the father of the baby gather cherries for thee." Then Christ speaks from the womb, ordering the tree to bow down and telling Joseph, "Those cherries were for me." Even more significantly, this very same incident is dramatized in the *Ludus Coventriae* cycle of medieval drama,<sup>15</sup> which aimed at the same kind of audience as that for the *Secunda Pastorum*. (The change from dates to cherries in both the carol and the play probably reflects different areas and different cravings on the part of the expectant mother.)<sup>16</sup>

Other evidence that connects the cherry and the Child is medieval

<sup>12</sup> Vol. 2. The paintings are attributed to the Master of the Death of the Virgin (Joos van Cleve?). In Vol. 1, p. 144, Panofsky remarks that such fruits, when appearing intact — "still-life features" — also allude to the *gaudia Paradisi*, which were lost through Man's fall but regained through Mary, the second Eve, who gave birth to Christ, the second Adam.

<sup>13</sup> George Ferguson, *op. cit.*, 34.

<sup>14</sup> William Hone, *Ancient Mysteries Described* (London, 1823), 90-91; Edgar Hennecke, *New Testament Apocrypha*, ed. Wilhelm Schneemelcher, trans. R. M. Wilson, I (Philadelphia, 1963), 411-412. In the medieval poem that dates about 1425, "Dispute between Mary and the Cross," occurs the line (217), "Dropes rede as ripe cherrees... from his flesshe gan laue." (See *Festivals of the Church*, XX, 219, in R. Morris, ed., *Legends of the Holy Rood*, EETS, O. S. 46 (1871), p. 217.) In E. Panofsky's example, *op. cit.*, II, Fig. 191, a cherry tree bows down to Mary and the Infant during a period of rest on the Flight.

<sup>15</sup> W. Hone, *op. cit.*, 67-68.

<sup>16</sup> L. Réau, *op. cit.*, I, 132.

legend, in which cherries, like the miraculous birth of Christ, are associated with mid-winter fertility and symbolize resurrection;<sup>17</sup> and also the lives of such saints as St. Gerard de Monza, a Christ-figure like St. Francis, beatified in 1207 for his work among the poor and the sick and whose attribute became the bob of cherries.<sup>18</sup>

Thus the bob of cherries presented by the first shepherd alludes to Christ's sacrifice, to His coming in winter as a promise of new life, and to His sweet flesh as the boon His birth means to all mankind — a level of meaning at least implied in Coll's phrase, "my swetyng."

Gib, whose complaints to his friends before the miraculous birth have less a personal and more a metaphysical ring, hails the Child as Savior and offers a bird, a popular gift in the visual and verbal arts of the Middle Ages.<sup>19</sup> In early Christian art, the bird symbolized the winged soul, and was often used on stelae and sarcophagi, flanking a portrait of the deceased. Later, its form indicated the spiritual as opposed to the material.<sup>20</sup> This latter significance is well illustrated in paintings depicting the life of St. Francis. In the well known canvas by Giovanni Bellini (New York, Frick Collection), completed perhaps thirty years later than the Towneley play, but continuing a long tradition in the rendering of the Stigmatization, such birds as a heron and a bittern appear in the rocky landscape. They symbolize, perhaps, not only the souls of the elect but also righteousness or penitence. The association of birds with this saint — frequently referred to in popular literature as a "second Christ" — emphasizes the artistic and dramatic link between the bird and the Child.<sup>21</sup>

When given the form of a dove, the bird embodies the Holy Ghost, the creative spirit of the Trinity that moved over the face of the waters in one Biblical account of the Creation and presided over the Annunciation and the Baptism.<sup>22</sup> A popular Northern European painting that features the dove as Holy Ghost is Hubert and Jan van Eyck's *Ghent Altarpiece* (Ghent, Church of St. Bavon) where, in the

<sup>17</sup> Martial Rose, ed. *The Wakefield Mystery Plays* (New York, 1962), 303; also L. J. Ross, *op. cit.*, 39.

<sup>18</sup> L. Réau, *op. cit.*, III, 2, p. 580.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 1, p. 40, points out the popularity of this attribute in medieval sculpture.

<sup>20</sup> Erwin Panofsky, *Tomb Sculpture* (New York, n.d.), 47, Figs. 175, 177; and George Ferguson, *op. cit.*, 6-7.

<sup>21</sup> Millard Meiss, *Giovanni Bellini's 'St. Francis'* (New York, 1964), 22-23, Figs. 3, 6. L. Réau, *op. cit.*, III, 1, pp. 80-81, 87 and III, 3, pp. 516-529, discusses the identification of such birds as the dove and the calandrius with both Christ and St. Francis.

<sup>22</sup> M. Rose, *op. cit.*, 303; A. C. Cawley, *op. cit.*, 113, n. 722; L. Réau, *op. cit.*, I, 40, 80-81.

lower panel, the dove sends rays down upon all groups in the green meadow; and the Southern European painting that best illustrates the role of the dove in the Annunciation is Simone Martini's triptych (Florence, Uffizi), in the central panel of which rays from the dove's beak strike Mary's cheek. Thus Gib's offering is as multi-layered in reference as that of the cherries, its primary emphasis being on the third person of the Trinity.

Daw, "both rustic shepherd and Biblical prophetic shepherd,"<sup>23</sup> identifying the Child's celestial ancestry and asking Him to "Put furth thy dall!" extends a ball, its spherical shape long an attribute of God the Father. When placed in the hands of His Son, it becomes an emblem of sovereignty.<sup>24</sup> An early medieval example in sculpture of a ball used for the same purpose is the panel on the Cathedral at Autun which narrates the Flight into Egypt and shows the Infant holding in his fist a round ball. Paintings featuring the same object and dating approximately the same as that of the play are Jan van Eyck's *Madonna of the Chancellor of Rolin* (Paris, Louvre) in which the Child holds a ribbed ball of glass that is crested by a jeweled cross; and Fra Angelico's *Annalena Madonna* (Florence, San Marco Museum) in which the Child also clasps a ball. In the Wakefield play, this attribute of kingship is further strengthened by the context for the gift. Daw concludes:

*Haue and play the withall,  
And go to the tenys.*

Tennis, a fashionable game in France at the end of the fourteenth century, was well known in England and Scotland at the same time. It was, of course, an aristocratic, rather than a rural, sport.<sup>25</sup> The simple rustic who presents this seemingly inappropriate gift is alluding to an attitude held by many in the play's rather mixed audience — churchmen, gentry, merchants, and aristocrats, as well as farmers — that Christ was not born to humble parents but, rather, to the "Queen of Galilee."<sup>26</sup> She is often referred to as queen in medieval poetry, and royally garbed in medieval painting, illumination, stained glass,

<sup>23</sup> William M. Manly, "Shepherds and Prophets: Religious Unity in the Towneley 'Secunda Pastorum'," *PMLA*, 78 (1936), 153-154, discusses these different traits among the three shepherds. Curiously enough, he finds their presents merely "rustic gifts" from contemporary English shepherds in bondage to feudal landlords (p. 152).

<sup>24</sup> L. Réau, *op. cit.*, II, 1, p. 41 and George Ferguson, *op. cit.*, 313.

<sup>25</sup> A. C. Cawley, *op. cit.*, 113, n. 736.

<sup>26</sup> W. Hone, *op. cit.*, 90.

and mosaic. Finally, the gift of Daw underscores the embodiment, at the moment of the Child's birth, of all three persons in the Trinity, beginning with the Father.

Thus the gifts complement each other, characterize the rustic donors, and underscore the moral intent of the play. Coll, the shepherd most involved with his personal discomfort, offers first a "material" gift, a bob of cherries that represents the sweetness of the Infant's flesh, which results from the good deeds He performs from the moment He draws breath. Gib, more prescient in his responses, gives a "spiritual" gift, a bird that signifies the spiritual essence of the Infant, "comly and clene" in the manger. Daw, most articulate of the group, gives a "political" gift, a ball that symbolizes the earthly power and influence of the Child. Coming at the end of the play, the gifts also function in a manner similar to that of the Expositor and Doctor in other mystery plays: they establish the doctrine that all three members of the Trinity are imminent in the Incarnation and they point out the play's moral, the tragic destiny of the Infant Savior.

Finally, the *Secunda Pastorum* is a more unified work of art than its predecessor. Every element in its triadic structure—number of shepherds, their salutations, their gifts—reinforces the doctrine of the Trinity, and the relationship between donor and present is organic. This study of the iconographical significance of tableaux gifts in the two plays reveals the artistic progress of the Wakefield Master in using traditional materials in original, striking ways. The *Prima Pastorum*, a successful rendering of religious conventions, places the Master high on the list of medieval dramatists, but it is merely preparation for the *Secunda Pastorum*, indeed astonishing not only for its parodic wit but also for its dense and highly integrated texture.

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# Mediaevalia

## IN SEARCH OF ADHEMAR'S PATRISTIC COLLECTION

The author of the *Liber de vera philosophia* tells us that in his day a certain Master Adhemar, Canon Regular of Saint-Ruf (Valence), spent thirty years or more (1148-1178) visiting an "infinite" number of churches and monasteries in Gaul, Spain, Italy, and even Greece, reading and re-reading the "countless" volumes written on the Trinity, and questioning all competent scholars to find a patristic source for the statement quoted against Gilbert of Poitiers at the consistory of Rheims. The statement was: Quicquid est in Deo, Deus est.<sup>1</sup> He finally grew tired of his fruitless search and decided to compile a collection of texts related to the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Eucharist.

We are told that he divided the collection into twenty-four distinctions and sent six copies to men interested in his work.<sup>2</sup> To give his readers an idea of the structure and contents of the collection, the author of the *Liber de vera philosophia* copied *aliquas auctoritates* beginning with the third distinction of the collection.

P. Fournier<sup>3</sup> published only the headings of the twenty-four distinctions. A list, published in 1963, of the auctoritates quoted in the *Liber de vera philosophia* shows that what our author calls *aliquas auctoritates* comprises a total of 185 quotations<sup>4</sup> many of which are summaries rather than literal transcriptions. Nevertheless the list outlines the general structure so well that it soon led to the discovery of Adhemar's collection as preserved in the Stiftsbibliothek of Zwettl in Austria (MSS 240, ff. 70v-124v, and 295, ff. 1-71) with a total of 311 quotations.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the considerable increase in both the number and the length of the quotations, the collection preserved at Zwettl is only an abbreviation of the original compilation. Adhemar's *Tractatus de Trinitate* shows that, as a rule, his excerpts are long and exceptionally accurate.<sup>6</sup> In the Zwettl collection

<sup>1</sup> P. Fournier, *Études sur Joachim de Flore* (Paris, 1909) 75.

<sup>2</sup> N. M. Haring, "The Porretans and the Greek Fathers", in: *MedSt* 24 (1962) 193.

<sup>3</sup> *Études* 76-77.

<sup>4</sup> N. M. Haring, "Die Vätersammlung des Adhemar von Saint-Ruf in Valence", in: *Scholastik* 38 (1963) 402-420.

<sup>5</sup> N. M. Haring, "Eine Zwettler Abkürzung der Vätersammlung Adhemars von Saint-Ruf (Valence)", in: *Vierteljahresschrift f. Theol. und Philosophie* 1 (1966) 30-53. The division into distinctions and chapters is only tentative. The two copies preserved at Zwettl are of equal length and contents. MS Zwettl 295, however, is the older and better copy.

<sup>6</sup> N. M. Haring, "The *Tractatus de Trinitate* of Adhemar of Saint-Ruf (Valence)", in: *ArchHistDoctrLitMA* 29 (1964) 111-206.

most of the patristic excerpts are also relatively long, but the number of scribal errors is quite conspicuous. In his *Treatise on the Trinity* Adhemar adopts a system of dots and marginal nota-monograms to draw attention to significant words and phrases. Since traces of a similar system of dots are found in MS Zwettl 295, we may conclude that he adopted a similar device in his collection.

It is known that some of Gilbert's students worked closely together in an endeavour to vindicate their master by proving his doctrinal agreement with the Fathers. At the foot of f. 60v of the *Liber de vera philosophia* we find a fairly long excerpt copied from Hugh Etherian's *Liber de differentia naturae et personae*<sup>7</sup> which is a compilation of texts translated by Hugh Etherian to show that according to Greek Fathers some distinction must be made between person and nature in God, a distinction Gilbert considered necessary to avoid Sabellianism.

On f. 86 of MS Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek 345 there are passages copied from the same work.<sup>8</sup>

At the end of Gilbert's *Commentary on Psalms* in MS Paris, B. N. Lat. 439, f. 193 (s. xii), two excerpts<sup>9</sup> have been added which also clearly point to a Porretan background: (1) Si quis extra sanctam Trinitatem mala nescio qua nomina divinitatis intulerit quod ipsa divinitas sit (Trinitas) ut Nostici et Priscillianiste dixerunt, anathema sit. (2) Numeratur Trinitas in substantiis atque personalibus proprietatibus perfectis atque semotim subsistentibus et numero divisibilibus.

The first of these two texts dates back to a council of Braga and is already quoted in Gilbert's commentary on the Pseudo-Athanasian Creed.<sup>10</sup> The second text is taken from Sophronius,<sup>11</sup> one of Gilbert's favorite Greek Fathers.<sup>12</sup> The canon of the council of Braga occurs twice in the *Liber de vera philosophia*<sup>13</sup> and twice in the *Summa Porretana*<sup>14</sup> of MS Vat. Ross. Lat. 212.

<sup>7</sup> *Liber de differentia* 13 and 24; ed. N. M. Haring, in: *MedSt* 24 (1962) 24-25 and 29.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem* 17 and 26; ed. Haring 26-27 and 29.

<sup>9</sup> The script of the addition dates back to about the year 1200. Another much longer excerpt on the same folio deals with the Incarnation.

<sup>10</sup> Gilbert, *Expositio in Quicumque uult* 34; ed. N. M. Haring, in: *MedSt* 27 (1965) 36. Another canon from the same council is quoted by Hugh of Honau, *Liber de Homoyssion* II, 42; MS Cambridge, Univ. Lib. II.iv.27, f. 46: De eodem synodus Bracarenis: "Si quis Patrem et Filium... dixerunt, anathema sit". PL 84,563BC or Mansi 9,744CD. See also Adhemar, *Tractatus* III, 38; ed. Haring 177.

<sup>11</sup> *Ep. syn. ad Sergium*; PG 87,3155C.

<sup>12</sup> Hugh of Honau, *Liber de diversitate naturae et personae* I, 8; ed. N. M. Haring, in: *ArchHistDoctrLitMA* 29 (1962) 8.

<sup>13</sup> *Liber de vera philosophia* V, 3; MS Grenoble, Bibl. de la Ville 290, f. 61rb: In canonibus: "Quicumque extra Trinitatem loquitur et mala nescio que verba adducit ut deitas est Trinitas ut Nostici et Priscilliani, anathema sit". *Liber de vera phil.* XII, 34; f. 100v: In canonibus: "Quicumque extra Trinitatem loquitur et mala nescio que verba adducit ut deitas est Trinitas ut Gnostici et Priscilliani, anathema sit".

<sup>14</sup> *Summa Porretana*, Dist. IX, f. 134v: In canonibus: "Quicumque extra Trinitatem loquitur et mala nescio que verba adducit ut Nostici et Priscilliani, anathema sit". Dist. XI,

The fact that the canon is listed among the *flores prime partis collecte* of the excerpts offered by the author of the *Liber de vera philosophia* (f. 100v) reveals that it was found in Adhemar's collection, although it does not occur in the abbreviation preserved at Zwettl. The addition *loquitur et* which is common to all four of these quotations points to a common source just as much as the uniform introduction: *In canonibus*.

In the *Summa Porretana* just mentioned the text also occurs in what the author calls *flores prime partis collecte*,<sup>15</sup> although his list of excerpts is shorter than the list of "flowers" culled from Adhemar's collection by the author of the *Liber de vera philosophia*. Like Adhemar's collection, the *Summa Porretana* also deals with three subjects: the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Eucharist. Many folios (126 ff.) are filled with texts generally found in the same length and in the same order in the *Liber de vera philosophia*.<sup>16</sup> The key to these literary relationships is Adhemar's collection which has not yet been discovered in its entirety.

In MS Paris, Arsenal 1117B, ff. 394v-395v, Gilbert's commentary on the *opuscula sacra* is followed by a famous epitaph<sup>17</sup> and a compilation of twelve patristic texts related to the Trinity.

#### 1 Vigilius of Thapsus

The first text is attributed to Athanasius, copied from Vigilius of Thapsus, a very popular authority among the Porretans.<sup>18</sup>

#### 2 Didymus the Blind

Then follow three excerpts from Didymus the Blind, *De Spiritu sancto*, in the translation of St. Jerome. He, too, was studied by the Porretans,<sup>19</sup> though not quoted nearly as frequently as "Athanasius".

#### 3 Theodoret of Cyrus

The next auctoritas is Theodoret whose work *Against Sabellius* Gilbert had discovered in the Latin Acts of the Council of Chalcedon.<sup>20</sup> This conciliar collection was one of the *magnum voluminum corpora*<sup>21</sup> which Gilbert's clerics carried into the consistory of Rheims in 1148.

f. 147: In canonibus: "Quicumque extra Trinitatem loquitur et mala nescio que verba adducit ut deitas est Trinitas ut Gnostici et Priscilliani, anathema sit".

<sup>15</sup> MS Vat. Ross. Lat. 212, f. 146v.

<sup>16</sup> The theological treatise of MS Paris, B. N. Lat. 2802, ff. 78-113v, also belongs to this group but differs in the use of patristic texts.

<sup>17</sup> Gall. chr. 2 (Paris. 1873) 1178B: Temporibus nostris celeberrimus ille magister...

<sup>18</sup> N. M. Haring, "The Porretans" 194 (Adhemar), 210 (Hugh of Honau). *Idem*, "Die Vätersammlung" III, 2 (p. 406); XIII, 1 (p. 410); XIV, 2-5 (p. 410); XV, 1 and 8 (p. 412); XIX, 7-8 (p. 414); XX, 1 (p. 416); XXI, 8 (p. 418); XXII, 6 (p. 418); XXIII, 6 (p. 419). See also the index to Adhemar's *Tractatus*; ed. Haring 289.

<sup>19</sup> N. M. Haring, "The Porretans" 194 (Adhemar) and 203 (Hugh of Honau). *Idem*, "Die Vätersammlung" XIX, 36 (p. 416). Adhemar, *Tractatus* IV, 102; ed. Haring 197. *Lib. de vera phil.* XII, 85; f. 101v: Didimus libro *de Spiritu sancto*: "Si quis contrarius... est substantia Trinitatis". Hugh of Honau, *Liber de div.* 50, 3; ed. Haring 214.

<sup>20</sup> N. M. Haring, "The Porretans" 187. The text is composed of five pieces found in E. Schwartz, *Acta Conc. Oec.* II, 5, 151(38)-154(10).

<sup>21</sup> Geoffrey, *Ep. ad Albinum* 4; PL 185. 589C.

## 4 Pope Hormisdas

An excerpt from a letter<sup>22</sup> of Pope Hormisdas (514-523) to the Greek Emperor Justin I (518-527) confirms the Porretan origin of our collection,<sup>23</sup> for it occurs (in the same length) in Adhemar's *Tractatus de Trinitate*,<sup>24</sup> in the Zwettl collection,<sup>25</sup> and (shortened) in Hugh of Honau's *Liber de Homoyssion*.<sup>26</sup> The text is already quoted by Abelard.<sup>27</sup>

## 5 Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem

In both the Zwettl collection<sup>28</sup> and Adhemar's *Tractatus*<sup>29</sup> Pope Hormisdas is followed by Sophronius whose letter to Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople, Gilbert had found in the Latin Acts of the third Council of Constantinople (680-681). This conciliar collection was also most likely among the tomes carried by Gilbert's clerics into the consistory hall at Rheims.<sup>30</sup> The fact that in our compilation Hormisdas is likewise followed by Sophronius is hardly accidental.

## 6 Augustine of Hippo

The next auctoritas is copied from St. Augustine's letter to the physician Maximus. It occurs twice (in a longer excerpt) in Adhemar's *Tractatus de Trinitate*.<sup>31</sup> The next two quotations in our compilation date back to Ambrosiaster and Ambrose.

## 7 Ambrosiaster

His text is quoted as: Augustinus, *Questionum ueteris et noue legis*: Unus quidem sed non singularis. Habet exterius in misterio alterum qui sit cum altero. Ambrosiaster and Ambrose are cited together for the first time by Abelard<sup>32</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Ep. 236, 8; CSEL 35, 719.

<sup>23</sup> N. M. Haring, "The Porretans" 194 (Adhemar), 201 and 203 (Hugh of Honau).

<sup>24</sup> *Tractatus de Trinitate* II, 32; ed. Haring 159; Hormisda papa in decreto suo ad Iustinum Imperatorem: "Adoremus... transferatur". Cf. "Vätersammlung" X, 1 (p. 408).

<sup>25</sup> Dist. X, 1; MS Zwettl 295, f. 15v: Hormisda papa ad Iustinum Imperatorem: "Adoremus... transferatur".

<sup>26</sup> MS Cambridge, Univ. Lib. II.iv.27, f. 27: Unde Ormisda papa: "Servemus propria... transferatur". See also the quotation from the same decretal in his *Liber de div.* 50, 5; ed. Haring 215.

<sup>27</sup> Abelard, *Sic et Non* 5; PL 178, 1358D-1359A.

<sup>28</sup> Dist. X, 2-3; MS Zwettl 295, f. 16. "Die Vätersammlung" X, 2 (p. 408).

<sup>29</sup> *Tract. de Trin.* II, 33; ed. Haring 159.

<sup>30</sup> N. M. Haring, "The Porretans" 186. The text consists of a number of pieces found in PG 87(3), 3151D-3159A.

<sup>31</sup> *Tract. de Trin.* I, 100 and V, 14; ed. Haring 147 and 199.

<sup>32</sup> Abelard, *Sic et Non* 5; PL 178, 1358C: Augustinus, *Quaest. veteris et novae legis*, cap. 59: Unus quidem sed non singularis. Habet ex aeternis in mysterio alterum qui sit cum altero. Pseudo-Augustine, *Quaest. ex Novo Test.*, 87(b); PL 35, 2283. Abelard, *Sic et Non* 5; PL 178, 1358C: Ambrosius, *De Fide ad Gratianum Imperatorem*: Quod unius... ad naturam. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Grat.* V, 3, 46; PL 16, 685D. Abelard omits the words: Singularitatem hanc dico quae Graece monotes dicitur.

whose correct reading *ex aeternis* appears as *exteriorius* in our compilation. The change from *ex aeternis* to *exteriorius* is already found in the *Summa Sententiarum*,<sup>33</sup> while the Abelardian *Ysagoge*<sup>34</sup> simply omits the word(s). Peter Lombard finally dropped the entire second sentence.<sup>35</sup> It had become meaningless.

#### 8 Ambrose of Milan

The two quotations, first put together by Abelard, are still united in the *Summa Sententiarum*,<sup>36</sup> the *Ysagoge*,<sup>37</sup> and the *Sentences*.<sup>38</sup> Our compilation follows this tradition. However, in the text derived from St. Ambrose<sup>39</sup> our author omits the sentence: Singularitas ad personam pertinet, unitas ad naturam. This omission is probably deliberate, for the Porretans considered *unitas* a transcendental which could be predicated not only of the divine nature but also of the divine persons. Accordingly the sentence is also omitted by the Porretan Hugh of Honau who likewise quotes both texts.<sup>40</sup>

#### 9 Jerome

The last two pieces of our compilation, attributed to Augustinus in *Sermone de Trinitate*, date back to St. Jerome.<sup>41</sup> But, as quoted, they are derived from a text published among the sermons of St. Augustine,<sup>42</sup> for the words *sed in personarum qualitate* found there and in our text do not occur in Jerome's commentary. In addition, the first of the two quotations is a textual adjustment of the source used by the compiler.

### TEXT OF THE ARSENAL COLLECTION (MS Paris, Arsenal 1117B)

#### 1 In libro Athanasii legitur:

Sabellianus dixit: Fidei nostre professio hunc eundemque<sup>1</sup> et Patrem et Filium predicat Deum (Vigilius of Thapsus, *Contra Arian.* I, 7; PL 62,184B).

#### 2 Didimus:

Filius in Patris appellatione uenit dicens: *Ego ueni in nomine Patris mei.* Filii

<sup>33</sup> *Summa Sent.* I, 9; PL 176, 56A.

<sup>34</sup> *Ysagoge* III; ed. A. Landgraf, in *Spic. s. Lov.* 14 (Louvain 1934) 261.

<sup>35</sup> *Sent.* I, 23, 5; ed. Quaracchi (1916) 152: De hoc etiam Augustinus in libro *Quaestionum veteris et novae legis* ait: "Unus est Deus sed non singularis".

<sup>36</sup> *Summa Sent.* I, 9; PL 176, 56A.

<sup>37</sup> *Ysagoge* III; ed. Landgraf 261.

<sup>38</sup> *Sent.* I, 23, 5; ed. Quaracchi (1916) 152.

<sup>39</sup> Ambrose, *De Fide ad Grat.* V, 3, 46; PL 16, 685D.

<sup>40</sup> Hugh of Honau, *Liber de Homoyssion*; MS Cambridge, Univ. Lib. II.iv.27, f. 47: Eandem vim habere nomen singularitatis non nescivit Augustinus cum dixit: "Unus quidem sed non singularis. Habet in ministerio alterum qui sit cum altero". (f. 47v): Hinc et alibi dicit idem Augustinus: "Quod unius... sed unitatis".

<sup>41</sup> Jerome, *Tract. de ps.* 91; ed. G. Morin, *Anecdota Mareds.* III, 3 (Maredsous 1903) 76.

<sup>42</sup> *Serm.* 232, 4; PL 39, 2174.

<sup>1</sup> eundem Migne.

quippe tantummodo est *in nomine Patris* uenire, salua proprietate Filii ad Patrem et Patris ad Filium (*De Spiritu sancto* 30; PL 23,136B).

3 Idem:

Quaecumque sunt Filii hec eadem et Pater habet. Procul hinc absint dialecticorum tendicule et sosphimata<sup>2</sup> a ueritate pellantur que occasionem impietatis ex pia predicatione capientia dicunt: Ergo et Pater est Filius et Filius Pater.<sup>3</sup> Sed cum dixerit: *Omnia quaecumque<sup>4</sup> habet Pater mea sunt* Patris nomine se Filium declarauit. Paternitatem qui Filius erat non usurpauit quamquam et ipse per adoptionis gratiam multorum sanctorum sit Pater (*De Spir. s.* 38: PL 23, 142C-143A).

4 Idem:

Quomodo ergo serui qui in nomine domini ueniunt? Per hoc ipsum quod subiecti sunt et seruiunt indicant dominum proprietatem eius ferentes<sup>5</sup> domini. Serui quippe sunt domini. Sic et Filius qui uenit *in nomine Patris* proprietatem Patris portat et nomen. Et per hec unigenitus Dei Filius approbatur. Quia ergo et<sup>6</sup> Spiritus sanctus in nomine Filii a Patre mittitur habens Filii proprietatem secundum [f. 395] quod Deus est: non tamen filietatem<sup>7</sup> ut Filius<sup>8</sup> sit ostendit quia unitate sit iunctus ad Filium (*De Spir. s.* 31; PL 23,137A).

5 Theodoritus:

Natura et substantia hoc quod commune est significant: persona uero et subsistentia quod proprium.<sup>9</sup>

Sancte igitur Trinitatis una quidem est natura atque substantia. Commune est enim trium substantia non autem una subsistentia seu persona sed tres subsistentie.<sup>10</sup> Oportet igitur christianum<sup>11</sup> rerum non ignorare proprietatem<sup>12</sup> ne forte aliud pro aliis<sup>13</sup> intelligens circa dogmata peccet.

Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt subsistentia tria proprietatibus, una uero substantia: sed non, quoniam una substantia, una quoque proprietas. Nec quoniam<sup>14</sup> tres proprietates, tres quoque substantie. Non enim erant tria unum, si tres essent substantie neque unum tria si una proprietas.<sup>15</sup>

Trinitas personis non substantia: et unitas substantia<sup>16</sup> non personis.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>2</sup> sophismata *Migne*.

<sup>3</sup> *Migne*: Si enim dixisset... esse mendacium. Cum uero dixerit....

<sup>4</sup> quae *Migne*.

<sup>5</sup> (ferentes domini) referentes *Migne*.

<sup>6</sup> (ergo et) ergo *Migne*.

<sup>7</sup> filieitatem *Migne*.

<sup>8</sup> (Filius sit) Filius eius sit *Migne*.

<sup>9</sup> Long omission: Significant uelut una et communis... ad intelligibilia (ed. Schwartz, p. 152, lines 2-24).

<sup>10</sup> (sed tres subsistentie) trium Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti tres subsistentie *Schwartz*.

<sup>11</sup> (christianum) desiderantem spiritalis diuitias et uolentem christianorum dogmata uindicare *Schwartz*.

<sup>12</sup> proprietates *Schwartz*.

<sup>13</sup> (pro aliis) pro alio *Schwartz*.

<sup>14</sup> (nec quoniam) non enim *Schwartz*.

<sup>15</sup> Continuation on p. 154, line 7.

<sup>16</sup> substantia changed to substantie by corrector.

<sup>17</sup> Continuation on p. 154, line 9.

Alius et alius et alius — tres enim subsistentie — non autem aliud et aliud et aliud. Una enim natura atque substantia est (Theodoretus. *Contra Sabellium*; ed. E. Schwartz, *Acta Conc. Oec.* II, 5 [Berlin 1936] 151-154).

6 Hormisdas papa:

Adoremus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum indistinctam distincte incomprehensibilem et inenarrabilem substantiam Trinitatis ubi etsi admittit numerum ratio personarum unitas tamen non admittit essentie separationem ita tamen ut seruemus propria<sup>18</sup> unicuique persone ut<sup>19</sup> nec personis diuinitatis singularitas denegetur nec ad essentiam hoc quod est proprium nominum transferatur (*Ep.* 79; PL 63,514AB).

7 Sophronius:

Trinitatem in unitate credimus et in unitate Trinitatem glorificamus: Trinitatem quidem pro tribus substantiis,<sup>20</sup> unitatem autem propter singularitatem deitatis.<sup>21</sup>

Trinitas numerabilis personalibus facta<sup>22</sup> est substantiis: sancta<sup>23</sup> unitas extra omnem est numerum.

Diuiditur<sup>24</sup> numerabilibus substantiis,<sup>25</sup> numeratur personalibus alteritatibus: identitate essentie atque nature coniungitur.<sup>26</sup>

Unitas singularis<sup>27</sup> omnem refugit secundum essentiam numerum. Unus enim Deus a nobis creditur<sup>28</sup> quoniam et deitas una predicatur,<sup>29</sup> licet<sup>30</sup> in tribus substantiis demonstretur.

Impium<sup>31</sup> orthodoxis utrumque est: et<sup>32</sup> singularitas secundum substantiam<sup>33</sup> et ternalitas in naturis.

Paganus<sup>34</sup> est qui hoc cum Arrio perhibet. Iudeus est qui illud<sup>35</sup> cum Sabellio suscipit.

Unum<sup>36</sup> hec tria in quibus est deitas predicamus. Diuiditur<sup>37</sup> indiuisa sancta Trinitas et diuise coniungitur et hoc<sup>38</sup> quidem propter naturam et identitatem

<sup>18</sup> Omission: diuine propria nature seruemus.

<sup>19</sup> (ut nec) nec *Migne*.

<sup>20</sup> subsistentiis *Migne*.

<sup>21</sup> Continuation on col. 3154A: Nam sancta Trinitas numerabilis...

<sup>22</sup> (facta est) est *Migne*.

<sup>23</sup> (substantiis sancta) subsistentiis et sancta *Migne*.

<sup>24</sup> (diuiditur) cum diuiditur namque *Migne*.

<sup>25</sup> subsistentiis *Migne*.

<sup>26</sup> Omission: et omnimodam partitionem non recipit.

<sup>27</sup> (singularis omnem) singularis et incomputabilis omnem *Migne*.

<sup>28</sup> (nobis creditur) nobis enixius creditur *Migne*.

<sup>29</sup> (una predicatur) una flagranter predicatur *Migne*.

<sup>30</sup> Omission: licet in Trinitate personarum... firmiter agnoscitur.

<sup>31</sup> Continuation in col. 3154C: Impium quippe est....

<sup>32</sup> Omission: et a ueritate prorsus proiectum est.

<sup>33</sup> subsistentiam *Migne*.

<sup>34</sup> Omission: Illud enim... aut omnino.

<sup>35</sup> (illud cum) illud impie cum *Migne*.

<sup>36</sup> Continuation in col. 3155A. Omission: et ideo bene... et idcirco.

<sup>37</sup> Continuation in col. 3155C. Omission: Et tria unum... deitate.

<sup>38</sup> Continuation in col. 3159A. Omission: In personis... annuntiatur.

substantie et cognationem essentie, illud uero propter alterificas horum trium proprietates, propter<sup>39</sup> dissimilitudinem proprietatum que inconfuse unamquamque [f. 395v] figurant personam (*Ep. syn. ad Sergium*; PG 83 (3), 3151D-3159A).

8 Augustinus ad Maximum:

Hec omnia nec confuse unum sunt nec distincte tria sunt. Sed cum sint unum, tria sunt: et cum sint tria, unum sunt (*Ep.* 170.5; PL 33.749).

9 Augustinus, *Questionum ueteris et noue legis*:

Unus quidem sed non singularis: habet exterius in misterio alterum qui sit cum altero (*Ambrosiaster, Quaest. ex N. T.* 87 (b); PL 35.2283).

10 Ambrosius, *De Fide ad Gratianum Imperatorem*:

Quod unius est substantie, separari non potest etsi non sit singularitatis sed unitatis (*De Fide ad Grat. Imperatorem* V, 3, 46; PL 16.685D).

11 Augustinus in *Sermone de Trinitate*:

Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non diuiduntur in diuinitate sed in personarum qualitate (*Jerome: Pseudo-Augustine, Serm.* 232, 4; PL 39.2174).

12 Idem in eodem:

Diuiduntur proprietatibus sed natura sociantur (*Ibidem*).



Despite the absence of St. Hilary the Porretan origin of this compilation is beyond doubt, though its relationship to Adhemar is not equally certain. Since Adhemar's collection was compiled about 1180 and since the author of the *Liber de vera philosophia* seems to have written some ten years later, there is no difficulty in point of time, for the Arsenal manuscript containing the compilation is dated 1190-1230.<sup>40</sup> Much more obvious is the close relationship between Adhemar's collection and the compilation found in MS Dublin, Trin. Coll. 303, edited by M. Colker<sup>41</sup> who holds that "the great majority of quotations in the Dublin collection do not appear in the collection of Adhemar".<sup>42</sup>

The Dublin compilation consists of thirty-one texts most of which are found in Adhemar's abbreviated collection as preserved at Zwettl. It has been said earlier that the complete collection is still unknown. But the abbreviation preserved at Zwettl fully suffices to prove that the Dublin compilation is copied from Adhemar's collection. Since the Dublin manuscript was written about 1200, it presumably belonged to a Porretan who was familiar with Adhemar's work.

<sup>39</sup> propterque *Migne*.

<sup>40</sup> The date given by Henry Martin, *Catal. des manuscrits de la Bibl. de l'Arsenal* 2 (Paris, 1886) 290 is saec. xii.

<sup>41</sup> *MedSt* 27 (1965) 171-180. The collection is preceded and followed by the four capitula and ends with the profession of faith attributed to the council. Apart from a few slight variants the text of the capitula agrees verbatim with the Laon-Douai version published in *Scholastik* 40 (1965) 78-79. M. Colker, however, declares on p. 183 "that the first and fourth statements of the Dublin *capitula* are markedly fuller than the corresponding statements in any of the texts offered by Father Haring".

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem* 162-163.

The following comparative list indicates the passages of the Dublin compilation, as numbered in the edition, and the corresponding passages in both the Zwettl abbreviation and Adhemar's *Tractatus de Trinitate*. Passages whose length is equal to the corresponding Dublin text are preceded by an equal-sign. Otherwise the difference in length is stated. The introductions to the various texts are not included.

DUBLIN 303	ZWETTL 295	TRACTATUS
1 Discerne ... Dei est. <sup>43</sup>	IV, 1 (longer)	= IV, 78.
2 Habitat ... Christi. <sup>44</sup>	IV, 2 (shorter)	IV, 79 (shorter).
3 Sed ... subsistit. <sup>45</sup>	= III, 6	= II, 12.
4 Non ... generans. <sup>46</sup>	IV, 7 (longer)	IV, 85 (longer).
5 Si ... equalitate nature. <sup>47</sup>	IV, 8 (longer)	V, 45 (longer).
6 Caret ... sed generis. <sup>48</sup>	= IV, 9	= IV, 86.
7 Oportet ... Sabellii. <sup>49</sup>	= IV, 10	= IV, 87.
8 Solus ... tamen personam. <sup>50</sup>	= IV, 11	...
9 Unius ... sit Christus. <sup>51</sup>	= IV, 13	...
10 Infixus ... suam. <sup>52</sup>	= III, 4	= II, 10.
11 Intelligitur ... deos. <sup>53</sup>	III, 5 (longer)	II, 11 (longer).
12 Si ... anathema sit. <sup>54</sup>	= Council of Braga, canon 2.	...
13 Unus ... cum altero.	= Arsenal collection, text 9.	...
14 Quod ... sed unitatis. <sup>55</sup>	= Arsenal collection, text 10.	...

<sup>43</sup> *Summa Porretana*; MS Vat. Ross. Lat. 212, f. 132: Ylarius in vii. *de Trinitate*: Discerne igitur... Dei est. Cf. "Die Vätersammlung" IV, 6 (p. 406). *Sent.* I, 34, 1; ed. Quaracchi (1916) 213. Otto, *Gesta Frid.* I, 58; MGH SS (ad usum schol.) 46, 84.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *Sent.* I, 34, 1; p. 214-215.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. "Die Vätersammlung" III, 4; p. 406.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *Ibidem* XIII, 6; p. 410.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *Ibidem* XXI, 2; p. 417. The reading equalitate persone nature is a scribal error.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Adhemar, *Tractatus* II, 41; p. 160 (same length). Hugh of Honau, *Liber de div. naturae* 33, 13; ed. Haring 187 (shorter).

<sup>49</sup> Cf. "Die Vätersammlung" XVI, 8 (p. 413) and Gilbert, *Exp. in Quicumque* 33; ed. Haring 35.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *Summa Porretana*, Dist. IX; f. 133v: De eodem in vii. (concilio Toletano): Nam si unam naturam hominis Deique alteram confecisset, tota Trinitas corpus assumpsisset. See also Otto, *Gesta Frid.* I, 58; p. 84. *Sent.* III, 5, 1; p. 567. *Summa Porretana*; MS Paris, B. N. Lat. 2802, f. 95 (on margin: Concil. Tol. xi et vii): Persona Dei non natura accepit naturam hominis, non personam. Si enim natura Dei naturam hominis assumpsisset, tota Trinitas corpus assumpsisset....

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *Summa Porretana*, Dist. IX; f. 113v: Concilium Toletanum xi: Non credimus ut huius Trinitatis unitatem Virgo... Filii non quod commune Trinitati. Cf. "Die Vätersammlung" XXIV, 3; p. 419.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. "Die Vätersammlung" III, 3; p. 406. Hugh of Honau, *Liber de div.* 42, 4; ed. Haring 201.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Sent.* I, 33, 2 and I, 34, 1; pp. 211 and 216.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Gilbert, *Expos. in Quicumque* 34; ed. Haring 36.

<sup>55</sup> Ambrose, *De Fide ad Grat.* V, 3, 46; PL 16, 685D or CSEL 78, 234.

DUBLIN 303	ZWETTL 295	TRACTATUS
15 Generans ... aliquid.	= XXII, 10	...
16 Ergo ... ipse genuit.	= XXII, 11	...
17 Et ... substantie erit.	= XXII, 12	...
18 Plane ... incommutabilem. <sup>56</sup>	= XVII, 2	= IV, 70.
19 Hoc ... ut sit.	= XXIII, 8	= II, 68.
20 Si ... distinctionem.	XVII, 18 (longer)	I, 104 (longer).
21 Homines ... alicuius est. <sup>57</sup>	XXIV, 1 (shorter)	V, 15 (shorter).
22 In ... est mutabile.	XXXIV, 13 (shorter)	V, 19 (shorter).
23 Sicut ... relativum nego. <sup>58</sup>	...	...
24 Habent ... suas. <sup>59</sup>	= XXIV, 4	= I, 15.
25 Itaque ... dicimus.	...	I, 31 (longer).
26 Dicitur ... unus Deus. <sup>60</sup>	XV, 2 (longer)	...
27 Pater ... sociantur.	= Arsenal collection, texts 11-12.	...
28 Pater ... non nature. <sup>61</sup>	...	V, 14 (longer).
29 Omnis ... deitatis. <sup>62</sup>	= XXIV, 11 (shorter)	III, 59 (longer).
30 Igitur ... conservat. <sup>63</sup>	= XXIV, 12	= I, 101.
31 Cum ... qualitas. <sup>64</sup>	XXIV, 8 (shorter)	V, 20-21 (shorter).

Of these thirty-one texts twenty-four occur in the Zwetl collection. Thirteen of the twenty-four are of equal length in the Zwetl collection, six in it are longer, five shorter. The Zwetl collection is an abbreviation. An author may abbreviate by shortening, by omitting, or by shortening and omitting, texts of a collection. The greater length of six texts in the Zwetl collection suggests that the compiler of the Dublin collection shortened those excerpts. In most instances this is confirmed by comparison with Adhemar's *Tractatus de Trinitate*. The shorter texts in the Zwetl collection show that its abbreviator not only omitted but also shortened texts found in the original collection.

<sup>56</sup> Both Adhemar and Hugh of Honau consistently attribute Alcuin's *De Fide sanctae Trinitatis* to St. Augustine. Cf. N. M. Haring, "The Porretans" 194 (Adhemar) and 201 (Hugh of Honau).

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Summa Porretana*; MS Vat. Ross. Lat. 212; f. 118: Homines minus intelligentes quid et....

<sup>58</sup> In this Augustinian text the word *quantitatem* in the sentence: secundum quantitatem aio, non candidus est secundum quantitatem nego is a scribal error for *qualitatem* in both cases.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Adhemar, *Tract. de Trin.* I, 15 and V, 38; pp. 138 and 203.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. "Die Vätersammlung" XV, 7; ed. Haring 412.

<sup>61</sup> In this text the words Pater Filius Spiritus sanctus... inquam are an adjustment made by the compiler. The original has only: Haec enim propinquitatis sunt nomina, non naturae. The reading propinquitatis instead of proprietatis is found in Adhemar, *Tract.* V, 14; ed. Haring 199.

<sup>62</sup> The same text is quoted by Hugh of Honau, *Liber de Homoyssion*; f. 15v: Idem in epistola sua: "Omnis itaque... non dividendis deitatis". The introductory phrase in *epistola sua* is also found in Adhemar, *Tract. de Trin.* III, 59; ed. Haring 180.

<sup>63</sup> See also "Die Vätersammlung" XXIV, 6 (p. 419) and Zwetl collection XVII, 17.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Hugh of Honau, *De div. nat.* 33, 12; p. 187.

Very significant is also the sequence of texts. Dublin 1-2 corresponds to Zwettl IV, 1-2 (*Tractatus* IV, 78-79); Dublin 4-9 to Zwettl IV, 7-11 and 13. This second group constitutes a series of six texts quoted in both compilations in the same order with one omission (Zwettl IV, 12). Four of them (Dublin 6-9) are of equal length, two (Dublin 4-5) are longer in the Zwettl collection (IV, 7-8). Dublin 15-17 agrees with Zwettl XXII, 10-12: a group of three texts, all of identical length.

Concerning the five texts (Dublin 12, 13, 14, 23, 27) that are found neither in the Zwettl collection nor in Adhemar's *Tractatus* nothing definitive can be said until Adhemar's complete collection has been found. We have seen that text 12 (First council of Braga) occurs twice in the *Liber de vera philosophia* and twice in the *Summa Porretana* of MS Vat. Ross. Lat. 212. Hence it was most likely derived from Adhemar. The text-group Dublin 13-14, already found in Abelard, was so well known that the compiler of the Dublin collection may have added it himself. But it may be well not to forget that the pair occurs also in the Arsenal collection, texts 9 and 10. The same applies to text 27 of the Dublin compilation, for that text is also found in the Arsenal collection (texts 11-12).

These comparisons provide sufficient evidence that the Dublin compilation is derived not from some patristic collection put together by Gilbert but from the collection made by Adhemar. Since historical records show that Gilbert did not believe in patristic excerpts, Adhemar's idea of compiling a patristic collection was not exactly in keeping with his master's method of using books rather than pieces culled from various sources and deprived of their context. However, it must be granted that originally Adhemar did not plan such a compilation. It was, as we have seen, a by-product of his search for a certain theological principle in the writings of the Fathers.

The traces of the collection testify to the importance attributed to it by scholars attached to Gilbert. But the history of the influence of Adhemar's collection is still to be written, and the most desirable help in writing it would undoubtedly be the discovery of the original work.

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## GENOESE POLICY AND THE KINGDOM OF SICILY

1220 - 1240

By 1220, the Genoese had held a prominent place in the commercial and political life of the Kingdom of Sicily for more than two generations. This position had been won partly from the Norman rulers of the South and partly by taking advantage of the political turmoils of the twelfth century, which found Norman kings and German Emperors willing to bargain for the support of the great emporium on the Ligurian Gulf. In particular, Genoa had profited from the chaotic conditions in the *Regno* following the death of the Emperor Henry VI in 1197 and of Constance, his Queen, in the following year. During the minority of Frederick II, while German troops contended with native

elements for control of the kingdom, Genoese influence grew apace. A Genoese Count of Malta commanded the royal navy. A Genoese usurper, Alamannus Da Costa, seized control of Syracuse and held it in fief. Finally, thanks to astute bargaining with the Chancellor of the kingdom in 1200, Genoese merchants enjoyed exemptions from port duties and tolls and obtained a *fondaco* in Palermo itself. In the years between 1209-1220, the youthful heir to the Sicilian throne cultivated them as allies while he struggled to hold onto his crown and to gain the imperial diadem as heir to Henry VI and candidate of Pope Innocent III.

But, in 1220, as a result of Frederick II's return from Germany in triumph as Emperor-elect, relations between Genoa and the Kingdom of Sicily took on a new complexion. His accession to the imperial throne thrust him to the center of political developments in northern Italy. His imperial policies in the north inevitably affected the claims and aspirations of the Genoese, not merely in the southern *Regno* but also in the north itself. It was imperative for them to secure confirmation from Frederick for all their privileges, but especially for those in the Kingdom of Sicily, because they held the latter by the most precarious claims. Therefore, they dispatched ambassadors in haste to meet Frederick as he made his descent to Rome for the imperial coronation. The Emperor-elect, however, put off their attempts to open the question of their position in the *Regno*. He received them with honor and willingly confirmed the privileges they held from the Empire, but he would go no further. Instead, he invited them to accompany him to Rome for the coronation. Warily, the Genoese ambassadors declined. Their matters stood when Frederick, soon after his coronation, re-entered his southern kingdom and promulgated the Constitutions of Capua in December, 1220. Why did the Genoese fail to reach agreement with Frederick on their privileges in the *Regno*? What role did Frederick's position as Emperor play in their policy toward the Kingdom of Sicily? Finally, was the break between Genoa and Frederick in the late 1230's presaged or even caused by the events of the early twenties?

Previous historians have largely argued that Frederick II precipitated a crisis in Genoese-Sicilian relations by promulgating, in his Constitutions of Capua, the Law of Privileges, which revoked all grants made by or in the name of the crown of Sicily since the death of William II in 1189. The Constitutions also abolished illegal markets and tolls and ordered the collection of duties and rents from both natives and foreigners "notwithstanding any earlier grant or liberty".<sup>1</sup> The effect of this legislation on Genoa was to void all of her claims in the *Regno*. The Genoese annalist Marchisius Scriba complained that the Emperor had rendered evil for the good that his Genoese allies had performed for him.<sup>2</sup> This theme has been taken up by modern writers. Adolf Schaube argued that Frederick already intended to revoke the privileges of Genoa in the Kingdom of Sicily when he refused to negotiate with their ambassadors on

<sup>1</sup> Ryccardus de Sancto Germano, *Chronica*, ed. by Carlo Garufi, in L. A. Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, new ed., 7:2 (Bologna, Nicola Zanichelli, n.d.), 90.

<sup>2</sup> *Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori*, ed. by L. T. Belgrano and Cesare Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, in *Fonti per la Storia d'Italia*, XI-XIII (Roma, Istituto Storico Italiano, 1901), 12, 171.

his return to Italy.<sup>3</sup> The Emperor deprived them of their privileges in order to unify and strengthen his rule and to form a better basis for the financial administration of the *Regno*.<sup>4</sup> Faced with this crisis, the Genoese may have made some attempt at resistance, but it was futile.<sup>5</sup> Genoa's position in the *Regno* was lost as a result of Frederick's desire to destroy the influence of foreigners in the economic and political life of his kingdom.

The late Vito Vitale stated this position forcefully:

Immediately (Frederick) demonstrated clearly his intention of not being willing to accept the situation resulting from the disorders of the period of the regency, and all his political and economic action reacted against the condition created during his minority in Sicily by the work of the Genoese....<sup>6</sup>

But Vitale also made a detailed investigation of the events leading up to this rupture. Where previous authors had contented themselves with a mere indictment of the Emperor, he attempted to analyze the various factors contributing to the break. In particular, he described how the Genoese reacted to Frederick's request that their ambassadors accompany him to the imperial coronation. Although the Emperor held out the promise of further negotiations on the Sicilian question, they refused to go along.<sup>7</sup> As Vitale summed up their position: "The question was transported from the ground of particular concessions to that of principle: at stake were the prestige of the Emperor and the defence of communal sovereignty".<sup>8</sup> The Genoese annalist informs us that they were afraid of the great loss that would result if they acceded to the imperial request.<sup>9</sup> But Vitale does not pursue this argument further. Rather, he relies on the view that Frederick's attack on Genoa's commercial position, exemplified by the Law of Privileges of 1220, provoked the hatred of Genoa.<sup>10</sup> But how valid is that position? Did the Genoese suffer a substantial and continuing loss in their commercial position in the Kingdom of Sicily? And, even if they did, was this loss a major determinant of their policy toward the Kingdom of Sicily and its ruler Frederick II? It is the contention of this paper that fear of imperial encroachment on communal sovereignty led the Genoese

<sup>3</sup> *Handelsgeschichte der romanischen Voelker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzuege* (Munich, Oldenbourg, 1906), 486-7.

<sup>4</sup> Heinrich Chone, *Die Handelsbeziehungen Kaiser Friedrichs II zu den Seestaedten Venedig, Pisa, Genua* (Berlin, 1902), 16. This view is further developed by Ernst Kantorowicz, *Frederick The Second* (New York, 1957), 123-4. In his view, this legislation resulted in a re-modelling rather than a restoration. For a fuller treatment of an alternate view, see also J. M. Powell, "Medieval Monarchy and Trade: The Economic Policy of Frederick II in the Kingdom of Sicily," *Studi Medievali*, 3a serie, 3. 2 (1962), 453-472. This chapter contains an analysis of the Constitutions of Capua.

<sup>5</sup> Cesare Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *Genova e le sue Relazioni con Federico II* (Venice, 1923), 29-30.

<sup>6</sup> *Il Comune del Podestà a Genova* (Milan, 1951), 6.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 6. *Annali Genovesi*, *Op. cit.*, 168.

<sup>8</sup> Vitale, *Il Comune*, *Op. cit.*, 192.

<sup>9</sup> *Annali Genovesi*, *Op. cit.*, 168.

<sup>10</sup> Vitale, *Il Comune*, *Op. cit.*, 198.

to subordinate their economic to their political interests and to adopt a policy of caution aimed at avoiding a definitive break with Frederick. Frederick II's position as Emperor rather than his actions as king in the *Regno* inspired this policy. For, as a matter of fact, the Genoese were able to adjust to their new economic position in the Kingdom of Sicily without great difficulty.

The Law of Privileges of 1220 was a tool in the hands of the king to aid him in restoring effective royal control in the Kingdom of Sicily after the "Time of Troubles". Roger II had employed a similar technique early in the history of the Kingdom. Henry VI had attempted to do so shortly before his death. Far from being part of a consistent program to re-model the monarchy, its whole tenor suggested a return to the customs of the last Norman king. Studies of its application fail to reveal any deviation from this announced intention.<sup>11</sup> So far as its effect on Genoese trade is concerned, Vitale conceded that it did not result in driving the great maritime powers of the North out of the *Regno*.<sup>12</sup> But perhaps more important than these considerations was the reaction of the Genoese.

The revocation of Genoese privileges in the *Regno* in 1220 aroused a poetic passion in the annalist. He characterized it as an act "against all humanity". It further rankled him that this was the return for the services Genoa had "so magnificently" and "so faithfully" rendered to the Emperor.<sup>13</sup> Though he was deeply angered at Frederick, his complaints were brief. Then he moved on to his next topic. Beyond doubt, the Genoese suffered real losses as a result of the Law of Privileges. The annalist noted several: the loss of the palace of Margaritus in Palermo which had served as a *fondaco*; deprivation of freedom from tolls and duties in their trade; the loss of Syracuse, which they had snatched from under the noses of the Pisans.<sup>14</sup> But there is a great danger of being carried away by the rhetoric of the annalist. Severe though these losses may appear to us, the question at issue is how seriously were they regarded by the Genoese. On this point, the silence of the annalist about any attempts by Genoa to retaliate against the Emperor or even to re-open negotiations on their privileges in the *Regno* after 1221 points to a serious weakness in the argument that these losses were a major influence on Genoese policy toward Frederick and the *Regno*. The character of the annalist supports this contention. Where the commune was engaged in disputes with neighboring rivals over a period of years, the annalist picks up the threads of the narrative each year and traces their developments. The failure of the annalist to do so in this case hints that Genoa may well have found a *modus vivendi*.

The Genoese notarial documents offer support for the view that the commune embarked on a cautious policy of trading without privileges in the Kingdom of Sicily. These documents, as is well known, record commercial contracts and other types of transactions. The earliest preserved cartulary, that of Giovanni Scriba, begins in 1154. Unfortunately, the ravages of time and a disastrous fire

<sup>11</sup> Ryccardus de Sancto Germano, *Chronica*, *Op. cit.*, 90. See also my "Frederick II and the Church in the Kingdom of Sicily," *Church History* 30 (1961), 28-34.

<sup>12</sup> Vitale, *Il Comune*, *Op. cit.*, 198.

<sup>13</sup> *Annali Genovesi*, *Op. cit.*, 170-1.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 171.

have resulted in the loss of many of these precious sources. Consequently, they must be used with great caution, especially in discussions of the changing pattern or volume of trade. However, a careful analysis of the remaining evidence for the period of the early twenties does not indicate that the Law of Privileges caused a decline in the volume of Genoese trade with the *Regno*. This position counters the view of Vitale.

He has argued: "...it is certainly characteristic that the commercial acts and economic relations with Sicily in general contained there, fairly numerous even in 1220, become rarer even to the point of disappearing entirely in successive years, to recover between 1224 and 1225, but without returning to the frequency they had at the beginning of the century".<sup>15</sup> If this analysis is correct, it lends startling support to the view that the Law of Privileges had drastic and lasting effects on Genoese trade with the *Regno*. But Vitale relies here on a simple statistical comparison of two periods in Genoa's trade with the South without examining the question of the validity of the comparison. His argument fails because the notarial documents preserved for the early twenties do not represent a valid sample. In fact, they do not furnish evidence of any substantial decline in trade beginning after 1220.

The simple statistical approach supports Vitale. For 1220, for which we have parts of three notarial cartularies, there are nine contracts in which Sicily was mentioned as the destination for the venture. All of these were drawn between September 12 and 24, well within the usual period for the departure of ships on this voyage.<sup>16</sup> In 1221, with parts of two cartularies surviving, there is only one contract to Sicily.<sup>17</sup> In 1222, Salomonus provides us with four contracts, two for Sicily and two for the mainland.<sup>18</sup> But the year 1223 yields nothing, despite the fact that we have parts of two cartularies.<sup>19</sup> Even though the number of contracts involved is so small, the decline from nine in 1220 to none in 1223 appears impressive.

But these figures lose all meaning if we examine the cartularies themselves.

<sup>15</sup> *Il Comune, Op. cit.*, 199.

<sup>16</sup> The notarial cartularies are preserved in the Archivio di Stato in Genoa. All citations in this paper to these documents will be given thus: ASGN, followed by the number of the cartulary in which the notary is found and the folios, recto and verso, on which a contract is found. For 1220, Gandulphus de Sexto, 18:2, lists 3 *commendas*: f. 66r no. 3; 66v, 1; 66v, 4. Nicolaus Ferrarius, 56: 135r, 1; 135r, 2; 136v, 2; 137r, 1; 137r, 2. Nicolaus, 7: 144r-1594; 198r-216r, lists no contracts mentioning any part of the *Regno*.

<sup>17</sup> ASGN, Gandulphus de Sexto, 18:2, 79r-82v; Nicolaus Ferrarius, 56: 146r-157v. The contract referred to is contained in Nicolaus Ferrarius, 56: 157r, 2, dated September 8, 1221. Its appearance so near the end of this fragment of the cartulary hints at the possibility that other contracts for Sicily were lost. Moreover, it is inconceivable that the factor would carry only a single investment to Sicily in this year.

<sup>18</sup> ASGN, Salomonus, 14: 1r-128r. *Commenda* for August 1, 1222 to Naples (14: 27r, 2) August 4, 1222 to Naples (14: 30rv, 1); August 20, 1222 to Sicily (14: 33r, 4); September 24, 1222 to Sicily (14: 48v, 1).

<sup>19</sup> ASGN, Fridericus de Sigestro (16:1, 1r-8r) covers the period July to December, 1223. This fragment contains no commercial agreements at all; most of the acts involve land sales. Salomonus, 14: 143r-143v, covers only December, 26-27, 1223.

For the year 1220, which furnished the largest number of contracts from this period, there are three surviving notaries and two of these list commercial agreements with Sicily. The fact that only one contract survives from 1221 may best be explained by the fact that Gandolphus de Sexto, who had registered three agreements for the Sicilian trade in 1220, does not list commercial contracts for any destination in 1221. Moreover, the portion of Nicolaus Ferrarius surviving from this year is much shorter than for the previous year. While Salomonus listed four contracts for the *Regno* in 1222, his cartulary contains none in 1223, because it lacks records for the period of intensive trade, while Fridericus de Sigestro had a different clientele.<sup>20</sup> Interestingly enough, the cartularies have suffered their greatest losses for our purposes in 1221 and 1223, the two years which contribute most to the impression of a decline. If we eliminate these years from consideration, on the grounds that their evidence is not representative, the notarial cartularies do not point to a decline in trade in 1221 and the years immediately following.

In fact, the evidence of the notaries indicates a continuance of trade with the *Regno*. During the entire decade of the twenties, there are only two years in which some port or area of the Kingdom of Sicily is not mentioned: 1223 and 1225. Yet between them falls the year in which forty separate commercial contracts were drawn by the notary Urso for ventures to the South.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, no events of political importance to Genoa and the Kingdom of Sicily occurred in either of those years. In the notarial cartularies for this period, the evidence strongly supports the view that there was no change in the character of the trade with the South after 1220 as a result of the Law of Privileges. Those involved in the trade—Ferrarius, Gallus, de Volta, de Flexo—were members of families long associated with Genoese commercial life. Men of their experience were not going to invest in vain ventures; they must have had some hope of gain. It is difficult to find in the notarial acts any evidence of a crisis in Genoese-Sicilian relations in the twenties.

The sparse evidence of constitutional and diplomatic sources also points to a regularization of relations after 1221. In September, 1222, Frederick issued a statute regulating markets in his kingdom. In it, he granted foreign merchants alone the right of using gold in the transaction of business and even of transporting it outside his kingdom.<sup>22</sup> In March, 1224, he wrote the citizens of Acre informing them that he had taken the Genoese under his special protection and that no one was to molest them.<sup>23</sup> Both of these actions favored the Genoese; neither indicates any friction between Frederick and the commune.

<sup>20</sup> See preceding note. It is apparent that the notarial records surviving for 1223 are far from representative of the commercial transactions of the year.

<sup>21</sup> ASGN, Urso, 16:2, 1r-21r, covers the period August to December, 1224. Between August 26 and October 27, he registered 40 *commendas*, one for the Principate and the remainder to a Sicilian destination. This hardly supports Vitale's assertion that the mainland attracted the Genoese more than did the island after 1221. *Vitale, Il Comune, Op. cit.*, 199.

<sup>22</sup> Ryccardus de Sancto Germano, *Chronica, Op. cit.*, 106.

<sup>23</sup> ASG: Materie Politiche, Letter of March 28, 1224 from Frederick II to the citizens of Acre. Printed in E. Winkelmann, *Acta Imperii inedita saeculi XIII.* 2 vols. (Innsbruck, 1880), I, 241.

Despite the unsatisfactory state of the evidence, it seems sound to conclude that the Law of Privileges of 1220 did not cause a permanent rupture in Genoese-Sicilian relations. Its effects were, at most, very temporary.

Although the Genoese suffered genuine losses as a result of the Law of Privileges, they avoided a break with the Emperor and followed a cautious course of trading without specific privileges. This policy was dictated by the fact that Frederick II was not merely king in Sicily but also Emperor. If only the economic position of the Genoese in the *Regno* had been at stake, they might have reacted vigorously. But the imperial involvement dictated greater caution. Concern for communal sovereignty was a much more important factor than economic advantages in determining Genoa's policy in the *Regno*.

This view receives additional support from a study of Genoa's relations with Frederick and the Kingdom of Sicily in the 1230's. After his return from the Crusade, Frederick intensified his efforts at strengthening his power in northern Italy. The Papacy and the Lombards united against his attempts and sought to create a system of alliances to oppose him. The Genoese, however, remained aloof from the Lombards, while dealing gingerly with all imperial demands.

In the fall of 1229, an imperial embassy appeared in Genoa. In all probability, its purpose was to sound out the Genoese and seek their support in Frederick's negotiations with Pope Gregory IX. He had just returned from Syria and repelled the Papal army which had invaded the *Regno* in his absence. Now he was conducting an intensive propaganda campaign to ensure support for his cause in the treaty negotiations.<sup>24</sup> But the Genoese played coy. Though they appointed the ambassadors Frederick had requested, the embassy found many excuses for delaying its departure until February, 1230.<sup>25</sup> There is a hint in the tone of the annalist that they felt it necessary to assert their independence in the face of an imperial request. Of course, there was also their reluctance to become involved in the Papal-Imperial dispute.

Within a year the Genoese found themselves involved in another similar situation. In September, 1231, the Emperor ordered them to send ambassadors to an imperial diet at Ravenna. Besides the Podestà, whose presence was commanded in the imperial letter, the Genoese chose eight other leading citizens. When their embassy appeared at Ravenna, Frederick received it with honor. He was angered, however, because the Lombards had refused to permit the Germans to pass through their lands in order to attend the diet. As a result, he decreed that no Lombard of an enemy city might serve as Podestà in any commune owing fidelity to the Emperor. This action hit directly at the Genoese, who had chosen Paganus de Petrasancta of Milan as their Podestà for the following year. Vainly they argued with Frederick that they had acted in good faith and had chosen Paganus before the imperial ban. But they made it clear that "the election... could not be retracted with honor... for the Genoese commune".<sup>26</sup> Their defence was an appeal to the sovereignty of the commune and, despite every effort of Frederick to dissuade them, they summoned Paganus to the office of Podestà. The enraged Emperor ordered the imprisonment of all

<sup>24</sup> *Annali Genovesi*, *Op. cit.*, 13, 47, note 1.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.

Genoese in the *Regno*, but even this drastic measure had no effect on the Genoese save to make them consider joining the Lombards. However, more cautious counsels prevailed and a major crisis was averted. Still, this incident reveals how the imperial threat to communal sovereignty touched a sensitive nerve in the Genoese body politic.

The notarial cartularies covering the 1230's indicate that Genoese merchants shied away from the *Regno* after 1231. Despite the existence of abundant evidence for trade with Africa, Provence, and other regions during this period, I have not been able to find a single contract mentioning Sicily or the mainland between 1232 and 1240.<sup>27</sup> The *complete absence of such agreements for the entire period* appears significant, especially when considered in conjunction with other evidence for an increasing fear of Frederick II in Genoa.

The Genoese annalist paid an increasing amount of attention to the activities of the Emperor in northern Italy during the thirties. He described in detail the imperial campaign of 1236 against Cremona and that of 1237, in which the Milanese met a decisive defeat.<sup>28</sup> With apprehension, the annalist recounted the movements of the Emperor bringing him ever closer to Genoa. Finally the decisive moment arrived. Frederick demanded an oath of fidelity from the Genoese. They agreed to the oath, but the Emperor distrusted them and sent a new embassy ordering all Genoese to swear fidelity to the imperial cause. The Podesta summoned the citizens to the church of San Lorenzo to discuss this command in full parliament. Yet, even as they met, the city was being fortified and plans made to oppose the Emperor. Driven by the pressure of imperial demands, fearful of threats to their independence, they deserted their policy of cautious conciliation and joined forces with Venice and the Pope against Frederick.<sup>29</sup>

The decade of the thirties was decisive for the development of the definitive

<sup>27</sup> The notaries covering this period are: for 1232, Nicolaus de Beccaira, Obertus de Marzano, Salomonus, and an unknown author; for 1233, Enricus de Brolio, Guido de San Ambrosio, Iohannes de Ravecha, Nicolaus de Beccaira, and Obertus de Marzano; for 1234, Ingo Contardus, Lantelmus, Obertus de Marzano, and Palodinus de Sexto; for 1235, Bonusvassallus de Cassino, Bonusvassallus de Maiori, Lantelmus, Obertus de Marzano, Palodinus de Sexto, and Salomonus; for 1236, Andreas, Bartholomeus Fornarius, Bonusvassallus de Cassino, Bonusvassallus de Maiori, and Palodinus de Sexto; for 1237, Andreas, Bartholomeus Fornarius, Bonusvassallus de Maiori, Enricus de Bisanne, Palodinus de Sexto, and Simon de Flacono; for 1238, Bonusvassallus de Cassino, Enricus de Bisanne, and Thealdus de Sigestro; for 1239, Bonusvassallus de Cassino, Bonusvassallus de Maiori, Enricus de Bisanne, Salomonus, Solimanus, and Thealdus de Sigestro; for 1240, Bonusvassallus de Maiori, Enricus de Bisanne, Salomonus, Simon de Flacono, and an unknown author. The decade of the thirties averages five notarial cartularies per year; that of the twenties averages less than three. The greater abundance of these documents for the thirties makes them a more trustworthy source for the argument that trade virtually disappeared between Genoa and the *Regno* after 1232 than were the fragmentary remains of the twenties. Some idea of the volume of trade to other ports may be gained from this example: Johannes de Ravecho (18:2, 193r-210v) lists one hundred twenty-nine contracts, but none for Sicily in August and September, 1233.

<sup>28</sup> *Annali Genovesi*, *Op. cit.*, 13, 79-81.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 88-90.

break in Genoa's relations with Frederick. More and more, the Genoese had identified themselves with the cause of the Lombards as their fear of imperial encroachment on communal liberties increased. With each new embassy or oath of loyalty, they sensed a threat to their independence. It was the danger that the threat would become a reality that led to the final rupture.

The accession of Frederick II to the imperial throne had complicated Genoese relations with the Kingdom of Sicily. Though, heretofore, economic considerations had been of paramount importance, the presence of the German emperor on the Sicilian throne forced the Genoese in the twenties to subordinate their economic ambitions in the *Regno* to a cautious policy of trading without privileges. In this way they avoided any head-on collision with the Emperor that might challenge their sovereignty. For, since Frederick was both king and Emperor, there was no way to pursue a vigorous policy of commercial expansion in the *Regno* without risking war and possible defeat. The presence of this risk explains the timid policies of the Genoese and their rather easy surrender of their privileges in the Kingdom of Sicily in the early twenties. The Law of Privileges of 1220 did not drive the Genoese out of the *Regno*; the trade crisis resulting from it has been much exaggerated. Nor did any of Frederick's commercial policies strongly influence the course of Genoese relations in the thirties. Rather, we conclude that the continuing element in Genoese policy toward the Kingdom of Sicily in the reign of Frederick II was its concern over the imperial threat to communal sovereignty. The break in 1238 was presaged not in the reaction of the Genoese annalist to Frederick's Law of Privileges but in his description of the Genoese embassy of 1220. As much as they desired the confirmation of the Sicilian privileges, the Genoese ambassadors refused to attend the imperial coronation, because so "great a loss could come to our city from this custom".<sup>30</sup>

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## "MAN'S HEAVEN": THE SYMBOLISM OF GAWAIN'S SHIELD

### i

It is by now fairly generally accepted that the central concern in *Gawain and the Green Knight* is "perfection"; though whether the poem's main action is a quest for perfection on Gawain's part, or a demonstration of perfection already in some sense achieved, is still at issue.<sup>1</sup> Whichever way you take it, however, the central image of the motif is Gawain's shield, with its two insignia; and the "endless knot" is as knotty now as it ever was.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 12, 168; Vitale, *Il Comune*, *Op. cit.*, 192.

<sup>1</sup> For the first view, see for example R. H. Green, "Gawain's Shield and the Quest for Perfection," *ELH*, 29 (1962), 121 ff. For the second, see Alan M. Markman, "The Meaning of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight," *PMLA*, 77 (1957), 574-586.

I propose in this paper to add another exegesis of this problematical shield to the many already extant, because I think there are several clues in its description which may help to explain it more clearly than has hitherto been done. What I shall offer here is essentially a theological and numerological interpretation of the symbolism of the shield, and I shall try to relate it to the poem's central concern of perfection (or-wholeness). But first, one methodological *caveat*: like all great poems *Gawain* is an open ended structure which suggests more than it actually says; and my interpretation is to be taken as primarily suggestive, rather than prescriptive. My concern will be with the traditional and as it were "archetypal" values of certain symbols, values which we can demonstrate to have been available in tradition to the poet, but which we cannot prove him to have used. My main concern is with the *likelihood* that such values may have been in the poet's mind when he developed his symbol: though there is no reason for him not to have used a symbol without an articulate consciousness of its possible meanings.

To begin with, we should perhaps have a definition of "perfection" which will encompass the spiritual state with which Gawain and his shield are concerned; and the best place, as I see it, to start is at the beginning, with the *locus classicus*: Jesus' command at the end of the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5:24): "Estote ergo vos perfecti, sicut et Pater vester caelestis perfectus est."<sup>2</sup> The Greek word rendered by the Vulgate's *perfecti* is τέλει, which gives us a better idea of the real meaning. As the article on this subject in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia* tells us, "The essential significance of 'perfect' (τέλος) in the NT is that of an ideal relation of the Christian to the divine end, or τέλος, in regard to his character and service."<sup>3</sup>

So perfection is related to the fulfilment of a divinely appointed end; and in the sense in which Gawain's shield stands either for its achievement or the process of that achievement, it is movement toward a desired end and the approximation to that end; it is fulfilment of the utmost demands of one's own nature. Or, as St. Thomas has put it, "Dicendum quod unumquodque dicitur esse perfectum in quantum attingit proprium finem, qui est ultima rei perfectio."<sup>4</sup> And what is this end, the *proprium finem* toward which the Christian man labors? Again St. Thomas:

Caritas autem est quae unit nos Deo, qui est ultimus finis humanae mentis, quia "qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo" ... Et ideo secundum caritatem specialiter attenditur perfectio Christianae vitae."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> For a very lucid and detailed account of the subject of perfection generally, see R. Newton Flew, *The Idea of Perfection in Christian Theology* (London, 1943), especially 1-41.

<sup>3</sup> Frederic Platt, "Perfection (Christian)," in James Hastings, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (New York, 1917), 728.

<sup>4</sup> *Summa Theol.*, IIa IIae, q. 184, art. I, R. This and other quotations from S. Thomas de Aquino *Ordinis Praedicatorum Summa Theologiae* (Ottawa, 1942). For comment on this passage and others related see M. W. Bloomfield, "Some Reflections on the Medieval Idea of Perfection," *Franciscan Studies*, 17 (1957), 213-237.

<sup>5</sup> *Summa Theol.*, loc. cit.

We will see shortly how this particular perfection, especially the idea of the ultimate perfection of human life being that "quae unit nos Deo" applies.

ii

The device on Gawain's shield is a five-pointed star, drawn all in one motion:

For hit is a figure þat haldez fyue poyntez,  
And vche lyne vmbelappez and loukez in oþer,  
And ayquere hit is endelez... (627 ff.)<sup>6</sup>

This figure is of course in outline the "Seal of Solomon"; but that in itself is normally a mere spiritual prophylactic, a demon-chaser, and has nothing about it which would make for a symbolic identification.<sup>7</sup> The device itself is an ancient one, stretching back in fact to Babylon; later, it became associated with the traditional magical powers of Solomon, and was supposed to have been cut on the bezel of his famous ring.<sup>8</sup>

But these traditional and historical affiliations do not matter much, I think, in the present case. In the context of Gawain's adventure, the basic, let us say "archetypal" meaning of the symbol is more important. And this resides in the particular significance of the number five. We learn from the above-quoted description that the device has two characteristics: it has "fyue poyntez," and each line is connected and interlocked with the others, so that "ayquere hit is endelez." Its two significances are therefore *five* and *one*; if these are combined, the total numerological meaning of the pentangle would seem to be "The One transcendent derived from the interaction of the Manifold." But why should the number five be associated with any kind of unity, and what kind of unity is it most likely to be associated with?

To begin with, five is pre-eminently the "number of man," in both a natural and an esoteric sense. It is the number which characterizes physical humanity as one and three do the Godhead. For the following pentads immediately spring to mind: the five senses, the five bones of the skull, the five metacarpal bones and five fingers of each hand, the five metatarsals and five toes of each foot, the five sensory orifices of the face. (The fact that the integrity of man is underlain by pentads may also have something to do with the Lord's direction in Exod. 27:1 that the altar be made five cubits by five.)<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> This and all other citations are from E. V. Gordon and J. R. R. Tolkien, ed., *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* (Oxford, 1960). For discussion and diagram, see their note to the passage.

<sup>7</sup> For an account of the early history of the symbol and its apotropaic use, see Jean Marques-Rivière, *Amulettes, talismans et pantacles* (Paris, 1950), 68-69.

<sup>8</sup> E. A. Wallis Budge, *Amulets and Talismans* (New Hyde Park, 1961), 40.

<sup>9</sup> See Budge, op. cit., 430-431. Also C. G. Jung, *Psychology and Alchemy* (New York, 1953), 184, n. 122. There is also a list in Budge, 431, of miscellaneous pentads in the Bible which may have no significance but that of a satisfactory grouping-number, i.e., "some," but not "many." For a different and rather obtuse account of the symbolism of the

And the sign itself, the pentangle, appears, for example, in Cornelius Agrippa's *De Occulta Philosophia* inscribed in a circle in whose circumference is written the Greek word *lyíqa*, "wholesome."<sup>10</sup> The context in which it appears in Agrippa is partly that of an amulet (i.e., apotropac rather than symbolic), but the association with health points out at least a possible perfective connotation (Cf. Lat. *salus*).

The pentangle does however in its physical reference pose certain problems, and these reflect in one way or another on whatever it points to. For although five is in itself a "good" number, or at least can be, it is nonetheless incomplete, unmatched. That is, there is no repose or perfection in a pentad *per se*, because it is "masculine";<sup>11</sup> it is not a perfected unity like a tetrad or a dodecad, or even a decad.<sup>12</sup> For while the *mandala* or quadrated circle is generally an icon suggesting the Godhead (e.g. the *tetramorphus* of the Evangelists, the Buddhist Lotus), the pentangle carries a different suggestion: "The fivefold *mandala*... signifies natural man in his material and bodily aspect, suggesting unconsciousness as against wholeness."<sup>13</sup> So in the unity, the "endelez" self-sufficiency of the pentangle, there is a suggestion of imperfection, of the physical and the mutable. This underlies and in a sense qualifies and balances the other aspect of the device, the possibility of one-ness emerging from and transcending the physical and imperfect. I shall discuss the implications of this shortly.

### iii

After the pentangle has been described, the poet presents us with a long disquisition (640-665), whose content is an exegesis of the figure:

Fyrst he watz funden fautlez in his fyue wyttes,  
And efte fayled neuer þe freke in his fyue fynGRES...  
And alle his affyaunce vpon folde watz in þe fyue woundez  
Pat Cryst kazt on þe croys, as þe crede tellez...

number five in general, see V. F. Hopper, *Medieval Number Symbolism* (New York, 1938), 123-125, which attempts to account for the significance of mystical numbers by the accidents of historical transmission.

<sup>10</sup> Budge, 232-233.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. C. G. Jung, "An Account of the Transference Phenomena," in *The Practice of Psychotherapy* (New York, 1954), 201, n. 13.

<sup>12</sup> An example of the sense of wholeness inherent in these groupings can be seen in the constitution of the Pleroma according to the Valentinian Gnosis, where the Aeons are established in groups of 8, 10 and 12. For an account of the Valentinian sources (now lost) see Tertullian, *Adversus Valentinianos*, VII, 8 and VIII, 4 (*Corpus Christianorum* [Series Latina], II, 759-760). Further accounts may be found in Hippolytus, *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium*, VI (ed. P. Wendland, *Griech. Christl. Schriftsteller*, XXVI), and Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses*, I (ed. W. W. Harvey, Cambridge, 1857). For a synthesis, see Hans Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion* (Boston, 1963), 179 ff.

<sup>13</sup> John Weir Perry, *The Self in Psychotic Process* (Berkeley, 1953), 96. For a detailed historical and analytic account of mandala-symbolism, see Jung, *Psychology and Alchemy*, 91-214.

... alle his fersnes he feng at þe fyue joyes  
 Pat þe hende heuen quene had of hir chylde...  
 Pe fift fyue þat I finde þat þe freke vsed  
 Wat3 fraunchyse and felagschyp forbe al þyng,  
 His clannes and his cortaysye croked were neuer,  
 And pite, þat passe3 al poynte3...

The endless knot of this exegesis may be somewhat simplified if we break it down not only according to pentads, but according to the orders or realms of actions which the pentads represent. And here we find a natural (especially so in the Middle Ages) breakdown into three: a triad, standing for those orders of existence and experience in which Gawain may be tested, and in which he will be expected to excel. The first order is the natural or physical: his "fyue wyttes" and his "fyue fingres"; the second is the religious, symbolized by the five wounds and the five joys; and the third is what we might call the chivalric or social, the five "courtly" virtues. Taken together and woven into a unity as indivisible as the pentangle itself, they constitute a prospective image of perfection for the Christian knight.<sup>14</sup> This ideal state of knightly perfection (in the fullest sense of the knight as *miles Christi*) is now ready for another type of analysis, in which the "fiveness of five", as it were, is broken down and reformulated.

The most obvious reformulation, and one that, as we shall see shortly, has medieval precedent, is that five is made up of four and one. Symbolically (or esoteriologically), this formulation gives us a quaternity, which is a form of "perfection," with a unity standing off by itself, and neither doing nor meaning very much. But if we put it this way — "Four one's transcended by a greater one equal One" — we are I think closer to the significance of the endless knot.

This is not mere theosophical speculation; it is, in fact, precisely the notional ambit of the alchemical five, the "quintessence." What is a quintessence, and why is it the fifth? We know that four is a "perfect" number — one of the simplest reasons being that it is "the minimum number by which a circle can be naturally and clearly defined"<sup>15</sup> — and this is our beginning. If the one-ness of anything, e.g. man, is made up of four elements, then the unity made up by the four is a fifth, superordinate, which naturally transcends them, and is their highest development, "ultima rei perfectio." Five is thus the *telos* of every four, the *quinta essentia* which is derived from the four but has powers and qualities not in them. Thus, according to a late medieval treatise, *The Book of Quinte Essence*,

philosophoris clepen þe purest substaunce of many corruptible þyngis  
 elementid 'quinta essencia,' þat is to seie, 'mannys heuene' ... for whi,  
 as quinta essencia superior, þat is, heuene of oure lord god, in reward

<sup>14</sup> George J. Engelhardt, "The Predicament of Gawain," *MLQ*, 16 (1955), 219, reads the orders differently, but he too arrives at three. The areas of performance to be tested, he says, are the military, the religious, and the courtly; the virtues are therefore valor, piety and courtesy.

<sup>15</sup> Jung, "An Account of the Transference Phenomena," 207.

of þe .iiiij elementis, is yncorruptible & vnchaungeable/ riȝt so quinta essencia inferior, þat is to seie, mannys heuene, is incorruptible, in reward of the .4. qualitees of mannys body...<sup>16</sup>

So we have a fifth which transcends the four of which it is "elementid," and is something higher, an incorruptible essence.

We may then suspect that Gawain's pentangle, in addition to representing physical and human wholeness and the perfection of Christian knighthood, and carrying implications of the problematical weaknesses of body and matter, may suggest also something "quintessential," a goal or ideal transcending all of its parts.

Now if human perfection is to be raised, as it were, to a higher power — if man is to attain really his proper end, which as St. Thomas tells us is God — it can only be through approximation to the Godhead, or through the Godhead's act of approximation to the human state, which is in the end the same thing. In other words, the human *quinta essentia*, "mannys heuene," is to be arrived at by approximating to Him who was the most perfect of men: to Christ. This is of course why the Blessed Virgin's picture is on the obverse of the pentangle, not because it was on Arthur's shield in Nennius and Holkot.<sup>17</sup>

For if the pentangle is a prospective symbol of humanity perfected and its possibility of self-transcendence, what better obverse could it have than she who constituted the physical five-ness of Christ, the "terra," as Tertullian says, into which Christ descended, and from which, once it was made fertile, he grew?<sup>18</sup> For if in one sense the pentangle may be taken as a representation of possible perfection of man in Christ, an abstract emblem of quintessence, then who should balance it more concretely than Mary, who clothed Christ in flesh and form, his spouse and his mother? The physicality, indeed, of the connection was clear to the Fathers: witness St. Ambrose, in his commentary on the most "Marian" of the Gospels, that of Luke: "Non enim virilis coitus vulvae virginalis secreta reseravit, sed immaculatum semen inviolabili utero spiritus sanctus infludit."<sup>19</sup>

The representation of Mary in the flesh then balances the abstract design on the front of the shield, as flesh balances spirit in the totality of human perfection. The potential weakness of that which the number five symbolizes is shored up by an image of the one flesh through which the materiality of flesh itself was transcended, and Gawain is armed with an image of his goal. In a very real sense then, the two emblems on the shield represent "mannys heuene," man perfected and the flesh glorified and strengthened by the fact

<sup>16</sup> Ed. F. J. Furnivall, *EETS OS*, 16 (1866), 2. Incidentally, for "quinta essencia inferior" the printed text reads "quinta essencia superior inferior." I do not know if this is the scribe's error or the printer's, but I have corrected it to accord with the sense.

<sup>17</sup> See the note to line 649 in the edition of Gollancz, Day and Serjeantson, *EETS*, 210 (1957). There is, however, no need to discount this echo of tradition; it is simply not primary.

<sup>18</sup> *Liber Adversus Iudaeos*, XIII, 11 (Corp. Christ. II, 1387).

<sup>19</sup> *Expositio Evangelii Secundum Lucam* (C.S.E.L. 32 [pars. 4], 72).

that God who *is* perfection became incarnate within it. To quote St. Ambrose again, in his address to Christ in the hymn *Veni redemptor gentium*:

Aequalis aeterno Patri,  
Carnis tropaeo cingere,  
Infirma nostri corporis  
Virtute firmans perpeti.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> *Hymnus* IV (according to the Benedictine order), PL 16, 1474. (For *cingere* the text in PL reads *accingere*; my reading is taken from Richard C. Trench, *Sacred Latin Poetry* [London, 1864], 89). For another interpretation of the Pentangle, not unrelated to that proposed here, see Robert W. Ackermann, "Gawain's Shield: Penitential Doctrine in Gawain and the Green Knight," *Anglia*, 76 (1958), 254-255.

## BIBLIOGRAPHIA GOTICA: PROGRESS REPORT AND A REQUEST

Some years ago *Mediaeval Studies* had the good fortune to be offered for publication the results of many years' work by the late Fernand Mossé: *Bibliographia Gotica*:

MedSt 12 (1950) 237-324

15 (1953) 169-183 (First Supplement)

19 (1957) 174-196 (Second Supplement by James W. Marchand)

This brought the Bibliography up until the middle of 1957. It was confessed by the compilers that, owing to prevailing world conditions during which much of the work was done, many items were probably omitted.

On April 10-11, 1965, following the annual meeting of The Medieval Academy of America, a meeting was held at Brown University by a group of scholars concerned with mediaeval bibliographies. (Cf. MedSt 27 (1965) 309-321). So many needs were presented that it was felt MedSt should continue the work which it had begun in this particular area.

Professor Ernst A. Ebbinghaus of the Pennsylvania State University, competent in this field, graciously offered to work on the project and the results of his efforts will appear in the 1967 volume of our publication. Supplements will appear in following years.

Mossé's original work and all the supplements will in due time be issued as a single integrated bibliography.

It would be very useful to us and to scholars of the future if readers of this page would send, either to Professor Ebbinghaus or to the Editor of MedSt articles which have been omitted in the course of publication or items which have appeared in unexpected or unusual places.

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